The Ontological Argument - valid or debunked?

[Neo-Scholastic]

A complete, self-sustaining being wouldn't need or want to create anything.  Creation is a symptom of deficiency.  Such a perfect creature would necessarily be atomic.

I don't need to give my family gifts but I do because I love them and I do so out of my abundance, not deficiency.

[Esquilax]

Also, and I shouldn't have to say this but apparently I do: entities that actually exist do not have their properties suddenly change or be added onto, merely because somebody happens to come up with an idea that undercuts the argument you've made that is the sole piece of thought suggesting that entity exists. Me making an argument against the ontological argument should not, if we're talking about something that really exists, cause that thing to suddenly have new properties to get around that argument I made.

When I say a thing, and then three people come out of the woodwork to give their god new attributes that, oh so conveniently, were never important enough to mention until such time as they allowed the ontological argument to still be right, that not only suggests awful things about the ontological argument as it was written, that it left out so much apparently crucial information, but also is deeply suspicious.

[Angrboda]

For example, a warning traffic sign is an objectively better example of a triangle than a spanakopita.

By an objectively better example of a triangle you are claiming that it's outline is a better fit for the definition of a triangle. A triangle has an objective definition of being a figure with three sides. This is not the case for greatness. There is no objective definition of what constitutes greatness, so whether or not a being fully exemplifies the notion of an objectively great being is a nonsense question. It has no sense in which it is true or false.

[GrandizerII]

2 is just simply true (as true as "all bachelors are unmarried")

No, "all bachelors are unmarried" is a logically valid tautology. The following is a logically invalid non-sequitur:

Premise 2: If it's possible that a maximally great being exists, then a maximally great being exists in some possible world.

If something is logically possible it does not at all entail that that something exists in any world.

and 3 is based on the argument that the maximally great being, as defined by Plantinga, is possibly necessary.

No it's another non-sequitur.

Premise 3: If a maximally great being exists in some possible world, then it exists in every possible world.

If something exists in a possible world it does not at all entail that it exists in all possible worlds. If something is possibly necessary that does not at all entail that it necessarily exists.

Sorry, Alasdair, but this is not right at all. I'm just a layman like you, so you don't need to take my word for it, but feel free to ask an academic atheist philosopher if what you're saying here is true. The only premise that should be in debate here is premise 1.

Again, possible world is not the same as an actual world. Possible world can be actual or just a world that's conceivably possible.

Second, premise 3 is not a non-sequitur because it follows logically from the prior premises in the case of an MGB (because an MGB by definition has to be necessary according to Platinga and others; if it's not necessary, then it's not an MGB).

So ways to counter premise 1:

1) It has not been established that premise 1 is possibly true. Contrary to what Christians like to say, you still need to provide some leveraging weight to the argument. As it stands now, it's just a really empty argument, despite its cleverness.

2) A maximally great being (defined as an omnipotent and omniscient being) is logically incoherent. No matter how powerful a being can get, there is always something it cannot do. If there are things it cannot do (like creating a rock that it cannot lift or destroy), then its power is restricted in some way. If there is a restriction, then it falls short of perfectness, and therefore is not really the maximally great being defined by Plantinga. Therefore, such a being cannot possibly exist.

3) Even if we were to overlook the paradox of omnipotence, and a maximally great being is allowed to not be able to do everything that can possibly be done by an entity, it cannot do what's logically impossible for any entity to do. For example, it cannot create out of literal nothingness; it cannot timelessly create time or anything for the matter; it cannot timelessly create in a mindful/sentient manner; and, of course, it cannot logically create a "square-triangle". So if you look at it this way, a maximally great being, if it exists, must have eternally coexisted with the ultimate universe/reality and always in time. It could not have been the Creator.

4) It has not been adequately argued, as far as I know, that sentience is an indicator of greatness. Perhaps, sentience is merely an indicator of evolution of beings that actually change and progress. Why would a maximally great being need to be sentient?

5) In line with option 3 and 4, the MGB need not be the traditional theistic god. In fact, at best, it can be a pantheistic sort of god that isn't the Creator but rather the Co-existor.

6) The ultimate universe itself might be the MGB (or maximally great entity).

[RoadRunner79]

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If you had the choice to be stuck in a cage with one of two hungry lions who have all the same properties, except one exists in the actual world, and the other possibly exists, but not actually.   Which one would you choose?  

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The latter, but changing the frame of the topic also changes the variables under discussion. At the point that we're discussing lions and cages, we're no longer having a conversation in any way related to the god question.

