Paganism vs. Monotheism

[Mudhammam]

You think of natural occurrences as being amoral because you view them as natural.  But if they were occurring by design, then it would be an entirely different matter.  Since many people seem confused by the subject being God, imagine how things would be if I could control the weather.  Suppose I cause a flood, and a few dozen people drown in it.  Is what I have done amoral?  And before you tell me that it may depend on the particulars, let us say, like God, I know in advance that it will kill those dozens of people (remember, God is supposedly omniscient, so he knows what the effects are of his actions).  So, in other words, I drown people with the weather.  In this imaginary scenario, am I an okay guy?  If not, then neither is God.

We can also view the matter in reverse.  Suppose I can control the weather, but I refuse to do so, and just let the flood kill the dozens of people.  I could have effortlessly (God is supposed to be omnipotent, so every action is effortless for such a being) prevented their deaths, but instead, I willfully and knowingly let them die.  And I let all of the people starve from droughts who 'naturally' starve, and etc.  In this imaginary scenario, am I an okay guy?  If not, then neither is God.

That's all very true; I suppose I looked past its utility in eliminating the most improbable definitions that one might enjoin to their concept of God. I, for one, cannot even begin to understand what practical import terms such as "omnipotent" and "omniscient" contain to be of any use in the first place. To play devil's advocate, and indulge my curiosity, however: Perhaps it is unfitting to degrade the Supreme Good (if such a quality really was inextricable from the Creator, which I don't see why it must be), by exemplifying instances of suffering, for two possible reasons: 1) It defines Good too narrowly, by making its concern exclusively anthropo- or geo-centric. 2) Cannot suffering, even in the most extreme forms, have intrinsic value? - the potential of bringing about greater degrees of good that would otherwise be impossible to realize?

With reference to "free will" and the question of its meaning or existence, all I said is that to even discuss moral evil it would seem one is required to acknowledge the presence of a rational will that is free to make moral decisions. That is to say, what is morality if all actions are determined by antecedents and the possibility of altering future consequents is ultimately beyond the capacity or responsibility of any individual to effect? Without freedom, how would human behavior be different - morally speaking - then other physical events, like the beating of a heart or a thunderstorm?

In what sense would "god" be anything other than just an unthinking force of nature if god has no rationality?  You have taken the god out of "god" and are describing natural forces.

In that it would be free, and natural forces - or regularities - are, perhaps, not.

[Redbeard The Pink]

Both tend to believe in an entire cast of fictional "spirit people" of one variety or another, but monotheists have one special character that they attempt to put in a class all its own, whereas polytheists expand that same class to include other characters.

Other than that, they really are the exact same thing. Any way you slice it, it's some way of trying to convince you that physical reality is just a thin veneer for a bunch of shit going on with magical, invisible people that you and I have no way to detect or voluntarily communicate with unless they can get us alone and we happen to be crazy.

The closest thing I've encountered to actual "monotheism" is those wishy-washy "higher power" people. I always have a hard time following their arguments, though, because it's so hard to understand what they're saying with Deepak Chopra's dick in their mouth.

[Pyrrho]

You think of natural occurrences as being amoral because you view them as natural.  But if they were occurring by design, then it would be an entirely different matter.  Since many people seem confused by the subject being God, imagine how things would be if I could control the weather.  Suppose I cause a flood, and a few dozen people drown in it.  Is what I have done amoral?  And before you tell me that it may depend on the particulars, let us say, like God, I know in advance that it will kill those dozens of people (remember, God is supposedly omniscient, so he knows what the effects are of his actions).  So, in other words, I drown people with the weather.  In this imaginary scenario, am I an okay guy?  If not, then neither is God.

We can also view the matter in reverse.  Suppose I can control the weather, but I refuse to do so, and just let the flood kill the dozens of people.  I could have effortlessly (God is supposed to be omnipotent, so every action is effortless for such a being) prevented their deaths, but instead, I willfully and knowingly let them die.  And I let all of the people starve from droughts who 'naturally' starve, and etc.  In this imaginary scenario, am I an okay guy?  If not, then neither is God.

