Free Will

[Pyrrho]

I have a very simple idea of "free will."  Basically, one is free if one can do as one wills.  Thus, if you will to keep your hand out of a fire, and you keep your hand out of a fire, that is free.  If you will to drink scotch and you drink scotch, you are free.  It is only insofar as you cannot do what you will that you are not free.  As for why you will what you will, that is not something you control (generally), and it is absurd to say that you do.  You do not generally will for your hand to be in a fire due to the nerves in your hand and the signals that are sent to your brain, etc.  Or in other words, due to the structure of your body.  You did not choose to have a hand in the first place, or nerves, or a brain, etc.  That is all due to things prior to your existence.  Whether that is due to "determinism" or random chance or whatever, clearly, you did not choose it.  Everyone of sense knows that, so why is it that people pretend it is not the case?*  I think people who insist on some sort of magical free will are silly.  Both to wish for it and to believe it makes any sense.


For those who like technical terms, I am taking a compatibilist position on free will (regardless of whether determinism is right or not; that would be more properly the subject of another thread, though one will need to deal with Hume's analysis of causation as well as modern physics if one argues for determinism).  It is also in keeping with ordinary definitions of "free":

free

1Able to act or be done as one wishes; not under the control of another: 
'I have no ambitions other than to have a happy life and be free' 
'a free choice'

http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/defini...ctCode=all

Anyone who wishes to use a different idea of "free will" should precisely define their meaning.  Then afterwards we can examine the question of whether it would make sense to say that people have that sort of thing or not.


Naturally, I expect the thread to degenerate into acrimony and to involve people making assertions about "free will" in which they reject the idea presented in this post, but fail to properly and fully explain their meaning.  Isn't that what always happens in online threads about "free will?"


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*As is often the case, the answer to the question resides in the question itself.  It is not everyone, but everyone "of sense" that was specified, and it is those who are lacking in sense who fail to realize such obvious facts.

[Darkstar]

I have always treated free will as pertaining to whether or not your will is free (hence the name). If your will is not free, then you don't have a free will.

As for your definition, I suppose the one question that comes to my mind is whether or not it is possible to do other than what you will (and by extension whether or not it is possible to not have free will by your definition). For example, if a gunman demands you hand over your wallet, you obviously don't want to lose your wallet, but you don't want to die, either. In that scenario your will to live trumps your will to retain your wallet, and thus from a certain perspective you are still doing what it is your will to do by handing over the wallet to preserve your own life. The only exception to this rule that I can think of is a situation in which you are literally given no choice at all.

[Kingpin]

Pyrrho I don't disagree with you. I've always taken "free will" to mean: "to do as one chooses". You can make a conscious effort to do anything you like, that is free will. This does not mean there are not limitations or consequences. As far as limitations go, you can choose to try to fly, but without a hang glider, your butt is going to die (but you still have the choice to try). As far as consequences, you may choose to beat your neighbor to death because he doesn't turn down his stereo, but you will most certainly spend your life in prison. Still have a choice.

Free will is not complicated. You have the freedom to choose to do whatever is within your ability to do. Quite often where the waters get murky is in discussions regarding original sin and blaming God for how things are etc. We talk about Adam and Eve having free will to choose to disobey and why would God make that possible knowing the consequences, etc. If you were not free to do as you choose, you would be an automaton.

[GrandizerII]

Pyrrho I don't disagree with you.  I've always taken "free will" to mean: "to do as one chooses".  You can make a conscious effort to do anything you like, that is free will.  This does not mean there are not limitations or consequences.  As far as limitations go, you can choose to try to fly, but without a hang glider, your butt is going to die (but you still have the choice to try).  As far as consequences, you may choose to beat your neighbor to death because he doesn't turn down his stereo, but you will most certainly spend your life in prison.  Still have a choice.  

Free will is not complicated.  You have the freedom to choose to do whatever is within your ability to do.  Quite often where the waters get murky is in discussions regarding original sin and blaming God for how things are etc.  We talk about Adam and Eve having free will to choose to disobey and why would God make that possible knowing the consequences, etc.  If you were not free to do as you choose, you are an automaton.

If I understand the OP correctly, Pyrrho is not advocating for the view that we are free to choose things independently of our nature and conditioning. So the Christian view of free will is illogical and cannot be demonstrated.

As for the OP's position, fair enough, but one problem I see with this is way too many laymen think of free will in the libertarian sense and not in the sense you speak of. So even if hat makes sense to you, that's not the notion of free will people tend to talk about.

[Pyrrho]

I have always treated free will as pertaining to whether or not your will is free (hence the name). If your will is not free, then you don't have a free will.

What do you mean by "your will is free"?

