Atheism and morality

[MindForgedManacle]

Yes they have. Me. I have presented arguments that establish that morality requires a god. Unless you actually address those arguments and show something to be wrong with the premises (which involves more than just nay saying) then I have done exactly as you asked. Deny that morality instructs and provide supporting considertaions. Deny that moral norms have inescapable rational authority and provide supporting evidence. Unless you can do that you're just nay saying. You just dislike the conclusion and infer that the argument must be faulty because a conclusion you dislike can't possible be true (or so I suggest).

Then it would seem prudent in pointing to the pists in question, given the 45 pages of posts in the thread.

You think you can refute an argument with a head count do you? Even if every single philosopher thinks that morality does not require a god it does if my arguments are valid and sound. And that's that. You can head count all you want, it will never show there to be something wrong with the arguments.

Okay, so now you either didn't read closely enough, or you're lying, because I explicitly stated that "Now this obviously does not make it false that morality requires a deity [...]" Christ man.

YOu acknowledge this to try and cover yourself. But then why mention the numbers unless you think it of some relevance?

I specifically noted that all that it does is show that there is good reason to find the claim dubious if the academic support for the claim is in the red. Relevant, yes. Falsifying, no... as I said before.

YOu do realise that rival metaethical views - those that are defended in the literature - are all hopeless? you do realise that? You do realise that this is recognised by the philosophers who defend them? You do realise that most of contemporary metaethical debate involves merely showing that your own favoured position is only slightly less bonkers than its nearest rival?? You do realise that moral nihilism or error theory - the view that morality does not exist - is growing in popularity among moral philosophers precisely due to the apparent inability of any rival analysis to respect morality's core features?? Perhaps most philosophers are atheists. Perhaps most moral philosophers are. But one thing is also for certain: most moral philosophers recognise that there are incredible difficulties reconciling morality with an atheistic world view and none, NONE would be so foolish as to suggest that it has been done to anything remotely close to everyone's satisfaction!!!

NONE of which I affirmed wasn't the case. In fact if I recall, I specifically said that what is actually important is that there are major problems with theistic accounts of morality and defenses of particular meta-ethical stances, and that whether or not an atheistic worldview can account for our intuition of morals is rather irrelevant to their truth or falsity.

We have a moral sense. It gives us the impression that there are instructions with which we have inescapable reason to comply.
There is only one way that I can see such things could be a reality and that is if a god exists.
This is evidence that such a god exists in the same way that your visual sense is evidence that there is an outside world.

Again, you're making this odd jump from 'we have this moral sense we've inescapable obligations' to therefore that sense reflects something actually true about reality. And then you claim that because you cannot think of any other way to account for them sans-God, they're true.

...No. That's an argument from ignorance. Aside from the fact that such a sense could merely be wrong, it can likewise have an evolutionary explanation for that sense, i.e it could've been that it was merely useful for species propagation.


I'll get the rest in a bit; my phone was slowing to a crawl in this text box.

[Inigo]

You didn't read what I said, did you? I said that you tried to eat your cake and have it. You quoted numbers and then you said 'of course, the numbers don't count'. THat's like a newspaper printing pictures of a nude woman and saying 'isn't it outrageous that our rival newspapers printed this dirty picture'. You wanted the numbers to be seen as counting for something, while not being guilty of the fallacy of thinking the numbers count. YOu are guilty of what Sartre would call 'bad faith'.

I detect the same 'bad faith' in the rest of what you say. Why don't you just tell me about these supposed flaws in my kind of position and we'll see if they really are flaws. Or perhaps you'd prefer just to tell me that lots of eminent people think there are huge flaws and leave it at that.

You point out that there are rival metaethical views. I then explain that I think they are all false and briefly explain what kind of problems I think attend to each. You then point out that this doesn't matter as what matters is whether there's a fault in my view. Er, wrong. it does matter as if there is a rival view that can account for morality's features as well or better than my own then clearly it should be preferred. So showing that each rival view has serious flaws is significant. That clearly does not, in and of itself, show my view to be correct and I have never, ever suggested that it does. Indeed, it is you who just keeps implying such things by informing me (as if I was unaware) that there are rival views and that these rival views have lots of defenders. I know!

