Do you control what you believe?

[IATIA]

As I said, are you defining "choice" as "free choice"?

A decision is making a choice. A choice is a set of options.

To make a decision or to choose from a set of options is the same thing. The options can be physical. I choose Pepsi over Coke.
The options can be mental. I choose to dislike this person.

If not, if you simply mean "decision": if a decision is made by someone and that decision is undetermined by their biochemical/bioelectrical physiology of the body, you'd call that free will?

The semantics of making a decision to choose have no bearing on the free will process. The question of free will is whether or not the body has complete control, i.e. determinate.

Well, what determines the part of them that actually does do the determining then? It can't just keep being more and more and more parts of them because that would lead to an infinite regress. Either at some point they have to be ultimately entirely determined by something outside of themselves or they are ultimately entirely not determined at all.

There is not an issue of infinite regression. Everything we are, starts with the Big bang (or for the theists, "let there be light").

As far as an individual is concerned, the determinism that brought them into being has little effect other than bring them to being. Everything after that is what shapes who we are and what decisions we will make.

A set biochemical reactions forces the body to make a 'choice' or 'decision'. The results of this decision will have an impact on the next and so on. I put my hand into fire and it hurt. "Not put hand in fire". I picked up a piece of chocolate and it hurt the sore in my mouth, but "GOOOD. Ignore pain, chocolate good." Ever touch a doorknob and get a jolt? A couple of those in a row and is there not an anxious feeling as you reach for one again?

Everything we do builds a repository of information along with the realtime environment is collected by the senses and processed in an attempt to make the next decision.

Last night on the PBS channel, they successfully hypnotized/brainwashed someone and they 'killed' a stranger. We really are not in control.

I had posted a link earlier for someone on 'quantum suicide'. The gist of this is that our awareness is beyond the body which is just our attachment to 'reality'. If one were to attempt to point a gun at their head and fire, (for sake of argument, two possibilities), one outcome is that we die, the other is that we do not. In the quantum world both possibilities exist together and in my world you are dead, but in your world the gun misfired. Your awareness will always exist attached to some reality. The bottom line in this train of thought is that if this is true, then one should be able to force this shift of worlds through other means. Now you're talking free will.

[Edwardo Piet]

A decision is making a choice. A choice is a set of options.

And are you defining our "set of options" as necessarily free? Or can we have a "set of options" and it not be free because despite the fact that they're "optional", they are only optional in the sense that they are possible and it is ultimately not us that is doing the opting?

To make a decision or to choose from a set of options is the same thing.

So the question is then, do you define all decision-making as free-decision making? If you do, then if "free will" is the ability to make free decisions then that would imply that by merely making decisions we have "free will".

The semantics of making a decision to choose have no bearing on the free will process.

True, but if we are going to talk about the relevance of whether "free will" exists or not it needs a definition, otherwise we don't even know what we're talking about, so semantics is relevant to us discussing "free will". If we get one definition of "free will" mixed up with another we're not talking about the same thing, we're equivocating.

There is not an issue of infinite regression. Everything we are, starts with the Big bang (or for the theists, "let there be light").

I'm saying that if our conscious motivation needs more of our conscious motivation to have "free will" then for the same reason we'd keep needing more and more and so that leads to an infinite regress. So we only have "free will" if we draw the line somewhere. If we don't and we follow the logic of "conscious motivation requires conscious motivation for free will to work" then it leads to an infinite regress, so that kind of "free will" can't work.

As far as an individual is concerned, the determinism that brought them into being has little effect other than bring them to being.

If everything that exists in the universe, including them, and including everything they've ever done said or thought and all their motives for action, all of their "will", is ultimately entirely determined from the big-bang, how do they have "free will"? Where do you draw the line between "will" and "free will"? At what point did their existence have a will and then at what point did that will become free? And if their will became free as soon as it existed, how is it free if it's determined entirely out of no choice of their own?

