Paganism vs. Monotheism

[Mudhammam]

You think of natural occurrences as being amoral because you view them as natural.  But if they were occurring by design, then it would be an entirely different matter.  Since many people seem confused by the subject being God, imagine how things would be if I could control the weather.  Suppose I cause a flood, and a few dozen people drown in it.  Is what I have done amoral?  And before you tell me that it may depend on the particulars, let us say, like God, I know in advance that it will kill those dozens of people (remember, God is supposedly omniscient, so he knows what the effects are of his actions).  So, in other words, I drown people with the weather.  In this imaginary scenario, am I an okay guy?  If not, then neither is God.

We can also view the matter in reverse.  Suppose I can control the weather, but I refuse to do so, and just let the flood kill the dozens of people.  I could have effortlessly (God is supposed to be omnipotent, so every action is effortless for such a being) prevented their deaths, but instead, I willfully and knowingly let them die.  And I let all of the people starve from droughts who 'naturally' starve, and etc.  In this imaginary scenario, am I an okay guy?  If not, then neither is God.

That's all very true; I suppose I looked past its utility in eliminating the most improbable definitions that one might enjoin to their concept of God. I, for one, cannot even begin to understand what practical import terms such as "omnipotent" and "omniscient" contain to be of any use in the first place. To play devil's advocate, and indulge my curiosity, however: Perhaps it is unfitting to degrade the Supreme Good (if such a quality really was inextricable from the Creator, which I don't see why it must be), by exemplifying instances of suffering, for two possible reasons: 1) It defines Good too narrowly, by making its concern exclusively anthropo- or geo-centric. 2) Cannot suffering, even in the most extreme forms, have intrinsic value? - the potential of bringing about greater degrees of good that would otherwise be impossible to realize?

With reference to "free will" and the question of its meaning or existence, all I said is that to even discuss moral evil it would seem one is required to acknowledge the presence of a rational will that is free to make moral decisions. That is to say, what is morality if all actions are determined by antecedents and the possibility of altering future consequents is ultimately beyond the capacity or responsibility of any individual to effect? Without freedom, how would human behavior be different - morally speaking - then other physical events, like the beating of a heart or a thunderstorm?

In what sense would "god" be anything other than just an unthinking force of nature if god has no rationality?  You have taken the god out of "god" and are describing natural forces.

In that it would be free, and natural forces - or regularities - are, perhaps, not.

[Redbeard The Pink]

Both tend to believe in an entire cast of fictional "spirit people" of one variety or another, but monotheists have one special character that they attempt to put in a class all its own, whereas polytheists expand that same class to include other characters.

Other than that, they really are the exact same thing. Any way you slice it, it's some way of trying to convince you that physical reality is just a thin veneer for a bunch of shit going on with magical, invisible people that you and I have no way to detect or voluntarily communicate with unless they can get us alone and we happen to be crazy.

The closest thing I've encountered to actual "monotheism" is those wishy-washy "higher power" people. I always have a hard time following their arguments, though, because it's so hard to understand what they're saying with Deepak Chopra's dick in their mouth.

[Pyrrho]

You think of natural occurrences as being amoral because you view them as natural.  But if they were occurring by design, then it would be an entirely different matter.  Since many people seem confused by the subject being God, imagine how things would be if I could control the weather.  Suppose I cause a flood, and a few dozen people drown in it.  Is what I have done amoral?  And before you tell me that it may depend on the particulars, let us say, like God, I know in advance that it will kill those dozens of people (remember, God is supposedly omniscient, so he knows what the effects are of his actions).  So, in other words, I drown people with the weather.  In this imaginary scenario, am I an okay guy?  If not, then neither is God.

We can also view the matter in reverse.  Suppose I can control the weather, but I refuse to do so, and just let the flood kill the dozens of people.  I could have effortlessly (God is supposed to be omnipotent, so every action is effortless for such a being) prevented their deaths, but instead, I willfully and knowingly let them die.  And I let all of the people starve from droughts who 'naturally' starve, and etc.  In this imaginary scenario, am I an okay guy?  If not, then neither is God.

That's all very true; I suppose I looked past its utility in eliminating the most improbable definitions that one might enjoin to their concept of God. I, for one, cannot even begin to understand what practical import terms such as "omnipotent" and "omniscient" contain to be of any use in the first place. To play devil's advocate, and indulge my curiosity, however: Perhaps it is unfitting to degrade the Supreme Good (if such a quality really was inextricable from the Creator, which I don't see why it must be), by exemplifying instances of suffering, for two possible reasons: 1) It defines Good too narrowly, by making its concern exclusively anthropo- or geo-centric. 2) Cannot suffering, even in the most extreme forms, have intrinsic value? - the potential of bringing about greater degrees of good that would otherwise be impossible to realize?

