Free will Argument against Divine Providence

[genkaus]

Only if it thinks experience is the same as brain function, and if it has access to an fMRI. But it's not the fault of the "entity" if it is not capable of experiencing as I do.

Existence of so many conditions does imply your definition's inadequacy.

"Good" enough is just a euphemism for "compatible." And that's begging the question-- you make a definition in physical terms, and later, once the dust has settled and nobody realizes that an operational definition is different than the original, you say, "Look-- there's a picture of someone's mind-- right there on the computer screen." But you're not talking about their experience-- you're talking about blood flow in the brain.

That's where you are wrong - we are not making a definition in physical terms, we are making it in empirical terms. That is the point you consistently fail to get.

Well, if we are defining reality based on our ideas, rather than vice versa, then maybe we should talk about some kind of idealistic monism. Because I think if you strip away all the ideas in physical monism, you are left with a bunch of wave functions, and no objects which can have attributes like will or the ability to experience.

We are identifying reality based on our ideas - which in turn are based on reality - not defining it. Which is why talking about idealistic monism makes to sense.

As I said, I accept the theoretical possibility, but I challenge you to prove it. It must be assumed, just as I assume that the text ascribed to "genkaus" comes from a sentient human mind. This is a pragmatic assumption-- but it cannot be "shown to be true."

Sure. What's the criteria for the falsifiability of your hypothesis that "sentience cannot be shown to be true".

No, it doesn't actually have to be capable of experience. It just has to be able to process data AS THOUGH it were capable of experience. Because if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck, we know for sure it feels like a duck-- right?

Wrong - that's the point I'm making. Without the actual capacity to feel experience it'd be impossible to completely mimic the results of experiential data processing.

We don't know. . . yet? I think what you meant to say is, "We don't know. . ." "Yet" is a predictive word, and I don't think you can demonstrate that the discovery of the elements you mentioned is guaranteed. . . or even possible.

Like I said, the current preponderance of evidence favors the physicalist interpretation of all mental functions, including sentience. Thus, the discovery of the elements I mentioned can be reasonably expected - though not guranteed - hence the use of the word "yet".

As I've already said, non-solipsism is a pragmatic assumption, not a provable fact. I accept this assumption, because interacting with people I consider "real" is more interesting to me, and feels more natural to me, than not doing so.

That's your problem: you don't say "we don't know yet, let's find out", your default position is "we can't know at all". Thankfully, the scientists don't share your view.

As for blindness-- let's change your example. How would you explain to a worm (if you could speak wormy) what it means to see? Or how could a bat explain to you what it feels like to use natural sonar?

Assuming that the worm or the bat is capable of that level of understanding - this is a question for you to ponder upon. I think about the issue quite frequently and have a few ideas about how to go about this - but any such discussion would be pointless if you keep arguing from the assumption that it can't be done.

Most importantly, what is the chance that ALL human beings have some shortcoming of which they are unaware, which makes their view on the reality of the universe so hopelessly skewed that they get it all wrong? Are we as clever, and as capable of objective observation, as we think we are? I'm going to say-- almost for sure not. And yet we insist on defining reality exactly by those limitations. I suppose a worm would say, "What's all this seeing business you keep going on about? Make me taste it, or it's not real."

I'd say, we are cleverer than you give us credit for - given that we are aware of the limits and shortcomings of our perceptual capacity and we have figured out ways to overcome them. Unlike your worm, we do not assume that it is not real if it is beyond the limits of our perceptual awareness, we say, if it is real, our perceptual limitations should not be a hindrance for us to perceive it.

[bennyboy]

That's where you are wrong - we are not making a definition in physical terms, we are making it in empirical terms. That is the point you consistently fail to get.

You say tomato, I say "begging the question." By "empirical," you mean observations which can be part of our mutual experience. Let me ask you this, would you accept mental self-reflection or self-observation as an act of empirical observation? If not, then put your thesaurus away, because you are using "physical terms" and "empirical terms" interchangeably.

We are identifying reality based on our ideas - which in turn are based on reality - not defining it. Which is why talking about idealistic monism makes to sense.

Your ideas are based on reality? As in, objective reality? Tell me, pray tell, how are you to confirm this confident assertion, but with your mental faculties? And should these faculties turn out to be too limited to comprehend the truth that the entire universe offers, what then?

Sure. What's the criteria for the falsifiability of your hypothesis that "sentience cannot be shown to be true".

What's this "true" stuff? Sentience, as in the ability to ACTUALLY experience rather than just to process information from the environment, cannot be shown to exist, except as a concept.

Wrong - that's the point I'm making. Without the actual capacity to feel experience it'd be impossible to completely mimic the results of experiential data processing.

