Free will Argument against Divine Providence

[Edwardo Piet]

Why does everyone keep spelling my name wrong?

I am not going to care about that, it looks better the way I spelt it anyway.

You are entitled to your opinion. What you are not entitled to is assuming your opinion is a fact and arguing from that assumption.

True. But I'm not doing that, which is illustrated by the fact that I said I'm just giving my opinion and not claiming it to be fact....

Libertarians don't see "chance as free-will" definition as useless and other libertarians don't regard "free-will without chance" as contradictory.

Free will that is not chance and is not determinism... what's that?

And those who see "chance as free will" as not useless... how does that make sense? Would they regard all our actions being decided as dice rolls as "free will"? As Bennyboy argues, that's freedom without the will.

Neither is an established position, but if you enter a debate which presumes libertarian definition then trying to interject another definition makes for an invalid argument.

The fact I'm arguing against the definition demonstrates that I am questioning the soundness and not the validity.

"Free will" has a large effect on what our moral responsibility ultimately is.

It does. But moral responsibility is defined simultaneously with free-will.

If we are unconsciously determined or undetermined, there is no free will in any meaningful way and, yes, no moral responsiiblity in no meaningful way, in my opinion.

Just out of curiosity, how do you think your arguments apply to a dualist worldview?

What kind of dualism?

Whatever the kind, the point is that we are either unconsciously determined or unconsciously undetermined and either way we have no free will in a meaningful way, in my opinion.

[genkaus]

True. But I'm not doing that, which is illustrated by the fact that I said I'm just giving my opinion and not claiming it to be fact....

You didn't state it as an opinion when you kept repeating that free-will must imply ultimate self-responsibility.

Free will that is not chance and is not determinism... what's that?

The way free-will exists within a dualistic context.

And those who see "chance as free will" as not useless... how does that make sense? Would they regard all our actions being decided as dice rolls as "free will"? As Bennyboy argues, that's freedom without the will.

Not sure how it makes sense - it doesn't make sense to me. But yes, that is how they regard "free-will" and they would regard dice-rolls as "free-will" except for the fact that they'd argue that dice-rolls are in fact deterministic.

The fact I'm arguing against the definition demonstrates that I am questioning the soundness and not the validity.

But the fact that you are doing so by simply changing the definition makes your argument invalid.

If we are unconsciously determined or undetermined, there is no free will in any meaningful way and, yes, no moral responsiiblity in no meaningful way, in my opinion.

Only is you assume free-will to mean ultimate self-determination and moral responsibility to mean ultimate moral responsibility - otherwise, there both free-will and moral responsibility can exist in a meaningful way.

What kind of dualism?

Whatever the kind, the point is that we are either unconsciously determined or unconsciously undetermined and either way we have no free will in a meaningful way, in my opinion.

Substance dualism - within which the mind or the soul is exempt from causal determinism and chance - and is therefore considered to be ultimately self-determined.

[Edwardo Piet]

You didn't state it as an opinion when you kept repeating that free-will must imply ultimate self-responsibility.

If it isn't my opinion, who's is it?

Yes, of course, it's my opinion, anyway, moving on.

The way free-will exists within a dualistic context.

What kind of dualism? Physicalist? Non-physicalist?

If non-physicalist, I'm not interested, it can be rejected as nonsense. If physicalist then it makes no difference anyway, it's still nonsense because it doesn't give you any more meaningful free will.

If it does... how?

Not sure how it makes sense - it doesn't make sense to me. But yes, that is how they regard "free-will" and they would regard dice-rolls as "free-will"[...]

So their position is unsound.

But the fact that you are doing so by simply changing the definition makes your argument invalid.

I will answer questions only from now on, since that was a pointless statement you made because as I said, I changed the definition because I believed it to be an unsound one, so the validity/invalidity is irrelevant.

Only is you assume free-will to mean ultimate self-determination and moral responsibility to mean ultimate moral responsibility - otherwise, there both free-will and moral responsibility can exist in a meaningful way.

No it can't because other forms of free will and responsibility are trivial truths.

Substance dualism - within which the mind or the soul is exempt from causal determinism and chance - and is therefore considered to be ultimately self-determined.

Ultimate self-determination is impossible since our will is ultimately either determined by unconsciousness and thereby not self-determined, or it isn't determined at all and therefore can't be self-determined at all since determination is a requisite for self-determination.

From now on I am going to respond to your questions only. Your statements I shall ignore.