While it is not directly related to the topic, it is related to your objection.   That existence is not greater than non-existence.  This begs the question, of why you would make the choice.  If you reflect on that, then I think that you have the answer to your objection.  I think that it also answers you second objection as well.

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While overcoming adversity or handicap is commendable I don't think there is anything which logically makes it greater (emotionally perhaps).  In this separate argument which you have created to knock down, it leads to absurdity, and therefore it is not possible (given the principle of sufficient reason).  I don't see how it effects the ontological argument.

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So, in my hypothetical, you have two beings: one is the maximally great being as understood by the ontological argument, which is a being that does things and has power, but that those things and that power are conditional on that being existing, given that "demonstrating" the existence of that being is the purpose of the argument and if it fails to do so, obviously the premises and characteristics of that being no longer matter. The other is my proposed maximally great being, which is exactly as powerful as the former being, but lacks this limitation of needing to exist in order to do things and have power.

Which one is greater: the being limited by needing to exist, or the one whose greatness does not carry this requirement? I fail to see how it's even possible to suggest the former.

Now, of course, in real life I don't find that argument particularly compelling, but that's a function of my not finding the ontological argument compelling in the least. I've already had to lower my standards of argumentation in order to address this particular dumpster fire on its own anemic merits, instead of just relying on the obvious point ("you can't argue a god into existence") but I think the fact that I was able to construct a valid rebuttal to the ontological argument that is also completely nonsensical on the face of it just demonstrates how nonsensical the thing I was responding to is.

It's the same problem that all these "I'm going to logic god into existence with vaguely defined philosophical handwaving," style arguments: a skilled enough wordsmith, equally as unencumbered from having to demonstrate a damn thing as the apologist is, can easily turn the terms of the argument back on itself without breaking a sweat. I sweetened the pot by adding in a few more points regarding the illogic of the individual premises, but thus far they've been largely ignored in favor of simply assuming the premises to be valid and rolling from there.

Wow.... is that really the way you think.... at this point, I'm wondering if no argument is greater than any argument.

[KevinM1]

A complete, self-sustaining being wouldn't need or want to create anything.  Creation is a symptom of deficiency.  Such a perfect creature would necessarily be atomic.

I don't need to give my family gifts but I do because I love them and I do so out of my abundance, not deficiency.

So, you don't hope to feel loved or appreciated in return? Ever?

[Edwardo Piet]

Premises 5 and 6 are redundant. Premises 2 and 3 are failed attempts at logical entailment. Premises 1 and 4 I accept so here is what Craig is left with:

Premise 1: It's possible that a 'maximally great being' exists.
Premise 4: If a maximally great being exists in every possible world, then it exists in the actual world.

He is left with "A maximally great being is a logical possibility in any and every world and if it does exist in every world then it exists in our world."

The same applies to the FSM. It's a logical possibility, meaning it's not a logically self-contradictory concept, and if it exists in all worlds then it of course exists in ours.

Here is a way to use the logical fallacy of equivocation in Craig's favor:

Premise 1: A maximally great being is a logical possibility.
Premise 2: A maximally great being is logically possible in all possible worlds.
Premise 3: If a maximally great being exists in all possible worlds then it exists in our world if our world is a possible world.
Premise 4: Our world is a possible world.
Premise 5: Sneakily commit the equivocation fallacy by equivocating logical possibility with possible worlds.
Fallacious conclusion: Therefore a maximally great being exists in our world.

[Edwardo Piet]

@ Irrational

I am not interested in your fallacy of the argument from authority "Hey, we're just lay people, if you don't agree with me yet ask someone academic."

Yes, an actual world is different to a possible world. I know this. You're misrepresenting me.

The point is something cannot exist in a possible world because existence is about actuality. Possible existence in a possible world is not the same thing as actual existence in a possible world. It's equivocating to say that because the existence of something is possible in a possible world then that means it actually exists in a possible world.

[robvalue]

1. If my bullshit goes under the radar, God exists
2. Bullshit....

[chimp3]

Philosophy is not a very effective tool of discovery. From Plato on to Chalmers philosophers have asked "What is mind?". In the 21st century Chalmers ( like Descartes ) believes the mind enters the brain at the pineal gland. Mind-Body dualism is the pinnacle of thousands of years of intensive philosophical research. Not once in thousands of years did philosophers discover the role of the prefrontal cortex , hippocampus , neurotransmitters , or neurons . Craig thinks he has discovered the mind of God in his little word play but Philosophy is not science. Making a valid argument is not dependent on the truth of the premise.