So basically, there is some unique quality of mind which cannot be represented by any mechanical process, no matter how complex? I mean people are pretty varied-- I don't think passing the Turing test is going to be so hard.

Like I said, the current preponderance of evidence favors the physicalist interpretation of all mental functions, including sentience. Thus, the discovery of the elements I mentioned can be reasonably expected - though not guranteed - hence the use of the word "yet".

The preponderance of evidence shows that every mind which is able to communicate the fact of its awareness to human beings supervenes on the human brain. It says nothing about how any physical system CAN supervene the important quality of actual awareness, or about what other physical systems might have some level of awareness.

That's your problem: you don't say "we don't know yet, let's find out", your default position is "we can't know at all". Thankfully, the scientists don't share your view.

Strawman much? I've never said we shouldn't try to find out about the brain or the mind. I've said that the ASSUMPTIONS we make about mind are neither proven nor provable, due to limitations intrinsic to the subjective perspective.

But let me say this: all the science we do begins and ends with sentience. You think looking through a microscope is an objective process? Or gazing through a telescope? No. These things are all experiences, and so all of science happens at the level of concepts, not the level of any physical reality that might underly them.

Don't believe me? Then answer me this: is a tree, for example, more properly referred to as an object, or as an emergent property of particles completely lacking tree-ness?

Assuming that the worm or the bat is capable of that level of understanding - this is a question for you to ponder upon. I think about the issue quite frequently and have a few ideas about how to go about this - but any such discussion would be pointless if you keep arguing from the assumption that it can't be done.

lol this is an anthropomorphic example. The point is that we can see that all living things are intrinsically limited in their capacity to comprehend the truth. We can fully understand WHY a worm can never ever comprehend, for example, the doppler shift of stars moving at different speeds; the worm cannot see, and so it cannot be said to comprehend "reality." Now, what are the chances that humans are so perfect in our perceptions that we have no absolute system limitations of this kind? I say zero percent; what say you?

[genkaus]

You say tomato, I say "begging the question." By "empirical," you mean observations which can be part of our mutual experience. Let me ask you this, would you accept mental self-reflection or self-observation as an act of empirical observation? If not, then put your thesaurus away, because you are using "physical terms" and "empirical terms" interchangeably.

Yes, I would accept mental self-reflection as an act of empirical observation. And no, by "empirical" I do not exclusively refer to observations necessarily a part of mutual experience. This is just another strawman created by your failure to understand established concepts.

Your ideas are based on reality? As in, objective reality? Tell me, pray tell, how are you to confirm this confident assertion, but with your mental faculties? And should these faculties turn out to be too limited to comprehend the truth that the entire universe offers, what then?

Yes. Yes. The confirmation of the assertion lies in its negation being self-refuting. And as long as these faculties are capable of comprehending the truth, their limitations are irrelevant.

What's this "true" stuff? Sentience, as in the ability to ACTUALLY experience rather than just to process information from the environment, cannot be shown to exist, except as a concept.

Any evidence for this assertion? Any evidence to show that the ability to ACTUALLY experience is something other than the ability to process information? What's the criteria of falsifiability in this? That is, what evidence do you require so that you may accept that sentience has been shown to exist?

So basically, there is some unique quality of mind which cannot be represented by any mechanical process, no matter how complex? I mean people are pretty varied-- I don't think passing the Turing test is going to be so hard.

Wrong. The unique quality of mind called "sentience" is a specific form of data-processing and its results cannot be mimicked by any other form of data-processing. So, if a mechanical process is to represent results specific to the quality of sentience, it'd need to be sentient itself.

The preponderance of evidence shows that every mind which is able to communicate the fact of its awareness to human beings supervenes on the human brain. It says nothing about how any physical system CAN supervene the important quality of actual awareness, or about what other physical systems might have some level of awareness.

Evidence also shows that not every mind that is aware can actually communicate the fact of its awareness. So the fact that your argument says nothing about the quality of awareness is irrelevant.

Strawman much? I've never said we shouldn't try to find out about the brain or the mind. I've said that the ASSUMPTIONS we make about mind are neither proven nor provable, due to limitations intrinsic to the subjective perspective.

[Emphasis mine] Your words, not mine. You are the one starting with the position that the assumptiones we make about mind are neither proven nor provable. This is precisely the position I'm accusing you of - therefore, not a strawman.

But let me say this: all the science we do begins and ends with sentience. You think looking through a microscope is an objective process? Or gazing through a telescope? No. These things are all experiences, and so all of science happens at the level of concepts, not the level of any physical reality that might underly them.

Wrong. Again. Sentience is not necessary for engaging in science. I don't need to personally look through the microscope or the telescope - as a matter of fact, nowadays, we prefer to have machines that analyze the visual data and simply give us the results.

