Any Moral Relativists in the House?

[vulcanlogician]

I did manage to dig up an article by Boghossian where he argues my thesis. The thesis is: realism and nihilism are tenable positions (ie coherent positions that take a clear stance on the status of moral facts) while relativism is not. Why? Because relativism simply lists what is permitted according to the values of culture x, y, or z. And thus gives only a factual account of these cultures' beliefs. But the debate about moral realism's status isn't a debate about what a given culture believes. It is a debate about whether there can be any truth value in a normative claim.

Relativism accepts this claim, as a cognitive theory.  Affirmatively stating that moral utterances are statements which can be true or false, and at least some of which are true, of a given subjects societal arrangement.  They could conceivably get it wrong.  Mistake the disposition of their society or another's toward a given act or state of affairs, and so, be morally mistaken.

Or put better:

It's manifestly clear, even in the statement above, that eating beef carries normative import in hindu society.  If we drilled a little deeper, we might find a generalizable statement that applies more broadly and beyond hindu society.  Eating beef is a threat to the good order of hindu society, and threats to the good order of society are routinely taboo in moral systems.  

These objections all seem to boil down to the idea that relativistic utterances carry no normative import and are in some sense fact free, but only fact free in the novel sense of the term which excludes those sets of facts the critic deems unworthy or insufficient.  Facts of a society may not be facts of an act, but relativism is not objectivism.

I can't stress enough that there is no disagreement between any cognitivist position as to whether or not there is or at least can be truth or moral import to a statement.  Cognitive theories are distinguished by their referents.  I get that these objections express the dispute between objectivism and relativism, but again suggest that they can be reduced to something like "relativism is not objectivism, therefore relativism is false" - "or "relativism refers to the wrong set of facts, therefore is false".  That it is a form of psuedo realism.  In command of some body of true statements, but not the proper one - and perhaps this is why we believe (or some of us believe) that morality is objective.  It presents itself that way, in subtle error.

-and I want to point out, that the essay above is arguing for absolute moral facts, which is a bigger lift than bog standard realism. OFC no contingent fact will satisfy a person looking for absolutes.  Most of the positions under realism wouldn't satisfy that criteria.

He doesn't really argue for absolutism so much as say that absolutism is worth a second look. From the little I've read elsewhere of the author's work, he is very careful in his exploration of possible moral absolutes... for instance, brute statements "Punching babies is wrong." Are not worth consideration. The underlying imperative "Why is it normally wrong to punch babies?" is where the essence of the possible moral absolute may lie. (Essence is my word, not his.)

But that's beside the point. The issue here is: is it problematic to look at morality in a relativistic way? Boghossian thinks it is. He gives two examples: witches and Einstein's theory of relativity. He argues that in one case (Einstein) it makes perfect sense to look at simultinatiety from a relativistic standpoint. For witches, he implies that we all agree that an "eliminativist" standpoint is more reasonable.

But we COULD be relativists about witches, right? You and I don't think witchcraft is real, but some Baptist minister may think witchcraft is very real and something we should spend time worrying about. So perhaps witchcraft is only false in relation to our assessment of the world? According to the Baptist minister (and maybe his "church culture") witchcraft is real. But the problem here is: being a relativist about witchcraft is NOT a theory about witchcraft. It's a theory about beliefs. Moral relativism has the same problem.

What I'd be more apt to do with the case of Hinduism and eating beef is say, "What is wrong (generally) with eating beef?" What reasoning do the Hindus give for such a prohibition? Is it because it offends some god? In that case the existence of such a god and whether we'd choose to obey such an entity weigh heavily on whether it is reasonable to consider the Hindus' prohibition.

But what if the reasoning given by some Hindus is, "The cow is a conscious being and killing it or exploiting it creates needless suffering.".... ? In that case, we'd want to examine whether creating needless suffering in a cow is wrong. Or if it even CAN BE wrong. In any case, what the Hindus believe about the matter does not relate to what really is (or isn't) the case.

Long story short, I don't want to die on this hill. But I DO think the author's criticism of relativism makes sense. There either ARE moral facts or there aren't. What cultures (or people) believe doesn't relate to the reality of moral facts one way or another.

Moral relativism sounds appealing because buried in it is the notion that "One should not judge other cultures or consider them evil because their practices seem abhorrent from your point of view."

Let me repeat that: "One should not judge other cultures or consider them evil because their practices seem abhorrent from your point of view." The irony is: that's a realist statement. Many cultures the world over do not believe such a thing. But if such a thing is true, then the opinion of any culture isn't going to change that.

THAT is where I'm coming from. Maybe "incoherent" is too strong a word, but that is my main issue with relativism, and I think it's reasonable to have this issue with it. Realist and nihilistic claims BOTH say something tangible about the possible existence of moral facts. Relativism does not.

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If there are absolute moral truths, then one of two things must also be true

1) There is a reason for that truth that cannot be determined by humans (i.e. God-given and God-understood only)
or
2) There is a reason for that truth that can be determined.

I'll take option 2 all day. Accepting option 1 gives you the choice to either obey or not obey. It says nothing about what is actually right or wrong. So, to me, it has nothing to do with ethics. Even if it were the case that only God could comprehend moral truth, I'd have no way of knowing that. For all I know, I'd be blindly obeying a malevolent god because (if 1 is true) I have no access to moral facts.

Anyway Plato (or maybe even Socrates himself) produced an argument that put this matter to rest centuries ago. We can't "get" morality from the dictates of a divine being, even if such a being were to exist. The fact that such a being does NOT exist is merely the final nail in the coffin.

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For anyone who prefers to sit back and listen to Boghossian's arguments in lecture form, here is a YouTube video. (It says basically the same things as he does in the article I posted earlier.)

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