[split] Theistic VS Naturalistic morality

[fr0d0]

That's bullshit fr0d0, my morality is not based on injustice at all

Yes your morality is based on injustice, because you accept that justice rarely happens. Of course your morality on the micro level has a solely positive purpose, there is, on the macro level, a huge limitation to that positivity, that would prevent your morality from being effective, and the point of the premise here, is that macro morality (as you seem confused about how to apply it) is only based on justice, and without the supernatural justice enforcer is illogical.

Life is unfair, so what? This is a reality that needs to be accounted for. There is nothing admirable about ignoring it or passing it off to some imaginary entity.

No one is passing off responsibility, that's a red herring. The only reason posthumous justice could be required is if one accepts it as fact. Under or over addressing justice in the now would be equally wrong. This is supplementary to the topic in hand, and something which I hope we'd both agree upon.

Prove to me how morality and justice aren't connected.

Easy. It is immoral to rape a child even if justice will never be done. What does justice add to it? Absolutely nothing. We would all like justice to be done in all circumstances, but that simply isn't the case. We have our ideals of justice and use this justice and the punishment it will bring as a deterrent, but justice being done is not necessary for a decision to be considered moral or immoral.

If we accept that our ideals will never be met, then what informs our morality is that injustice. Our conclusions have to be based on the reality of that shortfall. When our conclusions are based on perfect morality, then we are motivated to realise that moral standard.

"Moral behaviour, Kant is adamant, is rational behaviour; we have good reason to be moral. This is a fundamental principle of morality: if you ought to do something then you have a reason to do it. It makes no sense to say “I see that I ought to give money to charity, but I have no reason to.” If we ought to do something then that is a reason to do it. What is more, a moral reason is always a stronger reason for doing something than any other reason. If we have a moral reason to do a thing, and another reason not to do it, then rationally speaking we ought to do it. Moral behaviour is always rational."

I agree with that part entirely, what I disagree with is the idea that morality can only be rational if justice is done. Morality is a standard by which action is assessed, an action is deemed to be moral or immoral based on a moral theory. If morality is divine command then whatever god commands is whatever morality is, if morality is the relationship between desires and a state of affairs then morality is the assessment of action based on this standard. Justice is desired in both but only absolute in the former.

You always come back to this "command", which externalises God. To you that may be the case, but for Christians God inspires to love and never forces it.

Morality is made perfect factoring in the posthumous supernatural judge. Take away that and morality is flawed because it isn't always the rationally correct solution. I think you're stumbling with the definition of morality Kant is using.

Morality is NOT contingent upon justice. Justice is DESIRED not REQUIRED.

If justice isn't given then morality isn't rational.

You fear the judgement of one more entity than i do, that doesn't in any way change the content of moral decisions. I may conclude differently than you upon certain issues, though i don't know of anything that you would consider immoral that i would not (except for blasphemy perhaps), and vice verse, but in any other case our moral conclusions remain the same.

Your moral conclusions are dogged by injustice. How do you cope with the fact that justice isn't done? ...You accept the realism of life being unjust.. that's how. Therefore your moral conclusions are different. They're jaded. Mine are not jaded, because I believe justice is being done. My morality is based on a firm understanding where yours is baseless. How can the two be similar?

You may think that rape is wrong because God would condemn it, or because it's not in his nature where i consider it wrong because it thwarts more and stronger desires than it promotes, but the conclusion is the same.

That's a flippant comment. Again you raise God as an external enforcer rather than a loving inspirer. What we would be saying by God condemning it would be that in true justice... it's wrong. We see that injustice, but we can't easily affect justice. With our limited knowledge we can try to correct the balance, but in actual fact, we don't know where that balance lies. We're inspired by our ideals of justice, and try to enact them. Factoring in God is the same thing, except we believe he is the ultimate judge. This takes away none of our responsibility to be just.

For me, divinely inspired morality actually is rational and quite superior to naturalistic morality. The whole thrust of my faith is for a reason which is superior to the reasoning without it. That's why I do it. It makes sense. In the real world, here, now, my actual moral system is the best it can be.

You have yet to demonstrate that you are more moral in practice. Kant would slap you in the face for the assertion, it was something he was very explicit about. His objection was not at all to the moral standards of the non-believer, but the idea that these moral standards could arise without the divine. Yet we have non-theistic objective morality that is fully consistent with our moral feelings and conclusions none the less. God is not required to establish the truth of moral propositions.

