Discussion
right now there is an intellectual dispute between 2 major metaphysical views, idealism and materialism. with dualism bankrupt in its internal inconsistency (which is the interaction problem), so these are the only 2 competing metaphysical views on the nature of reality. is it fundamentally physical, or fundamentally mental? this dispute is important as they both have some religious implications to them. materialism implies determinism (we have no free will), atheism, and the absence of an afterlife. idealism implies libertarian free will, theism, and the possibility if not probability of an afterlife. how can we establish idealism is more reasonable than materialism?
note this is not a proof of one being true and one being false, rather this is just showing which is more reasonable given the information we currently have. everyone should be interested in not just any position, but the most reasonable one. this argument is going to make use of Cartesian skepticism and Occam's Razor.
materialists often like to think they hold the most reasonable perceive a physical world as by Occam's Razor it is unnecessary to postulate a fundamentally mental world. for those that don't know, Occam's Razor states the most reasonable position is the position that makes the fewest assumptions, as it is not pragmatic to make unnecessary postulations to explain what we experience. ironically, it is the materialists that are in violation of Occam's Razor. we do not directly experience a physical world. as René Descartes found with his exercise of Cartesian Skepticism; we can doubt everything, even the very physical world we seem to experience. but we cannot doubt our own conscious experience. he is famous for the quote "I think therefore I am" basically establishing our ability to doubt is proof of our own existence and conscious experience making it the one thing we cannot doubt. the very fact that consciousness is the one thing we cannot doubt makes it the most fundamental part of our experience, not the physicality of the world. so to suggest something is more fundamental than consciousness would be in violation of Occam's Razor since it would be making an unnecessary postulation to explain our experience. we already cannot doubt the existence of consciousness and cannot doubt it is the most fundamental part of our experience, so to postulate something is more fundamental would be presumptuous and unverifiable since we cannot affirm what is outside our conscious experience. therefore it is most reasonable to assume our consciousness is most fundamental as you cannot deny its existence and you cannot deny it is most fundamental to our conscious experience. again, this is not proof for idealism; rather it establishes it as the more reasonable position.
Objections
1. Monistic Idealism does not necessarily imply theism. it is perfectly compatible with atheism.
actually, it is not and this can be shown with epistemic investigation. there are essentially 2 different monistic idealist views, poly-consciousness and mono-consciousness. poly-consciousness representative of the general idealistic view that there are many distinct yet similar minds all experiencing the same world and are able to interact with one another. mono-consciousness is representative of the metaphysical solipsist view that your own personal mind is all that exists and any other minds that may exist are merely constructed from your own mind. concerning the poly-consciousness view, there is a need for explaining how distinctly separate yet similar minds can interact in a commonly shared world. the only coherent answer to this is they all have a fundamental commonality. given monistic idealism, this commonality between consciousness can only be a greater consciousness or super conscious to which we are all a part of. this super conscious would contain all minds and project the apparently physical world we experience enabling our interaction with it and each other. since this super conscious contains everything that exists in accordance with monistic idealism, it would therefore have full control over its own conscious states which in essence is full control over everything which would make it omnipotent. it would also contain all knowledge which would make it omnipotent. as you can see this super conscious is looking more and more like God and in fact they are ontologically indistinguishable. investigating the mono-consciousness view, or solipsist view, you can see striking similarities between that world and the poly-consciousness world. the only difference is in a solipsist world, you are the super conscious which is essentially saying you are God. I would say such a view is not reasonable since you don't have control over the world you experience or even all your conscious states; but that's another topic. the point is both views of idealism imply theism and there is no coherent alternative.
2. your idealist view postulates the existence of a super conscious to explain the many minds connection which is unverifiable while materialists postulate the existence of a physical world to which these many minds are derived. therefore the 2 make the same number of assumptions and though they are different are necessary to explain the many minds connection.
this is a well thought out objection but seems to miss something. both do make a necessary assumption to explain the many minds connection, but the materialist assumption includes assuming a separate substance than what we directly experience to explain this connection. the most fundamental thing in our experience is consciousness, and materialism assumes material that is distinctly separate from consciousness to which consciousness is derived. if consciousness is the most fundamental part of our experience, why assume there is something more fundamental to which consciousness is derived? idealism makes fewer assumptions by saying consciousness is fundamental and the super conscious is merely accommodating this belief to make it compatible with the many minds belief. so the super conscious is verifiable to a monistic idealist given it is necessary for its internal consistency.
