Is God a logical contradiction?

[John 6IX Breezy]

Remember the 1800s when animal behaviorists thought that the sound a dog makes when you kick it was just a reflex and if it whimpered or cringed those were just reflexes too, not an indication of suffering or fear? And that it was data that gradually made them change their minds because at some point it's just obstinate whinging to claim that behavior in creatures with similar brains and brain activities to ours doesn't imply shared experiences?

The only evidence available to reach the conclusion that higher animals experience similar sensations and emotions to humans; differing mostly in degree rather than kind, is all of it. It's not proof (science doesn't do proof), but it's rational to accept the evidence and irrational to deny it.

Psychologists are often very careful about what conclusions can be drawn about humans from animal studies. This is precisely because animals with similar brains and brain activities nevertheless can differ, and it doesn't always translate to humans. In other words, animal studies are not a substitute for human research; they may be useful, but tend to be inconclusive. It follows that you are also limited on what you can conclude about other animals just by looking at humans.

There are many reasons for this, but consider just the issues arising from embodiment, since it's a rising field:

"The constraints of embodiment are such that
substantive cross-species psychological generalizations are likely to be more limited than traditional
views in cognitive science, such as functionalism and
computationalism have led us to expect. Put bluntly,
differences in physical realization prevent or limit
identities at the psychological level: conversely, differences in the kinds of bodies that organisms have
trickle up to create differences in the corresponding
psychology. Thus, cognitive sciences should aim to
capture generalizations that reflect bodily variation in
ways that, for the most part, they have not" (Foglia and Wilson, 2013, p. 323).

Reference: Foglia, L., Wilson, R. (2013). Embodied cognition. Cognitive Science, 4, p. 319-325.