Do you believe in free will?

[Perhaps]

Under the assertion of law of identity. A thing cannot be what it is and not be what it is at the same time. Without any mechanism for consciousness, a conscious mind in not conscious. You can make all the assertions you like about ontological dependence and which principles do or do not translate to the non-material, but this one is inescapable.

Perhaps we've misunderstood each other here. I think that the conscience itself is the non-material subject in question. It interacts with the material brain to create the 'conscious mind' which gives us free will. Through what mechanism does it interact with the material brain to create the conscious mind, i'm not sure, but that doesn't mean that it can't interact. My only premises would be that the non-material is unaffected by the determinism of the material world, and the non-material is ontologically dependent on the material in which it is harbored.

As for the law of identity, I'm not sure what issue you have with my presentation of the non-material here. The conscience has a separate identity than the brain, and they come together to create the conscious mind. To use your example again, cause and effect have separate identities, yet combine under the identity of causation.

The problem is that so far, your attempted justifications only go as far as to say that free-will can exist. And in that they are incomplete. In order to assert that it can exist, you should give a possible scenario of how it can exist.

Possible scenario for the existence of free will via the non-material conscience:
1. There are non-material subjects which exist
2. Conscience is a non-material subject
3. The non-material can interact with the material (while remaining outside of the determinism of the non-material)
4. If there is interaction between the conscience and the brain, then free will exists
5. There is interaction between the conscience and the brain
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
4. Free will exists

Don't assume anything about my position. My position on freewill has already been spelled out in this thread. Refer to that is you wish to know what it is.

I apologize, could you provide which page on the thread you stated your opinion?

The materialistic perspective here is an assumption on your part. The limits I'd proscribe are the logical confines of identity and causation, unless, ofcourse, you are saying that logic is not applicable to the non-materia, in which case it'd be simply nonsense.

"Reason itself is fallible, and this fallibility must find a place in our logic"

I'm failing to see the issue you are proposing with the identity of the non-material subject, and I cannot explain to you how the interaction occurs between non-material and material (because I don't know), simply that it could (does) happen.

[genkaus]

Perhaps we've misunderstood each other here. I think that the conscience itself is the non-material subject in question. It interacts with the material brain to create the 'conscious mind' which gives us free will. Through what mechanism does it interact with the material brain to create the conscious mind, i'm not sure, but that doesn't mean that it can't interact. My only premises would be that the non-material is unaffected by the determinism of the material world, and the non-material is ontologically dependent on the material in which it is harbored.

As for the law of identity, I'm not sure what issue you have with my presentation of the non-material here. The conscience has a separate identity than the brain, and they come together to create the conscious mind. To use your example again, cause and effect have separate identities, yet combine under the identity of causation.

I've ignored it so far, but conscience means "awareness of a moral or ethical aspect to one's conduct together". Consciousness means "A sense or awareness of one's personal or collective identity, including the attitudes, beliefs". Since the subject of discussion is not morality, I'm assuming that your intended term was the latter all along. Correct me if I'm wrong.

Now, my primary issue here is absence of any standards set-up to determine what you mean by non-material. As I said before, conceptual fields such as logic and math are non-material as well as supposed entities such as souls, spirits, angels etc. These areas are qualitatively different and unless you specify what kind of non-material you are referring to and the resulting confusion contributes to error with regards to the subject.

Now, if metaphysically your premise had been the former - that consciousness is a conceptual abstract - then my argument would be that it is not free from material determinism. If its the latter, I'd simply say - baloney.

Possible scenario for the existence of free will via the non-material conscience:
1. There are non-material subjects which exist
2. Conscience is a non-material subject
3. The non-material can interact with the material (while remaining outside of the determinism of the non-material)
4. If there is interaction between the conscience and the brain, then free will exists
5. There is interaction between the conscience and the brain
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
4. Free will exists

Depending upon the qualities you assign to the non-material, your error would be in 3. (abstractions cannot remain outside material determinism) or in 1. (No, they don't).

I apologize, could you provide which page on the thread you stated your opinion?

I jumped into it on page 15.

I'm failing to see the issue you are proposing with the identity of the non-material subject, and I cannot explain to you how the interaction occurs between non-material and material (because I don't know), simply that it could (does) happen.

Firstly, you should be able to see the basic problem here - asserting something without even a hint at justification.

