Necessary Truths Exist

[Rational AKD]

You're using the Principle of Sufficient Reason, right? Perhaps you should read up on some of the devastating problems with it, especially Hume's criticism. The online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy has a good article on it.

Not to come off as a bit of an asshole, but if you're going to be posting arguments you didn't make and/or using concepts (the PSR) without specifying what they are, it's a bit less likely people will be likely to respond.

I didn't base the argument off the PSR, but rather my own reasoning. I suppose P2 would presuppose the PSR, but the conclusion is nothing within the PSR.

As for your argument, where to start? P3 is false by definition. Reality refers to EVERYTHING that exists. It is thus incoherent to say that "there is something that transcends everything that exists".

what I meant by reality was physical reality, or perhaps more accurate, contingent reality. by the fact that it is necessary, it transcends all contingent truths meaning it is not affected by or a part of contingent truths.

Furthermore, truth necessitates the existence of a mind, which is a subset of reality. I truth is the correspondence between a belief or assertion and reality, there can be no truths without minds.

this is not the definition I'm using when I say truth. the standard definition i'm using is "Conformity to fact or actuality." meaning truth is what is actually reflective of reality, which is separate from the perception of reality.

But ALL of that aside (and assuming this argument does not assume the PSR), I can answer this argument with what necessary truths there are:

-The Law of Identity

-The Law of Non-contradiction

I would agree that these truths are necessary. and by what I mean by transcendent, I would say they transcend reality.

-My existence as thinking thing ("I doubt therefore I think, I think therefore I am")

this is really an argument rather than a necessary truth. it is contingent upon the "I doubt" part. though you may know this to be true, it is not necessarily true. it's contingent upon your existence which is also contingent.

Those first two are self-attesting truths that cannot be denied without first assuming them as true. They aren't "transcendent", they are necessary features of language and thought. They're very much rooted in reality and the reality we experience.

what you say here seems to contradict. you first say they are "necessary features of language and thought" but then say they're rooted in reality. if they're entailed by features of language and thought, then they would be contingent upon our existence. but if they're rooted in reality, then they're true regardless of whether we exist or not. so that means they must be something other than necessary features of thought (or features of thought and something else), or they couldn't be true regardless of whether we exist or not.

[MindForgedManacle]

I didn't base the argument off the PSR, but rather my own reasoning. I suppose P2 would presuppose the PSR, but the conclusion is nothing within the PSR.

The reason I assumed this was basically just using the PSR is because this looks exactly like other theistic arguments from contingency. But as you admit P2 assumes the PSR, you have to answer the challenges to it, otherwise the argument is unsound.

what I meant by reality was physical reality, or perhaps more accurate, contingent reality. by the fact that it is necessary, it transcends all contingent truths meaning it is not affected by or a part of contingent truths.

Which means your argument is a circular argument and thus is invalid and unsound. If you say thay by reality you mean "physical, contingent reality" (how you can arbitrarily divide reality like that I'll never know), you necessarily assume there is something transcendent in one of your premises, meaning you're assuming what you're supposed to be concluding.

this is not the definition I'm using when I say truth. the standard definition i'm using is "Conformity to fact or actuality." meaning truth is what is actually reflective of reality, which is separate from the perception of reality.

Er, that's exactly what I said. What you're referring to is what is known as the Correspondence theory of truth, which is exactly what I brought up.

I would agree that these truths are necessary. and by what I mean by transcendent, I would say they transcend reality.

Which is entirely wrong and a confused view. You didn't even argue for why these are "transcendent" truths, you're just asserting they are. Unlike you, I've already given an account of those necessary truths and why they aren't transcendent. Seeing as I've done so in my last post (the part which you didn't address), I again can say your argument is unsound.

this is really an argument rather than a necessary truth. it is contingent upon the "I doubt" part. though you may know this to be true, it is not necessarily true. it's contingent upon your existence which is also contingent.

