Was Hitler objectively bad?

[The Skeptic]

I believe that he was. Since his actions caused a lot of suffering and death, which interferes with human flourishing, that's objectively malevolent. The fact is that the things he did were malevolent. Granted, the value judgement upon that fact might differ, I suppose you could say it is relative, but for me, if it's malevolent, it's malevolent.

[theVOID]

Clearly your premises are true, so I think the question is why it should be called morality, unless it is prescriptive in some way. If you are saying that we should act to fulfill the most desires, then that I would call morality. But, as mentioned, it cannot derive an ought from an is, as you admit, which is the meta-ethical difficulty I was referring to. So I don't see how it's any different from various forms of utilitarianism, specifically preference utilitarianism.

I don't think the is ought gap exists under all circumstances, the main problem with most utilirarianism is that the reasons for action come later, in Desirism they come first, because desires are our only oughts we have. Oughts are reasons for action, and the only reasons for action that exist are to fulfil the strongest desire of our conflicting desires.

[theVOID]

A prescription is dependent on IF and OUGHT.

??? What the fuck's the difference between prescribing and saying something 'ought' to be? At least in one's opinion?

Yes a prescription is dependent on an if, and so is an ought. But what's the fucking difference between the two?

There is none. I keep making this distinction because every time you ask why I 'ought', I give you an 'if', and each time you say something nonsense like "that's not objectively prescribing it's self".

Can you name me something that objectively prescribes it's self?

Who the fuck says you ought to simply because desirism says so? Until desirism can validate itself people can just tell it to go fuck itself.

For fuck's sake, there is nothing you ought to do because "Desirism says so", There only exists what you ought to do provided you value a specific state of affairs, and it's not the goal of desirism or anything else to tell you what you 'ought' to do for the sake of it (because 'for the sake of it' doesn't exist), what it tells you is what desires are good or bad based on their ability to fulfil or thwart other desires.

The argument is why we should give desirism the existing moral language.

Desirism has a valid (and fucking trivially so!) coherence. Valid in itself only though, and fucking trival it indeed is - because it can't show itself to be right. I've been through this fucking multiple times.

It can't show it's self to be right in what aspect?

Morality already has a definition! What is moral is what 'ought to be'.

That isn't the definition of morality at all, It's "conformity to the rules of right conduct; moral or virtuous conduct." Or essentially "A standard by which we judge action".

There is nothing there about what you ought to do, that comes based on what set of rules best reflect the various moral criteria, the use of moral language, moral intuition etc. That is what the only valid debate here is, whether or not Desirism best describes moral phenomenon, if that is the case then it is tentatively true that Desirism is the best theory for dealing with moral propositions.

If you're redefining morality to mean 'moral within the realm of desirism' then you're still not getting and fucking objectively morality! You're merely redefining 'morality' to suit your precious fucking desirism.

1) I'm not doing that at all, I am arguing that when you take all of the features of moral phenomenon, as currently defined, they are best described by Desirism, just like the features of evolutionary phenomenon are best described by 'the theory of evolution by means of natural selection'. Does natural selection 'Objectively prescribe it's self'?

2) 'Objective morality' simply requires that the moral propositions are objectively true or false. Divine attitude theory is false (god does not exist), and doesn't "objectively prescribe it's self" (whatever the fuck that actually means) but it still makes Objective moral claims; "If you desire not to burn in hell forever, you ought to act in a way consistent with the nature of God" Where what is consistent with God is objectively true or false. That is ALL ANYONE MEANS by "objective morality".

My fucking point is that desirism can't show what's objectively moral really, it can't show what 'ought to be' objectively, it can only show what ought to be within its own logic. How can any fucking moral system say that it is objectively right? It can't! And redefining morality completely is just fucking cheating and not actually getting to objective morality.

No moral system even attempts to show it's 'objectively right', all moral theories, like all theories period are tentatively true. If Desirism best describes moral phenomenon then using desirism as a moral framework makes the best and most perfect sense. If you want something more than that then you are out of luck, but you have to disregard every tentative truth out there, because none of them can show that they are 'objectively right" by definition.

You can't objectively show that what's moral is what desirism says is moral O - fucking - K? You can't magically transcend the meta-ethical issue by redefining morality to mean what you want it to mean... morality already has a definition and you can't prove any moral theory to objectively be better than any other.

