Free will Argument against Divine Providence

[Edwardo Piet]

Actually, if our will is acausal then we are equally not free because we can't will it ourself. If it is non-determined then we do not determine it either. We are part of the universe.

Anyway...

[genkaus]

Actually, if our will is acausal then we are equally not free because we can't will it ourself. If it is non-determined then we do not determine it either. We are part of the universe.

Anyway...

Did you miss the point completely? I'm saying that your argument is valid if and only if the definition of 'free-will' is 'will that is determined completely by oneself and free from everything other than oneself'.

Suppose I use an alternate definition: "It is irrelevant what determined my will. Having free-will means having the freedom to act according to your will". For example, suppose it is my will that I should have a great deal of money and a comfortable life. It would be irrelevant that the reason for this will would be that I was very poor growing up and never had anything. If I have the freedom to pursue this goal of having money and a comfortable life, then I have free will. Free-will is not contingent on how the will is formed but on how it behaves.

Given this interpretation of free-will, your counter-argument would not apply at all.

[Edwardo Piet]

Did you already miss that it was clear what definition I was talking about in the first place?

P1) Humans have free will to choose otherwise than they did (libertarian).

They have ultimate choice in a non-random self-determined way? I think not.

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The other definition doesn't deal with the issue that some people believe in the shitty libertarian definition anyway, it merely deals with the obvious; so your definition is futile, in my opinion.

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You are merely talking about the fact that our will has relative freedom AFTER it is fully determined ultimately entirely. So what? Everyone believes that apart from idiot fatalists. Even full blown determinism doesn't imply fatalism.

Trivial compatabilists. The "you" that is your personality and identity is ultimately entirely unfree, (but yes indeed, so what? However many people do find this important and believe otherwise like free-tards and that's what matters... that's the serious part of the debate (the part that isn't petty).

Yes you are free to act as your will wills... guess what? Of course! That's why it's called your will! It does all that for you anyway!! That's what it's meant to do either way! That's the whole point!

Compatabilism. Compatabilism. It's a diversion from the debate based on pedantic, trivial, futilism, fucking compatabilsm. Waste of time.

[bennyboy]

Either we are determined or we are not (or partly, which I dealt with above).... and our own self-determination (meaning self-motivation) has to, ultimately, be motivated (determined) unconsciously from somewhere. I hope that you understand. I don't know how you define "free will" but I'm talking about the (non-political) libertarian sense of free will, google it.

Here's what I do understand. In many ways, free-will is similar to the idea of god. People have a vague idea about what it means and based on that idea, they decide whether or not to believe in its existence. All the specifications and rationalizations are then based upon this belief. And that is why many people end up defending or criticizing a concept of free-will that didn't make any sense in the first place.

The first thing to be answered while considering free-will is what is it that your will is supposed to be free from? Your belief or non-belief in it should be based on the answer to this question.

Within libertarian metaphysics, the answer to this would be causality/determinism. In your words, if an agent's will is ultimately indeterminable - i.e. if we are ultimately undetermined, then our will is free from causality and therefore we have free-will. Whether or not our will is "ultimately self-determined" is not a consideration here.

Your idea of free-will seems to be that it is supposed to be free from everything but the self. In your view, it seems that if a person's will is contingent upon anything other than his self - whether fully determined or undetermined - then the will is not free. So, for you, "ultimate determination" is irrelevant unless it involves the self.

And these are two different conceptualizations of free-will. In my opinion, both definitions, upon closer inspection, render the concept of free-will, superfluous and pointless. However, given the basic difference of definition, your criticism of free-will does not apply to the libertarian view of it.

I'd say free will is the freedom to act on ideas, principles, etc.-- in other words, to process the universe through your own unique symbolism, and to impose that symbolism ON the universe to some degree.

