Morality in Nature

[Whateverist]

I wonder how you conceptualize this difference-making knowledge. Is it the reasoned categorization of the action, or is it an empathetic wince? Does an empathetic wince imply the presence of knowledge? Or does the knowledge have to be consciously held to be the sort you have in mind? I would be willing to concede the body contains knowledge which is actionable without my conscious participation - as when my hand jumps off the hot pan. Or when I wince in empathy for another's pain. Not sure what difference any of this makes in regard to morality .. but as you know that is not a concept I am invested in propping up.

Not sure what you are trying to say here.

Without the capacity to reason, I do not believe morality to be possible. And no, an empathetic wince need not implies a presence of knowledge only so far as you know who to empathize with. And I do not regard unconscious instincts as knowledge.

Well, if we only have knowledge without the empathic wince, would we even bother with a concept of morality? Wouldn't it just be a subset of logic otherwise? It is the special way in which we care which calls for another category. If you can't account for that, then all you have is a logic that can only persuade if one shares various premises. A pretty vapid conception of morality. Too often the defense of morality seems to resolve into a defense of propriety. Not really my concern.

[genkaus]

Well, if we only have knowledge without the empathic wince, would we even bother with a concept of morality? Wouldn't it just be a subset of logic otherwise? It is the special way in which we care which calls for another category. If you can't account for that, then all you have is a logic that can only persuade if one shares various premises. A pretty vapid conception of morality. Too often the defense of morality seems to resolve into a defense of propriety. Not really my concern.

This argument shows the basic error of your assumptions. Morality does not depend on nor is it the derivative of the "empathic wince". The relevance of empathy to morality is only to the extent you make it relevant. Morality is a standard guiding your actions - period. You can derive such a standard from your empathic instincts, you can derive from godly delusions or you can derive it from a subset of logic. The "special way of caring" is relevant to morality only if you make it relevant. It requires a separate category because of what it does - not where it comes from.

[Whateverist]

We disagree. I don't think you've adequately described morality.

[genkaus]

We disagree. I don't think you've adequately described morality.

We disagree. I have.

[bennyboy]

Add add without free will, morality is impossible. Because without free will, "morality" is just a euphemism for an (incredibly complex, to be sure) accidental interaction between instinct and environment.

Depends upon what you mean by "free will". While I do say that morality requires "free will", what I mean by the word is probably very different from what you do. For example, if you're referring to the libertarian definition of free-will, then, even without it, morality would still not be reduced to an accidental interaction between instinct and environment.

I suppose it depends what we mean by ALL those words. For example, what's an accidental interaction? Also, in what sense is instinct (which ultimately reduces down to purely environmental circumstances, mutation, etc.) separate from the current environment, except by time?

If we conceive of human agency, then we are saying that there is something about a human being which should be considered apart from everything else that is happening in the universe. So I'd define free will as that agency-- stipulating that it must be somehow separate from all that other business.

[genkaus]

I suppose it depends what we mean by ALL those words. For example, what's an accidental interaction? Also, in what sense is instinct (which ultimately reduces down to purely environmental circumstances, mutation, etc.) separate from the current environment, except by time?

Not really. Agreeing upon what is meant by "accidental interaction" or "instinct" is easier than agreeing upon what is meant by free will.

If we conceive of human agency, then we are saying that there is something about a human being which should be considered apart from everything else that is happening in the universe. So I'd define free will as that agency-- stipulating that it must be somehow separate from all that other business.

Like I said, what we mean by free-will are two different things. I can conceive of human agency as a part of the universe - not apart from it - and my conception of free-will doe not require it to be separate from the rest.

[bennyboy]

Like I said, what we mean by free-will are two different things. I can conceive of human agency as a part of the universe - not apart from it - and my conception of free-will doe not require it to be separate from the rest.

Yeah, I know. Your use of mind-existent words is not one of entity, but of labeling. So free will to you is a label for the kinds of brain function involved in making choices. And presumably, morality is a label for the kinds of brain function involved in mediating those choices based on one's world view or an understanding of their social implications.