Now, kindly point to one of these supposed flaws in my kind of view. Don't just tell me that someone thinks there's a flaw. Tell me what it is and explain just why it is a flaw, and we'll see if it is. For I am eager to have the flaws in my view highlighted as it is not a view I wish to be true.

Just to be clear: my view is that moral instructions are the instructions of a god who has total control over our interests in an afterlife. In claiming this I do not claim that the god exists. Merely that the god would need to exist if our moral sense data and moral beliefs are to have anything answering to them in reality.

What's the problem?

[fr0d0]

I've never seen a claim that God exists. So your atheism seems to be groundless)

If there is no verifiable claim that god exists, theism is rather groundless.

That just shows your thorough lack of understanding of your subject.

There can be no verifiable evidence for the supernatural, unless you have a supernatural detective on your team.

Christianity is the claim of belief through faith. Never more. Existence has to be an unknown.

At the root of Inigo's claim here there lies an assumption. A case in point.

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I've never seen a claim that God exists. Care to point me to one?

(Mine and other theists claim of belief in God of course attracts no burden. So your atheism seems to be groundless)

Okay, unless you're referring to in this thread only, and you've managed to memorize hundreds of posts, you're lying when you say you've never encoumtered the claim that 'God exists'. I mean hell, one could just as easily plop open the Bible and find a verse clearly stating that God exists, such as when Paul refers to "God's glory and power have been clearly seen, so that they are without excuse" [for not believing].

OK great. You should have no problem to pointing me to one example then.

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Even saying that you believe in God is a claim for a deity.

What I and other Christians claim is not independently verifiable proof, is the point. The claim we're dealing with here is that the person is an atheist for the reason that there lacks verifiable evidence, when such evidence would be logically impossible. -therefore- that persons basis for atheism is unfounded.

[genkaus]

Then we must part company on an irrelevant semantic issue. I, in common with, among others, professor Robin Le Poidevin use the term 'theist' to refer to what I have just said I use it to refer to.

I do this a) becusae this is how the term has been traditionally used. Some have only started using it more generally in order to make sense of 'a-theism'. that's all. After all, atheism is generally used to refer to the view that no god, of any kind, exists (not just the theistic god).

But anyway, I use the term 'theism' in its traditional sense because that's what I've always understood the term to mean, that's what it means in the philosophical community (see Prof Robin Le Poidevin for clarification) and furthermore I wish to distinguish myself from those who defend the Judaeo Christian god. And if you say you are a theist most people who were properly educated will believe you believe in the Judaeo Christian god or something damn similar. I don't.

Anyway, these are tedious semantic issues of no relevance to the credibility of the case I am making. It does not alter the validity of any argument I have made. All one has to do when I use the term 'theist' is remember that I use it in its traditional sense.

In fact, it doesn't matter what terms I use for anything. They're just labels. Some people here are more concerned with what to label themselves than anything else.

Actually, you are not using the term in 'traditional' sense. The traditional use of the word is what appears in the dictionary and your usage is clearly not that

[simplexity]

You didn't read what I said, did you? I said that you tried to eat your cake and have it. You quoted numbers and then you said 'of course, the numbers don't count'. THat's like a newspaper printing pictures of a nude woman and saying 'isn't it outrageous that our rival newspapers printed this dirty picture'. You wanted the numbers to be seen as counting for something, while not being guilty of the fallacy of thinking the numbers count. YOu are guilty of what Sartre would call 'bad faith'.

I detect the same 'bad faith' in the rest of what you say. Why don't you just tell me about these supposed flaws in my kind of position and we'll see if they really are flaws. Or perhaps you'd prefer just to tell me that lots of eminent people think there are huge flaws and leave it at that.

You point out that there are rival metaethical views. I then explain that I think they are all false and briefly explain what kind of problems I think attend to each. You then point out that this doesn't matter as what matters is whether there's a fault in my view. Er, wrong. it does matter as if there is a rival view that can account for morality's features as well or better than my own then clearly it should be preferred. So showing that each rival view has serious flaws is significant. That clearly does not, in and of itself, show my view to be correct and I have never, ever suggested that it does. Indeed, it is you who just keeps implying such things by informing me (as if I was unaware) that there are rival views and that these rival views have lots of defenders. I know!

