Monist vs. Dualist Experiment?

[Chas]

Except, unlike theists, I know of the existence of god and know of atleast one sunset for which he is directly responsible.

In other words, I know that qualia exists and I know that some of my behavior is caused by qualia. And that differentiates my proposition frm a theists.

Excuse me, but what the actual fuck does that mean?

[genkaus]

Except, unlike theists, I know of the existence of god and know of atleast one sunset for which he is directly responsible.

In other words, I know that qualia exists and I know that some of my behavior is caused by qualia. And that differentiates my proposition frm a theists.

Excuse me, but what the actual fuck does that mean?

Which part would you like explained?

[bennyboy]

No. I've answered it by showing the equivalence.

No. You tried to. There's a difference.

Every description of qualia fits matches brain function - thus the hypothesis that qualia is brain function stands on solid ground.

Um no. Qualia is the subjective experience of light, sound and senses. Brain function is neurons transmitting signals from nerve endings for processing in the brain.

Except, unlike theists, I know of the existence of god and know of atleast one sunset for which he is directly responsible.

In other words, I know that qualia exists and I know that some of my behavior is caused by qualia. And that differentiates my proposition frm a theists.

That's true. And you claim to know that qualia is brain function, while insisting that the Cyberboy 2000 has qualia despite not having a brain.

For you to talk about that, you first have to accept that bran systems are necessary to create qualia - which you haven't.

That's right. This has always been an "even if given" argument. An interesting aside, as it were.

Given the basic nature of qualia - that is, it is always associated with complex sensory events, positing its existence at neural or atomic level becomes nonsensical.

A piece of concrete is not a building. And a neuron's contribution to our complex experiences is not the same as experiencing a cup of hot chocolate.

You've said you don't believe in supervenience, but you are talking very much like someone who does.

Except, I'm not the one doing the defining. And showing evidence for a tautology is never required.

Qualia is a property of experience, which requires existence of a mind. Which means positing existence of qualia at the level where mind doesn't exist is nonsensical and does not require disproving.

You can replace "qualia" with "mind" if you want. I'd categorize mind as the medium on which qualia are expressed. But you still have the same philosophical issues: you don't know if anyone else has a mind, and you are left only with your hunch that your own mind is sufficient evidence of others.

If you want to say what qualia are, then you have to prove that's what they are.

You mean proof as in definition - which has been available to you from the start.

No, I mean your interpretation of what is observable, and the process by which you draw inferences from it to put forward as positive assertions.

[Chas]

Excuse me, but what the actual fuck does that mean?

Which part would you like explained?

The first sentence.

[genkaus]

No. You tried to. There's a difference.

Not in this case.

Um no. Qualia is the subjective experience of light, sound and senses. Brain function is neurons transmitting signals from nerve endings for processing in the brain.

And that experience is the result of neurons transmitting signals - as evidenced by the fact that manipulation of those transmissions determines the experience.

That's true. And you claim to know that qualia is brain function, while insisting that the Cyberboy 2000 has qualia despite not having a brain.

Based on the assumption that Cyberboy has been installed with mechanism that replicates brain function.

A piece of concrete is not a building. And a neuron's contribution to our complex experiences is not the same as experiencing a cup of hot chocolate.

Precisely my point. You need a lot of concrete and other stuff in a specific formation to form a building. And you need a lot of neurons working in a specific way to generate complex experience. It is precisely because a neuron's contribution in forming the experience doesn't itself count as experiential, that I discount the possibility of neural or atomic qualia.

You've said you don't believe in supervenience, but you are talking very much like someone who does.

My position does not match anyone's who believes in supervenience.

You can replace "qualia" with "mind" if you want. I'd categorize mind as the medium on which qualia are expressed. But you still have the same philosophical issues: you don't know if anyone else has a mind, and you are left only with your hunch that your own mind is sufficient evidence of others.

Except I do know of others having a mind.

No, I mean your interpretation of what is observable, and the process by which you draw inferences from it to put forward as positive assertions.

Again, that has been available to you from the beginning.

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Which part would you like explained?

The first sentence.

Its to demonstrate the failure of analogy. Benny claims that I'm assuming that qualia exists and it affects behavior in the same way a theist assumes that god exists and causes sunsets. My response is that unlike a theist, I know my own qualia existing (something we agreed to accept as a brute fact) and I know that it affects my behavior. For the analogy to fit, the theist would similarly have to know of atleast one god's existence and his role in causing sunsets.

[bennyboy]

Based on the assumption that Cyberboy has been installed with mechanism that replicates brain function.

No. Based on the assumption that Cyberboy has been installed with a mechanism that replicates those function occurring WITHIN the brain which are both necessary and sufficient to allow the existence of qualia. You are focused on the end results, and ignore the WAY or mechanism of doing the processing as a likely candidate for the spawning of qualia. There's no good reason to discard those possibilities.

---

Its to demonstrate the failure of analogy. Benny claims that I'm assuming that qualia exists and it affects behavior in the same way a theist assumes that god exists and causes sunsets. My response is that unlike a theist, I know my own qualia existing (something we agreed to accept as a brute fact) and I know that it affects my behavior. For the analogy to fit, the theist would similarly have to know of atleast one god's existence and his role in causing sunsets.

I agree that to this point, the parallel doesn't hold. HOWEVER, you still have the problem that there's no way to establish your evidence really serves as evidence for what you want it to.

I don't accept that behavior, for example, is sufficient evidence to establish that an organism (or other system) actual experiences qualia. Your problem is that there really isn't any kind of evidence that's any better, and that also avoids begging the question.