[bennyboy]

The reason why your test itself is invalid is as follows:

Your first requirement is that the monist position should prove that any physical system actually experiences the way you do when you wake up in the morning. However, the basic premise of physical monism is that everything is a physical system - including you, me and the rest of the humanity. Which means, you yourself are the example of a physical system that experiences the way you do. Which is why this argument is
a non-starter. The only way to counter this argument is by the assumption that "you" are more than a physical system. Which is basically disagreeing with premise of physical monism, i.e. assuming that "not everything is a physical system" and using that assumption to "disprove" physical monism.

When you start positing that properties which cannot be mutually observed or directly measured are "physical," then you've just redefined the word "physical." But if you're allowing this redefinition, you could also expand it to include God, fairies, the invisible pinkness of IPU and every OTHER entity or property which cannot be mutually observed or directly measured.

Similarly, your second criteria assumes that the dualist definition of mind or free-will is the "correct" definition and therefore, any operational definition of mind is equivalent to begging the question. But, this assumption is incorrect, which you'd realize if you actually took time to study the different views on the philosophy of mind. The most comprehensive and generic definitions of "mind" or "will" are philosophically neutral - they do not imply or favor a particular worldview such as dualism or monism. They are as applicable within monist context as they are within dualist one, though with quite different implications. However, the change in implications does not mean that the particular monist philosopher is redefining the word to avoid philosophical issues. And this is something you'd realize if you actually tried to understand how the word is used within different physicalist viewpoints.

The "correct" definition of mind is "the subjective experience of sensation and ideas" or something like that; it's a label for sentience. Now, you could define mind as brain function, but then what word will we use for "the subjective experience of sensation and ideas?" Let's say we call it "boobledyboo." You and I both know what will happen next: you will say, "boobledyboo is just brain function, and you can't prove otherwise!" But this ignores what most people really care about when they distinguish mind from body: whatever theory or world view you want to talk about, I do in fact wake up and become aware of my mind. And this mind is subjective, and is not objective; forcing it to take an objective meaning is goofy. The existence of the subjective stance is a brute fact, and cannot be defined away, not because of any particular position, but because we need a word to use as a label for that particular brute fact.

So let me ask you this: what are the criteria by which you (or ANY of the models, views or theories you keep telling me I'm ignorant of, but refuse to introduce into the discussion) determine something is "physical?" Let me guess: "Physical means any material, energy, or property which exists," right?

[genkaus]

If it isn't my opinion, who's is it?

Yes, of course, it's my opinion, anyway, moving on.

It may have been your opinion, but you did not present it as such.

What kind of dualism? Physicalist? Non-physicalist?

Physicalist dualism? What's that? Emergentism?

If non-physicalist, I'm not interested, it can be rejected as nonsense.

That's interesting. Because your personal definition of free-will - the one requiring ultimate self-determination - can only make sense within the context of substance dualism.

If physicalist then it makes no difference anyway, it's still nonsense because it doesn't give you any more meaningful free will.

If it does... how?

Assuming that by physicalist dualism you are referring to emergentism, this is how:

According to emergentism, certain entities (or properties or aspects) can arise within the physical system that are not reducible to its parts. The whole becomes more than the sum of its parts. For example, while your brain is formed of neurons firing, the way it functions gives rise to the existence of "mind" or "self" which cannot be described or explained completely by the cellular neural events. Adding indeterminism to the mix, i.e. assuming that the individual states of the parts do not fully determine the whole - you have a bit of "elbow room" at the mental level within which the mind is allowed to determine itself to certain extent. This gap in determination is referred to as "free-will" which would be meaningful in the way you specified.

So their position is unsound.

Not unless you can prove indeterminism to be false.

I will answer questions only from now on, since that was a pointless statement you made because as I said, I changed the definition because I believed it to be an unsound one, so the validity/invalidity is irrelevant.

Except you didn't prove it as unsound, nor did you give any arguments to that effect, thus making your argument by redefinition - as indicated earlier - invalid.

No it can't because other forms of free will and responsibility are trivial truths.

No, they're not.

Ultimate self-determination is impossible since our will is ultimately either determined by unconsciousness and thereby not self-determined, or it isn't determined at all and therefore can't be self-determined at all since determination is a requisite for self-determination.

This is where substance dualism gives you a third option - your will is ultimately determined by your consciousness and is therefore ultimately self-determined.