This implies the reality of a self somehow distinct from the rest of the universe (which we obviously all accept since we're talking about people in exactly this way). My problem with determinists is that they constantly mix coneptual realities (for example, about people, feelings, etc.) with objective realities (physics and chemistry). There's no bennyboy in physics or chemistry; the physical reality is just a bunch of particles vibrating in space, and energy flowing through various channels and routes. Particles do this EVERYWHERE, and energy does this EVERYWHERE; bennyboy is an arbitrary concept.

[genkaus]

Did you already miss that it was clear what definition I was talking about in the first place?

P1) Humans have free will to choose otherwise than they did (libertarian).

They have ultimate choice in a non-random self-determined way? I think not.

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The other definition doesn't deal with the issue that some people believe in the shitty libertarian definition anyway, it merely deals with the obvious; so your definition is futile, in my opinion.

Did you miss the point where I indicated the difference between your definition and the Libertarian definition?

No, it is not clear which definition of free-will you are talking about.

Are you using the Libertarian definition which requires only the option of "choosing otherwise" and the requirement of it being "ultimately self-determined" is unnecessary? In this case, your criticism does not apply.

Are you using your own definition which requires free-will to be "ultimately self-determined"? In which case, your criticism would apply, but that's irrelevant because that wasn't the point of the thread to begin with.

I provided a third definition to illustrate the point that your criticism applies to your definition of free-will and not any other definition - including the Libertarian definition.

You are merely talking about the fact that our will has relative freedom AFTER it is fully determined ultimately entirely. So what? Everyone believes that apart from idiot fatalists. Even full blown determinism doesn't imply fatalism.

Trivial compatabilists. The "you" that is your personality and identity is ultimately entirely unfree, (but yes indeed, so what? However many people do find this important and believe otherwise like free-tards and that's what matters... that's the serious part of the debate (the part that isn't petty).

Yes you are free to act as your will wills... guess what? Of course! That's why it's called your will! It does all that for you anyway!! That's what it's meant to do either way! That's the whole point!

Compatabilism. Compatabilism. It's a diversion from the debate based on pedantic, trivial, futilism, fucking compatabilsm. Waste of time.

Except, its not compatibilism because determinism is irrelevant to my definition of free-will. My definition of free-will was "freedom to act according to your will irrespective of how that will came about". Being determined by past events was just one possibility. Our will may just as easily be determined by random quantum fluctuations in the brain and my definition would still apply as long as we are free to act accordingly.

And the point of providing that definition was to show how your criticism only applies to your definition of free-will. In a non-deterministic universe, my definition of free-will would be compatible with and inclusive of the Libertarian definition of free-will. And since your criticism does not apply to my definition, it does not apply to all possible interpretations of Libertarian free-will. Which means, your criticism only applies to your own narrow interpretation of the Libertarian position.

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I'd say free will is the freedom to act on ideas, principles, etc.-- in other words, to process the universe through your own unique symbolism, and to impose that symbolism ON the universe to some degree.

This implies the reality of a self somehow distinct from the rest of the universe (which we obviously all accept since we're talking about people in exactly this way). My problem with determinists is that they constantly mix coneptual realities (for example, about people, feelings, etc.) with objective realities (physics and chemistry). There's no bennyboy in physics or chemistry; the physical reality is just a bunch of particles vibrating in space, and energy flowing through various channels and routes. Particles do this EVERYWHERE, and energy does this EVERYWHERE; bennyboy is an arbitrary concept.

Rather than regarding them as two distinct realities, I see them as aspects of the same reality which become evident when it is considered at two different levels. Its the difference between considering parts and considering the whole.

The best analogy that illustrates this difference is between software and hardware in a computer. If you are doing piece by piece analysis of the computer, then all you are going to see are small electric pulses being sent to and fro. At this level, "software" does not exist. It is only when you consider the operation as a whole that the existence of software becomes evident. This does not mean that the two are distinct - as in, separate and independent from each-other. A particular software cannot exist without a specific arrangement and operation of the hardware and the changes made in those electric pulses would effect a change in the software. Similarly, if the software is altered by the interaction of two or more programs, then that results in a change in hardware as well. And this is why the existence of software would not be just an arbitrary concept.

