The Modal Ontological Argument - Without Modal Logic

[Angrboda]

You're suggesting that something can't come from nothing is an a priori truth and therefore a fact?

yes, because an action can only be preformed by a thing and nothing is not something. it is a contradiction of the very definition of nothing to suggest nothing can "do" something.

Then you're simply wrong. Even if true, it's not a priori.

[Rational AKD]

Then you're simply wrong. Even if true, it's not a priori.

We seem to know some things a priori, or at least to be justified in believing them. Standard examples of propositions known a priori include: a bachelor is an unmarried male; 2 + 3 = 5

or perhaps nothing is the absence of anything.

A priori justification is a type of epistemic justification that is, in some sense, independent of experience.
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/apriori/

gee, i sure didn't have to experience anything to obtain that knowledge. sure sounds a priori to me...

[MindForgedManacle]

to pop into existance ex nihilo is impossible. nothing is the absence of anything, which means no things, no properties, no anything. as such, nothing can't "do" anything. if something popped into existence, caused by nothing, you would essentially be saying nothing caused something which is logically absurd. if something exists and it is possible for it not to exist, there must be a reason it exists rather than not.

Uhg. You are very dense if you are fooling yourself into this metaphysical conclusion by merely using VERY imprecise language. To say that something came into existence ex nihilo is not to say "nothing caused something to exist" (<- the imprecise language), it is to say that something exists but had no prior ontic reference or antecedent cause.

And again, to say there MUST be a reason why something exists seems to be something contemporary philosophers have effectively rejected, most notably continental philosopher Quentin Meillasoux in his book "After Finitude" (it may .

so Stanford is wrong then? also i think it's funny you think something can only be known metaphysically possible if it is physically demonstrated. yet what if the metaphysically possibility is known a priori? for example, logic dictates its metaphysical possibility. then according to Kant, such a thing would be "necessarily possible" which can simply be reduced to possible using axiom S5 (the one you hate so much even though there's nothing wrong with it).

When did I say "physically" demonstrated? I didn't. Regardless, yes, unless something has been demonstrated to exist you ONLY have epistemic possibility in assessing its possible existence because to claim otherwise is to make claims beyond what you know by definition.

I don't 'hate' S5, what I detest are people who don't actually understand S5 (you), much less what you NECESSARILY give up when working with the S5 axiom(s) - namely talking about metaphysics - and prat on about having disproved atheism.

you claimed it was theoretical as though that is proof it is metaphysically possible yet it's not even shown to be mathematically possible yet. this was after you claimed you can only show it is metaphysically possible if it is demonstrated. you were intentionally misleading as an attempt to avoid admitting defeat concerning the Stanford example.

I'm perfectly willing to revise my views on what can be said to be metaphysically possible.

And as for intentionally misleading, bullshit and I can show how you misused your source:

In additional, to the distinction between de re and de dicto modality there are some generally accepted, although not controversial, definitions and examples of the various kinds of modality.

...

φ is epistemically possible for a subject S if and only if φ is not ruled out by what S knows.

In other words, you can't go beyond what you know. And anyway, how does one KNOW which possible worlds are metaphysically possible in the first place? Again, trying to make strong metaphysical claims on the basis of S5 is vacuous.

not even Kant would agree with you there. he gives distinction between a priori and a posteriori and both are said to prove metaphysical possibility or necessity. you're making your own baseless assertions.

Yes and Kant turns out to have been wrong on a number of things. For one thing, Kant though (if I remember correctly) that Euclidean geometry and Newtonian mechanics were metaphysically necessary, but nowadays we know that is completely false.

that is how they are defined. if X is a perfection, then it is better to have X than lack it. this would be what is called a priori, just as 2+2=4 is a priori. so how does this come into play?
1. greater making properties don't entail their negation of lesser making properties.
2. omnipotence is a maximally great making property.
3. therefore omnipotence cannot entail its negation of non-omnipotence.
since it can't entail its negation, it can't be impossible which means it is possible.

Arguments by definitions are tautologies and thus generally useless, such as here.

Too easy man. For one, "better" necessarily entails a value judgement which gives the argument a different logical standing. Now you're not talking about an objective thing, but what you happen to like. That is NOT a priori in any sense of the term, anymore than the statement "Castling makes chess better" is an a priori truth.

You further misunderstand your own argument there. Not entailing a lesser-making property (again, a subjective value judgement) simply means an omnipotent be can't be impotent, not that omnipotence is possible.

in this case, there is only one great making property necessary here. so there's no conflict between multiple great making properties.