That's all very true; I suppose I looked past its utility in eliminating the most improbable definitions that one might enjoin to their concept of God. I, for one, cannot even begin to understand what practical import terms such as "omnipotent" and "omniscient" contain to be of any use in the first place. To play devil's advocate, and indulge my curiosity, however: Perhaps it is unfitting to degrade the Supreme Good (if such a quality really was inextricable from the Creator, which I don't see why it must be), by exemplifying instances of suffering, for two possible reasons: 1) It defines Good too narrowly, by making its concern exclusively anthropo- or geo-centric. 2) Cannot suffering, even in the most extreme forms, have intrinsic value? - the potential of bringing about greater degrees of good that would otherwise be impossible to realize?

You are sounding too much like Mother Teresa and her evil love of suffering, believing it is good for people to suffer, for me to be inclined to express my true feelings regarding your claims.  Do you really believe that suffering is good?  If you do, perhaps we should meet and you should let me torture you for a while and let you ponder how good that is.  If you refuse that, I will take it that you do not believe that suffering is good at all and are just saying nonsense.

With reference to "free will" and the question of its meaning or existence, all I said is that to even discuss moral evil it would seem one is required to acknowledge the presence of a rational will that is free to make moral decisions. That is to say, what is morality if all actions are determined by antecedents and the possibility of altering future consequents is ultimately beyond the capacity or responsibility of any individual to effect? Without freedom, how would human behavior be different - morally speaking - then other physical events, like the beating of a heart or a thunderstorm?

In what sense would "god" be anything other than just an unthinking force of nature if god has no rationality?  You have taken the god out of "god" and are describing natural forces.

In that it would be free, and natural forces - or regularities - are, perhaps, not.

I think that is going to get us into a very troublesome discussion of the nature of free will and whether or not we should be soft determinists instead of going with the 'libertarian free will' or 'hard determinist' view of things.  

Just FYI, I am, after thinking about it all for a while, a soft determinist in the sense that I do not see "free will," as commonly used in practical matters (e.g., courts of law), as conflicting with determinism.  But if you imagine something else, by all means, demonstrate this magical "free will," or give reasons to believe in it.

[Mudhammam]

You are sounding too much like Mother Teresa and her evil love of suffering, believing it is good for people to suffer, for me to be inclined to express my true feelings regarding your claims.  Do you really believe that suffering is good?  If you do, perhaps we should meet and you should let me torture you for a while and let you ponder how good that is.  If you refuse that, I will take it that you do not believe that suffering is good at all and are just saying nonsense.

Perhaps I could let you give me a hardy flogging, while you hurl vicious insults and encourage your friends to strike and spit upon my face; then you could pierce my head with a crown of thorns and nail my flesh into two beams of wood, watching as I struggle for hours to expire and when I finally do, its through suffocating under my own weight. And when just before I surrender myself to the grave, I, in my Stoic resignation, cry out, "I forgive you!" then perhaps you shall discover something supremely good, unbeknownst before: that divine will to love thine enemy, that trait which amongst all animals appears to be peculiarly human, all too human! ;-)

In all seriousness, I take your point. It seems to me to be the very definition of improbable - and the obstacle theists cannot overcome - to propose that there is not one single instance of suffering that lacks any redeeming quality or purpose; contrarily, if all such actual and possible evil does in some sense "work for good for those who love God," then the problem has, rather than been solved, simply been denied. Evil must be viewed, according to the "blessed," as a necessary supplement to the greatest possible good, and therefore not really evil at all.

I think that is going to get us into a very troublesome discussion of the nature of free will and whether or not we should be soft determinists instead of going with the 'libertarian free will' or 'hard determinist' view of things.  