Now, kindly point to one of these supposed flaws in my kind of view. Don't just tell me that someone thinks there's a flaw. Tell me what it is and explain just why it is a flaw, and we'll see if it is. For I am eager to have the flaws in my view highlighted as it is not a view I wish to be true.

Just to be clear: my view is that moral instructions are the instructions of a god who has total control over our interests in an afterlife. In claiming this I do not claim that the god exists. Merely that the god would need to exist if our moral sense data and moral beliefs are to have anything answering to them in reality.

What's the problem?

In reality, at least most peoples, it has already been explained to you multiple times how moral sense data can have something answering to it, without even an agent(external to ourselves) answering it. We ourselves are answering to this moral sense data as you put it. Multiple times this has been put forward and explained in detail, then since apparently you like to talk so much, you simply redefine what the word reality means so you can continue the argument. Or you simply systematically avoid answering, which has been done multiple times. That is what this entire thread is. Someone making a valid argument disproving your entire argument. You almost have a system of illogical steps.

1) Valid Argument disproving morality needs a god
2) According to my definition of morality your argument doesn't work(which it actually does)
3)more assertions...
4) Another valid argument disproving your view
5) According to my definition of reality, what is answering moral sense data is not actually real enough for me. As we all know abstract things are very real.
6)others feel free to add on to these steps...

We are answering to/inferring instructions(it contains instructions) from the moral sense data in this manner:
1)We are self aware
2)Self aware beings do not wish to suffer
3)We also suffer if anything else suffers
3)Because we do not wish to suffer anything which causes suffering is immoral, and this is the starting point for morality(belief system)
4)Not suffering is also inescapably reasonable(see above)

All these things are very real and based on fact

The moral sense data could be any of these things:
1)Karmic law
2)Neuronal emotional feelings which actually fits into karmic law
3)instincts and desires(which ties into number 2)
3)Natural Law(which does not necessarily need a god for its creation)

It could not be:
1)A gods commands/instructions because nothing is necessarily suffering and therefore these gods commands are not necessarily moral, in other words: euthypro's dilema
2)You are free to think of others...

[genkaus]

This has nothing to do with the definition of words. They're just labels. What I am doing is describing morality. I am describing how things seem when I sense that an act is wrong. For I use words like 'wrong' and 'morally bad' and 'morally obligatory' to refer to such bundles of features. Now, perhaps you don't. Perhaps you use the term 'morally wrong' to refer to a piece of cheesecake, or a feeling of devastation, or the first Tuesday of the month. Then you're just not talking about or analysing what I'm talking about.

If so, then it has everything to do with definitions. Definitions aren't labels, words are. Definitions do precisely what you claim to - describe the thing the word refers to. Nobody uses the term "morally wrong" as a label for cheesecake or Tuesday.

However, it seems I am not unusual either in what I am labelling my moral experiences or in my use of that label. For so far in my life it appears to me that other people are using those terms to refer to exactly the same impression. And in moral philosophy I have read many articles and books in which the authors describe a relevantly similar experience and use the terms as I do. And so I conclude that we are all talking about the same thing.

Except, your use of label is wrong. I don't know which moral philosophies you've read, but you've clearly got them wrong. The author's description does not match your own.

What I am referring to is an experience: an experience of something being externally instructed 'not to be done' and this 'not to be doneness' somehow giving rise in me to the belief that this act is one that I now have inescapable reason not to do.

Then you are not talking about morality at all. The moral experience or belief would be simply "something instructed not to be done thus giving rise to the belief that this act is one you have a reason not to do". It does not specify whether the instruction is externally given or internally created. It does not specify whether the reason not to do is inescapable or not. Thus, what you are describing here is a subset of morality - because it contains the aspects of morality but adds new ones. However, you cannot attach the label 'morality' to it because that label is already in use for a wider concept. If you want, you can call it gmorality.

That's just the description, not the analysis. It is just a description of something I experience and form beliefs about. It was what Kant was talking about, it was what Socrates and Plato were talking about, and so on. They didn't call it 'morality' in ancient Greece. Doesn't matter. The label doesn't matter. They were talking about the same feature of their reality -the same experience and trying, just as we are, to make sense of it.