[genkaus]

When you start positing that properties which cannot be mutually observed or directly measured are "physical," then you've just redefined the word "physical." But if you're allowing this redefinition, you could also expand it to include God, fairies, the invisible pinkness of IPU and every OTHER entity or property which cannot be mutually observed or directly measured.

Firstly, mutual observation and direct measurement are not and have never been the criteria for determining if something is physical - actual observation and actual measurement are. The difference is as follows: I may observe something instantaneous - such as a particular arrangement of clouds - that may not be observed by anyone else or repeated again. That does not make it non-physical. Similarly, in group hallucinations, people may claim to see the same thing, but that does not make it physical because it is not an actual observation. And not everything that is physical can be directly measured - we use indirect methods of measurement all the time in all sorts of cases.

Secondly, it is incorrect to assume that mental phenomena are not mutually observable or directly measurable. In this case, the apparatus for observation and measurement - our brain and nervous system - happens to be the same as the object being observed and measured. And since we typically cannot share the apparatus with someone else, it makes the process of someone else observing or measuring a tad difficult. But not impossible. For example, in case of conjoined twins where two individuals do share a potion of the apparatus, mental phenomena concerning the shared potion is mutually observable and directly measurable by both. This fact is more evident in case of Craniopagus twins where the shared apparatus is a portion of the brain.

The "correct" definition of mind is "the subjective experience of sensation and ideas" or something like that; it's a label for sentience.

No, it isn't. If you are going to argue definitions, then you should atleast consult a dictionary beforehand. The correct definition is:

The set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory.
or
the element, part, substance, or process that reasons, thinks, feels, wills, perceives, judges, etc.
or
The human consciousness that originates in the brain and is manifested especially in thought, perception, emotion, will, memory, and imagination.
or
the element or complex of elements in an individual that feels, perceives, thinks, wills, and especially reasons

And no, it is not a label for sentience.

Now, you could define mind as brain function,

No, I'd define it as in one of the ways given above - none of which match your "correct" definition.

but then what word will we use for "the subjective experience of sensation and ideas?"

Sentience. The word you are looking for is "sentience".

In the philosophy of consciousness, sentience can refer to the ability of any entity to have subjective perceptual experiences, or as some philosophers refer to them, "qualia". This is distinct from other aspects of the mind and consciousness, such as creativity, intelligence, sapience, self-awareness, and intentionality (the ability to have thoughts that mean something or are "about" something). Sentience is a minimalistic way of defining consciousness, which is otherwise commonly used to collectively describe sentience plus other characteristics of the mind.

Clearly, this refers to something different than the mind.

Let's say we call it "boobledyboo." You and I both know what will happen next: you will say, "boobledyboo is just brain function, and you can't prove otherwise!"

Or perhaps I'll say (and by 'I', I mean the physical monist philosopher I'm arguing for) -

"For the given physical monist theory X, sentience - the element of subjectivity associated with the mind - remains the biggest stumbling block that keeps it from being a comprehensive explanation for the existence of "mind". However, given that a lot of other aspects of mind are explained by X and the alternate explanations for sentience lack any evidence for it, X remains the best explanation for the mental phenomena, thus making the assumption that sentience is just another brain function a default position."

But this ignores what most people really care about when they distinguish mind from body: whatever theory or world view you want to talk about, I do in fact wake up and become aware of my mind.

The counter-argument should be really obvious here. The facts are not determined by what people care about. If the evidence suggests - as the physical monists insist it does - that mind is nothing more than specific manner of brain function, then what people care about or what your subjective awareness suggests does not matter.

And this mind is subjective, and is not objective; forcing it to take an objective meaning is goofy. The existence of the subjective stance is a brute fact, and cannot be defined away, not because of any particular position, but because we need a word to use as a label for that particular brute fact.

Do you realize that you are making absolutely no sense here? "Subjective" means based on the mind; existing in mind; or proceeding from mind. Objective means independent of the mind. Talking about subjective or objective while attempting to define the mind is nonsensical. Your "subjective stance" here is not a brute fact, its a tautology - trivially true and essentially meaningless.

So let me ask you this: what are the criteria by which you (or ANY of the models, views or theories you keep telling me I'm ignorant of, but refuse to introduce into the discussion) determine something is "physical?" Let me guess: "Physical means any material, energy, or property which exists," right?

"Determine" if something is physical - I'd say if it can be conceptually reduced to or be explained by its physical constituents.

[bennyboy]

not everything that is physical can be directly measured - we use indirect methods of measurement all the time in all sorts of cases.

