Seeing red

[emjay]

You will be surprised to find, maybe, that in the context of talking about brain and mind, I doubt there are any experiences we have that don't have some neural correlate.  Keep in mind that this is throwing out skepticism about the source of experiences, etc., which we've already probably talked about enough.

I'd like to list a few possibilities for consideration, not all (maybe not any) which are my own ideas.

First of all, let's start with the assumption that there's a physical universe, and that mind is exclusively a product of brain function, or at least of properties or functions of material in the brain.  Even given this, there are many levels upon which mind could supervene.  Let's list out a few of these levels just for hoots.

1)  Experience only supervenes through the coordinated effort of at least several brain parts.  Perhaps you need at least enough input to determine patterns, you need an organ capable of measuring events through a sense of time, etc.  Without all these components, you can't have anything said to be remotely conscious.

I just don't look at it at that level, but rather the network as a whole. So although neuroscience may identify/map different functional areas of the brain - and long may it continue to do so... by the different types of neurons, structure, and connectivity... they are ultimately all interconnected. Except for say split-brain patients where the corpus callosum that connects the two hemispheres of the brain is severed, leaving two networks, and no surprise for me given my theories, at least the appearance of two separate consciousnesses.

2)  Experience supervenes whenever certain brain parts (say the visual cortex) receive sufficient stimulation.  So if you stimulated a dead brain, little bubbles of "consciousness" would flash into that mental canvas for a moment despite the total lack of coherence of function in the brain in death.

Again, I see it at the whole network level rather than a specific function area. But that said, if hypothetically the visual cortex could be severed from the rest of the network it would still be a network in its own right. But it would be smaller and the connectivity would be different, at least pertaining to the rest of the - now hypothetically severed - network. So given my current theory, I would not necessarily expect the perception to take the same form as it does for the whole network... and that might depend on how the visual cortex is connected to the rest of the brain (which I'm afraid I don't know). If it was connected through a bottleneck as it were, like the corpus callosum, then I'd expect the perception to be similar (probably) because the states and relationships in the network would not be subject to that much outside interference, but if it was highly interconnected at every level in the visual cortex with far flung areas of the brain, then those additional relationships and states would change the overall constraints of the network, therefore different relationships and states would have to be differentiated in perception so I'd expect it to be different.

Regarding your second point, I fully agree and think something like could well happen. Basically, given input, a neural network 'settles' into a stable state of activation... that is to say first it's a kind of cascade of activation - as activation spreads through the network, with everything fluctuating, but eventually it settles down to a steady state of activation across the whole network. And given the connectivity in the brain it is possible for pockets of self-sustaining activity - in other words feedback loops - to exist, even once the input is turned off as it were. These little pockets are necessarily interconnected so they can be thought of as little mini networks for the sake of my theory. This is what I believe ideas to be - as in imagination/memory - with the vividness (where vividness just means different states represented) of the perception increasing the larger and more interconnected the pocket of activity becomes with additional input.

To be honest, the implications of this do give rise to genuine fears in me about what may happen during, and even after the death of the brain. There are safeguards in the brain to stop in getting over-excited - inhibitory neurons being one and 'neuron fatigue' which I don't know enough about but I believe would eventually cause a pocket of activation to stop. I don't know in enough detail about the physiology of the brain and how it is affected in the dying process. At a very rough level I know that neurons 'work' by allowing different types of ions from the 'extracellular space '(which has a similar make up to seawater) into the cell via passive channels and active pumps... and out of the cell in the same way, and that the purpose of these pumps etc is to create a potential difference across the membrane of the cell. But there it gets hazy for me because I don't understand electronics very well. But suffice it to say that the 'action potentials' of a neuron firing rely on the presence of these ions in the extracellular fluid. So one question for me is what happens to them after death? Then there's the pumps... they're not passive... they require energy so probably a neurons energy stores would run out. Then there's the neurotransmitters which I believe, though I'm not at all sure, receive their raw materials from the blood supply via some kind of transport molecules. But don't quote me on any of this... it's very very complicated and it's been a long time since I read anything about this in depth. But suffice it to say I don't know whether the brain could be stimulated after death... if the raw materials required for neural functioning would be present or for how long... nor do I know - and don't laugh - whether cremation could trigger neural activity... so I admit it is a worry (and perhaps an irrational one) that makes me seriously consider how I'd want to be disposed of after death. But nothing perhaps that a bit of dedicated study into the physiology couldn't solve.

