Why ontological arguments are illogical

[KichigaiNeko]

Just to lighten the thread up a bit.

[Whateverist]

Most ontological arguments define 'God' to be 'that which is the most perfect thing', or 'that which possesses all perfections', or something of the like. Are you claiming that the most perfect thing is not perfect?

Beware illusions of language. Just because you can formulate a sentence like "God is the most perfect thing" doesn't make it meaningful. Is that supposed to mean that God can be played to better effect than a Stradiverius violin? Does God have the best hair ever? Does He simultaneously have the shiniest bald pate? Is God the best temperature for a bath or the best temperature for a martini?

Perfect as an adjective must be in regards to something or other. What determines the categories for which God is the best, especially given that some categories are mutually exclusive?

[CliveStaples]

No, no, crystal clear. I'm just wondering why they argue that. It's a fairly ridiculous statement (imo anyway). Are those using this argument perfectly okay with it being directed towards any god whatsoever? I mean, when I'm thinking of Wotan, I must be thinking of something that actually exists? Correct (as per the argument)? Wakan-tanka also. Ah, and Tom Navy too. It's a good thing that there's alot of room "up there" because the skies are filling up with gods rather quickly in my mind atm.

No, I think the argument is tailored specifically to "God" defined as "that which possesses all perfections." Whether or not a particular religion's deity is identical to this same "God" depends on the properties the deity has (as well as how you decide to distinguish between objects--for example, if you hold to the identity of indiscernibles, then in order to show that a particular deity is the same as "God" amounts to showing that every proposition that is true of one must be true of the other.)

[The Grand Nudger]

No, it doesn't Clive (depend on the attributes the deity is said to possess). That would be assigning a personal judgement of perfection to someone else's gods (and what could possibly go wrong there eh?). Wotan is perfect as Wotan, Wakan tanka as Wakan tanka, Tom Navy, and Jeff the God of Biscuits as well. I'm afraid that this argument, to me, appears to rule out christianity as a proposition, since it fills the air above us so effectively with gods. Would a christian, for example, argue that these gods aren't perfect (or any other attribute which he wishes to assign to a god)? Of course he would, but he wouldn't be able to explain why this is so, or why it was relevant (and any explanation he offered is just as easily turned against his own by a believer in any other god through reference of their own gods and god claims as though they were standards). Each of these gods "possess all perfections" it just depends on who you ask. As a fun mind bender, the "imperfections" (you see, what we leverage this term for is largely a matter of cultural bias) of some gods are seen as precisely the source of their power, why they are "perfect" for the job of a god in the first place.

You know, that's something that always struck me as odd about the arguments we see offered up for a god. Even if one just conceded the entire argument up to the moment of conclusion, they still manage to fuck it up massively. You know that dream where you're pumping your legs as fast as possible, chest heaving, trying to outrun this or that -but never seem to get anywhere? Bit like that.

[genkaus]

Well, the argument goes something like:

If you're imagining something that has every perfection, and you're imagining something that doesn't actually exist, then the thing you're thinking of would be 'better' if it did actually exist. Hence what you were thinking of could not have been complete perfection.

'Better' isn't a necessary component of perfection either. I can imagine something perfect and I can think that it'd be 'better' if this thing never exists.

Well, moral goodness is a type of goodness, and moral perfection would be a kind of perfection (under the moral theory that these arguments are typically made under).

Immoral perfection (perfect immorality) is a 'kind of perfection' as well. So if your imagined god is required to have every kind of perfection, then he should be perfectly moral and immoral at the same time.

I think you just need to see more ontological arguments, then. Leibniz doesn't just declare that existence is a part of perfection; Plantinga doesn't couch his modal ontological argument in those terms, either.

I was referring to the terms you couched it in.

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No, I think the argument is tailored specifically to "God" defined as "that which possesses all perfections." Whether or not a particular religion's deity is identical to this same "God" depends on the properties the deity has (as well as how you decide to distinguish between objects--for example, if you hold to the identity of indiscernibles, then in order to show that a particular deity is the same as "God" amounts to showing that every proposition that is true of one must be true of the other.)

The definition itself is tailor-made for self-refutation, since mutually exclusive and contradictory properties come under the umbrella of "all".

[Whateverist]

Well, moral goodness is a type of goodness, and moral perfection would be a kind of perfection (under the moral theory that these arguments are typically made under).

Immoral perfection (perfect immorality) is a 'kind of perfection' as well. So if your imagined god is required to have every kind of perfection, then he should be perfectly moral and immoral at the same time.

I'm afraid this is no obstacle to Clive's argument. The God of the old testament demonstrates perfect evil time and time again. Gentle Jesus can play good cop to God the father's bad cop thus providing moral perfection of every stripe.

[Simon Moon]

The ontological argument is one of the silliest. I really don't understand why theists seem to think it's so compelling.

In effect, it defines a god into existence by claiming that existence is just one more attribute that a deity can have. But in reality, if a deity does not have existence, it has no other attributes either. So, we are still left with demonstrating that this deity actually exists.

This seems to be circular reasoning.

