Seeing red

[The Grand Nudger]

That's not actually a problem unless you can provide an example where two identical systems produce a different experience of consciousness.........do you have examples?  

Again. Try reading Nagel's "What is it like to be a Bat." It's a fairly short paper: http://organizations.utep.edu/portals/14...el_bat.pdf

The system identical to the bats, which produces a different experience of consciousness would be......? Do you think that two identical bats would have a different experience of consciousness?

Chad, you know I have absolutely no patience for your shit, lol...so please..make this something more than it seems. Show me how the article (already familiar with it) has anything to do with what you quoted above.

[bennyboy]

Since this is my kind of thread, I guess I should step in and say something.

First of all, let's state explicitly that all of this is hypothetical-- Rhythm, you are asking us to imagine whether one experience is or isn't similar to another, and on at least two different levels: 1) that it must be knowable that something which SEEMS to experience actually does, i.e. that other people aren't philosophical zombies, etc.; 2) that even given (1), we accept at least the hypothetical possibility that identical states COULD be reproduced.

Clearly, neither is the case. We cannot establish that any physical system, human or otherwise, actually experiences qualia, instead of just seeming to. And while we can imagine it, we know that we will never, ever be able to exactly reproduce a brain or its state down to QM perfection. Appeals to evidence fail, automatically, on both sides: at best, we can arbitrarily decide to what degree our evidential requirements may be stretched until we discard the evidence as being insufficient.

Why is this important? Because we have to ask not only whether two identical systems can have the same experience, but whether a DIFFERENT system could have the same experience, possibly even not in response to the same stimuli. This is important because if so, both physical systems have been adapted to perceive an underlying reality-- redness-- though in fact the qualia of redness exists nowhere in the universe (at least in the sense that you can directly measure it).

I'd like to speculate on another idea, but with regards to sound. It seems to me that very small or very large animals' experiences would be red-shifted or blue-shifted relative to ours. For example, I'd expect a very small animal to be able to perceive high frequencies, but unable to perceive low frequencies (at least as sound) because of the different size of the receiving mechanism and different "speeds" of brain processing. In other words, what for me is a very high-pitched whine (a mosquito's buzz) might be for that mosquito a rhythmic pulse rather than a high-pitched whine. A super-galactic being (i.e. a being made of of a gazillion galaxies) might experience the rotation of collections of galaxies as a gravity-wave hum, while we, obviously, couldn't hear anything (or possibly even measure it).

The same goes for organisms that can see very high frequencies of light, or very low ones. I'd imagine that a tiny organism would be sensitive to higher frequencies of light, where as our super-galactic being would care little for white light and much more for light of very long wavelengths, which would be much less susceptible to friction over long distances and therefore "carry" better. But I think to that being, such wavelengths would be center-normalized, i.e. experienced much as we experience say green. i.e. the super-galactic being wouldn't know that it was experiencing things infinitely slowly (relative to us).

Here's another example. An intergalactic being, if it is an evolved organism, might experience whole galaxies as "sweet," depending on their configuration, and others as "sour."

If true, this would indicate to me that redness, or mid-range-humness, or sweetness, etc. might be universal experiences, but subjectively experienced by different organisms in response to different scales of stimuli. In other words, the experiences are symbolic representations of relative experience much more than they are of things and their properties. They would be ideas, independent of scale in time or in space, and dependent only on the subjective experience of each individual organism.

So I think a more interesting question about bats is this: Do they experience blood as sweet (i.e. that ideal foods are represented by similar qualia among all organisms)? Or is there a unique "bloodness" taste that we will never be able to appreciate?

And here's the problem. We can't know. Because while pragmatic assumptions about humans, brains, and correlations betweed reported experience and brain function are fun, they shed absolutely no light on the nature of experience beyond that of humans.

[Edwardo Piet]

Hopefully this will interest you Squishy, I fucking love this guy I've seen every single one of his Youtube videos I think he is amazing:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=evQsOFQju08

[The Grand Nudger]

Since this is my kind of thread, I guess I should step in and say something.

Welcome aboard...lol.  Shall we dance? Imma crunch this up so that your more interesting question doesn't get lost in the dross.

---

First of all, let's state explicitly that all of this is hypothetical-- Rhythm, you are asking us to imagine whether one experience is or isn't similar to another, and on at least two different levels: 1) that it must be knowable that something which SEEMS to experience actually does, i.e. that other people aren't philosophical zombies, etc.;

Sure.  If it seems like we (or anything else) experience...it's difficult to posit that we don't.  Particularly given our limitations in that regards..."seems" is all we've got to go on. 