It's actually not an argument. Rathet, it's a demonstration that everything I say or think necessarily presupposes my existence as a thing that thinks. The fact that I think is an incorrigible truth, and thus cannot be false. The rest follows necessarily.

what you say here seems to contradict. you first say they are "necessary features of language and thought" but then say they're rooted in reality. if they're entailed by features of language and thought, then they would be contingent upon our existence. but if they're rooted in reality, then they're true regardless of whether we exist or not. so that means they must be something other than necessary features of thought (or features of thought and something else), or they couldn't be true regardless of whether we exist or not.

Er, are you denying that our existence and language is part of reality? I didn't say they're (the laws) rooted in reality, other than in our language and thought, hence why they're called the laws of thought. They attest themselves to be true, because language necessitates such before any communication, thought and/or symbology can get off the ground.

These truths ONLY exist if there are minds to apprehend them. They are both necessarily true, yet contingent on minds because truth only exists of there are minds in the first place. They are very much like Descartes cogito in that way: necessary, immanent truths that are nonetheless contingent on the existence of at least one mind to realize their inherent, inescapable truth.

[Walking Void]

The subject is pretty basic stuff to me. I try to base absolutes on physical laws. Firstly, yes, physical laws are subject to change.

Physical laws define limits and behaviour, because, simply, the experiments proved repeatedly that absolute zero is never reached, or that warm bodies transmit energy to cold bodies (those were specific examples).

[Rational AKD]

The reason I assumed this was basically just using the PSR is because this looks exactly like other theistic arguments from contingency. But as you admit P2 assumes the PSR, you have to answer the challenges to it, otherwise the argument is unsound.

the PSR seems rather self evident to me, the relationship of cause and effect. but since you support Hume's view on the subject, I might as well tackle his argument. to be honest, I really don't think Hume is a good philosopher. he accepts the PSR only to attack it.

once we admit that some contingent state of affairs have no explanations, a completely new skeptical scenario becomes possible: there is no demon deceiving you, but your perceptual states are occurring for no reason at all. thus we cannot even say that violations of the PSR are even probable if the PSR is false.

if the PSR is false, then we would have to accept the possibility of literally anything happening with no cause. but anyways, lets look at Hume's argument. he argues that the claims of cause and effect are distinct and separate and thus we can clearly conceive an object without a cause. the problem here is this doesn't show what he thinks it does. the problem is he is not following the consequences of his argument. he can conceive of an object and as long as that object isn't logically absurd (like a round cube or something) then it can exist conceptually. but in order for it to exist physically, other factors come into play. the statement "an object can exist without cause" is equivalent to "an object can exist with no cause" which is equivalent to "an object can exist because of nothing." to say that nothing caused something is logically absurd. just about everything that exists has a possibility of not existing. when we have multiple possibilities, there is always a reason as to why one of them is actualized because if there is no reason then we can't say how the other is actualized. if energy exists for no reason, then we can't say how it could possibly not exist even though we should since it's contingent. it's like saying __+5=X and the blank is nothing (and no, I don't mean zero).
I think I've dragged this out long enough, but the existence of truth is evident, and there must be a reason for something to be true.

If I ask why you believe any particular matter of fact, which you relate, you must tell me some reason; and this reason will be some other fact connected with it. but as you cannot proceed after this manner, in infinitum, you must at least terminate in some fact, which is present in your memory or senses; or allow that your belief is entirely without foundation.
-An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

even Hume thought something must have a reason to be true. a contingent fact without explanation is "entirely without foundation."

Which means your argument is a circular argument and thus is invalid and unsound. If you say thay by reality you mean "physical, contingent reality" (how you can arbitrarily divide reality like that I'll never know), you necessarily assume there is something transcendent in one of your premises, meaning you're assuming what you're supposed to be concluding.