I didn't redefine morality, I argue that desirism best describes all moral phenomenon and is thus tentatively true. You can't show that phyletic gradualism is "objectively better" than punctuated equilibrium in any sense other than you can say that Phyletic gradualism best describes the known phenomenon.

It's only by our moral intuitions that we can fucking say 'X is right' or "Y is wrong" at all, all prescribing is entirely subjective.

Not true, we can also make that distinction based on relationships, provided we can find positive and negative relationships between variables. In that instance our intuitions may be practically of use, but they can be objectively right or wrong based on the relationship in question.

Something beging objectively moral within a certain moral framework doesn't prove, and is no closer to proving, that X or Y is objectively moral or immoral whatsoever. Prescriptive within a certain moral framework is merely descriptive in the world we actually fucking live in.

Unless the framework in question is the best description of known phenomenon, then we have a tentative conclusion and thus you are fully justified in using said framework.

That proves nothing. Morality is a matter of subjective and relative opinion and there is no evidence of any objective morality outside of any entirely unproven moral framework that can't be objectively fucking substantiated is exactly where we still stand on the very valid meta-ethical issue. You can't say that any moral framework is objective because it can't use it's own logic to validate itself as being any 'better' then any other moral system.... you have to start with meta-ethics IF you actually want a fucking objective morality. And it seems impossible to me, indeed.

Reooow! Enjoy your hissy fit.

I've already pointed out that theories are tentative. It's not called "meta ethical proof" for a reason.

Science is an entirely descriptive issue. We wouldn't fucking say that we could objectively evice that scientists SHOULD research X, SHOULD experiment on Y. That would be prescribing and would be subjective and relative.

Of course not, we have no IF in your example. It's the same fundamentally flawed objection you bring up time and time again, the necessity for intrinsic value. If scientists want to know about X they ought to do what they believe will best lead to knowledge about x.

Science is completely fucking different to moral frameworks because moral frameworks are supposed to be prescriptive!! They can't objectively validate themseleves anymore than science can objectively say it should or shouldn't treat people like guinea pigs (And no, it can't.... that's a moral issue and a matter of opinion).

The only valid prescriptions that exist ARE descriptions of a relationship, they ARE NOT mutually exclusive. Name me one valid prescription that is not an accurate description of a relationship between a set of desires and a state of affairs.

Morality is entirely a matter of opinion because what we ought to do is entirely a matter of opinion.

And what we ought to do is a relationship between what we desire and what actions will get us to a state of affairs in which the desire is true.

Because outside of any moral framework what ought to be obviously can't be proven. And moral frameworks themselves can't be proven and the logic within them is fucking tautological to their owns reasoning (at best that is - at best it is merely coherent! Not objective in the real world).

I know all of this, It's simply not relevant. Theories are tentative, the best theory is the one that best describes the phenomenon in question.

Desirism it's self is true in that it is objectively true or false that certain desires tend to promote more and other desires than they thwart and vice verse,

So what that's descriptive and not actually a matter of moralitiy.

It's Descriptive in it describes a relationship between a set of desires and a state of affairs
It's Prescriptive in that it prescribes the action that tends towards said state of affairs.

and since desires are the only reasons for action that exist all action that we take is contingent upon the relationship between our desires and the state of affairs,

Still descriptive

Prescriptions are reasons for action, desires are the only reasons for action that exist. If you want to tell someone you ought to do x, you are saying they ought to have the desires give you reason for action to do x.

If you want a world that supports desirism them you will value it and say desirism ought to be subscribed to, yes. That's still descriptive!!! "People who desire desirism ought to support it within its own logic".... you have not bridged any 'Is' 'ought' gap.

I've covered this in the latest post.

Desirism is merely being descriptive though so fuck it. It's prescirptive within itself but then that means you should only listen to it if you already agree with it!

Right, and you should (prescription) only try to learn about life using techniques arrived at by the theory of evolution by means of natural selection if you already believe it's true. So what? It's got nothing to do with the reasons why we believe The theory of natural selection is accurate.

It once again comes down to tentative truths.

Desirism is entirely descriptive when it is correct. When it gets prescriptive and says anyone ought to desire X or ought not to desire Y it is completely fucking unsupported!