Just FYI, I am, after thinking about it all for a while, a soft determinist in the sense that I do not see "free will," as commonly used in practical matters (e.g., courts of law), as conflicting with determinism.  But if you imagine something else, by all means, demonstrate this magical "free will," or give reasons to believe in it.

I don't see how a legal definition of "free will" imposes on, or resolves, the philosophical conclusions any deteminist - hard or soft - must appear to confess: freedom to choose right or wrong, i.e. the moral quality attached to such freedom, is entirely illusory. If you claim that these contentious notions - free will, determinism, and moral responsibility - are compatible, I think it's likewise incumbent on you to explain how and why this could be so, also without appeal to magic.

Here's an interesting argument for human freedom I was recently offered, which is a formalization of Sartre:
1. For a state of affairs to cause human action, the causal efficacy of said state of affairs must come only from the characteristics of the state of affairs itself.
2. A state of affairs has no meaning in itself.
3. If a state of affairs has no meaning in itself, its meaning must be given to it by someone experiencing it.
4. The meaning of a state of affairs must be given to it by someone experiencing it. (MP on 2 & 3)
5. The meaning of a state of affairs is what motivates our actions.
6. If the meaning of a state of affairs is what motivates our actions, then (for human actions) the causal efficacy of said state of affairs does not come only from characteristics of the state of affairs itself.
7. (For human actions) the causal efficacy of a state of affairs does not come only from characteristics of the state of affairs itself. (MP on 5 & 6)
8. No state of affairs can, by itself, cause human action. (MT on 1 & 7)
9. If no state of affairs can, by itself, cause human action, then human action is free.
10. Human action is free. (MP on 8 & 9)

What is your take on that?

[Pyrrho]

---

You are sounding too much like Mother Teresa and her evil love of suffering, believing it is good for people to suffer, for me to be inclined to express my true feelings regarding your claims.  Do you really believe that suffering is good?  If you do, perhaps we should meet and you should let me torture you for a while and let you ponder how good that is.  If you refuse that, I will take it that you do not believe that suffering is good at all and are just saying nonsense.

Perhaps I could let you give me a hardy flogging, while you hurl vicious insults and encourage your friends to strike and spit upon my face; then you could pierce my head with a crown of thorns and nail my flesh into two beams of wood, watching as I struggle for hours to expire and when I finally do, its through suffocating under my own weight. And when just before I surrender myself to the grave, I, in my Stoic resignation, cry out, "I forgive you!" then perhaps you shall discover something supremely good, unbeknownst before: that divine will to love thine enemy, that trait which amongst all animals appears to be peculiarly human, all too human! ;-)

---

In all seriousness, I take your point. It seems to me to be the very definition of improbable - and the obstacle theists cannot overcome - to propose that there is not one single instance of suffering that lacks any redeeming quality or purpose; contrarily, if all such actual and possible evil does in some sense "work for good for those who love God," then the problem has, rather than been solved, simply been denied. Evil must be viewed, according to the "blessed," as a necessary supplement to the greatest possible good, and therefore not really evil at all.

You are certainly correct, that that is a kind of denial that there is a problem.  That response is unsatisfactory for a few reasons.  First, it is asserted and not supported by legitimate arguments.  (The arguments are typically a form of begging the question, in which it is assumed that there really is a God as described, and uses that as the basis for deciding that this is the best of all possible worlds.  However, since the existence of such a God is the issue at hand, assuming its existence is purely begging the question.)  So there is no reason to accept it at all.  Second, the idea is implausible on its face.  That is, it is not what appears to be the case.  Of course, appearances can sometimes be deceiving, but there is in this case no compelling reason to suppose that the appearance is anything other than exactly correct.  Third, a direct consequence of that idea is that it is impossible to ever do anything that is evil.  If I become a mass murderer, then that must be somehow for the greater good, and consequently it is good for me to be a mass murderer.  And if I torture small children to death in my basement, then, that, too, must be good, as that must also be for the greater good.  A direct consequence of that idea is that everything is permitted; everything is good.  And not only that, but that every action that does happen must be better than every action that does not happen; thus, if I torture to death children in my basement, me doing that must be better than the counterfactual idea of me not doing it.  And yet the advocates of the idea that you express never (at least never in my experience) accept this conclusion that necessarily follows from their position.  In other words, they end up contradicting themselves, and consequently are wrong in their view of the world, no matter what the truth may be.