Don't believe me? Then answer me this: is a tree, for example, more properly referred to as an object, or as an emergent property of particles completely lacking tree-ness?

An object.

lol this is an anthropomorphic example. The point is that we can see that all living things are intrinsically limited in their capacity to comprehend the truth. We can fully understand WHY a worm can never ever comprehend, for example, the doppler shift of stars moving at different speeds; the worm cannot see, and so it cannot be said to comprehend "reality." Now, what are the chances that humans are so perfect in our perceptions that we have no absolute system limitations of this kind? I say zero percent; what say you?

Now you are confusing comprehension for perception? What is wrong with you?

The limitations on an entity's perceptual capacity does not intrinsically limit its capacity to comprehend the truth. The reason why a worm cannot comprehend the doppler shift is not because it cannot see, its because it lacks the requisite higher brain functions required for comprehension. Perceptual perfection is not necessary for comprehending the truth. The advances made by science are definitive evidence of that - we are quite capable of comprehending the truths that go way, way beyond our perceptual capacity. Which is precisely why - so far - we do not know of any intrinsic limitations on our capacity to understand the truth and there is no evidence to suggest that any such intrinsic limitations exist.

[bennyboy]

Yes, I would accept mental self-reflection as an act of empirical observation. And no, by "empirical" I do not exclusively refer to observations necessarily a part of mutual experience. This is just another strawman created by your failure to understand established concepts.

Great. If you accept mental self-reflection as one source of empirical observations, and you do not instist that "mental" must be read as "exclusively brain function," then we've finally agreed on something.

Yes. Yes. The confirmation of the assertion lies in its negation being self-refuting. And as long as these faculties are capable of comprehending the truth, their limitations are irrelevant.

The truth is a philosophical construct, that can ONLY be proven in context. So for the worm, substance X may taste bad. It is true that for worms, substance X tastes bad. In the worldview in which solipsism is assumed false, then it is true that my wife gave me breakfast and said "good morning." That's a description of my experience, unburdened by philosophical possibilities that would make that statement fail to represent reality. In the worldview in which the univere is physically monist, then it is true that the brain is the source of mind-- as we are limited to physical structures and processes in determining where mind comes from, and it would be goofy to choose any OTHER PHYSICAL structure.

However, it is not absolutely true that substance X tastes bad-- that truth is dependent on opinion. It is not provably absolutely true that my wife fed me, because I cannot poove using any experience at my disposal that anything exists outside my experience of it. It is not provably absolutely true the the mind is in the brain, because it is not provably true that all the experiences which minds have, including the experience of looking at brains through fMRI machines, come from outside those minds.

So be careful of "truthiness" masquerading as truth, when your truths are not provable. All you can do is say, "In a world view where X is assumed, Y seems true."

Any evidence for this assertion? Any evidence to show that the ability to ACTUALLY experience is something other than the ability to process information? What's the criteria of falsifiability in this? That is, what evidence do you require so that you may accept that sentience has been shown to exist?

BOP hot-potato game fails here. Subjective awareness exists; I will not move forward with any debate which doesn't accept this fact, since I can experience its truth on my own. You have specific ideas about the mind, i.e. that it is a property supervenient on the brain, and is therefore physical.

You can poke in the brain and find "evidence" in people saying "I smell smoke." You can also look out your window and see evidence that the world is flat. But neither of these pieces of evidence is sufficient to constitute proof. You must exhaust other possibilites.

Wrong. The unique quality of mind called "sentience" is a specific form of data-processing and its results cannot be mimicked by any other form of data-processing. So, if a mechanical process is to represent results specific to the quality of sentience, it'd need to be sentient itself.

You've stated this belief a couple times now, but I don't think you've shown it true. Pray tell, what specific form of data-processing are you referring to?

Evidence also shows that not every mind that is aware can actually communicate the fact of its awareness.

Not without begging the question, it doesn't. You're talking about a functional definition of mind, not about actual experience.

[Emphasis mine] Your words, not mine. You are the one starting with the position that the assumptiones we make about mind are neither proven nor provable. This is precisely the position I'm accusing you of - therefore, not a strawman.

I say it's not proven because it's not proven. I say it's not provable because the validity of all physical evidence requires philosophical assumptions that beg the question. For example, you must assume that the physical objects you gather evidence about are not products of your own mind (solipsism), or of the Matrix, or the Mind of God, or any other form of idealism. But you can't, because your only way of collecting information about anything is through experience.

Wrong. Again. Sentience is not necessary for engaging in science. I don't need to personally look through the microscope or the telescope - as a matter of fact, nowadays, we prefer to have machines that analyze the visual data and simply give us the results.