2) that even given (1), we accept at least the hypothetical possibility that identical states COULD be reproduced.

Sure, because I don't make special exemptions for experience.  I expect that in all hypothetical games of hypothetical mousetrap...the trap will fall in a similar manner when you trigger the mechanism.

Clearly, neither is the case.  We cannot establish that any physical system, human or otherwise, actually experiences qualia, instead of just seeming to.

You say clearly as though you can establish something...directly before saying that you cannot establish something.  If you dispute that I experience qualia...or we dispute that a dog experiences qualia, this discussion is DOA.  You don't -seem- feel the need to dispute that I have qualia..because I seem to, as does a dog.  We can only go with what we've got.

And while we can imagine it, we know that we will never, ever be able to exactly reproduce a brain or its state down to QM perfection.  Appeals to evidence fail, automatically, on both sides: at best, we can arbitrarily decide to what degree our evidential requirements may be stretched until we discard the evidence as being insufficient.

My expectations are not based upon a reproduction in evidence, but my un-willigness to make any special pleading argument about that which -is- in evidence.

Why is this important?  Because we have to ask not only whether two identical systems can have the same experience, but whether a DIFFERENT system could have the same experience, possibly even not in response to the same stimuli.  This is important because if so, both physical systems have been adapted to perceive an underlying reality-- redness-- though in fact the qualia of redness exists nowhere in the universe (at least in the sense that you can directly measure it).

The qualia seems to exist in your skull, which does, as far as I'm aware, reside in the universe.  

I'd like to speculate on another idea, but with regards to sound.  It seems to me that very small or very large animals' experiences would be red-shifted or blue-shifted relative to ours.  For example, I'd expect a very small animal to be able to perceive high frequencies, but unable to perceive low frequencies (at least as sound) because of the different size of the receiving mechanism and different "speeds" of brain processing.

It's not just the size of the ear that counts.  The speed of processor is not the only factor...you've failed to account for buffering and executive summary.

In other words, what for me is a very high-pitched whine (a mosquito's buzz) might be for that mosquito a rhythmic pulse rather than a high-pitched whine.  A super-galactic being (i.e. a being made of of a gazillion galaxies) might experience the rotation of collections of galaxies as a gravity-wave hum, while we, obviously, couldn't hear anything (or possibly even measure it).

Regardless of the above...that may be true for reasons other than it's size or the speed of it's processing, sure.  

The same goes for organisms that can see very high frequencies of light, or very low ones.  I'd imagine that a tiny organism would be sensitive to higher frequencies of light, where as our super-galactic being would care little for white light and much more for light of very long wavelengths, which would be much less susceptible to friction over long distances and therefore "carry" better.  But I think to that being, such wavelengths would be center-normalized, i.e. experienced much as we experience say green.  i.e. the super-galactic being wouldn't know that it was experiencing things infinitely slowly (relative to us).

I think that you've far exceeded what your already flawed assumptions above could possibly infer...but all of that may still, nevertheless, be true.  

Here's another example.  An intergalactic being, if it is an evolved organism, might experience whole galaxies as "sweet," depending on their configuration, and others as "sour."

Hardly a stretch, less exotic life on our own planet -seem- to experience things in a manner that we would describe similarly.  The language is stretched a bit...but we go with what we've got.

If true, this would indicate to me that redness, or mid-range-humness, or sweetness, etc. might be universal experiences, but subjectively experienced by different organisms in response to different scales of stimuli.  In other words, the experiences are symbolic representations of relative experience much more than they are of things and their properties.  They would be ideas, independent of scale in time or in space, and dependent only on the subjective experience of each individual organism.

Our experiences -seem- to be subjective assessments of objects or quantities, sure.   The last part of that think I'd need an incredible amount of clarity and elaboration on before I'd feel comfortable commenting. 

---

So I think a more interesting question about bats is this: Do they experience blood as sweet (i.e. that ideal foods are represented by similar qualia among all organisms)?  Or is there a unique "bloodness" taste that we will never be able to appreciate?

I can tell you what we commonly perceive as sweet in a strawberry.  Acidity.  I can tell you what it is we're tasting when we taste blood as well..iron.  If we took a look at a bats taste buds...we might be able to get some more info on that in the case of the bat but we'd still have to wonder what with the differences in our brains. To put it bluntly, I expect a bats experience to be divergent from our own....but similar to the experience of other bats.

And here's the problem.  We can't know.  Because while pragmatic assumptions about humans, brains, and correlations betweed reported experience and brain function are fun, they shed absolutely no light on the nature of experience beyond that of humans.