Everything after that is what shapes who we are and what decisions we will make.

And everything done is still ultimately entirely determined from the big bang. It's a causal chain. We're part of the causal chain of the universe, including our decisions. So we don't have "free will". Or, if there isn't a causal chain then the universe is indeterministic so we can't determine anything, so we have no "free will".

We really are not in control.

Ultimately we're not in control at all. I agree. Libertarian "free will" is false. But we are in control in the sense that fatalism is false: We do have motives and those motivations of course motivate us and influence our life, so, in another sense, that is our "control".

[...]Your awareness will always exist attached to some reality.

Therefore our awareness is ultimately entirely determined from the big bang because it is attached to reality. And if our awareness and therefore our conscious motivation is ultimately entirely determined from the big bang then, how do we have "free will"?

The bottom line in this train of thought is that if this is true, then one should be able to force this shift of worlds through other means. Now you're talking free will.

How could we force it if the world is indeterministic? If the world is indeterministic then our "will" can't be determined so we can't determine our "will" ourselves so, in what sense is it "free"? And if our "will" can't determine anything because the world is indeterministic in what sense do you mean we could "force" anything?

On the other hand if the scientifically indeterministic - in the sense that it is unpredictable - quantum world is nevertheless philosophically deterministic, then everything is still ultimately entirely determined so in what sense do we ever "force" anything if "we" are ultimately entirely forced by the causal chain back to the big-bang that precedes us?

[IATIA]

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A decision is making a choice. A choice is a set of options.

And are you defining our "set of options" as necessarily free? Or can we have a "set of options" and it not be free because despite the fact that they're "optional", they are only optional in the sense that they are possible and it is ultimately not us that is doing the opting?

To make a decision or to choose from a set of options is the same thing.

So the question is then, do you define all decision-making as free-decision making? If you do, then if "free will" is the ability to make free decisions then that would imply that by merely making decisions we have "free will".

The semantics of making a decision to choose have no bearing on the free will process.

True, but if we are going to talk about the relevance of whether "free will" exists or not it needs a definition, otherwise we don't even know what we're talking about, so semantics is relevant to us discussing "free will". If we get one definition of "free will" mixed up with another we're not talking about the same thing, we're equivocating.

There is not an issue of infinite regression. Everything we are, starts with the Big bang (or for the theists, "let there be light").

I'm saying that if our conscious motivation needs more of our conscious motivation to have "free will" then for the same reason we'd keep needing more and more and so that leads to an infinite regress. So we only have "free will" if we draw the line somewhere. If we don't and we follow the logic of "conscious motivation requires conscious motivation for free will to work" then it leads to an infinite regress, so that kind of "free will" can't work.

As far as an individual is concerned, the determinism that brought them into being has little effect other than bring them to being.

If everything that exists in the universe, including them, and including everything they've ever done said or thought and all their motives for action, all of their "will", is ultimately entirely determined from the big-bang, how do they have "free will"? Where do you draw the line between "will" and "free will"? At what point did their existence have a will and then at what point did that will become free? And if their will became free as soon as it existed, how is it free if it's determined entirely out of no choice of their own?

Everything after that is what shapes who we are and what decisions we will make.

And everything done is still ultimately entirely determined from the big bang. It's a causal chain. We're part of the causal chain of the universe, including our decisions. So we don't have "free will". Or, if there isn't a causal chain then the universe is indeterministic so we can't determine anything, so we have no "free will".

We really are not in control.

Ultimately we're not in control at all. I agree. Libertarian "free will" is false. But we are in control in the sense that fatalism is false: We do have motives and those motivations of course motivate us and influence our life, so, in another sense, that is our "control".

[...]Your awareness will always exist attached to some reality.

Therefore our awareness is ultimately entirely determined from the big bang because it is attached to reality. And if our awareness and therefore our conscious motivation is ultimately entirely determined from the big bang then, how do we have "free will"?