Right. You use your mind to generate ideas about the world, you program your tool to measure photons or temperature or whatever, and then you collect the results-- by experiencing a readout display. There is no case in which observations can be made without some experience. At best, you could have a kind of informational Schrodinger's Cat, where you set a machine to perform a particular function, and where the result must be TrueFalse until it is resolved by your experience of it.

Don't believe me? Then answer me this: is a tree, for example, more properly referred to as an object, or as an emergent property of particles completely lacking tree-ness?

An object.

Okay, and what are the properties of this object? Solidity? Green-ness? Show me how the constituent particles of a tree have either of those properties.

Now you are confusing comprehension for perception? What is wrong with you?

No. I'm saying an inability to perceive the truth is an inability to comprehend it.

The limitations on an entity's perceptual capacity does not intrinsically limit its capacity to comprehend the truth. The reason why a worm cannot comprehend the doppler shift is not because it cannot see, its because it lacks the requisite higher brain functions required for comprehension. Perceptual perfection is not necessary for comprehending the truth. The advances made by science are definitive evidence of that - we are quite capable of comprehending the truths that go way, way beyond our perceptual capacity.

No, we're not. We have shown, definitively, that we can use technology to refine and expand our ability to perceive. But in order to do this, we have to have some idea about what ability we want to refine. If there is some important property in the universe which we can neither comprehend nor even imagine, we will not be able to do this.

[genkaus]

Great. If you accept mental self-reflection as one source of empirical observations, and you do not instist that "mental" must be read as "exclusively brain function," then we've finally agreed on something.

Hold yer horses. Here, the only statement I made is that mental self-reflection is a source of empirical observation. And while I do not insist that "mental" must be read as "exclusively brain function", I do read mental as "only brain function", since you've not proven that there is anything more to it.

The truth is a philosophical construct, that can ONLY be proven in context. So for the worm, substance X may taste bad. It is true that for worms, substance X tastes bad. In the worldview in which solipsism is assumed false, then it is true that my wife gave me breakfast and said "good morning." That's a description of my experience, unburdened by philosophical possibilities that would make that statement fail to represent reality. In the worldview in which the univere is physically monist, then it is true that the brain is the source of mind-- as we are limited to physical structures and processes in determining where mind comes from, and it would be goofy to choose any OTHER PHYSICAL structure.

However, it is not absolutely true that substance X tastes bad-- that truth is dependent on opinion. It is not provably absolutely true that my wife fed me, because I cannot poove using any experience at my disposal that anything exists outside my experience of it. It is not provably absolutely true the the mind is in the brain, because it is not provably true that all the experiences which minds have, including the experience of looking at brains through fMRI machines, come from outside those minds.

So be careful of "truthiness" masquerading as truth, when your truths are not provable. All you can do is say, "In a world view where X is assumed, Y seems true."

That's the coherence theory of truth. Try out the correspondence theory of truth for size.

Truth is a philosophical construct that indicates how well a statement corresponds to objective reality. So, when we say that for worms, substance X tastes bad, the truth of the statement is determined by the fact of whether or not there is actually a "bad taste" sensation produced in the worms. According to this theory, your worldview itself is subject to true/false evaluation. So, here it doesn't matter if your beliefs are "true" within the context of your worldview - if your worldview is false, i.e. it does not accurately represent reality, then the truth-value of your statement is invalid.

Within this context, the term "absolutely" is meaningless, but the true/false value of a statement is provable.

BOP hot-potato game fails here. Subjective awareness exists; I will not move forward with any debate which doesn't accept this fact, since I can experience its truth on my own. You have specific ideas about the mind, i.e. that it is a property supervenient on the brain, and is therefore physical.

So, you accept that subjective awareness exists and yet you are not willing to accept any proof of that it exists? You sound curiously like a theist: "God exists and I have experienced this truth on my own, but it is not possible to prove that he exists."

You can poke in the brain and find "evidence" in people saying "I smell smoke." You can also look out your window and see evidence that the world is flat. But neither of these pieces of evidence is sufficient to constitute proof. You must exhaust other possibilites.

Maybe you missed the memo, but there are no proofs in science - only evidence. The hypothesis with the most amount of evidence for it wins out and it does not need to disprove all the other positions out there. And right now, my hypothesis has the evidence.

You've stated this belief a couple times now, but I don't think you've shown it true. Pray tell, what specific form of data-processing are you referring to?

I've told you already - try remembering it this time. Self-referential data-processing.

A system (mind) receives data from external sources (sense data) and processes it leading to specific results.

If the same system receives the above event, i.e. the reception and processing, as data and processes that as well, then that phenomena is called "experience". A collection of such multiple experiences give result in "sentience".