Now, if you are talking about consciousness as an abstract non-material entity, then it'd be a reflection of the material world and therefore any so-called interaction would be bound by material determinism. But there I'd have no argument against its identity.

If you are talking about it as a spiritual non-material entity, then the problem would be much different. The non-material consciousness would need a mechanism to receive the input getting to the brain (because consciousness always needs to be "conscious of" something), otherwise it wouldn't exist. It needs to do it in such a way that the chain of causality governing that material reception does not affect it as well. Without these explanations, the identity of your non-material consciousness would be incomplete.

[Perhaps]

I've ignored it so far, but conscience means "awareness of a moral or ethical aspect to one's conduct together". Consciousness means "A sense or awareness of one's personal or collective identity, including the attitudes, beliefs". Since the subject of discussion is not morality, I'm assuming that your intended term was the latter all along. Correct me if I'm wrong.

Now, my primary issue here is absence of any standards set-up to determine what you mean by non-material. As I said before, conceptual fields such as logic and math are non-material as well as supposed entities such as souls, spirits, angels etc. These areas are qualitatively different and unless you specify what kind of non-material you are referring to and the resulting confusion contributes to error with regards to the subject.

Now, if metaphysically your premise had been the former - that consciousness is a conceptual abstract - then my argument would be that it is not free from material determinism. If its the latter, I'd simply say - baloney.

The non-material subject I am referring to incorporates the aspects of both the conscience and consciousness - it is simply that which gives us awareness - let's call it the mind to avoid further confusion. The mind which I am presenting is not a conceptual abstract, rather it is what creates the conceptual abstracts. The mind governs our interactions with reality in so much as it is the only way in which we can perceive and act in correlation with what we 'know' to exist and be true.

This mind is that which allows our existence in a material construct. It is not the material construct which allows for the existence of the mind. As we perceive the material world, a brain is necessary to carry the mind, but without the mind our identity would be null and void. It is what separates us, as identities, from the material world (and all of its attributes).

What is my justification for these assertions? What evidence do I have to support my premises? Can I be sure that I am correct?

If the mind is that which gives us awareness, then what are we being aware of? Surely it must be the material world as it exists around us, but what then of differing perceptions of existence? It cannot be valid that we both perceive the material world differently if only the material world exists (objectively and determined for everyone). What then allows for this? The mind offers an alternative to this dilemma. If we have differing perceptions of the material world as it exists, then perhaps it is not as objective as once thought. Perhaps reality is merely a conceived notion which may or may not match the 'true' material world closely.

I do not doubt that the material world exists, but I cannot justify that it is objective, or that it 'exists' as I perceive it after my mind ceases... Where does this take the discussion as it relates to free will? If the mind creates the material world as we (as identities) perceive it, then surely we (as identities) can affect it without being confined to our perceptions - thus the idea of free will.

Possible scenario for the existence of free will via the non-material conscience:
1. There are non-material subjects which exist
2. The mindis a non-material subject
3. The non-material can interact with the material (while remaining outside of the determinism of the non-material)
4. If there is interaction between the mindand the brain, then free will exists
5. There is interaction between the mindand the brain
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
4. Free will exists

Depending upon the qualities you assign to the non-material, your error would be in 3. (abstractions cannot remain outside material determinism) or in 1. (No, they don't).

Now that I have clarified my premises' validity, would your objections still remain the same?

[Reforged]

I've ignored it so far, but conscience means "awareness of a moral or ethical aspect to one's conduct together". Consciousness means "A sense or awareness of one's personal or collective identity, including the attitudes, beliefs". Since the subject of discussion is not morality, I'm assuming that your intended term was the latter all along. Correct me if I'm wrong.

Now, my primary issue here is absence of any standards set-up to determine what you mean by non-material. As I said before, conceptual fields such as logic and math are non-material as well as supposed entities such as souls, spirits, angels etc. These areas are qualitatively different and unless you specify what kind of non-material you are referring to and the resulting confusion contributes to error with regards to the subject.

Now, if metaphysically your premise had been the former - that consciousness is a conceptual abstract - then my argument would be that it is not free from material determinism. If its the latter, I'd simply say - baloney.

The non-material subject I am referring to incorporates the aspects of both the conscience and consciousness - it is simply that which gives us awareness - let's call it the mind to avoid further confusion. The mind which I am presenting is not a conceptual abstract, rather it is what creates the conceptual abstracts. The mind governs our interactions with reality in so much as it is the only way in which we can perceive and act in correlation with what we 'know' to exist and be true.