When some other creature behaves in a manner recognizable to us in regards to a situation or stimuli recognizable to us..and also just so happens to share similar sensory structures with us.....I'd say we're doing more than groping in the dark.  Our own experiences could only be so useful...but I think that it's more than a little bit disingenuous to call them useless.  I don't expect a dogs qualia to be a mirror image of my own (I don't even expect yours to be)..but I know it's close enough for us to go hunting..together, to plot and scheme against the poor games life, together...he understands both the goal and the process.   If we were experiencing something entirely different and in no way analgous........that would be awfully hard to explain...don't you think? All of this, mind you, with the understanding that dogs can smell atomic weight (precisely what makes them so useful in context)...which must be a phenomenal contributor to their qualia which is greatly reduced in my own relative experience. I, on the other hand....must seem nearly precognitive to my dog because my qualia includes a much better developed ability to predict the animals decisions than he possesses. He knows where they are... I know where they're going..and we're -both- hunting "them". We both seem to agree upon what a deer is.

His nose and my big brain are a winning combination, unless you happen to be delicious and made out of meat. Our experience in the hunt simply -could not- be identical...but it also can't be completely and utterly dissimilar. Or at least the entire situation falls into absurdity and null values if it is. What a fantastic chain of unreasonable coincidence, that we manage to pull off so reliably.

[emjay]

Hiya Benny, I was hoping you'd drop by    

Since this is my kind of thread, I guess I should step in and say something.

First of all, let's state explicitly that all of this is hypothetical-- Rhythm, you are asking us to imagine whether one experience is or isn't similar to another, and on at least two different levels: 1) that it must be knowable that something which SEEMS to experience actually does, i.e. that other people aren't philosophical zombies, etc.; 2) that even given (1), we accept at least the hypothetical possibility that identical states COULD be reproduced.

Clearly, neither is the case.  We cannot establish that any physical system, human or otherwise, actually experiences qualia, instead of just seeming to.  And while we can imagine it, we know that we will never, ever be able to exactly reproduce a brain or its state down to QM perfection.  Appeals to evidence fail, automatically, on both sides: at best, we can arbitrarily decide to what degree our evidential requirements may be stretched until we discard the evidence as being insufficient.

Why is this important?  Because we have to ask not only whether two identical systems can have the same experience, but whether a DIFFERENT system could have the same experience, possibly even not in response to the same stimuli.  This is important because if so, both physical systems have been adapted to perceive an underlying reality-- redness-- though in fact the qualia of redness exists nowhere in the universe (at least in the sense that you can directly measure it).

I think a different system could indeed have the same phenomenal experience, even as a response to different stimuli, because with that colour synesthesia - where people see letters and numbers as colours - something like that could already be happening... along with all the examples given of animals that perceive things the same way but with a different sense - dogs smelling weight and bats seeing sound as Rhythm mentioned earlier. It definitely appears that certain types of perceptions could be considered standard, in that they consistently appear to represent different types of data. And that does address one of the questions I've had in that once something is encoded in a neural network it just essentially becomes a number with nothing to say that this part of the brain is for colour or that part of the brain is for sound... so though we can name areas of the brain for their function - the visual cortex for instance - from the perspective of the network itself there is nothing so say what type of data a given neuron will represent. So in other words it appears to me that once sensory data enters the neural network it becomes uniform in its physical representation inside it, with nothing to specify it's source (ie what it represents in the outside world). So all that's left from my perspective and the perspective of my theorising is an enclosed and interrelated network of values that has essentially been cut off from its source and therefore could represent anything. And something like colour synesthesia would, in my view, probably be manifested in this network as a change/addition of 'wiring' and thus a change in the relationships represented by the network. So that's why I think consciousness has to be about representing those values and relationships, and can only be about that, because that's all that's left. And if colour for instance consistently appears then it suggests that it could be a standard way of representing certain values/relationships or patterns of values/relationships in the system. And the question becomes if is standard, why/how is it standard? My suggestion was that it was the only way to meet the constraints of the network... to represent differences and similarities of values and the relationships between them, with perception becoming more vivid - i.e. differentiated... different states represented - the richer the interconnectivity and differing values in the system. But that still doesn't answer the question of why it would be the only way unless it is something like you suggest, an underlying reality, so thanks for that... it's very interesting

I'd like to speculate on another idea, but with regards to sound.  It seems to me that very small or very large animals' experiences would be red-shifted or blue-shifted relative to ours.  For example, I'd expect a very small animal to be able to perceive high frequencies, but unable to perceive low frequencies (at least as sound) because of the different size of the receiving mechanism and different "speeds" of brain processing.  In other words, what for me is a very high-pitched whine (a mosquito's buzz) might be for that mosquito a rhythmic pulse rather than a high-pitched whine.  A super-galactic being (i.e. a being made of of a gazillion galaxies) might experience the rotation of collections of galaxies as a gravity-wave hum, while we, obviously, couldn't hear anything (or possibly even measure it).