[bennyboy]

Rather than regarding them as two distinct realities, I see them as aspects of the same reality which become evident when it is considered at two different levels. Its the difference between considering parts and considering the whole.

This line of reasoning sounds suspiciously familiar.

The best analogy that illustrates this difference is between software and hardware in a computer. If you are doing piece by piece analysis of the computer, then all you are going to see are small electric pulses being sent to and fro. At this level, "software" does not exist. It is only when you consider the operation as a whole that the existence of software becomes evident.

It is my position that information is independent of the medium in which it acts, or is stored. That doesn't mean information can have NO medium.

Why does this matter? Because it is only when you ALREADY consider the brain (or the computer) as separate and unique to the rest of the universe that the information of "software" exists at all. The reality (in a determinist physical monism) is that all those particles are already related, even before the brain forms. There is no new information, and the fact that we see the "software" isn't an existential statement-- it's an act of the sentient mind.

I've often used the example of mp3 files. You could encode a complete song in black and white seashells arranged on a beach. It's only if you already know that it's an mp3 file that you can draw that form out of the background chatter. We have to assume that if an alien came along, he'd look at them and see only a bunch of black and white shells-- and this DESPITE it being clear to us what it is.

[Edwardo Piet]

Except, its not compatibilism because determinism is irrelevant to my definition of free-will.

That's what compatabilism is! Compatabilism is when free will is compatible with determinism and therefore whether we are determined or not is irrelevant to the fact we have free-will (if we define it that way).

Also, do you understand the libertarian definition of free will or not?

The whole point of "could have done otherwise" is that if you are ultimately entirely determined then you could not have done otherwise.... so I am talking about libertarian free will....... which is impossible.... because we could not have done otherwise.... (unless it's through indeterminism ( so it's down to chance) and therefore not our own determination (so it is once again down to chance (which is not free will)).

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[genkaus]

That's what compatabilism is! Compatabilism is when free will is compatible with determinism and therefore whether we are determined or not is irrelevant to the fact we have free-will (if we define it that way).

Except, my definition of free-will does not say anything about determinism. It does not indicate if my definition of free-will is compatible with determinism. It does not indicate if it is incompatible.

Also, do you understand the libertarian definition of free will or not?

Yes. Do you? And do you understand how your definition is different from the libertarian definition?

The whole point of "could have done otherwise" is that if you are ultimately entirely determined then you could not have done otherwise[1].... so I am talking about libertarian free will....... which is impossible.... because we could not have done otherwise.... (unless it's through indeterminism ( so it's down to chance) and therefore not our own determination[2] (so it is once again down to chance (which is not free will)).

Here's where you commit the fallacy of equivocation. The definition of free will used at [1] is different from the one used at [2].

[1] - Libertarian definition - Free will exists if your will is ultimately undetermined.

[2] - Your definition - Free will exists if your will is ultimately self-determined.

Do you see the difference yet? If you were using the Libertarian definition throughout the argument instead of switching it halfway through, then your statement would've read:

"The whole point of "could have done otherwise" is that if you are ultimately entirely determined then you could not have done otherwise.... so I am talking about libertarian free will....... which is impossible.... because we could not have done otherwise.... (unless it's through indeterminism ( so it's down to chance) and therefore not our own determination (so it is once again down to chance (which is free will according to the libertarian definition))."

[Edwardo Piet]

"[1] - Libertarian definition - Free will exists if your will is ultimately undetermined."

Okay so you really don't understand. I guess you've never heard of hard incompatabilism or so-called 'pessimism' on the matter.

Furthermore I am creating no false dichotomy when I assume you are either talking about compatabilism or incompatabilism. It's a perfectly true dichotomy, of course, since either your definition is compatable with it or not.

This is a waste of time. I said I would reply once because I have tirelessly been through this so many times on the forums without a satisfactory counter-answer and so I'm pretty secure on the matter anyway, I just thought I'd have one more pop at it.