You are sounding too much like Mother Teresa and her evil love of suffering, believing it is good for people to suffer, for me to be inclined to express my true feelings regarding your claims.  Do you really believe that suffering is good?  If you do, perhaps we should meet and you should let me torture you for a while and let you ponder how good that is.  If you refuse that, I will take it that you do not believe that suffering is good at all and are just saying nonsense.

With reference to "free will" and the question of its meaning or existence, all I said is that to even discuss moral evil it would seem one is required to acknowledge the presence of a rational will that is free to make moral decisions. That is to say, what is morality if all actions are determined by antecedents and the possibility of altering future consequents is ultimately beyond the capacity or responsibility of any individual to effect? Without freedom, how would human behavior be different - morally speaking - then other physical events, like the beating of a heart or a thunderstorm?

In what sense would "god" be anything other than just an unthinking force of nature if god has no rationality?  You have taken the god out of "god" and are describing natural forces.

In that it would be free, and natural forces - or regularities - are, perhaps, not.

I think that is going to get us into a very troublesome discussion of the nature of free will and whether or not we should be soft determinists instead of going with the 'libertarian free will' or 'hard determinist' view of things.  

Just FYI, I am, after thinking about it all for a while, a soft determinist in the sense that I do not see "free will," as commonly used in practical matters (e.g., courts of law), as conflicting with determinism.  But if you imagine something else, by all means, demonstrate this magical "free will," or give reasons to believe in it.

[Mudhammam]

You are sounding too much like Mother Teresa and her evil love of suffering, believing it is good for people to suffer, for me to be inclined to express my true feelings regarding your claims.  Do you really believe that suffering is good?  If you do, perhaps we should meet and you should let me torture you for a while and let you ponder how good that is.  If you refuse that, I will take it that you do not believe that suffering is good at all and are just saying nonsense.

Perhaps I could let you give me a hardy flogging, while you hurl vicious insults and encourage your friends to strike and spit upon my face; then you could pierce my head with a crown of thorns and nail my flesh into two beams of wood, watching as I struggle for hours to expire and when I finally do, its through suffocating under my own weight. And when just before I surrender myself to the grave, I, in my Stoic resignation, cry out, "I forgive you!" then perhaps you shall discover something supremely good, unbeknownst before: that divine will to love thine enemy, that trait which amongst all animals appears to be peculiarly human, all too human! ;-)

In all seriousness, I take your point. It seems to me to be the very definition of improbable - and the obstacle theists cannot overcome - to propose that there is not one single instance of suffering that lacks any redeeming quality or purpose; contrarily, if all such actual and possible evil does in some sense "work for good for those who love God," then the problem has, rather than been solved, simply been denied. Evil must be viewed, according to the "blessed," as a necessary supplement to the greatest possible good, and therefore not really evil at all.

I think that is going to get us into a very troublesome discussion of the nature of free will and whether or not we should be soft determinists instead of going with the 'libertarian free will' or 'hard determinist' view of things.  

Just FYI, I am, after thinking about it all for a while, a soft determinist in the sense that I do not see "free will," as commonly used in practical matters (e.g., courts of law), as conflicting with determinism.  But if you imagine something else, by all means, demonstrate this magical "free will," or give reasons to believe in it.

I don't see how a legal definition of "free will" imposes on, or resolves, the philosophical conclusions any deteminist - hard or soft - must appear to confess: freedom to choose right or wrong, i.e. the moral quality attached to such freedom, is entirely illusory. If you claim that these contentious notions - free will, determinism, and moral responsibility - are compatible, I think it's likewise incumbent on you to explain how and why this could be so, also without appeal to magic.

Here's an interesting argument for human freedom I was recently offered, which is a formalization of Sartre:
1. For a state of affairs to cause human action, the causal efficacy of said state of affairs must come only from the characteristics of the state of affairs itself.
2. A state of affairs has no meaning in itself.
3. If a state of affairs has no meaning in itself, its meaning must be given to it by someone experiencing it.
4. The meaning of a state of affairs must be given to it by someone experiencing it. (MP on 2 & 3)
5. The meaning of a state of affairs is what motivates our actions.
6. If the meaning of a state of affairs is what motivates our actions, then (for human actions) the causal efficacy of said state of affairs does not come only from characteristics of the state of affairs itself.
7. (For human actions) the causal efficacy of a state of affairs does not come only from characteristics of the state of affairs itself. (MP on 5 & 6)
8. No state of affairs can, by itself, cause human action. (MT on 1 & 7)
9. If no state of affairs can, by itself, cause human action, then human action is free.
10. Human action is free. (MP on 8 & 9)

What is your take on that?

[Pyrrho]

[Mudhammam]

[vorlon13]

Am I the only one to find it a little weird the 'classic' Judeo/Christiam/Moslem God dude is not a monotheist ??

[Pyrrho]