3)  The essence of consciousness exists at a neuronal level-- this is the basis of perception, and every firing neuron has a kind of miniscule "awareness," although the person himself may not actually have access to it.  The conscious mind would be a kind of dynamic structure composed of billions of these tiny "idealets," if I can coin a word here.

I don't believe it's at the level of neurons, only networks. Ultimately a neuron is multi-purpose, and in my way of thinking not only can come to represent anything that it can detect, but can also represent more than one thing, though perhaps not at the same time. There are plenty of dendrites to go around so the same neuron could partake in different ways in different relationships. So I can't assign meaning to a neuron except through its relationships with others in the network.

4)  The most elemental "spark" of consciousness exists whenever information is exchanged, anywhere in the universe-- for example when a photon is absorbed with light information from a distant star by a receiving atom-- even if this is not part of an organism.  In this case, the cascade of information through electrochemical transmission in a single neuron would represent already a relatively massive corridor of "consciousness", though it would likely still be too insignificant to raise the conscious attention of a human being.

This is really where we came in isn't it... when I first met you guys? I kind of conflated yours and Rhythm's positions because they both relied on 'information' - which also appeals to me - though now I understand the difference between you. I admit it does hold an appeal and could even be the next logical step up from my theory in this thread in that I see consciousness as differentiating states and relationships and what is the universe but a helluva lot of different states and relationships?

I think the latter case is interesting.  It would mean that mind is intrinsic to all matter, not just special systems.  It would be the coordination of idealets into larger ideas, then concepts, and then a world view that WE would perceive as conscious awareness, much like only a gazillion particles working together can appear as a "thing" to us.

This would then eliminate the need to ask how mind supervenes on a physical brain.  Instead, all material interactions would be seen as mindful, with ours just being a unique case.

Let's try a reductio process here, because that's how I arrive at this idea.  Take a brain, and kill a single neuron.  Then another.  Then another.  What would happen?  Would there be a kind of critical mass, at which the brain would suddenly go into a coma?  Or would the quality of experience degrade imperceptibly but steadily, neuron after neuron, after neuron?  I suspect the latter, in which case not more than 2 neurons would be needed to support at least some kind of experience, although so primitive it would be almost quantum.

Given the choice, I'd say the latter, with the effect being as the result of each neuron removed reducing the complexity of the relationships and states to be differentiated in consciousness.

Now, let's take our 2 neurons, and start pulling molecules, 1 by 1.  Would there be a critical mass at which the neuron could no longer function, or would it gradually become less and less responsive?  Again, I suspect the latter.  I don't think any 1 particular pulled molecule would "turn off the lights," but instead you'd have shades of gray.  At some point, you'd have that structure which would allow the most minimal possible perception, though again I'd call it something like a "perceptling" or something like that to indicate its primitive elemental nature.

What, now, if you replaced the body of the neuron with wiring?  Would it still function?  One might suppose that so long as the emission and reuptake of neurotransmitters was possible, the method of transmission along the body wouldn't matter.  What now if you swapped out the synaptic mechanism with an electric mechanism, would it matter?  It's hard to see how, right?  So this would mean that a simpler system-- an electric wire-- should also be able to support the same elemental "perceptling."

Now we can go freaking nuts and continue pulling out metal molecules, maybe replacing them with fiber optics, or even just photons transmitting across a "synapse" of empty space."

Well, this is not really different than say a photon leaving the sun and being absorbed by an atom in a rock on Earth.