Not without begging the question, it doesn't. You're talking about a functional definition of mind, not about actual experience.

Ever heard of the locked-in syndrome? Anesthesia awareness? These are examples that show that communication is not the only way to detect awareness.

I say it's not proven because it's not proven. I say it's not provable because the validity of all physical evidence requires philosophical assumptions that beg the question. For example, you must assume that the physical objects you gather evidence about are not products of your own mind (solipsism), or of the Matrix, or the Mind of God, or any other form of idealism. But you can't, because your only way of collecting information about anything is through experience.

Except for the fact that the validity of those philosophical assumptions is subject to judgment as well. Which is why, assumptions based on objective reality do not beg the question. You should be able to justify your philosophical assumptions as well.

Right. You use your mind to generate ideas about the world, you program your tool to measure photons or temperature or whatever, and then you collect the results-- by experiencing a readout display. There is no case in which observations can be made without some experience. At best, you could have a kind of informational Schrodinger's Cat, where you set a machine to perform a particular function, and where the result must be TrueFalse until it is resolved by your experience of it.

Wrong again. The existence of a readout display indicates that observation has already been made without there being any experience involved. In fact, I can write a program to automatically calibrate the tool according to the raw data received, I can create another program to receive the result from the display and yet another program to analyze those results according to specific concepts and report the conclusions and the whole scientific process after formulating the hypothesis has taken place without any experiential involvement. In fact, once I can write programs capable of formulating concepts instead of simply working by them, we can get rid of human experience in science altogether.

Okay, and what are the properties of this object? Solidity? Green-ness? Show me how the constituent particles of a tree have either of those properties.

Solidity more than green-ness. However, constituent particles don't need a particular property for that property to be present in whole. But that is not the same concept as "emergentism".

No. I'm saying an inability to perceive the truth is an inability to comprehend it.

You can't perceive the truth - you perceive reality, you comprehend truth.

No, we're not. We have shown, definitively, that we can use technology to refine and expand our ability to perceive. But in order to do this, we have to have some idea about what ability we want to refine. If there is some important property in the universe which we can neither comprehend nor even imagine, we will not be able to do this.

You say that you are not confusing comprehension with perception, but your arguments suggest otherwise. There are many important properties of universe that are beyond our perception, but we comprehend them. Even properties which seem counter-intuitive or incomprehensible - we comprehend them as well. So, there is simply no evidence to suggest there being some incomprehensible/unimaginab;e property of the universe.

Also, we are not limited to simply expanding our basic modes of perception either. For example, we don't have the ability to perceive the chemical make-up of an object. That hasn't stopped us from building something capable of such perception.

[Edwardo Piet]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pCofmZlC72g

[bennyboy]

That's the coherence theory of truth. Try out the correspondence theory of truth for size.

Truth is a philosophical construct that indicates how well a statement corresponds to objective reality. So, when we say that for worms, substance X tastes bad, the truth of the statement is determined by the fact of whether or not there is actually a "bad taste" sensation produced in the worms. According to this theory, your worldview itself is subject to true/false evaluation. So, here it doesn't matter if your beliefs are "true" within the context of your worldview - if your worldview is false, i.e. it does not accurately represent reality, then the truth-value of your statement is invalid.

Reality is one thing, and proving that your idea represents it is quite another. You are fond of the word "evidence," and avoid the word "proof" like the plague, for obvious reasons: philosophical positions cannot be proven in the way that you would normally require positions to be proven: through empirical observations which can be shared with others.

Don't believe me? What observations can you use to prove that your observations represent reality?

So, you accept that subjective awareness exists and yet you are not willing to accept any proof of that it exists? You sound curiously like a theist: "God exists and I have experienced this truth on my own, but it is not possible to prove that he exists."

I absolutely agree. From the perspective of an objective system like science, you can as well prove that God exists as you can prove that a system is actually experiencing anything.

I've told you already - try remembering it this time. Self-referential data-processing.

A system (mind) receives data from external sources (sense data) and processes it leading to specific results.

If the same system receives the above event, i.e. the reception and processing, as data and processes that as well, then that phenomena is called "experience". A collection of such multiple experiences give result in "sentience".

And back to the question-begging substitution of operational definitions for real ones. The fact is, that when I wake up and open my eyes, I do more than process light: I experience red as redness. If you want experience to mean other than that, it matters little: the fact of that subjective perception defies semantic attempts to squeeze it into your model.

Ever heard of the locked-in syndrome? Anesthesia awareness? These are examples that show that communication is not the only way to detect awareness.

Not the only way? There isn't even ONE way. All we can do is talk to an organism, and if it reports that it is subjectively experiencing its environment, we can choose whether we are willing to believe it.