right now there is an intellectual dispute between 2 major metaphysical views, idealism and materialism. with dualism bankrupt in its internal inconsistency (which is the interaction problem), so these are the only 2 competing metaphysical views on the nature of reality. is it fundamentally physical, or fundamentally mental? this dispute is important as they both have some religious implications to them. materialism implies determinism (we have no free will), atheism, and the absence of an afterlife. idealism implies libertarian free will, theism, and the possibility if not probability of an afterlife. how can we establish idealism is more reasonable than materialism?
note this is not a proof of one being true and one being false, rather this is just showing which is more reasonable given the information we currently have. everyone should be interested in not just any position, but the most reasonable one. this argument is going to make use of Cartesian skepticism and Occam's Razor.
materialists often like to think they hold the most reasonable perceive a physical world as by Occam's Razor it is unnecessary to postulate a fundamentally mental world. for those that don't know, Occam's Razor states the most reasonable position is the position that makes the fewest assumptions, as it is not pragmatic to make unnecessary postulations to explain what we experience. ironically, it is the materialists that are in violation of Occam's Razor. we do not directly experience a physical world. as René Descartes found with his exercise of Cartesian Skepticism; we can doubt everything, even the very physical world we seem to experience. but we cannot doubt our own conscious experience. he is famous for the quote "I think therefore I am" basically establishing our ability to doubt is proof of our own existence and conscious experience making it the one thing we cannot doubt. the very fact that consciousness is the one thing we cannot doubt makes it the most fundamental part of our experience, not the physicality of the world. so to suggest something is more fundamental than consciousness would be in violation of Occam's Razor since it would be making an unnecessary postulation to explain our experience. we already cannot doubt the existence of consciousness and cannot doubt it is the most fundamental part of our experience, so to postulate something is more fundamental would be presumptuous and unverifiable since we cannot affirm what is outside our conscious experience. therefore it is most reasonable to assume our consciousness is most fundamental as you cannot deny its existence and you cannot deny it is most fundamental to our conscious experience. again, this is not proof for idealism; rather it establishes it as the more reasonable position.
Objections
1. Monistic Idealism does not necessarily imply theism. it is perfectly compatible with atheism.
actually, it is not and this can be shown with epistemic investigation. there are essentially 2 different monistic idealist views, poly-consciousness and mono-consciousness. poly-consciousness representative of the general idealistic view that there are many distinct yet similar minds all experiencing the same world and are able to interact with one another. mono-consciousness is representative of the metaphysical solipsist view that your own personal mind is all that exists and any other minds that may exist are merely constructed from your own mind. concerning the poly-consciousness view, there is a need for explaining how distinctly separate yet similar minds can interact in a commonly shared world. the only coherent answer to this is they all have a fundamental commonality. given monistic idealism, this commonality between consciousness can only be a greater consciousness or super conscious to which we are all a part of. this super conscious would contain all minds and project the apparently physical world we experience enabling our interaction with it and each other. since this super conscious contains everything that exists in accordance with monistic idealism, it would therefore have full control over its own conscious states which in essence is full control over everything which would make it omnipotent. it would also contain all knowledge which would make it omnipotent. as you can see this super conscious is looking more and more like God and in fact they are ontologically indistinguishable. investigating the mono-consciousness view, or solipsist view, you can see striking similarities between that world and the poly-consciousness world. the only difference is in a solipsist world, you are the super conscious which is essentially saying you are God. I would say such a view is not reasonable since you don't have control over the world you experience or even all your conscious states; but that's another topic. the point is both views of idealism imply theism and there is no coherent alternative.
2. your idealist view postulates the existence of a super conscious to explain the many minds connection which is unverifiable while materialists postulate the existence of a physical world to which these many minds are derived. therefore the 2 make the same number of assumptions and though they are different are necessary to explain the many minds connection.
this is a well thought out objection but seems to miss something. both do make a necessary assumption to explain the many minds connection, but the materialist assumption includes assuming a separate substance than what we directly experience to explain this connection. the most fundamental thing in our experience is consciousness, and materialism assumes material that is distinctly separate from consciousness to which consciousness is derived. if consciousness is the most fundamental part of our experience, why assume there is something more fundamental to which consciousness is derived? idealism makes fewer assumptions by saying consciousness is fundamental and the super conscious is merely accommodating this belief to make it compatible with the many minds belief. so the super conscious is verifiable to a monistic idealist given it is necessary for its internal consistency.
I do not feel obliged to believe that the same God who has endowed us with senses, reason, and intellect has intended us to forgo their use and by some other means to give us knowledge which we can attain by them.
-Galileo
-Galileo