The bottom line in this train of thought is that if this is true, then one should be able to force this shift of worlds through other means. Now you're talking free will.

How could we force it if the world is indeterministic? If the world is indeterministic then our "will" can't be determined so we can't determine our "will" ourselves so, in what sense is it "free"? And if our "will" can't determine anything because the world is indeterministic in what sense do you mean we could "force" anything?

On the other hand if the scientifically indeterministic - in the sense that it is unpredictable - quantum world is nevertheless philosophically deterministic, then everything is still ultimately entirely determined so in what sense do we ever "force" anything if "we" are ultimately entirely forced by the causal chain back to the big-bang that precedes us?

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It is late, but I will address each point tomorrow night. Including the out of context portion. hock:

[Whateverist]

Gad but I've been avoiding this like the plague. I've never enjoyed the free will debates and have never felt clear about many of the terms used. I think I may reclaim the apathetic high ground after conceding DvsF's points. So long as the free will that is being discussed is libertarian free will, then indeed it would seem we have not got it. What choices we have, unlike the decisions we make, are not and cannot be of our choosing. For whatever we would choose will always already be that which we would/must choose.

Neither am I free to be someone else for I am always already someone in particular with a given set of motivating desires and fears. The decisions I make in relationship to these may indeed feedback on the future state of my desires and fears. For example if I decide to push my fear of the dark and tight places by doing some spelunking it may well change the motivational charge of those fears. But my desire to push those fears already bespeaks a desire to break free of them, and not a truly free choice to do so.

Of course, if we understand free will in the ordinary sense of lack of constraint then indeed we do have that .. in spades. We are always free to decide what we will but only given what choices may present themselves for our conscious consideration. At some pre-conscious level we cannot control what choices we will become aware of nor how motivating we will find them. Those are things to be discovered about who we already are and not a blank slate to be written on with a god-like, disinterested hand.

So if someone just finds himself compelled to molest little boys, butcher prostitutes or vote republican I should not judge him to harshly. They need not ultimately be deserving of damnation to justify imposing a societal consequence. I can allow that it may be in their constitution given the road they have traveled to do monstrous things. I am even willing to give up being glad to see them suffer so long as they are prevented from continuing on their asocial path .. well, except for the republicans.

[Edwardo Piet]

Whateverist:

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Gad but I've been avoiding this like the plague. I've never enjoyed the free will debates and have never felt clear about many of the terms used. I think I may reclaim the apathetic high ground after conceding DvsF's points. So long as the free will that is being discussed is libertarian free will, then indeed it would seem we have not got it. What choices we have, unlike the decisions we make, are not and cannot be of our choosing. For whatever we would choose will always already be that which we would/must choose.

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Agreed.

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Neither am I free to be someone else for I am always already someone in particular with a given set of motivating desires and fears. The decisions I make in relationship to these may indeed feedback on the future state of my desires and fears. For example if I decide to push my fear of the dark and tight places by doing some spelunking it may well change the motivational charge of those fears. But my desire to push those fears already bespeaks a desire to break free of them, and not a truly free choice to do so.

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Agreed again.

Of course, if we understand free will in the ordinary sense of lack of constraint then indeed we do have that .. in spades. We are always free to decide what we will but only given what choices may present themselves for our conscious consideration.

Many people do indeed define 'free will' as merely having some degree of self-control in the sense that our conscious motivations can influence other conscious motivations that we have. But many people also believe that 'free will' is deeper than that.

At some pre-conscious level we cannot control what choices we will become aware of nor how motivating we will find them.

And of course we are ultimately entirely predetermined by unconscious motivation(s)/causes.

I shall also add that apparently there is scientific evidence that all the actions we make are already determined by our unconsciousness shortly before they are determined by any conscious motivation that we have.

[Whateverist]

Many people do indeed define 'free will' as merely having some degree of self-control in the sense that our conscious motivations can influence other conscious motivations that we have. But many people also believe that 'free will' is deeper than that.