Except for the fact that the validity of those philosophical assumptions is subject to judgment as well. Which is why, assumptions based on objective reality do not beg the question. You should be able to justify your philosophical assumptions as well.

They rely on the assumption that there IS an objective reality.

Wrong again. The existence of a readout display indicates that observation has already been made without there being any experience involved. In fact, I can write a program to automatically calibrate the tool according to the raw data received, I can create another program to receive the result from the display and yet another program to analyze those results according to specific concepts and report the conclusions and the whole scientific process after formulating the hypothesis has taken place without any experiential involvement. In fact, once I can write programs capable of formulating concepts instead of simply working by them, we can get rid of human experience in science altogether.

Remember we're talking about using empirical observations to act as evidence for theories, not about making robots that do cool stuff automatically. Well, if you want to use your wonderfully programmed machine to confirm your theory, you (or some other sentient being) are going to have to be able to experience its resultant state in some way.

Solidity more than green-ness. However, constituent particles don't need a particular property for that property to be present in whole. But that is not the same concept as "emergentism".

Call it "boobeldyboo" if you want. Without a sentient mind to see the green-ness, or to draw the idea of "solidity" from a particular density or arrangment of wave function in space, entity words like "tree" are meaningless.

No, we're not. We have shown, definitively, that we can use technology to refine and expand our ability to perceive. But in order to do this, we have to have some idea about what ability we want to refine. If there is some important property in the universe which we can neither comprehend nor even imagine, we will not be able to do this.

You say that you are not confusing comprehension with perception, but your arguments suggest otherwise. There are many important properties of universe that are beyond our perception, but we comprehend them. Even properties which seem counter-intuitive or incomprehensible - we comprehend them as well. So, there is simply no evidence to suggest there being some incomprehensible/unimaginab;e property of the universe.

You say "evidence" too much, as a substitute for "not provable, but I believe it anyway." It sounds like you are saying there is no information in the universe, of any type, which humans cannot observe. What's your evidence for that? That we can perceive some things?

[genkaus]

Reality is one thing, and proving that your idea represents it is quite another. You are fond of the word "evidence," and avoid the word "proof" like the plague, for obvious reasons: philosophical positions cannot be proven in the way that you would normally require positions to be proven: through empirical observations which can be shared with others.

Don't believe me? What observations can you use to prove that your observations represent reality?

You seem to be very, very confused about a lot of philosophical concepts. Try understanding them before blindly using them in whatever way seems okay.

I use the words proof and evidence in two different contexts - philosophical and scientific. Within philosophy, you use logic and deductive reasoning - here, the proof is possible. Within science, you use empirical observation and inductive reasoning - here only evidence is possible. Even in simultaneous application of these two fields of study, you have to be careful to keep the lines of reasoning separate. Therefore, a statement like "prove" your position through "empirical observation" is simply idiotic.

So, either your question should be "What logical reasoning can you use to prove that your observations represent reality?" or "What observations can you use as evidence to support your position that your observations represent reality?" - keep that difference in mind - don't make me keep correcting you.

Now, would you like to restate the question in a sensible form or do you insist in keeping it nonsensical and ask me to answer that?

I absolutely agree. From the perspective of an objective system like science, you can as well prove that God exists as you can prove that a system is actually experiencing anything.

Once again, the objective system of science does not prove anything.

And back to the question-begging substitution of operational definitions for real ones. The fact is, that when I wake up and open my eyes, I do more than process light: I experience red as redness. If you want experience to mean other than that, it matters little: the fact of that subjective perception defies semantic attempts to squeeze it into your model.

And back to countering logical arguments with baseless accusations of question begging - given that the operational definitions used here are the real ones. The fact is, when you wake up in the morning, you do more than process light; you process the event of processing light and that is what you call experiencing redness. It is subjective perception because you are perceiving something internal to yourself and it fits quite neatly in my model without any semantic gymnastics. If you want to keep insisting that experience means something other than than without explaining what, then that's your problem.

Not the only way? There isn't even ONE way. All we can do is talk to an organism, and if it reports that it is subjectively experiencing its environment, we can choose whether we are willing to believe it.

So, I assume you can talk to fishes and bugs and other assorted members of the animal kingdom - I mean, how else are you to even start justifying that these creatures are subjectively experiencing their environment?

They rely on the assumption that there IS an objective reality.

Not an assumption - an axiom established by being self-evident and its negation being self-refuting.

Remember we're talking about using empirical observations to act as evidence for theories, not about making robots that do cool stuff automatically. Well, if you want to use your wonderfully programmed machine to confirm your theory, you (or some other sentient being) are going to have to be able to experience its resultant state in some way.