This mind is that which allows our existence in a material construct. It is not the material construct which allows for the existence of the mind. As we perceive the material world, a brain is necessary to carry the mind, but without the mind our identity would be null and void. It is what separates us, as identities, from the material world (and all of its attributes).

What is my justification for these assertions? What evidence do I have to support my premises? Can I be sure that I am correct?

If the mind is that which gives us awareness, then what are we being aware of? Surely it must be the material world as it exists around us, but what then of differing perceptions of existence? It cannot be valid that we both perceive the material world differently if only the material world exists (objectively and determined for everyone). What then allows for this? The mind offers an alternative to this dilemma. If we have differing perceptions of the material world as it exists, then perhaps it is not as objective as once thought. Perhaps reality is merely a conceived notion which may or may not match the 'true' material world closely.

I do not doubt that the material world exists, but I cannot justify that it is objective, or that it 'exists' as I perceive it after my mind ceases... Where does this take the discussion as it relates to free will? If the mind creates the material world as we (as identities) perceive it, then surely we (as identities) can affect it without being confined to our perceptions - thus the idea of free will.

Possible scenario for the existence of free will via the non-material conscience:
1. There are non-material subjects which exist
2. The mindis a non-material subject
3. The non-material can interact with the material (while remaining outside of the determinism of the non-material)
4. If there is interaction between the mindand the brain, then free will exists
5. There is interaction between the mindand the brain
_____________________________________________________________________________________________
4. Free will exists

Depending upon the qualities you assign to the non-material, your error would be in 3. (abstractions cannot remain outside material determinism) or in 1. (No, they don't).

Very simple multiple choice question for both of you, are the electrical impulses in our brains material or non-material?

[TheJackel]

If I had free will, I could willingly make myself GOD, and have the will to make all of you worship me.. If you can show me how I have zero constraints, limits, or boundaries of will, you might have a point. Otherwise you're just playing with placebos..

1. There are non-material subjects which exist

There are no such things that can exist to which are made of nothing as nothing doesn't exist. Everything is physical interactions, physical expressions, and physical states. Immateriality is a logical fallacy.

[Perhaps]

Let's suppose a thought experiment to help clarify some of my justifications...

1. You are the only person in existence in the material world
2. You do not possess, nor can you possess, a mechanism through which you can 'view' or 'see' the world
3. This material world which you exist in has the same attributes as the one which we exist within currently
______________________________________________________________________________________
4. Do colors exist?

Similarly:
1. No one exists in the material world
2. The material world which exists has the same attributes as the one which we exist within currently
____________________________________________________________________________________
3. Does the material world exist?

[Reforged]

Ok... don't answer my question then... rude.

[TheJackel]

1. You are the only person in existence in the material world
2. You do not possess, nor can you possess, a mechanism through which you can 'view' or 'see' the world
3. This material world which you exist in has the same attributes as the one which we exist within currently

Without sensory systems, there is no possibility of the emergence of a conscious state. And btw, all things that exist can only be made of what existence itself is made of, so your argument is invalid entirely. And we already know that energy is the capacity of information, and the carrying capacity of information. For petes sake, it's starring you in the face as you read this statement. Using deductive logic here, can you tell us here what energy is made of? It's a really simple answer... I'll even give you a hint:

We are energy beings made of atoms, and atoms made of energy, and our consciousness is the expression of energy

Here, let me demonstrate:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XM4rS38pd0U&

-

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lK8U8RZyzsM&



Welcome to the real world..

[genkaus]

The non-material subject I am referring to incorporates the aspects of both the conscience and consciousness - it is simply that which gives us awareness - let's call it the mind to avoid further confusion. The mind which I am presenting is not a conceptual abstract, rather it is what creates the conceptual abstracts. The mind governs our interactions with reality in so much as it is the only way in which we can perceive and act in correlation with what we 'know' to exist and be true.

So, you are proposing three categories of metaphysical existence - material, abstract and mental (the one you refer to as "the mind"). You see the third one as a separate category in and of itself, but that does not clarify any other details regarding its existence. Unless you can specify how it interacts with the other two forms of reality, there is no reason to even consider its separate existence.

This mind is that which allows our existence in a material construct. It is not the material construct which allows for the existence of the mind. As we perceive the material world, a brain is necessary to carry the mind, but without the mind our identity would be null and void. It is what separates us, as identities, from the material world (and all of its attributes).

