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(October 14, 2015 at 11:05 pm)Pyrrho Wrote: Additionally, this claim;
"As these contraries are metaphysical, I'm inclined to think that the suggestion of a possible test is a category mistake..."
seems to suggest that metaphysics isn't really about anything. It seems to me that a "difference" that makes no difference is no difference at all. ... I am also not convinced that a metaphysical position has the practical importance that you claim. No matter what the ultimate cause, it is still a good idea to lock up serial killers . . . . Metaphysics seems entirely irrelevant to all of this.
(August 31, 2013 at 4:01 pm)Jörmungandr Wrote: I've made the argument before, but to my mind, punishment serves one of 5 possible goals: (I just added one)
1. Insuring the safety of innocents by isolating offenders from the community and depriving them of the opportunity to re-offend;
2. Deterrence;
3. Rehabilitation;
4. Compensation - the redistributing of the fruits of the offender's resources to compensate society;
5. Retribution - making someone "pay" for what they have done because they are morally deserving of punishment.
As noted, deterrence is generally not regarded as effective. And retribution is probably, from a moral and practical standpoint, one of the least compelling justifications for punishment. I'm not going to elaborate further where this suggests we head with criminal punishment except to point out two key points.
In Michel Foucault's landmark study of the history of punishment, Discipline and Punish, he points out how, with the reforms in punishment that have occurred in Europe since the 16th century, the focus of punishment has shifted away from punishing the individual for an act to one in which we largely punish and attempt to correct the person as someone who has a mind capable of committing such acts. Thus we allow insanity as a defense, because the person's inclination to commit crime is not amenable to the treatment, punishment. We adjust the punishment dependent on the goal of fixing the criminality of the mind, not on addressing the severity of the crime; three strikes and you're out is aimed at minds that can't be fixed, not crimes that have been committed. Child molesters can be given chemical or surgical castration in exchange for reduction of sentence and leniency. Prisoners are monitored for progress and paroled earlier if they "show signs of good character" — it's not the crime that determines punishment anymore, it's the predisposition to offend which is the focus of punishment. Retribution, perhaps, is a return to focus on the crime rather than on fixing the criminal mind, but I'd be hesitant to take that step without serious consideration as to whether doing so serves any legitimate purpose.
The second point is, that as a hard determinist, I don't believe in free will. The moral justification for using punishment as retribution for a crime is that the person is morally deserving of the punishment, and that requires moral culpability which doesn't exist in the required sense if free will doesn't exist. The other four aims of punishment — deterrence, isolation from society, compensation, and rehabilitation — all can be justified without recourse to the assumption of free will; retribution alone cannot. Now I recognize that relative to my peers, I hold an extreme view with regard to free will, yet I think many of us realize that, regardless of where on the continuum regarding the existence of free will you stand, most of us recognize that most crimes and criminal behavior is a consequence of both factors within the individual's control, as well as a large measure of factors totally outside their control, ranging from social class, education, intelligence, all the way to things like being born in a society or culture that encouraged certain values and not others, to being genetically fated to the development of temperament which leaves one at increased risk of criminal or violent behavior. As a personal matter, I try to remove free will from any justification for punishment; but even someone more moderate could well be persuaded to minimize the impact that situational factors such as being born black, being poor, and such have on the fairness and equity with which we address criminal behavior; I think, arguably, retribution results in unfairness because it treats moral culpability and the resources to act morally as evenly distributed resources, and they are not.
The difference between a hard determinist and a soft determinist is in how they define the expression "free will."
For the purposes of this thread, I am taking no position on whether determinism is true or not. I am simply suggesting a usable notion of "free will." One that is compatible with determinism. (Of course, it does not entail determinism, but it is compatible with it.)
I have yet to encounter a coherent definition of "libertarian free will." If it is meant to be incompatible with determinism, then it must mean that at least one event is not caused. I do not see how that gives anyone any special freedom. And I have not heard anything more from its defenders (or its detractors) that would supply anyone with some special freedom that they could not have in a deterministic universe.
"A wise man ... proportions his belief to the evidence."
— David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section X, Part I.
October 15, 2015 at 1:00 pm (This post was last modified: October 15, 2015 at 1:03 pm by Mudhammam.)
(October 15, 2015 at 12:00 pm)Pyrrho Wrote:
(October 14, 2015 at 11:45 pm)Nestor Wrote: Yeah, we would still try to rehabilitate people and keep those who pose an imminent threat away from society, but it would make no sense to moralize, to say to the convicted murderer or rapist: "You had the genuine possibility of doing otherwise but you choose not to," which, if such in fact is not the case, seems repugnant to my conception of human dignity.
When I encounter an apple that is rotten, I interact with it differently than I interact with a fresh, ripe apple. How the one got to be rotten, and how the other got to be ripe, makes no difference for this. The same applies to people. The difference between a good and a bad person is in what they are, not in how they got to be what they are. I married my wife because of what she is, not because of how she came to be what she is.