No, we don't. That's the beauty of CyberScientist 3000. I just have to feed in a hypothesis - the CyberScientist will observe and examine any prior studies on the subject, devise experimental criteria for the hypothesis, conduct the experiment, analyze the results, categorize them as evidence for or against the hypothesis and record the results for other applications to observe. The reason why this would work is because observation does not require experience and awareness does not require sentience.

Call it "boobeldyboo" if you want. Without a sentient mind to see the green-ness, or to draw the idea of "solidity" from a particular density or arrangment of wave function in space, entity words like "tree" are meaningless.

Wrong again - what is required is a mind capable of conceptualization, not sentience. You are, once again getting confused between different aspects of consciousness.

You say "evidence" too much, as a substitute for "not provable, but I believe it anyway." It sounds like you are saying there is no information in the universe, of any type, which humans cannot observe. What's your evidence for that? That we can perceive some things?

I say "evidence" because, as I clarified earlier, we are talking about conclusions that we can draw from empirical observation. If I wanted to establish "proof", I'd talk about logic. Within the context of observation, I make the statement "lot of evidence for it, therefore I believe it". Within context of logic, I say "Proved as logically sound, therefore, I believe it". Nowhere do I say anything remotely similar to "not provable, but I believe it anyway".

And I am saying that there is no information of any kind that humans cannot observe. The evidence for this is that we've been able to observe many different kinds of information - even the ones beyond our perceptual limitations.

[bennyboy]

Reality is one thing, and proving that your idea represents it is quite another. You are fond of the word "evidence," and avoid the word "proof" like the plague, for obvious reasons: philosophical positions cannot be proven in the way that you would normally require positions to be proven: through empirical observations which can be shared with others.

Don't believe me? What observations can you use to prove that your observations represent reality?

You seem to be very, very confused about a lot of philosophical concepts. Try understanding them before blindly using them in whatever way seems okay.

I use the words proof and evidence in two different contexts - philosophical and scientific. Within philosophy, you use logic and deductive reasoning - here, the proof is possible. Within science, you use empirical observation and inductive reasoning - here only evidence is possible. Even in simultaneous application of these two fields of study, you have to be careful to keep the lines of reasoning separate. Therefore, a statement like "prove" your position through "empirical observation" is simply idiotic.

That's quite the lecture for someone in a philosophy thread who has appealed to evidence (or a lack of it) perhaps a dozen times, in order to shift the BOP. You keep bringing up evidence, and I keep saying that none if it is sufficient to prove the mind even exists.

As for not being able to "prove" things through evidence-- baloney. I can prove that people can fly in the air by showing you a plane. You wouldn't say, "Hrrrm. It appears the evidence supports the hypthesis that people can fly," because in this case, the evidence is sufficiently strong as to consitute proof. Similarly, I would take the observation of the act of someone sailing completely around the world as proof that it wasn't flat. Unless, of course, I was more interested in pedantic semantics than in talking about the subject at hand.

So, either your question should be "What logical reasoning can you use to prove that your observations represent reality?" or "What observations can you use as evidence to support your position that your observations represent reality?" - keep that difference in mind - don't make me keep correcting you.

Now, would you like to restate the question in a sensible form or do you insist in keeping it nonsensical and ask me to answer that?

Did it occur to you that since I've stated many times that accepting the existence of the subjective (i.e. actually experiencing) mind at all is a PHILOSOPHICAL position, that I'm refuting your repeated fall-back position of appealing to evidence when you can't provide a philosophical proof? That's why the post you just quoted used the word "you." I didn't mean that in the general sense of "one." I meant it as in "you, genkaus."

So, I assume you can talk to fishes and bugs and other assorted members of the animal kingdom - I mean, how else are you to even start justifying that these creatures are subjectively experiencing their environment?

Forget other animals, and let's start with people. As I've already said, the step from solipsism to accepting that other people exist and experience as I do is a philosophical assumption, and no empirical evidence is sufficient to constitute proof (yeah, I said it).

No, we don't. That's the beauty of CyberScientist 3000. I just have to feed in a hypothesis - the CyberScientist will observe and examine any prior studies on the subject, devise experimental criteria for the hypothesis, conduct the experiment, analyze the results, categorize them as evidence for or against the hypothesis and record the results for other applications to observe. The reason why this would work is because observation does not require experience and awareness does not require sentience.

And nobody will ever know the result, and be able either to confirm or disprove their scientific hypotheses.

Call it "boobeldyboo" if you want. Without a sentient mind to see the green-ness, or to draw the idea of "solidity" from a particular density or arrangment of wave function in space, entity words like "tree" are meaningless.

Wrong again - what is required is a mind capable of conceptualization, not sentience. You are, once again getting confused between different aspects of consciousness.