I've covered Prescription and Description and given you a challenge already.

I'm tired of repeating myself right now. Especially when I have trouble fucking explaining myself it seems

Cognitive dissonance.

Once we clear up why Desirism is tentatively true and how it IS prescriptive (And my challenge should solve that) you should come around

[Edwardo Piet]

There is none. I keep making this distinction because every time you ask why I 'ought', I give you an 'if', and each time you say something nonsense like "that's not objectively prescribing it's self".

Can you name me something that objectively prescribes it's self?

I meant that it can't prove that it objectively should be followed. It's objectively descriptive but not objectively prescriptive.

'Objective morality' simply requires that the moral propositions are objectively true or false.

So yes Desirism is objective in the sense its descriptive propositions are true.

Of course not, we have no IF in your example. It's the same fundamentally flawed objection you bring up time and time again, the necessity for intrinsic value. If scientists want to know about X they ought to do what they believe will best lead to knowledge about x.

And so science is based around objective ideas about nature and the universe and whatnot so in that sense it's objective. But it still can't objectively prove itself as true without tautology because there are only tentative truths like you say, so in that sense it's not objective.

The difference is science is descriptive only. It doesn't attempt to bridge the 'is' 'ought' gap.
It is true that if you can't value 'X' then it makes no sense to say you should value it. But if you can value 'X' there is nothing to say you 'ought to' value it.

And what we ought to do is a relationship between what we desire and what actions will get us to a state of affairs in which the desire is true.

You can't prove that, you can only assume it. The fact that we can desire 'X' doesn't objectively mean we should fulfil that desire even if it's to the fulfilment to all desires of everyone.. That's just your own judgement that 'better for everyone' is better, that goes past describing and into prescribing. You haven't bridged the 'is' 'ought' gap.

It's Descriptive in it describes a relationship between a set of desires and a state of affairs

Yes it objectively does that.

It's Prescriptive in that it prescribes the action that tends towards said state of affairs.

No it doesn't do that objectively.

Prescriptions are reasons for action,

No, prescriptions say we "should" act whether that's true or false (and I don't see how that can be objectively true or false at all). 'Reasons for action' (desires) merely say why we already act not that we should act, they are descriptions only.

desires are the only reasons for action that exist. If you want to tell someone you ought to do x, you are saying they ought to have the desires give you reason for action to do x.

You are describing the obvious fact that it makes no sense to tell someone that they 'ought' to do 'X' if they can't, and they can't if they don't have the reasons for action (desires) to do so. But you still don't objectively show whatsoever that they ought to do anything at all. You haven't bridged the 'is' 'ought' gap. You don't objectively prescribe at all you just objectively describe and then sneak the subjective prescription in.

[Zen Badger]

I believe that he was. Since his actions caused a lot of suffering and death, which interferes with human flourishing, that's objectively malevolent. The fact is that the things he did were malevolent. Granted, the value judgement upon that fact might differ, I suppose you could say it is relative, but for me, if it's malevolent, it's malevolent.

And that is your subjective view(which I agree with BTW).

And the actions of a person can only ever be judged morally by other people, in other words their actions are viewed, and can only ever be viewed subjectively.

The only objective view can be taken by the universe at large and it doesn't care.

[theVOID]

There is none. I keep making this distinction because every time you ask why I 'ought', I give you an 'if', and each time you say something nonsense like "that's not objectively prescribing it's self".

Can you name me something that objectively prescribes it's self?

I meant that it can't prove that it objectively should be followed. It's objectively descriptive but not objectively prescriptive.

Nothing at all can "objectively prescribe" it's self. That's assuming you're using the term like Makcey, which half the time you don't seem to be. Mackey considered "objective prescriptivity" to be the mechanism by which the intrinsic value theories of moral realism state their reason for action (like Bentham's pleasure utilitarianism), he does not consider it a necessity for a theory of moral realism, nor does it exist in his own moral realism. It's a completely arbitrary objection.

And any prescription is necessarily a relationship between a set of desires and a state of affairs, if you desire that P you ought to do x (where x is the action that tends to do bring about a state of affairs). Any prescription when drawn out ends up with a desire and a goal.