I say physical reality because we can acknowledge the existence of conceptions, but consider a difference between conception and reality. that's why I define it as physical reality, because conceptions aren't usually considered a part of reality. and no, i'm not assuming what i'm concluding. in P1, it says that there are only 2 possibilities as to why something is true. if you can find an alternate to prove this premise wrong, be my guest. in P2, it says there can't be an infinite regress of contingencies which makes it an eliminating premise. it also implies the existence of necessary propositions (by process of elimination) which is pointed out in C1. none of the premises assume it's transcendent, but rather list the possibilities and deduce from there.

Er, that's exactly what I said. What you're referring to is what is known as the Correspondence theory of truth, which is exactly what I brought up.

Er, no. there's a fundamental difference between the correspondence theory of truth and what i'm saying. and the key point you seemed to miss in my explanation was "which is separate from the perception of reality." i'm using an objective definition of truth which is separate from the perception. according to the correspondence theory of truth, truth is what we can find correspondent to nature which is contingent upon us finding that correspondent; which is why you're having a problem with my conclusion of necessary transcendent truths. my definition is truth doesn't change, only our perception of it does. when Einstein discovered special relativity, he didn't change the truth, he just discovered we were wrong. no one says they discovered the truth was wrong, that would be absurd. they say they discovered they were wrong.

Which is entirely wrong and a confused view. You didn't even argue for why these are "transcendent" truths, you're just asserting they are.

you're right, because that's not what I was arguing for. I was only arguing for the existence of necessary transcendent truths. if I were to argue these are necessary transcendent truths, I would add these 2 premises:
P4: logic is a tool we can use to determine truth.
C3: therefore fundamental laws of logic are necessary truths that transcend reality. (C2, P4)
Conclusion: necessary transcendent truths exist in the fundamentals of logic.

It's actually not an argument. Rathet, it's a demonstration that everything I say or think necessarily presupposes my existence as a thing that thinks. The fact that I think is an incorrigible truth, and thus cannot be false. The rest follows necessarily.

yes, it is an incorrigible truth but not a necessary one. it is possible for us not to exist, and at one point we know we didn't. in order for something to be a necessary truth, it must be impossible to be false. that statement "I doubt" is contingent upon your existence which is also contingent. though the fact that you doubt is self evident which entails your existence tells you it's true, but it's still possible to be false.

Er, are you denying that our existence and language is part of reality? I didn't say they're (the laws) rooted in reality, other than in our language and thought, hence why they're called the laws of thought.

don't play games, you can't take back what you said.

They're very much rooted in reality and the reality we experience.

you made a very clear distinction between reality and the reality we experience implying these laws apply apart from our experience which is also apart from language and thought.

They attest themselves to be true, because language necessitates such before any communication, thought and/or symbology can get off the ground.

if that's possible then answer me this. is it possible for a rock to be both spherical and flat if we don't exist? is it possible for an apple to be an orange at the same time in the same sense if we don't exist? is it possible for something to neither exist or not exist? they are necessary for language, but they are also necessary for nature since we can't find any of these to be true either by experience or intuition.

They are both necessarily true, yet contingent on minds because truth only exists of there are minds in the first place.

you really need to learn the difference between an entailment and a necessity. an entailment is when you have a necessary outcome of a given event. a necessity is when it is impossible for something to be false. if logic is contingent upon minds, it's not necessary. contingent and necessary are contradictory.

[MindForgedManacle]

the PSR seems rather self evident to me, the relationship of cause and effect. but since you support Hume's view on the subject, I might as well tackle his argument. to be honest, I really don't think Hume is a good philosopher. he accepts the PSR only to attack it.

To be honest (and not to sound rude ), I don't care if it seems self-evident. The PSR is philosophically controversial, and thus isn't something you can wave aside as not being such. Hume's criticism is considered one among several that must be overcome in order for the PSR to get of the ground.