Fine. Show me the "actual" measurement of consciousness. I'll wager you're going to show me an fMRI readout.

The "correct" definition of mind is "the subjective experience of sensation and ideas" or something like that; it's a label for sentience.

No, it isn't. If you are going to argue definitions, then you should atleast consult a dictionary beforehand. The correct definition is:

The set of cognitive faculties that enables consciousness, perception, thinking, judgement, and memory.
or
the element, part, substance, or process that reasons, thinks, feels, wills, perceives, judges, etc.
or
The human consciousness that originates in the brain and is manifested especially in thought, perception, emotion, will, memory, and imagination.
or
the element or complex of elements in an individual that feels, perceives, thinks, wills, and especially reasons

And no, it is not a label for sentience.

Okay, you have some pretty varied definitions there. The "brain" definition is an obvious question-beggar, and is out. Now, when I talk about "feeling," I'm talking about an experience. I already know that you're going to wiki feeling and give a definition that does not describe it adequately in my view, like: "the neurological response of an organism's brain to stimulus."

but then what word will we use for "the subjective experience of sensation and ideas?"

Sentience. The word you are looking for is "sentience".

You are about to define sentience as an ability, rather than as any kind of content, so you might want to iron out that inconsistency. But my point is, WHATEVER word we use, even sentience, will eventually get distilled down to a physical-compatible definition, no matter how un-physical-compatible it started out in its initial intention.

In the philosophy of consciousness, sentience can refer to the ability of any entity to have subjective perceptual experiences, or as some philosophers refer to them, "qualia". This is distinct from other aspects of the mind and consciousness, such as creativity, intelligence, sapience, self-awareness, and intentionality (the ability to have thoughts that mean something or are "about" something). Sentience is a minimalistic way of defining consciousness, which is otherwise commonly used to collectively describe sentience plus other characteristics of the mind.

Clearly, this refers to something different than the mind.

Holy strawman, Batman!-- you have just insisted that I'm talking about sentience, and then you go on to show that sentience isn't mind, but a part of it. Nice trick if you can get away with it.

At any rate, whatever you want to call it, or whatever semantic quibble we can make about it, the fact is that there's something about what happens in a human being that separates it (at least we think so) from any other kind of data-processing: the ability to actually experience. In a conversation about free will, we are looking at the possibility that some quality of humanity (call it whatever you want) can affect how the universe unfolds through time. Defining everything in physical terms isn't debating-- it's a refusal to take the debate seriously, or (as you'll see at the end of this post) a refusal to debate.

Or perhaps I'll say (and by 'I', I mean the physical monist philosopher I'm arguing for) -

"For the given physical monist theory X, sentience - the element of subjectivity associated with the mind - remains the biggest stumbling block that keeps it from being a comprehensive explanation for the existence of "mind". However, given that a lot of other aspects of mind are explained by X and the alternate explanations for sentience lack any evidence for it, X remains the best explanation for the mental phenomena, thus making the assumption that sentience is just another brain function a default position."

Hang on, you're getting ahead of things here. I'm still waiting for you to show me a mind, or to prove it exists. You might as well be talking about how God is physical, or IPU.

But this ignores what most people really care about when they distinguish mind from body: whatever theory or world view you want to talk about, I do in fact wake up and become aware of my mind.

The counter-argument should be really obvious here. The facts are not determined by what people care about. If the evidence suggests - as the physical monists insist it does - that mind is nothing more than specific manner of brain function, then what people care about or what your subjective awareness suggests does not matter.

People care about their subjective experience, because it's a fact of high significance to them. And so they have a word to talk about that part of their experience which is not shareable with others except through intermediary symbolism-- the mind.

And this mind is subjective, and is not objective; forcing it to take an objective meaning is goofy. The existence of the subjective stance is a brute fact, and cannot be defined away, not because of any particular position, but because we need a word to use as a label for that particular brute fact.

Do you realize that you are making absolutely no sense here? "Subjective" means based on the mind; existing in mind; or proceeding from mind. Objective means independent of the mind. Talking about subjective or objective while attempting to define the mind is nonsensical. Your "subjective stance" here is not a brute fact, its a tautology - trivially true and essentially meaningless.

And yet, the mind is capable of examining itself, and of thinking about itself, without reference to the physical world outside it, and cannot be directly perceived by others. If you want to argue that my ideas about my own mind are objective, and not subjective, then good luck with that.