Sorry for the long ramble, but my point is this: without being able to determine otherwise, it seems to me that the most elemental structure capable of having some primitive perception would be a single body transmitting or receiving a photon.  In other words. . . mind is intrinsic to all matter, and matter is therefore not energy/matter, but energy/matter/mind.

This basically illustrates the problem with my theory. I go down to the level of nodes and relationships in a network, but no further. So from my perspective it doesn't matter whether the nodes are neurons, man-made chips, or implemented entirely in software; it's the states and relationships they represent that counts. But that therefore means that I've imposed my own abstract 'informational' layer between mind and matter that feels like it helps bridge the gap but doesn't really... it helps me understand it functionally and seems to correlate but it still doesn't bridge that gap. Because go low enough looking at a neuron... or anything else for that matter... and all you'll find is atoms in flux. So what is a neuron when it's representing a value? It is essentially just the flow of ions into and out of a cell. So looked at at that level the brain's neural network, in situ in the extracellular space is a maelstrom of activity with ions essentially being recycled as they move into and out of cells. Hard to pin anything down when looked at at that level. Likewise, relationships at that level just add synapses to the maelstrom.

So perhaps it is more like your theory where the states to be represented are not the abstract informational states in my intervening layer - which fails to bridge the gap - but the actual states of matter in the universe... and therefore as you say, energy/matter/mind. Something to think about

[bennyboy]

This basically illustrates the problem with my theory. I go down to the level of nodes and relationships in a network, but no further. So from my perspective it doesn't matter whether the nodes are neurons, man-made chips, or implemented entirely in software; it's the states and relationships they represent that counts. But that therefore means that I've imposed my own abstract 'informational' layer between mind and matter that feels like it helps bridge the gap but doesn't really... it helps me understand it functionally and seems to correlate but it still doesn't bridge that gap. Because go low enough looking at a neuron... or anything else for that matter... and all you'll find is atoms in flux. So what is a neuron when it's representing a value? It is essentially just the flow of ions into and out of a cell. So looked at at that level the brain's neural network, in situ in the extracellular space is a maelstrom of activity with ions essentially being recycled as they move into and out of cells. Hard to pin anything down when looked at at that level. Likewise, relationships at that level just add synapses to the maelstrom.

So perhaps it is more like your theory where the states to be represented are not the abstract informational states in my intervening layer - which fails to bridge the gap - but the actual states of matter in the universe... and therefore as you say, energy/matter/mind. Something to think about

Yeah, if you remember my PM, that's why I identify as an agnostic ambiguist: it seems to me that at boundary conditions, things that we think are very different are indistinguishable from each other. It happened with energy and matter; and I suspect the same paradox-conflation will eventually be the normal view with regard to the mind-body problem too.

[emjay]

This basically illustrates the problem with my theory. I go down to the level of nodes and relationships in a network, but no further. So from my perspective it doesn't matter whether the nodes are neurons, man-made chips, or implemented entirely in software; it's the states and relationships they represent that counts. But that therefore means that I've imposed my own abstract 'informational' layer between mind and matter that feels like it helps bridge the gap but doesn't really... it helps me understand it functionally and seems to correlate but it still doesn't bridge that gap. Because go low enough looking at a neuron... or anything else for that matter... and all you'll find is atoms in flux. So what is a neuron when it's representing a value? It is essentially just the flow of ions into and out of a cell. So looked at at that level the brain's neural network, in situ in the extracellular space is a maelstrom of activity with ions essentially being recycled as they move into and out of cells. Hard to pin anything down when looked at at that level. Likewise, relationships at that level just add synapses to the maelstrom.

So perhaps it is more like your theory where the states to be represented are not the abstract informational states in my intervening layer - which fails to bridge the gap - but the actual states of matter in the universe... and therefore as you say, energy/matter/mind. Something to think about

Yeah, if you remember my PM, that's why I identify as an agnostic ambiguist: it seems to me that at boundary conditions, things that we think are very different are indistinguishable from each other.  It happened with energy and matter; and I suspect the same paradox-conflation will eventually be the normal view with regard to the mind-body problem too.

