Question about "faith"

[Angrboda]

How do we know what we know apart from feeling like we know?

This is the question you asked, which I answered immediately.  If we have no other way of knowing™ than feeling a certain way about a thing, we know nothing.  There are no cognitive propositions, so there can be no true or false propositions.  All propositions resolve to feeling a certain way about a thing.  Emotivism.  I strongly suspect that you hadn't really thought that question, or at least it;s wording through, and staring now at the implications of it being a cognitive statement, it seems so ridiculous that you feel the need to pretend as though you never asked and I'm an asshole for explaining it to you.   An asshole for producing a distinction that you asked for, and imagined did not exist.  Is that knowledge, or do you feel a certain way about something?

I asked how we know. You answered how we don't know. It's possible that we don't know anything. But I started with the assumption that what you said was true, that we know things on the one hand, and that we have faith on the other hand. I asked you to show me how. What you gave me isn't a way to know something. Maybe it's a way to not know something. But it's not a way to know something, which is what I asked for.

I suggested no such thing.  You did.  You asserted that something was true.  That assertion implicitly contains the assertion that it can be false.   You've been chasing strawmen from the word go.  That doesn't really bother me much, but I will point out that any argument that depends on the refutation of a strawman is basically invalid.

I asserted that things -can be- true.  Don't really have to, mind you, it's a silent but necessary assumption in all logical discourse.  I would certainly assert that feeling a certain way about things doesn't exhaust the list of ways that human beings can arrive at knowledge, real or perceived.  It doesn't actually matter if that's true, so long as it can be true or false, it's a cognitive position.  As mentioned twice now, supposing that we're incapable, then we're incapable, but there's still a difference between cognitivist and emotivist propositions as categories.  

Oh this is complete bullshit. You asserted that a specific thing was true. Now you're just backpedaling and lying in the process. I haven't questioned either that there can be cognitive propositions or that there can be knowledge. You have, apparently because you can't show how either is possible so instead you offer some chicken little cum argument from ignorance of, "Well if it's not the case, then that would be horribly horribly bad!" Maybe. If that was the case. But that alone wouldn't lead to the conclusion that that is not the case, as that would be an argument from ignorance and invalid.

I haven't said this either.

Are you prepared to finally answer the question I asked, or am I going to have to suffer through several more posts filled with falsehoods, red herrings, and strawmen from you before I get an answer?

Like the answer you got immediately?  WTF is wrong with you?  If you don't want to suffer, work on better questions.  This has been a tedious disappointment.  I was wrong, we can't do better.  I enjoy a good disagreement, but I refuse to argue the contents of a text exchange into existence.  We can disagree about how often human beings engage in the one or the other calling both knowledge - though I doubt we'd really disagree, but we cannot disagree about the things that you and I have written, that are there for anyone to read, yourself included.

As I just explained, that was not an answer to my question, unless you're now changing your position to one of asserting that knowledge is not possible. You asserted that knowledge was possible by some other means than feeling like we know but that faith wasn't knowledge. I simply asked you to demonstrate the truth of your assertion, which you have not done. "Because if it's false, then knowledge is not possible," doesn't show that what you said is true, it only shows that it's possible that knowledge isn't possible. That's certainly a live option, but I wasn't in any sense implying that it was the actual case.

You're either arguing your case extremely fucking badly, or you're trying to argue your case by answering objections that might be made to your answer to my question in advance of my having made them. You're not a mind reader. You don't have the first clue where I'm headed with this. And apparently you don't feel up to the task you've set for yourself of defending your initial statement. If you can't support your initial statement as true, then it's just an article of faith with you. Nothing more.

(ETA: It's possible you are misreading the question. If my question were, "How do we know that we know apart from feeling like we know?" then your response would have been an answer to my question. That wasn't what I asked, however, but rather, "How do we know what we know apart from feeling like we know?" And note, my question itself assumes that we do in fact know things, so this rant of yours about not knowing as an answer to that particular question would just be a red herring.)