Again, call it "boobeldyboo" if you want. Absent the ability to actually experience things, rather than just process data, these entity words are meaningless.

I say "evidence" because, as I clarified earlier, we are talking about conclusions that we can draw from empirical observation. [. . .]
And I am saying that there is no information of any kind that humans cannot observe. The evidence for this is that we've been able to observe many different kinds of information - even the ones beyond our perceptual limitations.

Right. So you are using the fact that we can observe some kinds of information as evidence that we can observe all kinds of information. The worm could do the same thing-- and he'd be wrong.

____

Okay, I have sufficient evidence to prove that my initial instinct to walk away from this discussion was correct. We're both getting a little testy, and we're not really making any headway. If I'm going to pwn or get pwned as a matter of pride, I'd rather do it with better visuals, perhaps in the land of Norrath.

Last word on this stream of ideas goes to you. I'll be making comments about the Sam Harris video, which is very interesting indeed, and I'm sure you and I will be back at it again in a few days.

[genkaus]

That's quite the lecture for someone in a philosophy thread who has appealed to evidence (or a lack of it) perhaps a dozen times, in order to shift the BOP. You keep bringing up evidence, and I keep saying that none if it is sufficient to prove the mind even exists.

As for not being able to "prove" things through evidence-- baloney. I can prove that people can fly in the air by showing you a plane. You wouldn't say, "Hrrrm. It appears the evidence supports the hypthesis that people can fly," because in this case, the evidence is sufficiently strong as to consitute proof. Similarly, I would take the observation of the act of someone sailing completely around the world as proof that it wasn't flat. Unless, of course, I was more interested in pedantic semantics than in talking about the subject at hand.

If you review the thread you'll find that my position is that both monist and dualist positions bear the burden of proof regarding their assertions. As a monist, I accept that it is upto them to provide evidence for mind's existence and to show that mind is a function of the brain. And they have done that. All the research into cognitive science and neuro-biology constitutes as evidence for the monist position.

Similarly, as a dualist, you have the burden of proof to provide evidence for your assertion. This is not shifting the burden, since these are two separate assertions entailing their separate burdens. Therefore, your repetitive argument that the evidence for the monist position is not sufficient to absolutely prove its accuracy is not evidence for your position.

Secondly, you are equivocating on the word "proof", which is why I specified distinct uses of the words proof and evidence. You have no excuse for this sloppy equivocation.

Scientific proof is simply evidence supporting the hypothesis. It doe not "prove" the hypothesis absolutely. Philosophical proof, on the other hand, uses logic and if the premises are true, then the conclusions are proven "absolutely". Therefore, within the scientific context, I would say that "evidence supports the hypothesis that people can fly" and that "observation supports the hypothesis that the world isn't flat" - but I cannot consider any amount of such evidence to be "proof" in the sense of philosophical proof.

Did it occur to you that since I've stated many times that accepting the existence of the subjective (i.e. actually experiencing) mind at all is a PHILOSOPHICAL position, that I'm refuting your repeated fall-back position of appealing to evidence when you can't provide a philosophical proof? That's why the post you just quoted used the word "you." I didn't mean that in the general sense of "one." I meant it as in "you, genkaus."

Both philosophy and science are tools for evaluating reality. "Subjective mind exists" is a statement regarding reality - therefore, it is neither uniquely philosophical nor uniquely scientific. Depending on which tool you use, it could be scientific, philosophical or both. Given my "appeal to evidence", it should've been obvious that I'm judging the existence of mind in a scientific context. If you want the philosophical proof of its existence, then you should stop asking nonsensical questions like "what observations would prove the existence of mind?".

Forget other animals, and let's start with people. As I've already said, the step from solipsism to accepting that other people exist and experience as I do is a philosophical assumption, and no empirical evidence is sufficient to constitute proof (yeah, I said it).

Its not an assumption since solipsism itself is an indefensible and incoherent position as indicated by the problem of other minds. Which is why, accepting the existence of other minds is a philosophically justified position. Besides, there is ample empirical evidence for the that position as well.

And nobody will ever know the result, and be able either to confirm or disprove their scientific hypotheses.

The CyberScientist 3000 will know the result and the CyberScientist 4000 will be able to confirm or disprove the theory - which is the correct term for it now that it has evidence supporting it.

Again, call it "boobeldyboo" if you want. Absent the ability to actually experience things, rather than just process data, these entity words are meaningless.

Call what boobeldyboo? Given that experience itself is processing data, the entity words are entirely meaningful without it.

Right. So you are using the fact that we can observe some kinds of information as evidence that we can observe all kinds of information. The worm could do the same thing-- and he'd be wrong.

Can the worm observe any information beyond its perceptual limits? Because we can. Which is why the worm would be wrong and we'd be right.