[Insert Theistic Abuse of Philosophy]

if the PSR is false, then we would have to accept the possibility of literally anything happening with no cause. but anyways, lets look at Hume's argument. he argues that the claims of cause and effect are distinct and separate and thus we can clearly conceive an object without a cause. the problem here is this doesn't show what he thinks it does. the problem is he is not following the consequences of his argument. he can conceive of an object and as long as that object isn't logically absurd (like a round cube or something) then it can exist conceptually. but in order for it to exist physically, other factors come into play. the statement "an object can exist without cause" is equivalent to "an object can exist with no cause" which is equivalent to "an object can exist because of nothing." to say that nothing caused something is logically absurd. just about everything that exists has a possibility of not existing. when we have multiple possibilities, there is always a reason as to why one of them is actualized because if there is no reason then we can't say how the other is actualized. if energy exists for no reason, then we can't say how it could possibly not exist even though we should since it's contingent. it's like saying __+5=X and the blank is nothing (and no, I don't mean zero).
I think I've dragged this out long enough, but the existence of truth is evident, and there must be a reason for something to be true.[/quote]

This is essentially what I like to call a theistic abuse of philosophy, because in the philosophical world this has essentially been thoroughly handled. For example, the philosopher Quentin Meillassoux (who rejects the PSR) points out that the assumption that what prevents, say, things from popping into existence or events without causes has a reason, specifically the PSR. This makes it predicated on a circular argument wherein the PSR is presumed to be true in order to support the PSR as true. And if you reject the PSR, WHY couldn't the world look as it does? It's no more and no less likely than any other world, because any of them would be without reason.

Hume only used the PSR as a methodological practice, not an ontological truth, which is NECESSARY for your argument.

Further, your quote of Pruss gives me a "So what?" reaction. It doesn't imply or support the PSR as true. o.o

IHume quote

even Hume thought something must have a reason to be true. a contingent fact without explanation is "entirely without foundation."

You are quote-mining Hume, and you're possibly directly copying from the YouTube user and theist "InspiringPhilosophy" and his nonsensical video the "Leibnizian Cosmological Argument", which uses the PSR, the Pruss quote and the Hume quote you've used. I am suspicious of you.

Further, Hume's critique of the PSR comes from pointing out the separability of the ideas of cause and effect to demonstrate there is no necessary conceptual relation between the two, since conceiving of one without the other implies no contradiction. Hume isn't saying (as you earlier asserted) that "an object exists because of nothing", rather it's a denial of the ontological trurh of the PSR. In other words, the actual rendering would be more along the lines of "there is not necessarily a necessary reason why an object exists".



My phone wouldn't load the entire post and I have classes to go to (it's morning over here), so I'll have to respond to the rest slightly indirectly (I'll say what I'm responding to in each case), because in the next bit you make a rather simplistic error about the nature of truth and realoty. Namely, you presume to have direct accesd to reality itself, rather than your perceptions (which is the actual truth of the matter), but I'll have to get to that this evening.

[Whateverist]

News flash: "Necessary Truths Exist" .. necessarily no doubt.

In other news, "Bachelors Found To Be Un-married Men".

Full story and pictures at 11.


But seriously, TL;DR

[Mister Agenda]

Welcome back, Rational AKD.

Has anyone brought up virtual particles? They're rather devastating to the proposition that something can't come from nothing. They're particularly hard on the notion that 'everything that begins to exist must have a cause', because they're the only things we can experimentally verify beginning to exist, and they're causeless.

[Rational AKD]

I lied. Let me weigh in with a question: isn't this basically another form of the infinite regression "paradox"? Why couldn't there be an infinite number of levels of truths, with no end? Isn't rejecting the possibility of infinity begging the question already? It sounds like a logical equivalent of "The universe can't be infinite, and can't have created itself, so it must depend on God, who is self-dependent, for its existence." (no, I'm not accusing you of a secretly theistic argument, I'm just pointing out what seems to me like a similar logical pattern)

sorry I didn't see your post here. I covered reasons why P2 is true in objection 1. basically an infinite regress doesn't explain the truth, it passes on credit. if you have a "this happens then" relationship of an infinite chain of events, then there's less of a problem because they explain what not why. if you have a "this is _____ because" relationship of an infinite chain, it really doesn't explain why until it reaches a truth that takes credit rather than passing it and that would be a necessary truth. I compared an infinite chain of contingent truths to a finite circle of truths, because though each proposition within the circle has an explanation why it is true the circle itself doesn't. likewise an infinite circle can't explain itself unless it is necessarily true which still proves the conclusion.