"If you want to get healthy, you ought to take this medicine." The desire is to be healthy, the validity of the prescription is objectively true for false in terms of it's ability to bring about the state of affairs in which "I am health" is true.

It is objectively true of false whether or not a prescription is valid (tends to being about a state of affairs in which that P). That is an objective prescription, it's the only kind of prescription that exists. A prescription is a reason for action, to say that you should do x is the same as saying you have a reason for action to make or keep x true. Desires are the only reasons for action that exist. You will not intentionally act unless you desire the thing you are acting towards.

Anyway, that's not the issue, WE have to value accurate descriptions of reality, you could demonstrate that a methodology is the best descriptor of a set of phenomenon and that still would not make that methodology "objectively prescriptive". I argue that desirism is the most accurate description of moral phenomenon, thus is the best framework for approaching moral claims.

I may have even come up with a proof, rather than the tentative truth, but that will be for another thread once I have properly examined the formal argument.

'Objective morality' simply requires that the moral propositions are objectively true or false.

So yes Desirism is objective in the sense its descriptive propositions are true.

And prescriptive. A moral prescription is one form of moral proposition, these too are objectively true or false.

Of course not, we have no IF in your example. It's the same fundamentally flawed objection you bring up time and time again, the necessity for intrinsic value. If scientists want to know about X they ought to do what they believe will best lead to knowledge about x.

And so science is based around objective ideas about nature and the universe and whatnot so in that sense it's objective. But it still can't objectively prove itself as true without tautology because there are only tentative truths like you say, so in that sense it's not objective.

That's not what objective means, it means "not grounded in the opinion of persons". In that sense all relational measurements in science, both the descriptions of relationships and the prescriptions dealing with what actions and methods tend to lead to certain results, are both objectively true or false.

The difference is science is descriptive only. It doesn't attempt to bridge the 'is' 'ought' gap.
It is true that if you can't value 'X' then it makes no sense to say you should value it. But if you can value 'X' there is nothing to say you 'ought to' value it.

Right, but you can prescribe actions relative to desired results. Just like in desirism you can prescribe action relative to your desires and a state of affairs in which the desires are true. These statements can be both descriptive and prescriptive at the same time.

And what we ought to do is a relationship between what we desire and what actions will get us to a state of affairs in which the desire is true.

You can't prove that, you can only assume it. The fact that we can desire 'X' doesn't objectively mean we should fulfil that desire even if it's to the fulfilment to all desires of everyone.. That's just your own judgement that 'better for everyone' is better, that goes past describing and into prescribing. You haven't bridged the 'is' 'ought' gap.

No, I can prove it. To say that you should do x is to say there is a reason for action for you to do x. Desires are the only reasons for action that exist, thus all real prescriptions are necessarily descriptions of what desires tend to lead to a state of affairs in which that P. These statements are both descriptive and prescriptive at the same time. There are no other logically valid forms of prescriptions, including Mackey's "Objective prescriptivity". To complain that Desirism doesn't account for prescriptions that don't exist is a completely invalid objection.

Anything of value also only exists as a relationship between desires and a state of affairs. If I value equality I desire a state of affairs in which the statement "Everyone is equal" is true. We will only ever act in a way that fulfils the strongest of our competing desires, and anything that fulfils the desire in question has a positive value in the 'good for me' or 'good for you' (common good) sense.

Another example. To say "I value this hammer" is the same as saying "I desire a state of affairs in which that P is true, and this hammer has instrumental value in making That P"

You can do this for any values.

All values are either 'good for me', 'good for you' or 'good for us'. Moral value is a subset of a theory of value that deals exclusively with 'good for us'. Our moral judgements are a standard by which we judge action, an action that brings about state of affairs in which more and stronger desires are fulfilled than thwarted (which is the same as saying has a general increase in value) is 'good for us' good. Thus, we can morally judge action based on it's tendency to promote or thwart other desires.

Therefore, A morally good desire is one that when applied generally to the community is one that tends to promote more and stronger desires than it thwarts. The desire to rape is a desire that if it existed generally in the community would thwart more and stronger desires than it promotes, thus we who have an aversion to having our desires thwarted have a reason for action why we ought to condemn the desire to rape. You can assess desires subjectively ('good for me') or objectively ('good for us').

The rest of this seems to be the same objection, so i'll just wait for your response to the above.