In the libertarian sense being discussed, essentially by definition, the self-control or conscious input one has on affecting ones own fears and desires can only be motivated by preexisting contravening desires.

At some pre-conscious level we cannot control what choices we will become aware of nor how motivating we will find them.

And of course we are ultimately entirely predetermined by unconscious motivation(s)/causes.

In the libertarian sense, we are ultimately and entirely predetermined to be who we already happen to be. Who we are, from our own conscious point of view, is a thing to be discovered, not a thing to be decided. So self awareness requires knowledge of self.

Hmm. This suggests a route to a more satisfying concept of personhood than libertarian free will would on the surface appear to offer. It may be that if one is motivated by a desire for this self knowledge that the scope of decision making available to the individual becomes much greater than "being entirely predetermined" would suggest. It may be that conscious awareness of contradictory desires, in other words gaining a perspective from which possessing them both makes some kind of sense, may actually enable the individual as a whole to reconcile those competing desires. This would not be an exception to the rule that choices and motivations are not consciously manufactured. Here I am suggesting that the contribution of the conscious mind would be to provide a mirror to the deeper levels of the self from whence come all choices and motivation. There is no reason I can think of to suppose that the choices which motivate us are naturally well integrated. What do you think, does it fit?

I shall also add that apparently there is scientific evidence that all the actions we make are already determined by our unconsciousness shortly before they are determined by any conscious motivation that we have.

I've read about this too. I've never been convinced that the activity detected is evidence that conscious activity is determined by unconscious activity. I assume that conscious activity and unconscious activity are connected. What is being measured here may merely show the marshaling of those unconscious underpinnings in support of the conscious activity.

[Edwardo Piet]

In the libertarian sense being discussed, essentially by definition, the self-control or conscious input one has on affecting ones own fears and desires can only be motivated by preexisting contravening desires.

As I have said, the libertarian sense of free will isn't even logically coherent. Either we are ultimately entirely predetermined by unconsciousness or we are ultimately entirely undetermined. Libertarian free will would require neither of those to be true or it would have to avoid falling into an infinite regress of there never being enough conscious motivation. It can't do either.

Only some forms of non-libertarian "free will" are possible.

[...]we are ultimately and entirely predetermined to be who we already happen to be.

Yes.

Who we are, from our own conscious point of view, is a thing to be discovered, not a thing to be decided. So self awareness requires knowledge of self.

The way I personally interpret it is that we still make decisions it's just our decisions are predetermined. We make decisions in the sense that we have conscious motivations that encourage us to make them.

To say that decision making didn't exist might make us wrongly equivocate determinism with fatalism. The idea of no decisions existing at all seems fatalistic to me. Fatalism is an irrational notion because it excludes our conscious motivation(s) from the causal chain of the universe, while determinism by itself doesn't do that.

[...] It may be that if one is motivated by a desire for this self knowledge that the scope of decision making available to the individual becomes much greater than "being entirely predetermined" would suggest.

If we are ultimately entirely predetermined then it can't become greater. If instead we're undetermined then our will can't determine anything. Either way we don't have libertarian free will. Our "scope" doesn't change either way, we simply make choices, and some people have more "self control" or self-encouragement/self-discouragement in other words than others. We make choices... but not free choices. Or, if we are to define all choices as "free" then we make decisions, but they are not free and we don't make "choices".

It may be that conscious awareness of contradictory desires, in other words gaining a perspective from which possessing them both makes some kind of sense, may actually enable the individual as a whole to reconcile those competing desires.

In what way could we reconcile contradictory/competing desires?

This would not be an exception to the rule that choices and motivations are not consciously manufactured.

Ultimately they entirely aren't, yes.

Here I am suggesting that the contribution of the conscious mind would be to provide a mirror to the deeper levels of the self from whence come all choices and motivation.