As for your definition, I suppose the one question that comes to my mind is whether or not it is possible to do other than what you will (and by extension whether or not it is possible to not have free will by your definition). For example, if a gunman demands you hand over your wallet, you obviously don't want to lose your wallet, but you don't want to die, either. In that scenario your will to live trumps your will to retain your wallet, and thus from a certain perspective you are still doing what it is your will to do by handing over the wallet to preserve your own life. The only exception to this rule that I can think of is a situation in which you are literally given no choice at all.

Your example makes me think of Aristotle's discussion of the topic of what is "voluntary" in Book III of his Nicomachean Ethics.  Since I know from experience that most people who read this are not going to click on a link to read anything, here are the first two paragraphs of Book III:

Since virtue is concerned with passions and actions, and on voluntary passions and actions praise and blame are bestowed, on those that are involuntary pardon, and sometimes also pity, to distinguish the voluntary and the involuntary is presumably necessary for those who are studying the nature of virtue, and useful also for legislators with a view to the assigning both of honours and of punishments. Those things, then, are thought-involuntary, which take place under compulsion or owing to ignorance; and that is compulsory of which the moving principle is outside, being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person who is acting or is feeling the passion, e.g. if he were to be carried somewhere by a wind, or by men who had him in their power. 

But with regard to the things that are done from fear of greater evils or for some noble object (e.g. if a tyrant were to order one to do something base, having one's parents and children in his power, and if one did the action they were to be saved, but otherwise would be put to death), it may be debated whether such actions are involuntary or voluntary. Something of the sort happens also with regard to the throwing of goods overboard in a storm; for in the abstract no one throws goods away voluntarily, but on condition of its securing the safety of himself and his crew any sensible man does so. Such actions, then, are mixed, but are more like voluntary actions; for they are worthy of choice at the time when they are done, and the end of an action is relative to the occasion. Both the terms, then, 'voluntary' and 'involuntary', must be used with reference to the moment of action. Now the man acts voluntarily; for the principle that moves the instrumental parts of the body in such actions is in him, and the things of which the moving principle is in a man himself are in his power to do or not to do. Such actions, therefore, are voluntary, but in the abstract perhaps involuntary; for no one would choose any such act in itself. 

http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicoma...3.iii.html


But I am more interested in your question about whether it is possible to do other than what you will.  Why does that matter?  Would there be an advantage to being able to do what you do not want to do?  Would it not be better if you cannot fail to do what you want to do?

However, that seems to be getting into the question of whether determinism is true or not.  I do not care about that for what I mean by "free will."

I suppose I really need an answer to my first question in this post to be sure how to react to the rest of what you are saying.

[TheRocketSurgeon]

I have always treated free will as pertaining to whether or not your will is free (hence the name). If your will is not free, then you don't have a free will.

As for your definition, I suppose the one question that comes to my mind is whether or not it is possible to do other than what you will (and by extension whether or not it is possible to not have free will by your definition). For example, if a gunman demands you hand over your wallet, you obviously don't want to lose your wallet, but you don't want to die, either. In that scenario your will to live trumps your will to retain your wallet, and thus from a certain perspective you are still doing what it is your will to do by handing over the wallet to preserve your own life. The only exception to this rule that I can think of is a situation in which you are literally given no choice at all.

It's free will, technically, in that you are given two options--your money or your life--but it's not a free  choice. I get frustrated in my discussions (weekly!) on this topic, since I can't seem to get the Christians with whom I am having the discussion to understand the difference. Just because I am able to choose either option without physical or mental compulsion (free will in the technical sense), it does not make it a free choice, which is what they're actually implying. There are unacceptable penalties someone else has attached to one of the choices-- rather dire ones, such that it's really one powerful being exerting its  will over another's, to the point that the latter doesn't realistically  have an option.

Given the OP's definition of "not under the will of another", I'd say that free will is inapplicable to a situations where an outside agent is involved in creating a scenario that imposes its will, and leaves the chooser no real option.

[Pyrrho]

Pyrrho I don't disagree with you.  I've always taken "free will" to mean: "to do as one chooses".  You can make a conscious effort to do anything you like, that is free will.  This does not mean there are not limitations or consequences.  As far as limitations go, you can choose to try to fly, but without a hang glider, your butt is going to die (but you still have the choice to try).  As far as consequences, you may choose to beat your neighbor to death because he doesn't turn down his stereo, but you will most certainly spend your life in prison.  Still have a choice.  

Free will is not complicated.  You have the freedom to choose to do whatever is within your ability to do.  Quite often where the waters get murky is in discussions regarding original sin and blaming God for how things are etc.  We talk about Adam and Eve having free will to choose to disobey and why would God make that possible knowing the consequences, etc.  If you were not free to do as you choose, you are an automaton.