"Determine" if something is physical - I'd say if it can be conceptually reduced to or be explained by its physical constituents.

I'd add: it can be shown to exist.

_____

I don't think there's much point continuing with this, unless you want to begin a formal 1 vs. 1 debate; things are getting too squirmy now. The long and short of it is that I don't accept your definitions, or your rationale for choosing them: I think that they beg the question, and you think they are just adapted to different contexts. You don't accept my assertion that some words are intrinsically dualistic or idealistic, and that they must therefore be used in that context.

In the end, when a debate fails at the definition of terms, then that's pretty much all she wrote. We cannot agree on what free will is, and so we cannot carry on a sensible debate about whether it has anything to do with determinism or Divine Providence.

It's been fun trying, though.

[genkaus]

Fine. Show me the "actual" measurement of consciousness. I'll wager you're going to show me an fMRI readout.

That's right.

Okay, you have some pretty varied definitions there. The "brain" definition is an obvious question-beggar, and is out. Now, when I talk about "feeling," I'm talking about an experience. I already know that you're going to wiki feeling and give a definition that does not describe it adequately in my view, like: "the neurological response of an organism's brain to stimulus."

I already gave you the word for it and its definition.

You are about to define sentience as an ability, rather than as any kind of content, so you might want to iron out that inconsistency.

Predictions like "you are about to define..." aren't as impressive when I've already done the defining.

But my point is, WHATEVER word we use, even sentience, will eventually get distilled down to a physical-compatible definition, no matter how un-physical-compatible it started out in its initial intention.

And this is where you "beg the question". You assume that the concept started out as physicalist-incompatible - that the 'correct' definition reflects that incompatibility and that any physicalist compatibility indicates a redefinition.

Holy strawman, Batman!-- you have just insisted that I'm talking about sentience, and then you go on to show that sentience isn't mind, but a part of it. Nice trick if you can get away with it.

And I can get away with it because its not a strawman. You specifically asked for the word used to describe "subjective experience of sensation and ideas" and as it happens sentience (the ability of subjective experience) and qualia (the subjective experience itself) are used to to describe that concept. Further, as it happens, these are identified not as the whole of mind, but as specific aspects of it as distinct from other aspects.

At any rate, whatever you want to call it, or whatever semantic quibble we can make about it, the fact is that there's something about what happens in a human being that separates it (at least we think so) from any other kind of data-processing: the ability to actually experience. In a conversation about free will, we are looking at the possibility that some quality of humanity (call it whatever you want) can affect how the universe unfolds through time. Defining everything in physical terms isn't debating-- it's a refusal to take the debate seriously, or (as you'll see at the end of this post) a refusal to debate.

The first thing to note is that you made it a semantic quibble when you started arguing from 'correct' definition. Secondly, the definitions given here are not limiting the concept in physical terms - they are equally applicable to substance dualism, pan-psychicism or idealism. Thirdly, the implications of these definitions within a particular philosophy do not constitute a refusal to debate, they put the debate in context and clarify the points at which the debate actually makes sense.

Hang on, you're getting ahead of things here. I'm still waiting for you to show me a mind, or to prove it exists. You might as well be talking about how God is physical, or IPU.

By mind you mean the faculty of consciousness, perception, thought, judgment and memory. So the proof would mean a conscious individual capable of awareness, perceiving, thinking, judging and remembering. Do you not qualify for this?

People care about their subjective experience, because it's a fact of high significance to them. And so they have a word to talk about that part of their experience which is not shareable with others except through intermediary symbolism-- the mind.

Which is precisely why even if we were to discover that "sentience" is a brain function, the word would continue to be meaningful and people would continue to use it in the same sense they currently do.

And yet, the mind is capable of examining itself, and of thinking about itself, without reference to the physical world outside it, and cannot be directly perceived by others. If you want to argue that my ideas about my own mind are objective, and not subjective, then good luck with that.

Yes, self-awareness is one of the features of the mind - but the terms subjective or objective are not applicable at this point.

I'd add: it can be shown to exist.

You'd be wrong. Like I said, our capability to show whether or not it exists would've no bearing on whether it actually exists or if it is physical.

I don't think there's much point continuing with this, unless you want to begin a formal 1 vs. 1 debate; things are getting too squirmy now. The long and short of it is that I don't accept your definitions, or your rationale for choosing them: I think that they beg the question, and you think they are just adapted to different contexts. You don't accept my assertion that some words are intrinsically dualistic or idealistic, and that they must therefore be used in that context.