You contradict yourself. As you have maintained, the mind is dependent upon the brain for its existence and it does not outlast the brain. In that case, it is the material construct which would allow for the existence of the mind.

What is my justification for these assertions? What evidence do I have to support my premises? Can I be sure that I am correct?

If the mind is that which gives us awareness, then what are we being aware of? Surely it must be the material world as it exists around us, but what then of differing perceptions of existence? It cannot be valid that we both perceive the material world differently if only the material world exists (objectively and determined for everyone). What then allows for this? The mind offers an alternative to this dilemma. If we have differing perceptions of the material world as it exists, then perhaps it is not as objective as once thought. Perhaps reality is merely a conceived notion which may or may not match the 'true' material world closely.

I do not doubt that the material world exists, but I cannot justify that it is objective, or that it 'exists' as I perceive it after my mind ceases... Where does this take the discussion as it relates to free will? If the mind creates the material world as we (as identities) perceive it, then surely we (as identities) can affect it without being confined to our perceptions - thus the idea of free will.

Here's where you start going demonstrably wrong. Reality refers to the material world. What is true and what is not is determined by correspondence to that world. A true material world is a redundant expression.

The differences in perception do not affect the objectivity of the material world. They are due to the differences in the mechanism of perception. This explanation more than accounts for the differing perceptions of the material world - it also accounts for the same perceptions. Your explanation does not address why two people with completely different minds would perceive the same thing.

As I see it, your error comes from two faulty premises. Firstly, you sate, in contradiction to your earlier statement, that mind's existence is not allowed for by material construct. Second, in order to account for differing perceptions of an objective phenomena, instead of the more obvious solution of different mechanisms of perception, you go for the untenable position of attacking the objectivity of the phenomena. The result here is that you start placing the secondary form of reality (the mind) before the primary (the material). Since mind cannot exist without a material construct, since mental awareness cannot exist without a material world to be aware of - these statements place "mind" as a consequence of the material. Using subjectivity to try and switch places creates a contradiction. These two mistaken premises erroneously lead you to place "mind" outside the chain of causality - or rather, every mind as a first cause of its own.

Now that I have clarified my premises' validity, would your objections still remain the same?

You have only clarified your premises, their validity remains very much in question. Your exception of your non-material construct from the chain of causality remains very much in question.

---

Very simple multiple choice question for both of you, are the electrical impulses in our brains material or non-material?

Material.

---

Let's suppose a thought experiment to help clarify some of my justifications...

1. You are the only person in existence in the material world
2. You do not possess, nor can you possess, a mechanism through which you can 'view' or 'see' the world
3. This material world which you exist in has the same attributes as the one which we exist within currently
______________________________________________________________________________________
4. Do colors exist?

Yes.

Similarly:
1. No one exists in the material world
2. The material world which exists has the same attributes as the one which we exist within currently
____________________________________________________________________________________
3. Does the material world exist?

Yes. You said that in the premise yourself.

Clearly, here the material world is an objective phenomenon. This defeats your claim of its subjectivity.

[oxymoron]

4. Do colors exist?

"Wavelength" exists (for a specific ontology) as the distance between wavecrests in the electric or magnetic field of a light ray. Out sensory apparatus also exists (in a different ontology), and our vision would appear to have evolved so as to differentiate certain wavelengths in a range from other wavelengths in that range. That differentiation is called "color". So it would appear to happily exist so long as you accept that all wavelengths in the visible spectrum do not stimulate the various eye cells identically (and for deeper reasons to do with subsequent operations in the visual signal chain).

It does not matter that color is absolutely the same between individuals, because it is a relative value - it exist to show differences. If what I see as red, you see as blue, so long as we both call it "red" (a process that begins as a labelling when we acquire language by rote learning), then we can meaningfully communicate the color of (say) apples.

Two artificial neural networks, trained on different measurements of the same phenomenon, will most probably have a different set of internal weights on their links. However, when presented with new data, they will produce similar results, providing the training was valid (no overtraining, no undertraining, suitable annealing...). The networks capture the statistical trends in the input data and it is the (differential) relationship between the weights, and the network's structure (connectivity, bias functions and structure) that is of importance, not the absolute values of the weights themselves. So we can see from simple computer models that internal state (analogous to a subjective perception of color) is not the relevant variable, it is only meaningful relative to an architecture: subjectivity is irrelevant.