This is most certainly not what the others were talking about. In all three moral philosophies, the instruction is internally inferred - not externally issued. And only Kant claimed an inescapable reason in form of categorical imperative. Its clear that they are talking about things other than your gmorallity.

So, once again, my premise that morality instructs, and my premise that morality's instructions aree ones that possess inescapable rational authority are just descriptions of the thing I am analysing.

And thus your premise is wrong. The thing that the label 'morality' describes does not have the property of having inescapable rational authority and since that label is already in use, you need to find another label - like gmorality.

Then there's the analysis. That's where the real work happens. If you disagree with the description then really you're just not talking about what I am talking about and I'm frankly not interested in you, just as someone who uses the term 'atheism' to refer to the baking practices of 18th century Denmark would probably be surprised at this site and wonder why no-one was addressing the topic they were interested in.

Except, here the analogy applies to you - not anyone else. You are the one trying to use the label to describe something other than what it currently refers to. You are the one trying to redefine the word in order to perpetrate a tautological fallacy.

My analysis is that morality must be composed of the intructions and favourings of a god. That's the raw ingredient. Just as if one wants to analyse, say, peanut butter one would reverse engineer it. One would see what combination of more basic ingredients would create something that had all the same qualities as the original. You discover that if you mash peanuts up with a bit of oil you get something that has all of the same features as peanut butter. If you find that there is no other way of creating those features then you've discovered what peanut butter is made of. That, in effect, is what I am saying about morality. Given the features I have described the only way that I can see that you could get such feature in reality is if there is a god of a certain kind.

I that case, your argument would be correct. Your gmorality refers to something that contains externally generated instructions from a rationally inescapable authority - and therefore, I'd accept that your gmorality is incompatible with atheism and cannot exist without a god.

But that's pointless. Morality is not your gmorality. Morality does not have the specification of being external or of having a particular authority. Gmorality is not what moral philosophers talk about when talking about moral theories. All you are doing, in effect, is saying "I'm redefining morality to be something that cannot exist without god. And therefore, my conclusion is that atheism is incompatible with morality".

I am arguing first, that morality requires a god.

And trying to do so by redefining morality. Thus turning your entire argument into a particularly long form of "begging the question".

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Now, most of you atheists implicitly recognise the importance of reconciling the reality of morality with your worldview. For you recognise, at some inchoate poorly thought-out level, that unless you can do this your worldview has a serious deficiency. Something that appears very real, has to be considered a hallucination. This damages the credibility of the view. It damages it because to most of us morality appears more real than the reports of our sense of touch and sight (after all, it is conceivable that those are just hallucinations - it is conceivable, very conceivable, that I am dreaming right now). Yet it is far harder to conceive that there is nothing right or wrong with anything. That's precisely why the moral argument for a god's existence has real teeth and precisely why most of you feel it so important to deny what I am saying. it is why philoosphers are currently furiously working away at trying to show that morality is compatible with atheism (and failing - just take a look at their bonkers theories).

As a matter of fact, we atheists don't give a shit about your gmorality.

What we atheists talk about when we say "morality" and what you are talking about when you say "morality" are clearly two very different things.

We talk about "ideas regarding what should or should not be done". You are talking about "something containing externally issued instructions from a rational and inescapable authority about what should or should not be done".

I haven't met a single atheist who means the same thing by morality that you do. Come to think of it, other than those advocating the divine command theory, I haven't known any moral philosophers who use your definition of morality - which I'm calling gmorality for convenience - either.

No one is trying to reconcile your gmorality with atheism and no one is saying that gmorality is anything but a hallucination.

For instance, the moral argument for 'a god' is very powerful.

You mean the gmoral argument for god? No, that's weal as well.

I refer you to my arguments in which the existence of a god arrives as a conclusion to a deductively valid argument. That's the precise opposite of a non-sequitur.

If by deductively valid you mean using tautological fallacy - then yes.