In the end, when a debate fails at the definition of terms, then that's pretty much all she wrote. We cannot agree on what free will is, and so we cannot carry on a sensible debate about whether it has anything to do with determinism or Divine Providence.

It's been fun trying, though.

I think you should accept my given definitions because they are, in fact, the given definitions, i.e. indicative of what most people mean by the word when they use it. And this happens to be one of the few cases where appeal to popularity is not a logical fallacy.

I do accept that certain words are intrinsically dualistic or idealistic - words such as "soul" or "spirit". What I do not accept is that "mind", "sentience" or "will" are some of those words. I do not accept it because when I look at their 'correct' definitions, I find them to be equally applicable in monist, dualist or idealist contexts.

I also do not think that a disagreement in definitions should be an end of the debate especially when one definition is more inclusive than the other. For example, if we disagree on "free" where you consider it to mean "free from determinism" and I consider it to mean "free from certain constraints which may or may not be determinism", then the next logical step is to discuss which constraints make sense and whether or not determinism is one of them. Similarly, if you consider "will" to mean "non-physical attribute of the mind that makes decisions" and I consider it to be "attribute of the mind that makes decisions", the next step would be to discuss if "will" would have to be necessarily non-physical or physical.

[Edwardo Piet]

Physicalist dualism? What's that? Emergentism?

Yes.

---

It may have been your opinion, but you did not present it as such.

Since my statement is not a lie, when I state it I also think it which means that it is my opinion.

It's my opinion since I think it.

That's interesting. Because your personal definition of free-will - the one requiring ultimate self-determination - can only make sense within the context of substance dualism.

Ultimate self-determination is impossible. Ultimately we are not determined by ourselves.

We are ultimately not self-determined.

According to emergentism, certain entities (or properties or aspects) can arise within the physical system that are not reducible to its parts. The whole becomes more than the sum of its parts. For example, while your brain is formed of neurons firing, the way it functions gives rise to the existence of "mind" or "self" which cannot be described or explained completely by the cellular neural events. Adding indeterminism to the mix, i.e. assuming that the individual states of the parts do not fully determine the whole - you have a bit of "elbow room" at the mental level within which the mind is allowed to determine itself to certain extent. This gap in determination is referred to as "free-will" which would be meaningful in the way you specified.

A gap in determination is just randomness or probabilisticality, neither of which are ourselves doing the determinining and thereby having free will, since for ourselves to do the determining that would require NO gap in determination AND our determination to be ultimately determined by ourselves and not all entirely determined, ultimately, by everything that is not our conscious self.

A gap in determination is a gap in self-determination.

Not unless you can prove indeterminism to be false.

An absence of determinism is an absence of self-determinism.

Except you didn't prove it as unsound, nor did you give any arguments to that effect, thus making your argument by redefinition - as indicated earlier - invalid.

It's a contradiction, no determination means no self determination.

With or without determinism there is no free will.

This is where substance dualism gives you a third option - your will is ultimately determined by your consciousness and is therefore ultimately self-determined.

Our consciousness doesn't determine itself ultimately, therefore our will isn't ultimately determined either.

[genkaus]

Since my statement is not a lie, when I state it I also think it which means that it is my opinion.

It's my opinion since I think it.

Given that you haven't shown your opinion to be true, it could very well be a lie.

Ultimate self-determination is impossible. Ultimately we are not determined by ourselves.

We are ultimately not self-determined.

Unless you subscribe to dualism, where ultimate self-determination is possible.

A gap in determination is just randomness or probabilisticality, neither of which are ourselves doing the determinining and thereby having free will, since for ourselves to do the determining that would require NO gap in determination AND our determination to be ultimately determined by ourselves and not all entirely determined, ultimately, by everything that is not our conscious self.

A gap in determination is a gap in self-determination.

Not according to emergentist philosophers. According to them, a gap in determination means room for self-determination to take place - not randomness of probability. Thus there is no final gap in determination, since the gap in physical determination is filled in by self-determination.

A gap in determinations is a gap for self-determination.

An absence of determinism is an absence of self-determinism.

Sez you.

It's a contradiction, no determination means no self determination.

There is a difference between no determination and indetermination.

With or without determinism there is no free will.

Only if we accept your definition of free will within your metaphysical context. We are not doing that.

Our consciousness doesn't determine itself ultimately, therefore our will isn't ultimately determined either.

That's incorrect. Within many contexts of dualism, your consciousness does determine itself ultimately.