Very nicely put   

But just pondering again... the physical brain still does a job... and it's the same job. It still uses a neural network to represent values and relationships in order to get stuff done. If I choose not to refer to it at that functional/structural level, and instead look at the underlying matter, it is still the case that matter has been concentrated, organised, and structured within the brain in a certain way that is different from the organisation of matter outside the brain. The level I'm looking at it, for the sake of argument, is the particle level, but there is still a real physical layer of understanding above that when it's represented as brain structures, and yet another level... an abstract level... above that representing states, relationships, and function (the level I'd usually be looking at it from).  So for the sake of argument saying that all matter has mind... that all particles have a property of mind... then I wonder if even at the level of particles the way they are confined and organised in the brain allows them to represent the same states and relationships as the neural network level of understanding. Because I still cannot ignore the correlation between mind and neural network, whatever way I go on this question. So if mind does not arise from the neural network level and instead from the particle level, there has to be a reason why mind correlates with what would be functionally expected of the neural network level of understanding. So in other words, what would be a state at the particle level? Would concentrated ions count as a state for instance, where one concentration is a different state from another concentration? Or would a molecule count as a state in the sense of being a structural organisation of atoms etc? This is not the way I usually think about these things so I'm having trouble with it.

Then there's another question that is worth thinking about, both from your position and mine. What about subconscious processes (or indeed non-conscious processes). From my original theory's perspective, there'd have to be a reason why certain neural circuits did not contribute to consciousness despite still being states and relationships. And the same question would apply to your theory... why would certain particles contribute and not others to consciousness, especially given the essentially uniform physical structure of neurons?

[bennyboy]

So in other words, what would be a state at the particle level? Would concentrated ions count as a state for instance, where one concentration is a different state from another concentration? Or would a molecule count as a state in the sense of being a structural organisation of atoms etc? This is not the way I usually think about these things so I'm having trouble with it.

That's the thing. Everything in the universe has some relationship to everything else, and these relationships are all dynamic on some level. So it's ALL information in a sense. So when we talk about mind, and brains, and neural nets, what is the distinguishing feature that separates any arbitrary collection of components as having "states" or carrying "information," and the rest just being a bunch of stuff floating in space? I think you can guess that my position is that it is only by mind that these rather arbitrary divisions can be made, and so we're thrown back into our circle again. Let's say I were to arrange a bunch of black and white stones into a digital pattern on a beach, representing a Beatles' song. Is it a song, or isn't it? To me, it is, to anybody who doesn't know my mind, it couldn't possibly be. So perhaps something ONLY becomes information when a sentient mind aritrarily imbues it with meaning. Back to the circle a third time.

My particular interest is in photon emission and reception, and for a particular reason. From the "perspective" of a photon, no time has passed no matter how far it travels, which means (to me) that the point of arrival is predestined. The photon, then, instead of being seen as a packet of energy traveling for millions of years, could be seen as serving a kind of distant electron function: it binds together two atoms at a point (due to the relativistic flattening of the universe at the speed of light). What does this have to do with anything? -- It is an extension of information through time and space, much as DNA is an extension of state through time in the form of statistical effects of the environment on that DNA's formation, and much as the human memory serves to bring a remembered state into comparison with a new state.

Then there's another question that is worth thinking about, both from your position and mine. What about subconscious processes (or indeed non-conscious processes). From my original theory's perspective, there'd have to be a reason why certain neural circuits did not contribute to consciousness despite still being states and relationships. And the same question would apply to your theory... why would certain particles contribute and not others to consciousness, especially given the essentially uniform physical structure of neurons?

This is a problem, and is still so even in psychoneurology. It turns out that most perceptions, and consciousness itself, is distributed across many brain parts, and not always the same subsystems of each part. In other words, it seems to be the percepts themselves, rather than the mechanism processing them, which is responsible for the sensation of awareness.