(October 14, 2015 at 11:45 pm)Nestor Wrote: That's what separates us from beasts: we can reason against the passions; we can demarcate right and wrong and choose to do the former in spite of whatever proclivities draw us towards the latter.
We can see from various nonhuman animal studies that there appears to be moral behavior, and a sense of right and wrong, in a variety of animals. See, for example:
So a sense of morality does not separate humans from other animals.
(October 14, 2015 at 11:45 pm)Nestor Wrote: We function with a deeply imbedded sense of latitude to make decisions independent of any prior circumstances that have led up to that point. It seems to me that's what the philosophic virtues are largely about: living in accordance to a set of principles regardless of the situations that we find ourselves in. To commit to such ideals seems to me to be a choice that I am freely able to make at any given moment.
You can do what you want, within limits (e.g., you cannot fly without the aid of any devices, etc.). That is the freedom that you have. What would be the advantage to being able to choose what you do not want?
As for why you want what you want, that is another matter. That will involve things that are beyond your control, as my hand example is meant to illustrate.
(October 14, 2015 at 11:45 pm)Nestor Wrote: I'm also just not so sure that I'm persuaded of the idea that science, which deals exclusively with the physical world, is capable of answering such questions as whether or not the physical world is all that exists (and much of experience, if we include imagination and intellection, hardly seems remotely physical), and if it is not, then we might have to arrive at certain (that's an intentional double entendre) conclusions through other means - which is what we are always doing in exercising pure reason, anyway, and possibly free will, if it can survive.
Science deals with things that are testable. It is not inherently committed to a purely physical world. If psychics were real and had their abilities due to nonphysical things, their abilities would still be testable and demonstrable.
Going back to your idea of something being repugnant to your idea of human dignity, that is an interesting emotional aspect of you. That is not a way to determine the truth about things in the world. Humans are animals. Too many people have been infected with that vile superstition known as "Christianity" which warps their view and gets them to believe that humans are somehow separate from other animals. Modern evolutionary theory teaches us otherwise. Which explains why so many Christians hate evolution.
I'll concede the point for now. This much I do know: If there is something "more" that exists beyond the brain and its physical parts, which are subject to causal determination, it's very difficult - maybe impossible - to demonstrate what this might be, outside of what it feels like in actual experience, with any degree of plausibility.
My only bone left to pick with you is that you continue to call what we're left with free will.
He who loves God cannot endeavour that God should love him in return - Baruch Spinoza
(October 15, 2015 at 7:07 am)Evie Wrote: Very tired of arguing against contra-causal and compatabilist free will... done it so many times over the years and recently too. So I'm just gonna drop this video and a quote:
There is another difference with the crocodile (versus the man with an ax) that he does not bring up. If it gets away, one generally has no qualms about hunting down the crocodile later and killing it. In fact, it is often regarded as the right thing to do, to prevent it from attacking others. No trial, just go kill it. If I take that same attitude towards the man, I will be regarded as a murderer.
In other words, he needs to fill out his story a bit more, as I rather doubt he is endorsing the idea that it should be okay to hunt down the ax-wielding man and kill him. And if that is so, then he wants us to have a different attitude toward the two situations. And that needs to be explained.
However, most of what he says is quite compatible with what I am saying in this thread. He does not want to use the phrase "free will" to indicate something that is compatible with determinism. So he does not want to use that phrase as I do. In other words, we have a linguistic disagreement. But he does say that it is important to be able to be free to do what one wills.
"A wise man ... proportions his belief to the evidence."
— David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section X, Part I.
Although you do do that with crocodiles, I don't think that was his point. There's another version where he uses a bear as an example instead. By the way I am understating, of course that wasn't his point. His point was that free will is not just a delusion but a potentially harmful one.
When I encounter an apple that is rotten, I interact with it differently than I interact with a fresh, ripe apple. How the one got to be rotten, and how the other got to be ripe, makes no difference for this. The same applies to people. The difference between a good and a bad person is in what they are, not in how they got to be what they are. I married my wife because of what she is, not because of how she came to be what she is.
We can see from various nonhuman animal studies that there appears to be moral behavior, and a sense of right and wrong, in a variety of animals. See, for example:
So a sense of morality does not separate humans from other animals.
You can do what you want, within limits (e.g., you cannot fly without the aid of any devices, etc.). That is the freedom that you have. What would be the advantage to being able to choose what you do not want?
As for why you want what you want, that is another matter. That will involve things that are beyond your control, as my hand example is meant to illustrate.
Science deals with things that are testable. It is not inherently committed to a purely physical world. If psychics were real and had their abilities due to nonphysical things, their abilities would still be testable and demonstrable.