Aren't you forgetting omniscience and omnibenevolence?

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that's a rewording of what i said. the conclusion follows (or is true) from the premises. you can also say the truth of the conclusion is directly related to the truth of the premises. again, you're playing semantics. and the way i worded it is also worded similarly in many sources:

A deductive argument is said to be valid if and only if it takes a form that makes it impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion nevertheless to be false.
http://www.iep.utm.edu/val-snd/

As I said, structure is what's relevant here, which directly means whether there are any logical fallacies determines if the argument is structured properly.

An argument is valid just if it would be impossible for its premises all to be true and its conclusion false simultaneously.
http://logic.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/tutorial1/Tut1-07.htm

In other words, the conclusion has to follow from the premises.

A valid argument is one in which the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of its conclusion.
http://www.unc.edu/~megw/Logic.html

I like how on this one, you explicitly cut out the part that says exactly what I've been saying, directly in the sentence before the part you quote:

"If the logical form is a good one, the resulting argument will be valid."

Truth is not directly relevant to the validity of an argument. I can have a valid argument, yet it be completely false. ALL of the sources you quote are specifically saying that valid arguments are those which, properly structured, will have the conclusion follow from the premises, ones which the truth of the premises will lead to a true conclusion.


Now, you keep saying I built my counter argument such that it needs the MOA to be valid. Malarkey.
For one, all you do is say that your argument trumps mine. If we take the route of thinking S5 can actually tell us anything strong about metaphysics, then our arguments conflict, your's does not get primacy. All my argument does is take the claim that God has to exist in all possible worlds if he exists, and shows how that allows for a counter argument by showing an, under the aforementioned assumption about S5, that there must be a possible world in which God doesn't exist. The whole point is that by your own standard of using S5 in this way, you necessarily have to demonstrate that metaphysical naturalism is indisputably incoherent before even attempting your argument. My argument is in no way built on assuming the truth of your from the get-go. It assumes the claim that for God to exist he must be in all possible worlds, and points out that there is at least 1 possible world God can't exist in, and thus by your own definition rules out God's actual existence.

So rather than just pretend your argument has primacy, try to actually show it.

[Angrboda]

Then you're simply wrong. Even if true, it's not a priori.

gee, i sure didn't have to experience anything to obtain that knowledge. sure sounds a priori to me...

You don't have knowledge. That's what this whole argument stems from. And your claiming you do is just bare assertion.

But by all means, cite the section of the KVR in which Kant claims that something can't come from nothing is an a priori truth so that I can read it for myself.

[Darkstar]

For what, exactly? The falsity of a non-falsifiable hypothesis? Do you have any evidence other than "metaphysical possibility" that independent minds can exist?

why exactly is your hypothesis non-falsifiable? that just seems like an arbitrary statement to me.

I meant yours.

and do you even know what you're asking? "do you have any evidence for the possibility of brain independent minds other than their possibility?"

You said that particles can metaphysically go faster than light speed. The laws of nature beg to differ.

that's a false analogy and your point is irrelevant. as you said it's "technically true" it is possible for mind to exist independent of the brain, so i think it's time to move past this "mind can't exist apart from brain" point. it's dead and buried so move on.

I should have said that it is technically true that we don't know it isn't possible; I don't know if the laws of physics could support such a concept. Nonetheless, I will leave this corpse where you buried it.

i don't know what you mean by "actually possible." if it is physically impossible for a particle to move faster than light, then it couldn't happen in this universe so long as that physical law remained constant. but as i said before, physical laws aren't necessary. they can be different.

The fact that even axiomatic physical laws aren't necessary is why I said there may not be any necessary truths.

there is no equivalence between mind and electrical impulses. as i'm sure you already know, electrical impulses can exist without mind

But not the other way around.

and electrical impulses don't share properties with mind. there is a correlation, not an equivalence so the mind can't reduce to energy either.

But we can reduce A.I to energy, along with whatever physical hardware is is programmed onto. So, why not the brain? Neither a monist nor dualist perspective is metaphysically impossible, if I understand your argument correctly. But...I think we were burying this point, yes?

why? is it logically absurd for the mind to create something that resembles what is physical? i don't think so. it is very possible for a mind to create concepts as well as a mind that receives information that it thinks is real.

Quite. But if you are suggesting that said things aren't actually real, and only come from our perceptions, then I feel like we are going in the general direction of the Brain in a vat scenario.