Selective brain damage is interesting, too. In various cases, you can lost the ability to do a specific function: say, recognize a face. That experience is no longer in your toolkit. And yet, the basic "screen" of consciousness is still fine. I wonder if when we are sleeping, there's a kind of idea-less "screen" or not, but I'm not sure how it would even be possible to determine.

This seems to be the case: that sounds, sights, smells, etc. are coordinated on a kind of common medium. But it doesn't seem to exist anywhere. My guess is that it doesn't exist at all, and that wherever there is processing, there is percept-- but its just not "owned" by you, and so it's not part of your subjective experience. Your neuron may be having a blast with its exciting processing of electrochemical cascades, oblivious to your existence.

[Neo-Scholastic]

A person who is of opinion 2 [physicalism] will simply point out all of the things that -are- "about something"...like every component of any computational system.

Such a person tacitly concedes the weakness of their position. The apparent intentional behavior of the hardware depends on software and programed instructions, both of which are immaterial forms that people impose on the hardware. Software isn’t just descriptive of the system; but rather, proscriptive (see below). It serves as an example of something immaterial that is distinguishable from the material in which it manifests.

Your position is that there are two distinct substances which are causally connected, but no interface. Because if there were an interface that is not one of those two substances, you'd be a triplist or a pluralist.

First off, the underwear gnome episode is one of my favorite Southpark episodes. Thanks for the laugh. Anyways, this objection begs the question by assuming up front that only objects of identical substance can causally interact. Maybe, maybe not.

The caricature of dualism as believing in some “ghost in the machine” simply misses the point. In essence, dualists consider the divide between Idealism and Materialism a false one. Idealism recognizes that forms and ends act proscriptively and considers material properties purely descriptive. Everything is phenomena free of any dependence on some nomena. On the other hand, materialism recognizes that matter and its properties act proscriptively and considers formal and functional properties as purely descriptive. Hence materialists use terms like abstractions and constructs when referring to immaterial objects because, to them, anything other than matter isn’t really real. Monist positions appear deficient in one direction or the other.

At root dualists see causality operating both upwards from material substances and downward from immaterial objects. Circularity isn’t just a description of various sensible bodies (wheels, cookies, gears, etc.) but rather a proscriptive principle. For example, the degree to which a wheel participates in circularity determines its effectiveness. The very notion of so-called emergent properties is based on the principle of downward causation. The arrangement, or form, truly has a type of causal power over the material below it. When sensible bodies exhibit natures that cannot be attributed to their parts, it shows that the material and immaterial interact even if neither can be alienated from the other. Forms and functions express themselves through matter without being matter. Matter adopts forms and performs functions without being those forms and functions.

Using Scholastic nomenclature ideas are not thoughts or sensations. Sensations are the means by which we know. Ideas are the means by which we think. Abstraction means to identify the essential properties of a sensible body, it quiddity, and disregard any accidental properties. A concept is a mental object that participates in the ideal form. The relationship between the mental object, or concept, and extra-mental sensible body is identical to the relationship between two sensible bodies that share the same essence.

My responses to some previous posts will provide examples of how the Scholastic approach applies.

… aboutness is what philosophers refer to as intentionality.

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For this, a simple counter-example will suffice. Every year there is a race held in the desert to compare completely robotic vehicles' performance on a pre-determined course. These vehicles use a variety of sensors to track the terrain as they drive along. They 'map' the road as they come upon it.

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To suggest that the data in these onboard computers is not 'about' the road in front of them is ridiculous.

In Scholastic terms the robot is a hylomorphic substance. Absent software it is just hunks of metal and plastic. Absent hardware it is a disembodied set of immaterial instructions.

As a hylomorphic substance, the robot cannot reduce to one or the other. Anyone can see that instructions are proscriptive purposes and ideas, i.e. final and formal causes. Instructions can play out on anything from transistor to vacuum tubes (even gears and cogs). They can be physically stored on anything from solid-state hard drives to punch cards. They can be expressed in a wide variety of symbols strings and languages. The efficacy of a string of symbols depends on the extent to which it participates, to greater or lesser extent, in something beyond the signs themselves, something that gives the symbols efficacy. Formal Causes. Final Ends.

