In Defense of a Non-Natural Moral Order

[John 6IX Breezy]

I mean exactly what I say. There’s nothing specific about our capacity for reasoning. The brain is capable of handling abstraction and manipulating symbols.

This makes it suitable for a wide range of problem solving, and the fact that some things fall in that range is completely unsurprising.

Some things would. OFC we would have preferences within that range.

There’s nothing, at all, in any of your reference material that supports the content of your posts. Only the observation that within that range, some types of moral problems conform to the framework of human contemplation better than others, in some cohort.

Again, ofc they would, but.....,.?

We can agree that the brain is capable of solving a wide range of problems, as long as it's understood that it solves some better, and more effortlessly, than others, even when the problems are synonyms of each other (you only swap a word or two to turn a deontic conditional into an indicative conditional)