Does anyone own "The Moral Landscape"?

[The Grand Nudger]

So we are discussing wellbeing then, and that’s a given? Like I said, this is a narrow subset of what I would more generally describe as morality. Of course we can make factual statements about how actions affect wellbeing, at least in a vague sense, since wellbeing is not easy to define.

So all we’ve done, just like I said, is to skip the initial value-setting step. We’ve been prescribed values.

Does moral realism only concern itself with this branch of morality then, or does it apply to any value set? If it applies to any values, then we're back to deciding which are the best values, which is entirely circular.

I'd say that it's a given of all moral systems, sure, but I only used it as an example, and I can, ofc, elaborate on why I consider it a given...but it doesn't have to be.  Moral realism isn't a branch of anything, as I mentioned before.  It's fundamental to what we're talking about.  Any and every moral system either makes objective moral statements, or it does not.  

I might have identified why moral realism sounds like presup apologetics. I think that's because it is.

If you consider "wrong" or "immoral", they are just words. They have no inherent specific meaning that correlates with reality. They are commonly used in highly subjective ways.

If we want to make scientific statements and determine facts, we need to define our terms very specifically. What does "wrong" mean? It means whatever we say it does, for the terms of the discussion. There’s no way I can demonstrate that some particular kind of outcome is wrong, without first defining "wrong" to include that kind of outcome. In this way, it’s entirely circular. Or we just make emotional appeals, which are of course invalid in scientific discussion.

If we say "wrong" has to be about wellbeing, for whatever reason, then fine. But it hasn’t been demonstrated that wellbeing is wrong in the general sense, just by defining it this way; that would entirely be an equivocation. "Doing bad things to wellbeing is factually wrong, because that’s how I’m defining wrong" is a tautology. It doesn’t tell me anything about reality. It just shows personal biases, although perfectly understandable ones.

So a statement can be true, given certain assumptions and definitions, but that doesn’t mean you’ve necessarily established any kind of fact about reality. There’s always this looming assumption that wrong means "wrong for human society", because that’s all that apparently matters. You either admit this assumption to be the case, and so you have done nothing but slip in your own values by definition; or else you have to start from scratch and define "wrong" in more general terms, and somehow equate that with human society. In the latter case, you’ve still only shown something is wrong within the restrictions of your definition.

Try these instead, virtue, deontology, and consequentialist;

Doing factual harmful things to a meaningfully objective wellbeing is morally wrong.  

Factually failing to satisfy a meaningfully objective duty is morally wrong.

Factually yielding an objectively negative consequence is morally wrong.

In any case, yes, a trivial statement can be made given certain assumptions and definitions but unless that statement accurately models reality this isn't the sort of statement that a moral realist is talking about - and in this way an objective moral statement is precisely the same as an objectively descriptive statement from mathematics.  Yes, there are certainly things true -of the system-, there are ways to play with theoretical units to yield a proof that has no bearing on reality.  If this erodes the credible of the notion of objective morality, it erodes the credibility of objectively true and descriptive statements derived through mathematics.  I'm not saying that it's not a problem..only noting that if it's a problem..it's a problem for alot more than moral statements.

"Wrong for human society" isn't a necessary assumption of every moral statement.  I can give you an example for each of the three above that has nothing whatsoever to do with a society.  However, if we're discussing community ethics, then "wrong for society" must be included, whatever that is, because it's -community- ethics.  In that case it's not an assumption, it's a necessary variable of the thing being considered.  In either case, the judgements can either be meaningfully objective, or not.  

Coming back to the length and ruler analogy:

We agree on just a few different types of rulers because it has practical value to do so. But even if we all used our own rulers, it would still work because we’d have conversion rates between all our rulers. We're determining how many of a unit of our choice go into an objective length.

With morality, we're all using our own "moral rulers" to assess a particular action. There is no conversion rate between them, and no utility in trying to pick just a few. This is because, as I see it, it's not a fact about reality that is being "measured" in the first place here. It’s a subjective assessment of an action. We come up with a kind of "society ruler" as a compromise; no such compromise is needed with length, because there is a fact at the heart of the matter. Neither does the length shift as society changes.

If there is a correct moral assessment, then I’m certainly not trying to achieve it, because I see that as utterly meaningless. On the other hand, once we’ve agreed a set of values, our rulers become much more closely aligned. Before that point, they needn’t have any relation to each other.

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PS: I don’t even use the same ruler all the time anyway. I use adjusted ones depending on who is doing the action, and what I could reasonably expect from them.

I'd suggest The Moral Calculus, or The Geometry of Desert.  You might be surprised how much conversion there is between us, even when we're all using our own rulers.  This is one of the things that moral realists point to when establishing the basics of "what we're talking about" when we discuss moral things.  Not all systems have identical content, not all systems have identical units of measure.  Not all systems have equivalent evaluative variables - but..it;s contended by moral realists, all moral systems have at least some common loci, areas of consideration or focus.  One of those rulers is wellbeing because we find wellbeing referred to in things as disparate as secular utiliatarian consequentialist ethics..and divine command theory.  A moral realist doesn't have to accept the specifics of any given system as being representative..but they would note that the people using those systems are -trying- to come up with a representative description of many of the same x's.  I'll note, here, that the applicability of objective systems is that they present the opportunity to give us a more accurate picture of the nature of those things x, and in so doing give us a means -other than our bare opinions- to compare any two moral x's in relation to each other or ourselves.  

Language is very tricky here. Maybe it would be easier to say that there are truths about reality. So then scientifically speaking, a fact is something that appears to represent a truth about reality, beyond reasonable doubt. Facts are determined by testing falsifiable hypotheses.