… Let's say I were to arrange a bunch of black and white stones into a digital pattern on a beach, representing a Beatles' song. Is it a song, or isn't it? To me, it is, to anybody who doesn't know my mind, it couldn't possibly be. So perhaps something ONLY becomes information when a sentient mind arbitrarily imbues it with meaning.

I say they are an arbitrary symbol set that participates in a set of ideas beyond the symbols themselves.

[The Grand Nudger]

Such a person tacitly concedes the weakness of their position. The apparent intentional behavior of the hardware depends on software and programed instructions, both of which are immaterial forms that people impose on the hardware. Software isn’t just descriptive of the system; but rather, proscriptive (see below). It serves as an example of something immaterial that is distinguishable from the material in which it manifests.

I matters very little how the software got there (or how the hardware was built).  Your statement was obviously and thoroughly incorrect because material stuff very clearly can be "about something".  If, instead of your poorly stated initial objection, you feel that software cannot be programmed or hardware cannot be built in our absence.... I can only point you to the multitudinous examples of bioautomata in the plant kingdom.



Something tells me that this won't alter your position a single iota. You'll go on about how matter can't account for this, can't account for that....the fact of the matter in any such statement being utterly irrelevant. It's all a farce, as you would not have examples of "x" to point to as things matter can't account for unless, in fact, there are things doing "x" in the first place.

[The Grand Nudger]

Keep in mind that this was a speculative exploration, GIVEN the assumption that mind is purely physical-- an assumption I don't normally make.  So I'm not trying to reinforce my normal world view, but to examine the physicalist position from more angles and in more detail.

...except that you aren't expressing the physicalist position at all.  All things are made of matter, but not all things can fly.  So too, all things are made of matter...but not every thing can think.

I'm trying to figure out exactly what complexity of structure is required to support qualia.  Let me put it this way:
1)  There is nothing called mind except at the macro level-- mind only "spawns" when you hit a certain critical mass of processing;
2)  It's a spectrum-- the simplest kind of processing represents the simplest kind of mind-- so in this case, just as the human brain is made of large structures, sub structures, and microstructures, the human mind would be composed not just of ideas, but would be a composition of atomic "idealets."

IDK, if you give the simplest processing mind....and I'm not sure why you would, then any old calculator has mind.  I think that "mind", as a term, is meant to express more than the range of ability of a pocket calculator.  Don't you?

My point is that if you don't think the SIMPLEST data processing represents the simplest mind, then at what arbitrary level of complexity would you draw it?  Arbitrary lines in the sand aren't really good either in science or in philosophy, IMO.

I don't think that the simplest data processing represents mind, simple or complex, so I wouldn't know where a person who does draws that line.

[bennyboy]

...except that you aren't expressing the physicalist position at all.  All things are made of matter, but not all things can fly.  So too, all things are made of matter...but not every thing can think.

That's a strange comment, since only 1 of the 4 options I mentioned involved everything thinking. . . and even that under the specific circumstance that there is a physical interchange of information.

But tell me, what non-arbitrary standard can you say that differentiates between any particular bunch of stuff and "thinking?" All over the universe there are persistent states, and interchange of information, etc. Who's to say that a Galaxy, as its practically infinite particles do their dance in space, isn't receiving input, processing it, and outputting a behavior?

IDK, if you give the simplest processing mind....and I'm not sure why you would, then any old calculator has mind.  I think that "mind", as a term, is meant to express more than the range of ability of a pocket calculator.  Don't you?

Well, is there an arbitrary cut line, or is there a specific critical mass at which we can non-arbitrarily say, "This thing has mind?" Because if any processing has idealets, then I'd accept that there's mind all over the place-- just something so elemental that we can't comprehend it. But if it has to respond to a name and cry a little when you forget its birthday, that's a different issue.