If I understand the OP correctly, Pyrrho is not advocating for the view that we are free to choose things independently of our nature and conditioning. So the Christian view of free will is illogical and cannot be demonstrated.

As for the OP's position, fair enough, but one problem I see with this is way too many laymen think of free will in the libertarian sense and not in the sense you speak of. So even if hat makes sense to you, that's not the notion of free will people tend to talk about.

I will go further and say that it is nonsensical to say that one chooses independently of one's nature and conditioning.  One chooses in accordance with what one is.  If the "choice" had nothing to do with what you are, then in what sense would the it be your choice?

As for your second point, I think that those who try to speak of a "free will" that is "libertarian" are speaking gibberish.  They do not properly define their term, nor explain how it is that an action that is not determined makes it "free" and their action, as opposed to some random occurrence.  Things that occur randomly are not acts of your will.  The action must be in accordance with what you will, or it is not your action.  And, to quote myself:

As for why you will what you will, that is not something you control (generally), and it is absurd to say that you do.  You do not generally will for your hand to be in a fire due to the nerves in your hand and the signals that are sent to your brain, etc.  Or in other words, due to the structure of your body.  You did not choose to have a hand in the first place, or nerves, or a brain, etc.  That is all due to things prior to your existence.  Whether that is due to "determinism" or random chance or whatever, clearly, you did not choose it.  Everyone of sense knows that, so why is it that people pretend it is not the case?

So, in short, I think that those of whom you write are confused.  Which explains why these threads tend to involve unsatisfactory definitions and tend to never get anywhere.  If someone has a coherent definition of "libertarian free will," let them produce it and explain it.

[Faith No More]

I think a true understanding of the nature of our will will eventually come from neuroscience. Different regions are responsible for different parts of decision making, but I'm guessing the answer will be somewhere in the cerebral cortex, which is a part of the brain that is a recent evolutionary step only seen in mammals.

The problem I see with saying that we do have free will, even in the sense of the OP, is that we have no way of knowing if our will isn't beholden to our physical brain structure like other traits. We feel like we make decisions when presented with choices, but we have no way to prove that we could have made a different decision. We choose to drink that scotch, but unless we could exactly replicate that moment in time, we don't know that you could have chosen not to drink that scotch. We have no way of knowing that the parts of our brain that are responsible for making that decision weren't structured physically in a manner that would require us to make a certain choice given certain circumstances.

I feel that at this point it's speculative to say either way on the issue, but I have a sneaking suspicion that the more we learn, the less likely it will appear that we are making any choices at all.

[Kingpin]

I think a true understanding of the nature of our will will eventually come from neuroscience.  Different regions are responsible for different parts of decision making, but I'm guessing the answer will be somewhere in the cerebral cortex, which is a part of the brain that is a recent evolutionary step only seen in mammals.  

The problem I see with saying that we do have free will, even in the sense of the OP, is that we have no way of knowing if our will isn't beholden to our physical brain structure like other traits.  We feel like we make decisions when presented with choices, but we have no way to prove that we could have made a different decision.  We choose to drink that scotch, but unless we could exactly replicate that moment in time, we don't know that you could have chosen not to drink that scotch.  We have no way of knowing that the parts of our brain that are responsible for making that decision weren't structured physically in a manner that would require us to make a certain choice given certain circumstances.

I feel that at this point it's speculative to say either way on the issue, but I have a sneaking suspicion that the more we learn, the less likely it will appear that we are making any choices at all.

For sure it's speculative and there has been loads of research in neuroscience that is truly fascinating.  Quick question:

Do you think you chose to write your post?  Or was it the result of the physical structure of your brain and the level of hormones/chemicals at the time your brain processed the text in which you felt compelled to respond?  

I'm always intrigued by the reductionist point of view that everything is explainable when reduced, or that bottom up explanation if you will.  In most cases, it's true but not all.

[Faith No More]

For sure it's speculative and there has been loads of research in neuroscience that is truly fascinating.  Quick question:

Do you think you chose to write your post?  Or was it the result of the physical structure of your brain and the level of hormones/chemicals at the time your brain processed the text in which you felt compelled to respond?  

I'm always intrigued by the reductionist point of view that everything is explainable when reduced, or that bottom up explanation if you will.  In most cases, it's true but not all.

All I know is that the only thing I can say for certain is that it feels like I chose to write that post. The other thing I can say is that the more we research and understand the brain, the less control we have to appear over who we are and what we do. That's not to say we can conclude one way or the other, but it leads me to believe that the reductionist point of view is more likely.

My experience with depression and other mental issues also leads me to believe that we are beholden to our brain structure more than we like to think, if not entirely. Sure, there may be a piece of us sitting somewhere among our subconscious impulses and chemically-determined moods that is free, but if I were a betting man, I wouldn't lay my money on it.