It was a mistake for me to not keep my word. It just seems kind of rude of me to just hit and run post. But sorry I can't continue this because to suggest that libertarian free will is proven if we are ultimately undetermined is incorrect. That would suggest that undetermined random chance would be free will.

And that's a contradiction anyway since the whole point of the "will" is willpower, it is used to literally will us... and we're not willing anything if we are random like dice. Or even if we are "reasonably probabilistic". If it's down to chance, probability or determinism there is not libertarian free will.

Libertarian free will is the idea that we could somehow ultimately will things (which is to determine them) without determinism (which contradicts the ability for us to determine things). It's a pro-free will incompatabilism. The alternative to that is not only hard determinism or compatible "soft" determinism, there is also hard incompatabilism or "pessimism", which is what I subscribe to, as did the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer and Albert Einstein.

[genkaus]

"[1] - Libertarian definition - Free will exists if your will is ultimately undetermined."

Okay so you really don't understand. I guess you've never heard of hard incompatabilism or so-called 'pessimism' on the matter.

Actually, its your own interpretation of Libertarian free-will that I'm pointing to. So, if there is anyone who doesn't understand, it'd be you.

Furthermore I am creating no false dichotomy when I assume you are either talking about compatabilism or incompatabilism. It's a perfectly true dichotomy, of course, since either your definition is compatable with it or not.

Wrong. My definition's compatibility or incompatibility with determinism cannot be established without specifying a definition for determinism as well. Something I have not done.

Its the same as considering how my definition of free-will relates to "fogerty". Since I haven't defined what fogerty means or how it'd affect free-will, it makes no sense in saying that my position on free-will is compatible/incompatible with fogerty.

This is a waste of time. I said I would reply once because I have tirelessly been through this so many times on the forums without a satisfactory counter-answer and so I'm pretty secure on the matter anyway, I just thought I'd have one more pop at it.

It was a mistake for me to not keep my word. It just seems kind of rude of me to just hit and run post. But sorry I can't continue this because to suggest that libertarian free will is proven if we are ultimately undetermined is incorrect. That would suggest that undetermined random chance would be free will.

And that's a contradiction anyway since the whole point of the "will" is willpower, it is used to literally will us... and we're not willing anything if we are random like dice. Or even if we are "reasonably probabilistic". If it's down to chance, probability or determinism there is not libertarian free will.

Libertarian free will is the idea that we could somehow ultimately will things (which is to determine them) without determinism (which contradicts the ability for us to determine things). It's a pro-free will incompatabilism. The alternative to that is not only hard determinism or compatible "soft" determinism, there is also hard incompatabilism or "pessimism", which is what I subscribe to, as did the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer and Albert Einstein.

Its difficult to find a satisfactory "counter-answer" if your own view remains poorly defined. If you keep conflating contradictory metaphysical positions and switching between definitions then it becomes quite simple to argue that the concept becomes nonsensical and logically impossible.

Libertarian free-will simply refers to an incompatibilist position wherein a person's actions could have been otherwise. This definition takes different meanings and implications under different ontological assumptions.

One such assumption is mind-body dualism. You assume your "mind" or "self" or "will" to be something removed from physical causality. Within this context, the meaning of libertarian free-will would be that the will is ultimately self-determined - this being the only interpretation you consider. The very idea of the will being "self-determined" makes sense if and only if you consider it an entity unto itself. The idea that free-will requires "ultimate self-determination" makes sense if and only if you regard "self" as an irreducible primary. However, your own ontological position seems to be to reject mind-body dualism and argue that irrespective of determinism or chaos, free-will cannot exist. That would be the fallacy of stolen concept - you reject the basis of the interpretation and then choose that particular interpretation to argue against.

Assuming your physicalist ontological position on mind, the interpretation of libertarian free will would rely on physical indeterminism. Here, "actions could've been otherwise" would mean that if physical indeterminism is true and your actions are not fully determined by prior events then you have free-will. Within this context, the very idea of "ultimate self-determination" is ridiculous because the "self" is not regarded as an irreducible entity.