Actually, I said it only causes hallucinations to make you think you see a cheeseburger.

then it is not a cheeseburger.

You got me.

Additionally, it is not omnipotent, merely non-contingent.

that doesn't work. it has to have some property that makes it so it can't be contingent. in order for it to be non-contingent and exist it must be necessary. if it is necessary then it can't be destroyed. if it can't be destroyed, it is omnipotent.

How about any mind? Can a mind be destroyed? On the existence of what is a mind contingent? If not the brain, then...? By non-contingent, do you necessarily mean that it cannot be destroyed? I was under the assumption that it simply referred to something that came to be/always existed without something else influencing it to come about. So if I say this "cheeseburger" is non-contingent, that is false; in the sense that its existence is contingent on it not being hypothetically destroyed?

you are the one claiming uncertainty, not me. you are the one choosing solipsism alternatively, not me. i take monotheistic idealism rather than solipsism.

Technically, solipsism cannot be disproven. Maybe I haven't read enough about it, but it doesn't look like the idea that everything is merely a product of your mind, and...the idea that everything is merely a product of your mind, are all that different.

Modern Idealists, on the other hand, believe that the mind and its thoughts are the only true things that exist.

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On this scale, solipsism can be classed as idealism. Thoughts and concepts are all that exist, and furthermore, only the solipsist's own thoughts and consciousness exist. The so-called "reality" is nothing more than an idea that the solipsist has (perhaps unconsciously) created.

[MitchBenn]

Why are we even bothering with this argument when its first premise is bollocks?

The idea is that "If it's possible God exists then he DOES, so I just have to prove it's possible"?

This is NONSENSE. It's POSSIBLE that all kinds of things exist. This had no bearing at all on whether they do .

First rule of epistemology is you don't let someone get away with a flawed first premise. This premise is so flawed as to be meaningless.

[Alex K]

First rule of epistemology is you don't let someone get away with a flawed first premise. This premise is so flawed as to be meaningless.

Yes I think we established that now

[DeistPaladin]

Why are we even bothering with this argument when its first premise is bollocks?

The idea is that "If it's possible God exists then he DOES, so I just have to prove it's possible"?

This is NONSENSE. It's POSSIBLE that all kinds of things exist. This had no bearing at all on whether they do .

First rule of epistemology is you don't let someone get away with a flawed first premise. This premise is so flawed as to be meaningless.

Completely agreed. Everyone's just bouncing around the rubble and laughing at the original poster's efforts to try to pretend the structure is still standing. Still, that can be entertaining.

[Mystic]

Modal logic of possibly necessarily, then necessarily is actually just a way to state if something can possibly be necessarily in all possible worlds, then it exists necessarily in the actual world as well must exist in all possible worlds.

What you have to keep in mind, to shown to be possibly necessarily in all possible worlds, you have to first prove it is so in this world, and must be so in all worlds. Now that kind of sounds a waste of time, but the modal logic was meant just to show that in logic these statements are equal, and the more you think about it, the more you realize they are.

Now the argument with God is that it's being said to be a necessary truth. Like for example, the angles in a triangle adding up to 180 is a necessary truth in all worlds. We know this because it's possible in all possible worlds, and it's necessary truth in each possible world.

There are somethings that aren't necessarily so in all possible worlds, like, a decision I make.

Also properties that are changeable and could be different would not be a necessary possible thing in all possible worlds.

If God is defined to be a necessary being, then it would follow all his properties are such that they aren't changeable and also are necessary characteristics. This is already narrows the possibility of a necessary being to one. It can't have one colour over another, or one shape over another, because those aren't necessary. It's qualities rather must be necessary qualities.

Does this argument really prove God? I don't think so personally. Because it seems with every other necessary thing, we first know of it being true in this world, before we say it's true in all possible worlds. This one is trying to reverse the step, and showing that it being possible in all possible worlds, it would be so in this world. But what you have to show is that it would be so in every possible world, not that it's only possible so in every possible world. Or otherwise, it's not possibly necessarily, but possibly that, which is a different premise.

[Angrboda]

Now the argument with God is that it's being said to be a necessary truth. Like for example, the angles in a triangle adding up to 180 is a necessary truth in all worlds. We know this because it's possible in all possible worlds, and it's necessary truth in each possible world.

You mean, aside from the fact that it's not true in all possible worlds.....

Hell, it's not even true in this one, as the existence of matter basically guarantees that there is no flat region of space.


Actually, I see it as more of a question of commutivity of the modal logical operations, which is lost if you take it out of modal logic.