There are 3 ways that something can be said to exist;

1. as a concept of language
2. as a concept of mind
3. in reality

It seems to me that the ontological argument is speaking of a concept of mind, but is trying to apply it to reality. This seems to be an equivocation.

A piece of parody, Gasking's Proof for the Non-existence of god is as follows:

1.The creation of the universe is the greatest achievement imaginable.
2.The merit of an achievement consists of its intrinsic greatness and the ability of its creator.
3.The greater the handicap to the creator, the greater the achievement (would you be more impressed by Turner painting a beautiful landscape or a blind one-armed dwarf?)
4.The biggest handicap to a creator would be non-existence
5.Therefore if we suppose that the universe is the creation of an existing creator, we can conceive a greater being — namely, one who created everything while not existing.
6.Therefore, God does not exist.

[Oldandeasilyconfused]

Logic guarantees truth if and only if the premise is true. An argument may be perfectly logical and the inference valid but untrue,or at least unable to be claimed to be true. The ontological argument is logically valid,but the inference may not be claimed to be true.

I found the Wiki article cited below very helpful,especially the bits on Rene Descartes,and "the Muslim Plato" The mulla Sadra (Sadra al-Din Muhammud al-Shirazi)

An ontological argument for the existence of God (or simply ontological argument) is any one of a category of arguments for the existence of God. The exact criteria for the classification of ontological arguments are not widely agreed, but the arguments typically start with the definition of God and conclude with his necessary existence, using mostly or only a priori reasoning and little reference to empirical observation.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ontological_argument

[CliveStaples]

'Better' isn't a necessary component of perfection either. I can imagine something perfect and I can think that it'd be 'better' if this thing never exists.

Can you give an example? Simply stating that you can imagine it doesn't mean that it's logically possible; I could state, "I can imagine a square circle." That doesn't prove that square circles are logically possible.

Immoral perfection (perfect immorality) is a 'kind of perfection' as well. So if your imagined god is required to have every kind of perfection, then he should be perfectly moral and immoral at the same time.

No, I don't think immoral perfection constitutes a "perfection" in the sense that the ontological arguments offer--at least, not Leibnizian ones.

But I might be wrong. Can you show that, under some definition of 'perfection' given by some noteworthy ontological argument (i.e., not one you just made up), God would have to possess "immoral perfection"?

I was referring to the terms you couched it in.

But I've never written or made an ontological argument. You need to refer to the terms that Plantinga (modal ontological argument), Leibniz, et al. couch their arguments in.

The definition itself is tailor-made for self-refutation, since mutually exclusive and contradictory properties come under the umbrella of "all".

In Leibnizian terminology, no perfection is ever mutually exclusive with or contradictory to another perfection. Thus the conjunction of every such "perfection" is trivially logically possible.

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The ontological argument is one of the silliest. I really don't understand why theists seem to think it's so compelling.

In effect, it defines a god into existence by claiming that existence is just one more attribute that a deity can have. But in reality, if a deity does not have existence, it has no other attributes either. So, we are still left with demonstrating that this deity actually exists.

Superman does not have existence (in the sense that there is no real Kryptonian corresponding to Superman), and yet he has the following properties:

1) Can fly faster than a speeding bullet;
2) More powerful than a locomotive;
3) Able to leap tall buildings in a single bound

There are 3 ways that something can be said to exist;

1. as a concept of language
2. as a concept of mind
3. in reality

It seems to me that the ontological argument is speaking of a concept of mind, but is trying to apply it to reality. This seems to be an equivocation.

But there are things that exist in multiple ways at the same time; New York exists in reality and as a concept of mind (I can think of New York). Ontological arguments attempt to show that God must necessarily exist in reality and not merely as a concept of mind.

I don't see any equivocation there.

[genkaus]

Can you give an example? Simply stating that you can imagine it doesn't mean that it's logically possible; I could state, "I can imagine a square circle." That doesn't prove that square circles are logically possible.

I can imagine a perfect woman with whom every man and lesbian in the world would immediately fall in love with, but I can also see that its "better" if she doesn't exist - given the amount of conflict her existence would create.

No, I don't think immoral perfection constitutes a "perfection" in the sense that the ontological arguments offer--at least, not Leibnizian ones.

But I might be wrong. Can you show that, under some definition of 'perfection' given by some noteworthy ontological argument (i.e., not one you just made up), God would have to possess "immoral perfection"?

So, the ontological arguments use words in a different "sense" now? "Sense" which is not explained but must somehow be realized?

Regarding your point: "Gottfried Leibniz saw a problem with Descartes' ontological argument: that Descartes had not asserted the coherence of a "supremely perfect" being. He proposed that, unless the coherence of a supremely perfect being could be demonstrated, the ontological argument fails. Leibniz saw perfection as impossible to analyse; therefore, it would be impossible to demonstrate that all perfections are incompatible. He reasoned that all perfections can exist together in a single entity, and that Descartes' argument is still valid."

Clearly, he saw the incompatibility of all perfections and made the excuse.

In Leibnizian terminology, no perfection is ever mutually exclusive with or contradictory to another perfection. Thus the conjunction of every such "perfection" is trivially logically possible.

And once you offer an argument supporting this notion, I'll counter it. Otherwise, its a cheap cop-out.