---

I think that is going to get us into a very troublesome discussion of the nature of free will and whether or not we should be soft determinists instead of going with the 'libertarian free will' or 'hard determinist' view of things.  

Just FYI, I am, after thinking about it all for a while, a soft determinist in the sense that I do not see "free will," as commonly used in practical matters (e.g., courts of law), as conflicting with determinism.  But if you imagine something else, by all means, demonstrate this magical "free will," or give reasons to believe in it.

---

I don't see how a legal definition of "free will" imposes on, or resolves, the philosophical conclusions any deteminist - hard or soft - must appear to confess: freedom to choose right or wrong, i.e. the moral quality attached to such freedom, is entirely illusory. If you claim that these contentious notions - free will, determinism, and moral responsibility - are compatible, I think it's likewise incumbent on you to explain how and why this could be so, also without appeal to magic.

What I meant was that the way "free will" is commonly used in ordinary life makes no reference to metaphysical determinism.  One can look at Aristotle's discussion of this in the Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, of "voluntary" and "involuntary" actions.

http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicoma...3.iii.html

Whether there is ultimately an earlier cause of what a person is, that makes no difference for the distinction between a voluntary (i.e. free) action and an involuntary action.

One can look at this another way.  A man may be good or bad, as he is.  It makes no difference how he became that way, as far as the judgement that he is good or is bad at present.  A murderer is a murderer, regardless of what caused him to be a murderer.

Here's an interesting argument for human freedom I was recently offered, which is a formalization of Sartre:
1. For a state of affairs to cause human action, the causal efficacy of said state of affairs must come only from the characteristics of the state of affairs itself.
2. A state of affairs has no meaning in itself.
3. If a state of affairs has no meaning in itself, its meaning must be given to it by someone experiencing it.
4. The meaning of a state of affairs must be given to it by someone experiencing it. (MP on 2 & 3)
5. The meaning of a state of affairs is what motivates our actions.
6. If the meaning of a state of affairs is what motivates our actions, then (for human actions) the causal efficacy of said state of affairs does not come only from characteristics of the state of affairs itself.
7. (For human actions) the causal efficacy of a state of affairs does not come only from characteristics of the state of affairs itself. (MP on 5 & 6)
8. No state of affairs can, by itself, cause human action. (MT on 1 & 7)
9. If no state of affairs can, by itself, cause human action, then human action is free.
10. Human action is free. (MP on 8 & 9)

What is your take on that?

It seems to me he is equivocating on the phrase "meaning of a state of affairs."  With 5, the "meaning" of which he writes appears to mean the feelings that people have.  Yet people have feelings due to the particular state of affairs (not the way I would normally express this) that is the arrangement of their constituent parts.  And that runs counter to 2, in that the state of affairs, the way one is, is the cause of the feelings one has, and those feelings are what motivate action.

[Mudhammam]

What I meant was that the way "free will" is commonly used in ordinary life makes no reference to metaphysical determinism.  One can look at Aristotle's discussion of this in the Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, of "voluntary" and "involuntary" actions.

http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicoma...3.iii.html

Whether there is ultimately an earlier cause of what a person is, that makes no difference for the distinction between a voluntary (i.e. free) action and an involuntary action.

One can look at this another way.  A man may be good or bad, as he is.  It makes no difference how he became that way, as far as the judgement that he is good or is bad at present.  A murderer is a murderer, regardless of what caused him to be a murderer.