Frankly this just sounds like circular reasoning, just claiming that something is true because it is true.

not quite, though I can see how you can arrive at that conclusion. a necessary truth is a truth that is true no matter what. it is impossible to be false. by that it could be viewed as a self proclaiming proposition to be true, but this is only because of what it can't be by its definition. necessary is a type of possible which is contrary to contingent. impossible is also contrary to possible. a necessary truth can't be contingent or impossible (a truth can't even be impossible).

---

This is essentially what I like to call a theistic abuse of philosophy, because in the philosophical world this has essentially been thoroughly handled. For example, the philosopher Quentin Meillassoux (who rejects the PSR) points out that the assumption that what prevents, say, things from popping into existence or events without causes has a reason, specifically the PSR. This makes it predicated on a circular argument wherein the PSR is presumed to be true in order to support the PSR as true.

this is false. you don't need the PSR to come to a reasonable conclusion about consequences concerning the assumption "the PSR is false." rejection of the PSR only means that an explanation doesn't need a sufficient reason to be, not that sufficient reason can't explain things (or it would be self refuting). and the sufficient reason that can be used against it is the possibility of things popping into existence, and the fact that it can't be said to be improbable without begging the question that is (IE it is improbable because it is).

And if you reject the PSR, WHY couldn't the world look as it does?

because there's not a single thing in this world that has been shown impossible to explain with sufficient reason. if the PSR were false, we would expect to see things that can't be explained with sufficient reason. something is always caused by something, never nothing.

Further, your quote of Pruss gives me a "So what?" reaction. It doesn't imply or support the PSR as true. o.o

it gives it evidence that it is true. the fact that there is nothing that pops into existence without cause or explanation is evidence that it simply doesn't happen. it may not be proof, but evidence still establishes a more reasonable position.

Hume's critique of the PSR comes from pointing out the separability of the ideas of cause and effect to demonstrate there is no necessary conceptual relation between the two, since conceiving of one without the other implies no contradiction.

just to point out a separate point here, this only points out the possibility to conceptually exist, which only needs to be coherent. for example, I can conceive a rock on its own without the need for anything. it exists as a conception because it is logically coherent. but when I add something that is not necessary to it, such as physical existence, it now is in a state that is possible to be in and possible to not be in. this is the problem, the contradiction is not in the concept itself, but in the concept existing for no reason; in other words it exists because of nothing.

Hume isn't saying (as you earlier asserted) that "an object exists because of nothing", rather it's a denial of the ontological trurh of the PSR. In other words, the actual rendering would be more along the lines of "there is not necessarily a necessary reason why an object exists".

denial of this ontological truth inevitably leads to that conclusion. if something is without explanation, and this something exists; then it logically and inescapably follows that that something exists because of nothing. if you deny the PSR in one case for something's existence, then you inevitably arrive at the conclusion it exists because of nothing. and no, taking a weak position of "it's only possible for something to exist for no reason" doesn't save you. even saying one thing exists for no reason is saying that thing exists because of nothing which is logically absurd.

My phone wouldn't load the entire post and I have classes to go to (it's morning over here), so I'll have to respond to the rest slightly indirectly (I'll say what I'm responding to in each case), because in the next bit you make a rather simplistic error about the nature of truth and realoty. Namely, you presume to have direct accesd to reality itself, rather than your perceptions (which is the actual truth of the matter), but I'll have to get to that this evening.

since you haven't formally addressed the rest of my post, i'll wait until you do rather than taking on these vague summarized objections. can't wait.