Our facts are necessarily going to be some sort of partial approximation of truths. The scientific goal is to approach the truth as closely as possible. Language is again tricky and very important. There will presumably be infinitely many truths out there. If we want to refer to any particular ones, we need to be highly specific. Words alone do not carry enough specificity to identify them. The words need to be part of some methodology.

This is all fairly straightforward and apparent in practice, with things like length.

You might be oversimplifying the interesting history and ticks of length, here.....

The failure of anyone to ever come up with a "moral fact" that gets accepted in the same way length does speaks volumes to me. It’s not a methodology. It’s a very vague notion, with loaded overtones. You can’t just say, "There might be moral facts" and expect that to actually highlight some truths in any kind of meaningful way. You might as well say, "There could be bibbly wibbly facts". If we don’t have a precise method and are just appealing to emotion, biases and general trends in our evolution, we may as well be talking bibblies.

The US still hasn't accepted metric, ergo metric is not a fact.  No one can come up with a single system of measurement that everyone agrees to, therefore measurement is subjective.  

Moral facts are not a vague notion, there are no loaded overtones.  You're investing the concept with those issues.  Whether moral statements describe some aspect of reality, rather than the aspects of our personalities and opinions..is, I think...highlighting some potentially true thing in a meaningful way.  

So that’s where I’m at, for the 1.5 people who made it this far (including me). Science is an attempt to remove biases and subjectivity as far as possible, and it works. We deduce facts which are actionable. If you try and remove the biases and subjectivity from morality, you’re either left with nothing, or vague statements about human behaviour. I might as well add that I find consequentialism hopelessly simplistic anyway, which moral realism seems to rely on, and I would expect a realist to abandon it pretty quickly outside of extremely simple scenarios. And simple is what they are. It’s still trying to establish that "rape rather than no rape is objectively wrong", and failing in my opinion, after all this time. While subjectivitsts (or whatever we call ourselves) simply agree that we value wellbeing, and that rape is bad for wellbeing, job done. There will be people who don’t agree, but calling them factually wrong is of no practical use whatsoever, as well as being inaccurate.

b-mine

Moral realism doesn't rely on consequentialism.  Consequentialist moral theories either are..or aren't..meaningfully objective.  All moral statements either are, or aren't, objective.  It's fundamental.  A moral realist, for their part, would at least consider those objective moral statements (wherever they found them) to have greater weight in moral calculus.  A moral realist might affirm the basic validity of a subjective moral statement as a part of a useful system - but insist on the primacy of objective moral statements when they come into conflict with subjective ones.

So, say, you believe in slicing off clits cuz god said so and that's right?  Those in command of facts counter that it is harmful, and non beneficial and that's wrong.  There is no reason other than your subjective beliefs to slice off clits.  There is every objective reason not to slice off clits.  To whom should our moral policies defer?  Really consider for a moment..when you're making this determination..that you are (both) implicitly endorsing what you take to be objective moral statements.  Our moral intuitions inform us of things being right or wrong not as matters of our own opinion, but as matters of some fact about x.  This example shows that our moral intuitions can be wrong (only one of the two statements above can be true, but both can be false).....and it also shows that we make pronouncements and live our lives as if things were "really right" or "really wrong".  

Say that you counter that if you don't slice clits, this will be harmful to you and god will punish you and/or the little girl (which is the underlying basis of these godasaidsos each and every time). You've just assumed the metrics of the opposing viewpoint..and a survey of what has happened to girls with their clits sliced and not sliced can be arranged to determine whether or not that statement is objectively true. If it isn't..and the opposing statement is, clit slicing is (rationally) DOA from a moral realists pov. The only way to begin to rescue clit slicing is to demonstrate that god exists and really will skullfuck somebody for failing to do so - that harm will follow failure...but this only kicks the can...because we can then ask ourselves whether or not the commandment is objectively good. It's not clear that following an evil commandment for practical gain is morally righteous. It's commonly contended otherwise.

The skeptics task is to give us reason to assume that things aren't as they seem. Not to tell us that some specific moral statement, axiom, or system is false - that would not only be objectivism...moral realists explicitly contend that this is so.  Not to question the applicability, usefulness, or agreement of people.  I have a yellow broom.  How is this fact applicable to you?  Of what use is this fact?  Will everyone agree that I have a yellow broom?  The yellow broom skeptic wastes their time asking these questions. If the yellow broom skeptic tells me I don't have a yellow broom..they have denied the accuracy of my broom based statement but assumed the validity of the underlying objective schema. A pyrrhic victory.

The only way for the skeptic to make cogent case is to establish to some standard that the moral statement, system, or axiom is meaningfully subjective. Neither right nor wrong...-incapable- of being right or wrong, in it's purport to external content....but here's the real kicker on that one. If you competently made that case with some specific moral x, a moral realist would say "hey, nice job, thanks for spotting that for me, I'm going to scrub it out of my moral system and/or massively devalue it". Human beings aren't entirely rational actors, and we make mistakes.

Meanwhile, if a moral realist can bring the clit slicer above around to the fact that his beliefs about what god said are meaningfully subjective and the nature of the act of clit slicing is meaningfully objectively - that is the point from which you can begin to suggest that they stop slicing clits. Hey, they might still do it..sure. You can drop facts on people all day...we're highly resistant....but think of any other area where you would find yourself saying "I think that facts are meaningless and have no utility".

Now, to end with the bolded bit. You're only a subjectivist if you think that rape being bad for wellbeing is a matter of personal opinion. That, if your opinion were different, rape would or could be good for wellbeing.

Do you think that's the case? Do you think that something about the act of rape changes based upon our varying opinions, and that none of these competing hypothetical opinions could lay claim to being true or false, or more or less accurate, than the others?