The same goes for organisms that can see very high frequencies of light, or very low ones.  I'd imagine that a tiny organism would be sensitive to higher frequencies of light, where as our super-galactic being would care little for white light and much more for light of very long wavelengths, which would be much less susceptible to friction over long distances and therefore "carry" better.  But I think to that being, such wavelengths would be center-normalized, i.e. experienced much as we experience say green.  i.e. the super-galactic being wouldn't know that it was experiencing things infinitely slowly (relative to us).

Here's another example.  An intergalactic being, if it is an evolved organism, might experience whole galaxies as "sweet," depending on their configuration, and others as "sour."

If true, this would indicate to me that redness, or mid-range-humness, or sweetness, etc. might be universal experiences, but subjectively experienced by different organisms in response to different scales of stimuli.  In other words, the experiences are symbolic representations of relative experience much more than they are of things and their properties.  They would be ideas, independent of scale in time or in space, and dependent only on the subjective experience of each individual organism.

I've always wondered about that, whether whole galaxies or indeed the entire universe could be conscious, because to me it's all about the system, not the underlying hardware i.e. there's nothing special about neurons as information carriers, and there are indeed certain relationships manifested in nature - gravity for instance - that could play a part in creating system structure on such a large scale. But going off on one there, sorry about that

I can get on board with what you're saying. That colour for instance could be a way of representing a certain scale of normalised values... so that no matter what the size of the organism or what it was measuring it would stand a chance of getting a piece of the (colourful) action if its normalised values fell within that range. And the same principle for other perceptions. So yes, I agree that they could be universal experiences, tapped into, relatively, by different organisms in response to different scales of stimuli. That would fit in with what I've been saying in the sense of consciousness modelling the values and relationships in the network... because the values in a neural network are normalised... that was the uniformity I was referring to... so it doesn't matter what outside data is measured, or at what scale, because neurons themselves will do the job of normalising that data down to a range of values expressed by the frequency of firing.

So I think a more interesting question about bats is this: Do they experience blood as sweet (i.e. that ideal foods are represented by similar qualia among all organisms)?  Or is there a unique "bloodness" taste that we will never be able to appreciate?

And here's the problem.  We can't know.  Because while pragmatic assumptions about humans, brains, and correlations betweed reported experience and brain function are fun, they shed absolutely no light on the nature of experience beyond that of humans.

[The Grand Nudger]

I've always wondered about that, whether whole galaxies or indeed the entire universe could be conscious, because to me it's all about the system, not the underlying hardware i.e. there's nothing special about neurons as information carriers, and there are indeed certain relationships manifested in nature - gravity for instance - that could play a part in creating system structure on such a large scale. But going off on one there, sorry about that

Minor point of correction.  There actually -is- something about neurons that is "special" with regards to nuerons and galaxies (if there weren't we couldn't tell them apart..think about it).   You probably don't expect a cloud of dust to be conscious. I'm also not sure how sensible the notion of separating the system from it's hardware is......give me an example of something where a comment regarding a system can be made without reference either explicit or implied to the hardware?

This isn't to say that there could not be a galaxy out there which would be capable of carrying, processing, and retaining data in such a manner..or of being conscious....but you're flirting with the fallacy of composition in the manner in which you've arrived at the notion. A t-shirt has properties that cotton doesn't...and cotton has properties that a t-shirt doesn't. That a collection of nuerons appears to be conscious does not lend credence to the notion that a cloud of dust swirling a star would be - regardless of both, ultimately, being made of the same stuff, or of one being a part in some categorizing sense of the other.

[emjay]

I've always wondered about that, whether whole galaxies or indeed the entire universe could be conscious, because to me it's all about the system, not the underlying hardware i.e. there's nothing special about neurons as information carriers, and there are indeed certain relationships manifested in nature - gravity for instance - that could play a part in creating system structure on such a large scale. But going off on one there, sorry about that

Minor point of correction.  There actually -is- something about neurons that is "special" with regards to nuerons and galaxies (if there weren't we couldn't tell them apart..think about it).   You probably don't expect a cloud of dust to be conscious.  I'm also not sure how sensible the notion of separating the system from it's hardware is......give me an example of something where a comment regarding a system can be made without reference either explicit or implied to the hardware?