Going back to your idea of something being repugnant to your idea of human dignity, that is an interesting emotional aspect of you. That is not a way to determine the truth about things in the world. Humans are animals. Too many people have been infected with that vile superstition known as "Christianity" which warps their view and gets them to believe that humans are somehow separate from other animals. Modern evolutionary theory teaches us otherwise. Which explains why so many Christians hate evolution.
I'll concede the point for now. This much I do know: If there is something "more" that exists beyond the brain and its physical parts, which are subject to causal determination, it's very difficult - maybe impossible - to demonstrate what this might be, outside of what it feels like in actual experience, with any degree of plausibility.
My only bone left to pick with you is that you continue to call what we're left with free will.
I find it very strange that people want to insist on the phrase "free will" to be used for something that seems meaningless and useless, instead of having it be a useful phrase.
Even saying, "one could have done otherwise" is somewhat ambiguous. Often, one means, if one had wanted something else or willed something else, one could have done otherwise. In that sense, it fits perfectly with determinism, as there is no mention of why one wills whatever one wills.
As for how this feels, I do not think that one can normally will just anything. Can you honestly say that you can choose to will to peel the skin off of your left arm? You could peel the skin off if you wanted to, but you probably cannot want to do it. Your freedom (insofar as you have freedom) is in being able to do what you will to do. But you do not have the freedom to arbitrarily select what you want to do, what you will to do.
I think that what I am saying in this thread fits perfectly with the subjective experience that one has, as well as with modern ideas about how the world works. As for the terminology one uses, that is something that should not be confused with the ideas themselves.
It is also worth mentioning that I am not the only person to use "free will" as I do in this thread. And it is a good idea to be aware of this fact for future discussions with other people.
This is not entirely dissimilar to the fact that the word "atheist" has two different common meanings:
(April 4, 2015 at 12:41 am)Pyrrho Wrote: There seems to be quite a lot of time wasted on the question of the meaning of the term "atheism." I think I can explain why people talk past each other on this. Quite simply, there is more than one standard meaning of the English term "atheism."
There you will see (unless, of course, they change it between when I quote it and when you look at it):
atheism noun
1. the doctrine or belief that there is no God.
2. disbelief in the existence of a supreme being or beings.
Notice, the two common and proper definitions are not the same. They are, as is common with words, related in their meaning, but they are not the same.
People commonly insist that the word "atheism" means one of these, but the simple fact is, in English, either meaning is right and proper. Notice, one of these is a lack of belief, and the other is a belief.
So, when someone uses the term with one of these meanings, and you want to use the other, the best thing to do is to explain which of the standard meanings you intend. It is of no use to tell people that they are wrong to use a term in accordance with a standard meaning of the term; being a standard meaning, they are right to use it in accordance with that meaning, but one is wrong to insist it must mean only one of the standard meanings of the term.
The same idea applies to other words. Most words have more than one meaning in a dictionary, and it is ridiculous to believe that everyone else uses one and only one of the meanings contained therein. If there were only one right meaning of the term, there would only be one definition in standard dictionaries.
Sometimes, with the word "atheism," both senses are given as if they were one definition in a dictionary. As in this case:
(ā′thē-ĭz′əm) n.
Disbelief in or denial of the existence of God or gods.
Notice, in this case, two different ideas are presented as if they were one definition, and not two separate and distinct ideas. Still, if you pay attention, "disbelief" and "denial" are not the same thing. One is not believing something, and the other is believing that something is false. One is a lack of belief, and the other is a belief.
This means that it is a good idea to carefully define the expression at the beginning of the conversation, to avoid talking past each other.
"A wise man ... proportions his belief to the evidence."
— David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section X, Part I.
(October 15, 2015 at 2:21 pm)Evie Wrote: Although you do do that with crocodiles, I don't think that was his point. There's another version where he uses a bear as an example instead. By the way I am understating, of course that wasn't his point. His point was that free will is not just a delusion but a potentially harmful one.
His point seemed to be that we ought to regard the situations similarly, as not involving whatever it is he means by "free will." That in both cases, the things acted as they did due to preceding causes. But if we regard them the same, shouldn't we treat the cases the same?
If we are not to treat the cases the same, then, presumably, this is for some reason, and not some crazy arbitrary distinction. The thing is, he does not give us any reason not to treat them the same.
There is either an important difference in the two cases, or they should be handled similarly. He has suggested that there isn't an important difference in the two cases. The consequences of that seem problematic in a way he does not consider in his speech.
"A wise man ... proportions his belief to the evidence."
— David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section X, Part I.
The situation will be probably handled differently if we view the person as a thinking self with knowledge of right and wrong, as opposed to Sam Harris' conception of mental events as being akin to weather patterns, when he says that "there's no longer a place to lay emotional blame. It would be like blaming a hurricane for its bad behavior."
He who loves God cannot endeavour that God should love him in return - Baruch Spinoza
You're missing his point though... he was saying that a tumor for example is just a special case of events in the brain giving rise to behavior... oh well n/v/m.
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