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Metaethical subjective relativism
#1
Metaethical subjective relativism
Briefly, metaethical subjective relativism (MESR) is the position that statements about ethics are true or false only relative to the subjective, i.e. the properties of minds, either the mind of an individual or statistical properties of the minds of a group of individuals. In other words, it is a category error to ascribe the properties "good" and "bad" directly or inherently to actions, events, or states of affairs (in the same sense that mass and size are intrinsic properties of the Earth); instead, "good" and "bad" coherently refer only to the relation of minds to actions, etc.

Note that MESR is not the idea (sometimes called ethical subjectivism or intuitionism) that properties of minds create, determine, or provide an epistemic basis for believing that actions, etc. intrinsically have ethical properties. MESR is instead the idea that our linguistic habit of using the predicate copula (X is good/bad) to relate properties to actions, etc. (e.g. killing people is bad) is at best a metaphor, and at worst an error.

The basic argument is first that subjective relativism is positively demonstrable: people with minds do in fact have ethical relationships to actions, etc.: we approve and disapprove of certain actions and states of affairs. Second, to go beyond subjective relativism requires an epistemic system that either begs the questions, i.e. assumes as premises what is at issue, or fails to find a scientific evidentiary basis. Essentially, statements of the form (X is good/bad) meant literally are unfalsifiable.

This opening is obviously considerably oversimplified. I am happy to clarify and expand on my position on request, and you can visit my eponymous blog and click on the obvious tag to read my writing on this subject in more detail.
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#2
RE: Metaethical subjective relativism
I think that, as you've stated this, I agree with you mostly. I mightn't go so far as to say the statement "(action) is (value judgment)" is erroneous, as long as it's understood that we're talking in terms of a subjective standard of "good/bad." I believe it's obvious that most or all "objective" sources of morality (like the abrahamic god) can be dismissed out-of-hand.

I've always wondered if one could statistically assess good/bad/moral/immoral in terms of 1) neuronormativity and 2) the action/hormone/enzyme output of these brains. Step-by-step, I mean: 1) statistically determine the average brain, 2) quantify the action of things like serotonin, dopamine and oxytocin in response to various actions. Now, of course, this framework would be in terms of, say, "dopaminergic morality," but, you know. Just spit-ballin' here.
How will we know, when the morning comes, we are still human? - 2D

Don't worry, my friend.  If this be the end, then so shall it be.
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#3
RE: Metaethical subjective relativism
(July 27, 2015 at 3:17 pm)TRJF Wrote: I've always wondered if one could statistically assess good/bad/moral/immoral in terms of 1) neuronormativity and 2) the action/hormone/enzyme output of these brains.  Step-by-step, I mean: 1) statistically determine the average brain, 2) quantify the action of things like serotonin, dopamine and oxytocin in response to various actions.  Now, of course, this framework would be in terms of, say, "dopaminergic morality," but, you know.  Just spit-ballin' here.

It is worth noting that the best one could do from such an analysis would be to get an physical correlate to subjective feelings; one could not get a finding of good/bad unrelated to states of minds/brains. We could find what it means neurochemically for a person or collection of people to disapprove of something, but not whether they should disapprove of it.
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#4
RE: Metaethical subjective relativism
I found your blog but I didn't find an article/link to anything about metaethical subjective relativism. You are obviously better studied than I in economics, a real hole in my education. But I don't think MSR is about economics, unless indirectly. If you wouldn't mind PM'ing me a link to the post at your blog you had in mind, I would be obliged. (Don't want to encourage you in a path that might be in violation of the 30/30 rule but please PM me if you're not sure either.)
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#5
RE: Metaethical subjective relativism
(July 27, 2015 at 4:41 pm)Whateverist the White Wrote: I found your blog but I didn't find an article/link to anything about metaethical subjective relativism.  You are obviously better studied than I in economics, a real hole in my education.  But I don't think MSR is about economics, unless indirectly.  If you wouldn't mind PM'ing me a link to the post at your blog you had in mind, I would be obliged.  (Don't want to encourage you in a path that might be in violation of the 30/30 rule but please PM me if you're not sure either.)

