Objective morality as a proper basic belief

[Angrboda]

"Is God's nature good because it is God's, or is God's nature good because it is morally good (i.e. it conforms to an independent standard of good)?"  You see, playing the ontology card has gained you nothing.  Just as the Euthyphro dilemma applies to Divine Command Theory, it also applies to the argument that morality is derived from God's nature.  Either God's nature is arbitrarily good simply because it is God's, which results in an arbitrary set of morals which by definition is not moral.  Or God's nature is good in that it conforms to a standard of goodness that is independent of God, making God's nature superfluous to the question of morals.  You have accomplished nothing by your detour into ontology except to confuse the issue.  God is still an unsatisfactory source of morality, and you're left empty handed, claiming the existence of objective morals that you can't explain.

Well it's a good thing that I didn't give the Euthyphro dilemma then isn't it?

Gods nature is not arbitrarily good. It is necessary.

I never said God's nature is arbitrarily good.  What I did say was that the standard of goodness which God's nature meets must come from himself, or it must come from somewhere else.  Those are the two horns of the dilemma, and they are inescapable.  Saying that God's nature is "necessary" adds nothing to the question.  It is a non-answer.  Either the standard of goodness comes from God himself, in which case it's arbitrary, or it comes from somewhere else, obviating God.  It's irrelevant whether it "necessarily" comes from God or not.  Contingency and necessity have nothing to do with it.

Wrong.  You've failed to actually read the dilemma I've given you, and substituted your own false version.

Again, your version is based on an incorrect assumption that his nature of goodness is arbitrary.

I did no such thing.  I posed a dilemma with two horns.  Either God's nature is good because the standard of goodness comes from himself, or because the standard of goodness comes from somewhere else.  There is no third option.  Claiming I assumed something I didn't assume is just more waffling on your part.  You can't refute the dilemma, so you're just throwing out arbitrary answers.

Hurr durr!  This is not a valid response to the dilemma I've posed.  Try actually reading what I wrote instead of what you imagine I might write.

Again, your version is based on an incorrect assumption that his nature of goodness is arbitrary.

This is false.  I did no such thing.