I don't think that the simplest data processing represents mind, simple or complex, so I wouldn't know where a person who does draws that line.

Is there a line? Is there a minimal structure which can be said to be mindful? I think we're likely looking at a spectrum, so it may be that this is not an issue of reality, but just of what you personally are willing to call mindful.

[Angrboda]

… aboutness is what philosophers refer to as intentionality.  

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For this, a simple counter-example will suffice.  Every year there is a race held in the desert to compare completely robotic vehicles' performance on a pre-determined course.  These vehicles use a variety of sensors to track the terrain as they drive along.  They 'map' the road as they come upon it.

---

To suggest that the data in these onboard computers is not 'about' the road in front of them is ridiculous.

In Scholastic terms the robot is a hylomorphic substance. Absent software it is just hunks of metal and plastic. Absent hardware it is a disembodied set of immaterial instructions.

As a hylomorphic substance, the robot cannot reduce to one or the other. Anyone can see that instructions are proscriptive purposes and ideas, i.e. final and formal causes. Instructions can play out on anything from transistor to vacuum tubes (even gears and cogs). They can be physically stored on anything from solid-state hard drives to punch cards. They can be expressed in a wide variety of symbols strings and languages. The efficacy of a string of symbols depends on the extent to which it participates, to greater or lesser extent, in something beyond the signs themselves, something that gives the symbols efficacy. Formal Causes. Final Ends.

In other words, it's not really a mechanical device because "it's imbued with magic." No, you can use whatever nomenclature you like, it doesn't change the fact that a mechanical device has intentionality. Its instructions and the data in the hardware are very real physical manifestations. All your talk about final causes doesn't change that. And unless those instructions are expressed in the hardware of the robot, they do not function at all. The efficacy depends upon being mated to the right hardware. Period.

(ETA: And mated to the right environment.)

[The Grand Nudger]

That's a strange comment, since only 1 of the 4 options I mentioned involved everything thinking. . . and even that under the specific circumstance that there is a physical interchange of information.

But tell me, what non-arbitrary standard can you say that differentiates between any particular bunch of stuff and "thinking?"  All over the universe there are persistent states, and interchange of information, etc.  Who's to say that a Galaxy, as its practically infinite particles do their dance in space, isn't receiving input, processing it, and outputting a behavior?

All definitions of all terms are, essentially, arbitrary.  You keep using the word as though it meant something in context, it doesn't.   I'd draw the line for mind at a bare minimum, at self awareness.   Anything which behaves as though it has a sense of self is a candidate for mind.   There is more, but this has to be met or I'd be inclined to call it information processing......like most plants, rocks, or photons.  

Well, is there an arbitrary cut line, or is there a specific critical mass at which we can non-arbitrarily say, "This thing has mind?"  Because if any processing has idealets, then I'd accept that there's mind all over the place-- just something so elemental that we can't comprehend it.  But if it has to respond to a name and cry a little when you forget its birthday, that's a different issue.

I'd say the cutoff line is the point at which we see expressed in other things that which we see expressed in ourselves.  So, "below" worms and above photons.  We could go through rep by rep and get a more specific answer but we'd have to agree on a line first.   The intitiial hurdle is of self awareness is enough to winnow down the vast majority of candidate minds (even among living things).

Is there a line?  Is there a minimal structure which can be said to be mindful?  I think we're likely looking at a spectrum, so it may be that this is not an issue of reality, but just of what you personally are willing to call mindful.

Insomuch as people are fond of categorizing things, sure. We may be looking at a spectrum, but I don't know what would sense it would be to consider it a spectrum of mind. Or why would extend the spectrum of mind, wherever we set it's boundaries, to include all things. As before, not all things can fly......though I'm sure that we could argue a toaster in if we really wanted to.

Not that any of this matters..ofc.....I'll remind you that it's all insufficient. I'm talking in gibbberish, for all it must be worth.