It's when it comes to enforcing morality that we run into problems. People get all emotional about certain situations: child rape, murder, homosexuality, interracial marriage. They then use morality as the justification for inflicting punishment on others.

So what happens if free will really is a label for a deterministic process (i.e. the person could really not have behaved other than he did)? Punishing that process amounts to punishing determinism itself-- not very fair for the guy getting the electric chair.

[genkaus]

Yeah, I know. Your use of mind-existent words is not one of entity, but of labeling. So free will to you is a label for the kinds of brain function involved in making choices. And presumably, morality is a label for the kinds of brain function involved in mediating those choices based on one's world view or an understanding of their social implications.

It's when it comes to enforcing morality that we run into problems. People get all emotional about certain situations: child rape, murder, homosexuality, interracial marriage. They then use morality as the justification for inflicting punishment on others.

So what happens if free will really is a label for a deterministic process (i.e. the person could really not have behaved other than he did)? Punishing that process amounts to punishing determinism itself-- not very fair for the guy getting the electric chair.

Use of all words is one of labeling. So yes, free will is kind of brain-function involved with making choices. Morality, however is not a brain function. Its a set of concepts that exist in mind or brain which are referenced in particular choices. An understanding of social implications is likewise unnecessary.

As for the problem of enforcing morality - it cannot be solved by appealing to some other kind of morality. If a particular morality is being used to justify inflicting punishment on others, then first the application of that morality must be justified.

Further, even in case of using morality to justify punishment, it is not possible to punish a process. As to the question of "acting otherwise than he did" - that depends on the conditions of "given what constraints". If a person acts in a particular manner because it is in his nature, because that is who he is then he bears the responsibility for his actions and punishing him is justified. If his actions are externally constrained, however, then he shouldn't be punished - and often he isn't.

[bennyboy]

Further, even in case of using morality to justify punishment, it is not possible to punish a process.

Unless there's a magical morality floating in the heavens, then morality, decisions, behaviors, world view, etc. are all processes.

The narrative as I believe you have it is that a person is born a product of his DNA and his environment (starting in the womb). Each experience he has results in brain activity, including learning. Then when a person decides to behave immorally (whatever that is taken to mean), it's because of a deterministic interaction between his internal environment (hormones, brain state, etc.) and his external environment (people calling him stupid or something).

In the deterministic view, it is inevitable that a killer should kill. Given his brain state (which follows a deterministic chain right back to the womb), and his particular environment, he could not have done anything but kill.

So the killer is punished not for something he could control (i.e. a moral failing). He is punished for the way his brain processes information and forms behaviors. In fact, he HIMSELF is nothing but a collection of processes.

And they're being punished.

[genkaus]

Unless there's a magical morality floating in the heavens, then morality, decisions, behaviors, world view, etc. are all processes.

Wrong. A process indicates a series of actions. The word doesn't apply to sets of principles or ideas like morality, worldview etc.

The narrative as I believe you have it is that a person is born a product of his DNA and his environment (starting in the womb). Each experience he has results in brain activity, including learning. Then when a person decides to behave immorally (whatever that is taken to mean), it's because of a deterministic interaction between his internal environment (hormones, brain state, etc.) and his external environment (people calling him stupid or something).

You are ignoring a significant third aspect - the person himself. When you talk about his external environment and his internal environment, you are assuming the existence of something that can be identified as him. This identity is not equated to internal environment and is involved in the interaction.

In the deterministic view, it is inevitable that a killer should kill. Given his brain state (which follows a deterministic chain right back to the womb), and his particular environment, he could not have done anything but kill.

And given that the brain state is "him" and the brain state controls the subsequent actions, he, thus bears the responsibility for those actions.

So the killer is punished not for something he could control (i.e. a moral failing). He is punished for the way his brain processes information and forms behaviors. In fact, he HIMSELF is nothing but a collection of processes.

And they're being punished.

What makes you think that it was something he "could not control"? The role of an agent in a deterministic causal chain isn't disregarded so simply.