Done :-) Before I decided to study economics, I was very interested in studying philosophy.
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#6
RE: Metaethical subjective relativism
How good is your economics (given your barefoot status)? [J/K]
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#7
RE: Metaethical subjective relativism
(July 27, 2015 at 8:52 pm)Whateverist the White Wrote: How good is your economics (given your barefoot status)?  [J/K]

Heh.   Smile Not so bad, I think. And, even though I'm a communist, the libertarian capitalists in my department have given me uncommon recognition.
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#8
RE: Metaethical subjective relativism
TBB, what you are saying describes almost all human experience, not just the experience of ethics.  Beauty, love, even the color and solidity of the desk in front of me, are not to be found anywhere but in the evaluations of a subjective agent.

We often leave implied statements unsaid, and they are then discarded implicitly in semantic discussion, which is why almost anything seems silly under a microscope.  But when we say (act is value), that value must be related to something, and in the case of human being, that something is likely a mix of an awareness of instinct, of current hedonic state, of world view, etc.

The reason (act is value) is unfalsifiable isn't because of either the act or the value, it's because you are divorcing the statement from a goal.  If my goal is to have peace and quiet, then sticking a duck in a blender feet-first is clearly bad.  So I'd argue that the linguistic habit isn't so much one of creating meanings where none is falsifiable, but in ommitting a point of origin in the interest of brevity, only to have that point left behind and forgotten, and the value statement thereby rendered meaningless.
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#9
RE: Metaethical subjective relativism
(July 27, 2015 at 10:54 pm)bennyboy Wrote: TBB, what you are saying describes almost all human experience, not just the experience of ethics.  Beauty, love, even the color and solidity of the desk in front of me, are not to be found anywhere but in the evaluations of a subjective agent.

Well, there's certainly a subjective component to everything we do, since that is, in a sense, what we are: subjective agents.

However, part of our subjective consciousness posits things outside our minds. We explain our subjective experience by talking about the existence of things outside our minds that have a causal or existential relation to our consciousness. So, for example, without the subjective feeling of being pulled towards the center of the Earth, we would have no theory of gravity, but our theory of gravity includes this thing, the Earth, which is outside our mind, and which pulls us toward it, irrespective of our subjective state. We have a subjective consciousness of something objective.

I argue that some consider our subjective feelings of ethics to be similar: our preferences refer to something as objective as the Earth, but that these theories are incorrect; while they do have a causal history do exist, there is nothing outside our minds for our preferences to coherently refer to in the same sense that there really is something outside our minds that our subjective ideas about material reality coherently refer to.
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#10
RE: Metaethical subjective relativism
(July 28, 2015 at 7:54 am)The Barefoot Bum Wrote:
(July 27, 2015 at 10:54 pm)bennyboy Wrote: TBB, what you are saying describes almost all human experience, not just the experience of ethics.  Beauty, love, even the color and solidity of the desk in front of me, are not to be found anywhere but in the evaluations of a subjective agent.

Well, there's certainly a subjective component to everything we do, since that is, in a sense, what we are: subjective agents.

However, part of our subjective consciousness posits things outside our minds. We explain our subjective experience by talking about the existence of things outside our minds that have a causal or existential relation to our consciousness. So, for example, without the subjective feeling of being pulled towards the center of the Earth, we would have no theory of gravity, but our theory of gravity includes this thing, the Earth, which is outside our mind, and which pulls us toward it, irrespective of our subjective state. We have a subjective consciousness of something objective.

I argue that some consider our subjective feelings of ethics to be similar: our preferences refer to something as objective as the Earth, but that these theories are incorrect; while they do have a causal history do exist, there is nothing outside our minds for our preferences to coherently refer to in the same sense that there really is something outside our minds that our subjective ideas about material reality coherently refer to.
Okay, I get you.

Let me ask you a question.  As a mental agent, would one's DNA and the instinctive behaviors beyond the control of conscious awareness be considered part of the mechanism of the subjective agent, or part of the objective environment?  Since I have no control over those things, I would consider them objective to my subjective agency, even though other people seem them as part and parcel.

I'd therefore consider the love of a parent for a child as an objective (and mostly universal) human more, sufficient that those who don't experience it naturally will have it imposed as an inviolable ethic.  And I don't think that this is a product of conscious behavior, but more likely that whatever culture or world view one holds, it will wrap itself in some way around that natural impulse to protect.
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