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Yes they have. Me. I have presented arguments that establish that morality requires a god. Unless you actually address those arguments and show something to be wrong with the premises (which involves more than just nay saying) then I have done exactly as you asked. Deny that morality instructs and provide supporting considertaions. Deny that moral norms have inescapable rational authority and provide supporting evidence. Unless you can do that you're just nay saying. You just dislike the conclusion and infer that the argument must be faulty because a conclusion you dislike can't possible be true (or so I suggest).

All you have done is argue that your specific definition of morality requires a god. What your gmorality requires or doesn't require is irrelevant to actual morality.

You think you can refute an argument with a head count do you? Even if every single philosopher thinks that morality does not require a god it does if my arguments are valid and sound. And that's that. You can head count all you want, it will never show there to be something wrong with the arguments. YOu acknowledge this to try and cover yourself. But then why mention the numbers unless you think it of some relevance?

When it comes to defining something - refutation by numbers is relevant and valid. If neither the commonly used definition of morality nor the definition used by past philosophers matches yours, then your definition is wrong and therefore your arguments are not sound.

But one thing is also for certain: most moral philosophers recognise that there are incredible difficulties reconciling morality with an atheistic world view and none, NONE would be so foolish as to suggest that it has been done to anything remotely close to everyone's satisfaction!!!

On the contrary - no moral philosophers and especially no atheist moral philosopher has ever tried to reconcile what you mean by morality with an atheistic worldview. Many, however, have reconciled what morality actually means with an atheistic worldview and done so to everyone's satisfaction. Everyone except those like you whose definition of morality is different.

We have a moral sense. It gives us the impression that there are instructions with which we have inescapable reason to comply.

Wrong. All our moral sense gives us is the impression that there are instructions. It does not indicate whether or not there is an inescapable or rather any reason to comply. That would be gmoral sense - which we don't have.

There is only one way that I can see such things could be a reality and that is if a god exists.

Nope, such a sense can also be the result of perceiving a natural law in action as well. For a god, you'd need to add "externally generated instructions" to your gmoral sense as well. Oh wait, I forgot you did that already.

This is evidence that such a god exists in the same way that your visual sense is evidence that there is an outside world.

Having a visual sense is a natural part of human anatomy. Having the hypothetical gmoral sense is not.

I did. I wasn't impressed. You left out all the detail. Tell me about Hume's is/ought problem. You can't refute my position with vague gestures in the direction of something. And I can't defend myself against vague gestures. Put in the detail and we'll begin. If you can't put in the detail, well done - you've discovered you're prejudiced!!

Your inability to understand how Hume's law applies to your gmorality indicates your poor understanding of moral philosophies. The is-ought problem is the biggest stumbling block that any moral theory must overcome.

In your case, the simple fact of existence of god-given instructions is not sufficient - let alone inescapable - reason for compliance. Your personal, subjective desires necessarily play a part in its applicability. You say that if we don't follow the instructions given, we would be tortured in the afterlife - but that reason alone is not sufficient. There must be a personal desire not to be tortured. If I don't care what happens to me in afterlife or if I've found a way for their not to be one - such as cessation of my existence - then your gmorality is inapplicable and irrelevant to me.

[fr0d0]

I, in common with, among others, professor Robin Le Poidevin use the term 'theist' to refer to what I have just said I use it to refer to.

Could you please provide sources? I've looked and couldn't find anything.

[genkaus]

We are answering to/inferring instructions(it contains instructions) from the moral sense data in this manner:
1)We are self aware
2)Self aware beings do not wish to suffer
3)We also suffer if anything else suffers
3)Because we do not wish to suffer anything which causes suffering is immoral, and this is the starting point for morality(belief system)
4)Not suffering is also inescapably reasonable(see above)

Just this - I do not agree that statements 2 and 3 are necessarily true. However, I do agree that these premises form the starting point of some of the existing moralities.

[simplexity]

2 and 3 are only true for most of us who are aware. Yes. But if you like to suffer, than you are not really suffering. Which brings up some other additions. I reasoned through that maybe a little too quickly... If Inigo keeps going on about his gmorality, though arg... Good one btw.

What other moralities do not require the existence of suffering to work, though? I'd be interested.

[genkaus]

@Ryantology.

Has anyone told you that your avatar is extremely frustrating - bordering on immoral?