Which is still all ultimately entirely unconscious of course. Hence we are ultimately entirely predetermined.

There is no reason I can think of to suppose that the choices which motivate us are naturally well integrated. What do you think, does it fit?

Fit in what way? Our choices motivate us but out choices are ultimately entirely not free because they and ourselves are ultimately entirely predetermined by unconsciousness. In what way are you wondering whether choices "fit"? Everything fits in the sense that everything is predetermined by a causal chain.

I've read about this too. I've never been convinced that the activity detected is evidence that conscious activity is determined by unconscious activity. I assume that conscious activity and unconscious activity are connected. What is being measured here may merely show the marshaling of those unconscious underpinnings in support of the conscious activity.

What made you suspect that the evidence was wrong?

[Whateverist]

It may be that conscious awareness of contradictory desires, in other words gaining a perspective from which possessing them both makes some kind of sense, may actually enable the individual as a whole to reconcile those competing desires.

In what way could we reconcile contradictory/competing desires?

We -consciously- don't reconcile anything. All we do is hold up the mirror of mindfulness. What I'm suggesting is that doing so may (in some way I don't understand at all) allow the total consciousness (mostly unconscious) to recognize the conflict of desires. It may well be that the wellspring of motivation is not terribly bright, desire may just be desire with no intrinsic prioritization. The conscious mind is a product of the total consciousness, not an alternative to it. While indeed the conscious mind has not the power to make choices which do not trace back to the base desires of the total organism, it may nonetheless play a clarifying role in the way conflicting desires are reconciled. And not directly by conscious decision but indirectly through mindful recognition of how the actions taken in the service of competing desires is (or is not) paying off. What we consciously notice and recognize is at the same time a part of the awareness of our total consciousness. So what I am suggesting is that conscious awareness may play a role in how the unconscious comes to grips with conflicting desire which may in turn lead to a more fruitful reconciliation of desires at an unconsciousness level. Not directly as a result of our decision, but indirectly through the use the unconscious mind makes of our conscious mind.

I've read about this too. I've never been convinced that the activity detected is evidence that conscious activity is determined by unconscious activity. I assume that conscious activity and unconscious activity are connected. What is being measured here may merely show the marshaling of those unconscious underpinnings in support of the conscious activity.

What made you suspect that the evidence was wrong?

I don't suspect the evidence is wrong. I think it may not be interpreted correctly.

[Edwardo Piet]

What I'm suggesting is that doing so may (in some way I don't understand at all) allow the total consciousness (mostly unconscious) to recognize the conflict of desires.

It's still ultimately all entirely determined by unconsciousness.

While indeed the conscious mind has not the power to make choices which do not trace back to the base desires of the total organism, it may nonetheless play a clarifying role in the way conflicting desires are reconciled.

I agree.

What we consciously notice and recognize is at the same time a part of the awareness of our total consciousness.

Of course.

So what I am suggesting is that conscious awareness may play a role in how the unconscious comes to grips with conflicting desire which may in turn lead to a more fruitful reconciliation of desires at an unconsciousness level.

Partly, maybe so. But it is still all ultimately entirely determined by unconsciousness.

I don't suspect the evidence is wrong. I think it may not be interpreted correctly.

Okay well, what makes you suspect that it is interpreted incorrectly?

[Whateverist]

So what I am suggesting is that conscious awareness may play a role in how the unconscious comes to grips with conflicting desire which may in turn lead to a more fruitful reconciliation of desires at an unconsciousness level.

Partly, maybe so. But it is still all ultimately entirely determined by unconsciousness.

Yes. Not only that but remember even if one sets out to be aware of conflicting desires, that already bespeaks a pre-existing desire for self knowledge. Nothing we decide to do, including serving the clarification of our unconscious, can be freely chosen. It may turn out that along the path of mindful self knowledge, all paths merge to some degree so that the deeply personal turns out to be ubiquitously transpersonal. Or perhaps not.