[genkaus]

No. Based on the assumption that Cyberboy has been installed with a mechanism that replicates those function occurring WITHIN the brain which are both necessary and sufficient to allow the existence of qualia.

That's what I said.

You are focused on the end results, and ignore the WAY or mechanism of doing the processing as a likely candidate for the spawning of qualia. There's no good reason to discard those possibilities.

Mechanism of doing the processing is what the brain function is - which has been my likely candidate for the spawning of qualia all along

I agree that to this point, the parallel doesn't hold. HOWEVER, you still have the problem that there's no way to establish your evidence really serves as evidence for what you want it to.

I don't accept that behavior, for example, is sufficient evidence to establish that an organism (or other system) actual experiences qualia. Your problem is that there really isn't any kind of evidence that's any better, and that also avoids begging the question.

Your acceptance doesn't matter. Any reason as to why it wouldn't be sufficient?

[Neo-Scholastic]

Genkaus,

By classifying qualia as a function you hope to avoid the problem of over-determination.
You cannot avoid over-determination by assigning the same functions to brain states and qualia without also asserting that brain states and mental properties are identical, i.e. “they are the ride”.

While your position acknowledges an empirical pairing (correlation) between qualia and brain states, your position cannot supply a causal link explaining why they are so joined. You sidestep this objection by saying that no causal link is required, because mental properties are brain states, just differently described.

Let’s look more closely at your argument, as I understand it:

Premise 1: Quale Q1 performs a function, F1.
Premise 2: Brain state B1 also performs F1.
Premise 3: Q1 and B1 are identical.
Conclusion: If Q1 and B1 are identical then F1 has only a single cause and is not over-determined.

This argument fails because Premise 3 is not true. Q1 and B1 cannot be identical because you can say things about mental properties that cannot be said of brain states (Leibniz’s Law of Identicals). First, you can be certain of your own subjective experiences (privileged access) in a way not available to someone looking at only the physical facts about your brain states. Secondly, mental properties have intentionality. You can talk about mental properties, like ideas and thoughts, as being true or false. You can have feeling about something. But you cannot talk about a brain state as being true or not. A brain state isn’t about anything at all. It is what it is and nothing more.

This leaves you in a predicament. Either mental properties, like qualia, have distinct functions over and above the functions of the brain states that give rise to them OR mental properties supervene on brain states without making any contribution at all. In the first case, mental properties can improve evolutionary fitness at the cost of introducing some kind of dualism. In the second case, mental properties supervene on certain physical processes making subjective experience blind to natural selection, i.e. it has no reason for being an evolved feature.

[The_Thinking_Theist]

Question: Can you think of an experiment that would prove whether qualia are generated by physical processes versus facilitating them?

Those of us interested in philosophy of mind have a fair understanding of the issues and arguments surrounding the mind-body problem. To the best of my knowledge we all agree that a causal relationship exists between the brain-states and mental properties. How this fact is interpreted depends on whether you are a monist or dualist.

For philosophical reasons, I consider physical matter incapable of producing qualia and see the need for some other vehicle capable of supporting phenomena qualities (dualism). The analogy I use is that of a radio, which does not cause music, but is by virtue of its state can receive signals. Others consider first-person awareness an emergent property. They believe particular configurations of physical matter are capable of producing qualia as a non-fundamental property of reality.

Do you believe there is a non-philosophical way, i.e. scientific one, to determine which interpretation is correct?

Dualism is more of a Catholic idea (the Host, etc.), you should aim this at that crowd.

[genkaus]

Genkaus,

By classifying qualia as a function you hope to avoid the problem of over-determination.
You cannot avoid over-determination by assigning the same functions to brain states and qualia without also asserting that brain states and mental properties are identical, i.e. “they are the ride”.

While your position acknowledges an empirical pairing (correlation) between qualia and brain states, your position cannot supply a causal link explaining why they are so joined. You sidestep this objection by saying that no causal link is required, because mental properties are brain states, just differently described.

Let’s look more closely at your argument, as I understand it:

Premise 1: Quale Q1 performs a function, F1.
Premise 2: Brain state B1 also performs F1.
Premise 3: Q1 and B1 are identical.
Conclusion: If Q1 and B1 are identical then F1 has only a single cause and is not over-determined.

This argument fails because Premise 3 is not true. Q1 and B1 cannot be identical because you can say things about mental properties that cannot be said of brain states (Leibniz’s Law of Identicals). First, you can be certain of your own subjective experiences (privileged access) in a way not available to someone looking at only the physical facts about your brain states. Secondly, mental properties have intentionality. You can talk about mental properties, like ideas and thoughts, as being true or false. You can have feeling about something. But you cannot talk about a brain state as being true or not. A brain state isn’t about anything at all. It is what it is and nothing more.

This leaves you in a predicament. Either mental properties, like qualia, have distinct functions over and above the functions of the brain states that give rise to them OR mental properties supervene on brain states without making any contribution at all. In the first case, mental properties can improve evolutionary fitness at the cost of introducing some kind of dualism. In the second case, mental properties supervene on certain physical processes making subjective experience blind to natural selection, i.e. it has no reason for being an evolved feature.

This cannot be an accident. You succintly state my position in the first phrase and then, for the rest of the post, proceed to ignore it and argue against something else altogether. You cannot pretend that you simply misunderstood it if you were able state it in the beginning.

I'm NOT saying that qualia are brain-states.
I do NOT regard qualia and brain-states as identical.
Your Premise 1: "Quale Q1 performs function F1" is incorrect.
Q1 and B1 have not been argued to be identical.

Given that, none of your counter-arguments apply here.