This isn't to say that there could not be a galaxy out there which would be capable of carrying, processing, and retaining data in such a manner..or of being conscious....but you're flirting with the fallacy of composition in the manner in which you've arrived at the notion.  A t-shirt has properties that cotton doesn't...and cotton has properties that a t-shirt doesn't.

All I meant really was that I have no problem with the idea of man-made machines being conscious... that the components of the system could just as easily be man-made chips and circuits as biological components like neurons. So in reference to galaxies etc I'd have no idea what the components would be (or could be, if they could be) but I just wonder if they could be, but I'm totally out of my depth there, so that's all it was really - just idle curiosity   But there do still have to be components of some kind, and arranged/structured in a certain way for it to form a system, so sorry about that... a system cannot be separated from its components so my wording there was bad 

[The Grand Nudger]

Nor do I.  I'll allow anything that meets the criteria we use to judge consciousness in other human beings hold that same title -as- conscious.  Further I doubt that our own criteria are exhaustive....but it's what we have to go own.   While they may not ultimately be, just as I cannot prove that you (or you, Benny) are conscious...making a special pleading argument (ala "-you- are conscious but that other thing only -seems- to be conscious") would eliminate my ability to use reason to make any statements on consciousness, what it is, and what has it, at all.  

I truly -would- be groping in the dark, rather than reaching for the stars from a footstool...as I may be now.

(We bounce this stuff off of each other to refine not only our thoughts but the words we use to communicate them, eh? No sweat there and I've certainly had my share of those moments.)

[bennyboy]

Nor do I.  I'll allow anything that meets the criteria we use to judge consciousness in other human beings hold that same title -as- conscious.  Further I doubt that our own criteria are exhaustive....but it's what we have to go own.   While they may not ultimately be, just as I cannot prove that you (or you, Benny) are conscious...making a special pleading argument (ala "-you- are conscious but that other thing only -seems- to be conscious") would eliminate my ability to use reason to make any statements on consciousness, what it is, and what has it, at all.  

I truly -would- be groping in the dark, rather than reaching for the stars from a footstool...as I may be now.

(We bounce this stuff off of each other to refine not only our thoughts but the words we use to communicate them, eh?  No sweat there and I've certainly had my share of those moments.)

I think this is the essence of our difference in this:

You see the human mind as a rule, established by behavior, and are willing to extend that rule to non-human physical systems with similar behaviors unless you have a good reason not to.

I see the apparent lack of mind in the majority of objects as the rule, and I'll extend that rule to all objects unless I have sufficient reason to believe it doesn't apply.  But given advanced robotics and computing, I don't think behavior is a sufficient reason, since behaviors can (or could reasonably soon) be mimicked.

I find it ironic that as a materialist, you find it easy to see mind in many things, and as an idealist (kind of), I find it so easy not to believe that things have minds as I do, even when they might seem to.

[The Grand Nudger]

I think this is the essence of our difference in this:

You see the human mind as a rule, established by behavior, and are willing to extend that rule to non-human physical systems with similar behaviors unless you have a good reason not to.

 I see it as phenomena, not a rule.  I attempt to explain the unknown by way of the known.  It's not as though I have any other method (nor do you).

I see the apparent lack of mind in the majority of objects as the rule, and I'll extend that rule to all objects unless I have sufficient reason to believe it doesn't apply.  But given advanced robotics and computing, I don't think behavior is a sufficient reason, since behaviors can (or could reasonably soon) be mimicked.

You see a lack of a mind in objects ignoring that you yourself are an object, but we aren't discussing "objects" - we are discussing things which behave as we behave, which -seem- the way we -seem-.  

I find it ironic that as a materialist, you find it easy to see mind in many things, and as an idealist (kind of), I find it so easy not to believe that things have minds as I do, even when they might seem to.

I find it easy to see mind in those things which act in the manners that we do, upon those metrics which -you and I both- accept some notion of mind.  Why, Benny...why do you think that I have a mind, why do you allow me this attribute? What makes you think I have qualia, and why do you think (as I know you do) that my qualia and your qualia are similar?? The answer to these questions can -only- be an affirmation of my espoused positions - even if they are wrong as a matter of fact.

In truth you and I have no difference here...we both think that the same thing is going on with regards to mind (we merely point to different "stuff" as the culprit), as we've discussed before. Acknowledging this, however, will not allow you to assert your idealism as a better explanation than my materialism. Regardless, I appreciate our disagreement and our ability to disagree and still be noob crushing buddies simultaneously. Rare round these parts.

#intellectual bromance. I joined these boards to have discussions like this with people like you. Who are we, why are we we....as we are, and what does that mean?