Welcome back, Rational AKD.

Has anyone brought up virtual particles? They're rather devastating to the proposition that something can't come from nothing. They're particularly hard on the notion that 'everything that begins to exist must have a cause', because they're the only things we can experimentally verify beginning to exist, and they're causeless.

virtual particles don't come from nothing. they come from fluctuating energy within a vacuum. any honest quantum physicist would admit that the particles aren't coming from nothing, but rather what we thought was nothing (a vacuum) is not really nothing.

[genkaus]

Purpose: to establish the existence of necessary truths debunking the notion "there is no objective truth."

Don't confuse necessary truths with objective truths.

P1: in order for a proposition to be true, it must be true because it is contingent upon a factor or it’s necessary in its own truth.

This says nothing about the factor it is contingent upon. Even if the truth of a statement is contingent upon a factor, that does not mean the factor itself would have a truth value.

P2: there must exist fundamental propositions that can’t be true by a contingent factor (there can’t be an infinite amount of propositions all contingent upon the former).

False dichotomy - depending upon the theory of truth, there are other options available. For example, those fundamental propositions are neither true, nor false.

C1: therefore there are fundamental propositions that can only be true by the necessity of their own truth (P1, P2)

Wrong - for reasons given.

P3: if a proposition is necessarily true, then it is not contingent upon reality

Wrong. If I define truth itself to be contingent on reality, then 1) the concept of necessary truth would become meaningless, 2) reality itself would be neither true, nor false 3) the truth of any other proposition would remain contingent on reality.

C2: therefore there are necessary truths that transcend reality (C1, P3)
Conclusion: necessary transcendent truths exist.

Wrong.

[MindForgedManacle]

this is false. you don't need the PSR to come to a reasonable conclusion about consequences concerning the assumption "the PSR is false." rejection of the PSR only means that an explanation doesn't need a sufficient reason to be, not that sufficient reason can't explain things (or it would be self refuting). and the sufficient reason that can be used against it is the possibility of things popping into existence, and the fact that it can't be said to be improbable without begging the question that is (IE it is improbable because it is).

Er, what? You seem to be merely affirming what I was arguing against, without stating why? My point was is that to say that there is a reason that things don't pop into existence is a fine example of question-begging. The underlying assumption is that what prevents this popping into existence is the PSR. That's circular.

because there's not a single thing in this world that has been shown impossible to explain with sufficient reason. if the PSR were false, we would expect to see things that can't be explained with sufficient reason. something is always caused by something, never nothing.

And this is among the places Hume's critique is devastating. You're assuming the universal validity of "things don't come from nothing" based on your experience. But it is in fact the case that there is no logical contradiction in saying "something came from nothing".

As for things without sufficient reason, existence could be one. In other words, the PSR at best could apply to every individual constituent of reality, but not necessarily the whole.

it gives it evidence that it is true. the fact that there is nothing that pops into existence without cause or explanation is evidence that it simply doesn't happen. it may not be proof, but evidence still establishes a more reasonable position.

And there's a problem. You're again assuming the PSR is the reason things don't happen without sufficient reason, which is question-begging.

just to point out a separate point here, this only points out the possibility to conceptually exist, which only needs to be coherent. for example, I can conceive a rock on its own without the need for anything. it exists as a conception because it is logically coherent. but when I add something that is not necessary to it, such as physical existence, it now is in a state that is possible to be in and possible to not be in. this is the problem, the contradiction is not in the concept itself, but in the concept existing for no reason; in other words it exists because of nothing.

Firstly, to conceive of something is to already conceive of it as existing. You can't add existence to something, it isn't a property. If I'm thinking of the properties of an apple, then think of the apple as existing, have I actually added anything? No.

And again, to say that something needs a reason to exist is that question-begging again. You can't use the PSR as the reason the PSR is true.