I don't think Aristotle was aware of the problem that determinism poses, as Epicurus later was, so his notions of voluntarily action only side-step the dilemma, rather than address it. The metaphysical vs. the practical import of "free will" as a concept most certainly conflict if we're thinking about the issue clearly. It has ramifications for morality, as well as reward and punishment, for good or bad persons ought then to be more properly considered lucky or unfortunate, healthy or sickly, and if the latter - including in the case of the murderer or rapist - treated with the care and compassion of a physician rather than abused and maligned as the source of the disease. It makes about as much sense to me to call a person morally good or bad, if determinism is true with respect to thought and action, as it would be to call a fallen tree or a shifting tectonic plate or the common cold morally good or bad.

Anyway, I forgot how we got here... lol. Problem of evil... free will defense... no free will... no evil... hmm. I guess to summarize my view, I agree that an all-powerful and all-knowing God cannot escape the problem of evil, though it doesn't negate the possibility of a God which is either amoral or restricted by some means in its power or knowledge. But it seems that if we do profess evil to exist, then so must the freedom to do good. ("ought implies can"). Freedom, that is, in a metaphysical sense, not as a sort of short-sighted approximation of the nearest causes to an event which soft determinism wishes to muddle by the term "free will."

[vorlon13]

Am I the only one to find it a little weird the 'classic' Judeo/Christiam/Moslem God dude is not a monotheist ??

[Pyrrho]

What I meant was that the way "free will" is commonly used in ordinary life makes no reference to metaphysical determinism.  One can look at Aristotle's discussion of this in the Nicomachean Ethics, Book III, of "voluntary" and "involuntary" actions.

http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicoma...3.iii.html

Whether there is ultimately an earlier cause of what a person is, that makes no difference for the distinction between a voluntary (i.e. free) action and an involuntary action.

One can look at this another way.  A man may be good or bad, as he is.  It makes no difference how he became that way, as far as the judgement that he is good or is bad at present.  A murderer is a murderer, regardless of what caused him to be a murderer.

I don't think Aristotle was aware of the problem that determinism poses, as Epicurus later was, so his notions of voluntarily action only side-step the dilemma, rather than address it. The metaphysical vs. the practical import of "free will" as a concept most certainly conflict if we're thinking about the issue clearly. It has ramifications for morality, as well as reward and punishment, for good or bad persons ought then to be more properly considered lucky or unfortunate, healthy or sickly, and if the latter - including in the case of the murderer or rapist - treated with the care and compassion of a physician rather than abused and maligned as the source of the disease. It makes about as much sense to me to call a person morally good or bad, if determinism is true with respect to thought and action, as it would be to call a fallen tree or a shifting tectonic plate or the common cold morally good or bad.

Anyway, I forgot how we got here... lol. Problem of evil... free will defense... no free will... no evil... hmm. I guess to summarize my view, I agree that an all-powerful and all-knowing God cannot escape the problem of evil, though it doesn't negate the possibility of a God which is either amoral or restricted by some means in its power or knowledge. But it seems that if we do profess evil to exist, then so must the freedom to do good. ("ought implies can"). Freedom, that is, in a metaphysical sense, not as a sort of short-sighted approximation of the nearest causes to an event which soft determinism wishes to muddle by the term "free will."

One "last"  (I hope) comment on metaphysical free will for this thread.  I don't think that metaphysical free will helps with anything, because I have never heard a coherent explanation of what it is.

Additionally, if we go with determinism, it may have implications for morality, but that does not mean that the concept vanishes.  It just makes it different, just as an "objective" moral theory is different from a "subjective" one.  Abandoning some version of morality does necessarily entail abandoning every concept of morality.

Getting us back to the problem of evil, although conceptually, one can have a perfectly benevolent god that lacks omnipotence and omniscience, when thinking about it practically, the god must be very, very far from being omnipotent and omniscient.  After all, god does not even manage to call the police when someone is being murdered.  So we are left with something that is very, very far from being omnipotent or omniscient.  So far, in fact, that one may wonder if such an ignorant and/or impotent being should be called a "god" at all.