I would hope Kant would slap me in the face should I ever state such a thing. I don't have to demonstrate that I am more moral, that has nothing to do with it. The inclusion of a posthumously supernatural judge just makes me ABLE to be rationally moral, where the lack of the same makes you unable to.

God (or same) is not required to establish the truth of moral propositions, he is required to make them happen.

[theVOID]

That's bullshit fr0d0, my morality is not based on injustice at all

Yes your morality is based on injustice, because you accept that justice rarely happens. Of course your morality on the micro level has a solely positive purpose, there is, on the macro level, a huge limitation to that positivity, that would prevent your morality from being effective, and the point of the premise here, is that macro morality (as you seem confused about how to apply it) is only based on justice, and without the supernatural justice enforcer is illogical.

Do you even understand what morality is? It surely doesn't seem like it based on that utter nonsense.

And what do you mean by 'micro-level' and 'macro-level' morality? You're making up terms that don't exist in ethics, which isn't in it's self problematic, but you haven't defined and distinguished between the two. Are you talking about objective vs absolute morality?

Morality is a standard by which we judge action. We use the threat of justice as a deterrent for actions that are morally wrong and praise for actions that are morally right. The idea behind praise and condemnation is to instill moral ideas in ourselves and each other in order to remove or lessen the desire to commit wrong actions, thus there is no contingency upon justice being done because the threat of justice alone is sufficient in shaping behavior.

You can suppose all you like that there is an ultimate justice, and while it would be nice to think that every immoral action will be accounted for, it remains both wishful thinking and irrespective of all known effects of moral conditioning.

You need to read more of Kant's thoughts on morality, because you are making claims about applied morals that he never did, nor did he ever use 'macro' and 'micro' morality (whatever that means). I don't know of any ethicist who makes that distinction and that certainly wasn't what Kant was attempting to prove, he was trying to demonstrate that moral standards (the standards by which we judge action) are dependent on their being a God who balances all moral and immoral decisions. Kant has been long refuted on his false premise that morality is contingent upon justice (no surprise there, the argument is about 250 years old!)

No one is passing off responsibility, that's a red herring. The only reason posthumous justice could be required is if one accepts it as fact. Under or over addressing justice in the now would be equally wrong. This is supplementary to the topic in hand, and something which I hope we'd both agree upon.

I disagree, you want justice for all immoral action but there is none that can be demonstrated, so you pass responsibility for your 'ultimate justice' off to the deity. While it may satisfy you emotionally to hold those beliefs there remains no necessity for them.

I already agreed that in either model we have reason to bring justice, in your case it is to prevent further injustice, in mine it is both to prevent injustice and to satisfy the idea of justice it's self (to build the strength of the deterrent).

If we accept that our ideals will never be met, then what informs our morality is that injustice. Our conclusions have to be based on the reality of that shortfall. When our conclusions are based on perfect morality, then we are motivated to realise that moral standard.

We accept that justice may never be issued in all circumstances, that does not make morality based on 'injustice' in any way, it simply means that justice, while not being absolute, is still an effective deterrent against immoral behavior. Like I've said already, determining an action to be moral or immoral is not contingent upon justice being done.

You cannot in any way demonstrate that your belief in absolute justice makes your applied morality superior to those who do not believe in said justice (refer to Kant on this since you seem to base everything else on the argument from justice).

If we can both have 'real morality' that is indistinguishable from each other's while only one of us believes in ultimate justice, it clearly shows that belief in ultimate justice does nil in the way of determining right and wrong, nor does it affect our motivations for action. If we can establish a reason why we ought to act (categorically obligatory), and our competing moral theories provide entirely equal oughts (with the exception of blasphemy), then it can be demonstrated that ultimate justice is not a contingent factor in the establishment of moral standards.

Again, morality is a standard by which actions are judged, not the act of bringing justice to all action.

You always come back to this "command", which externalises God. To you that may be the case, but for Christians God inspires to love and never forces it.

It was an example of one of the two main theistic moral theories, I also referenced Divine attitude theory, you probably conform to that moral theory. Either way it does not change the point, ultimate justice simply has no impact on moral standards.

Morality is made perfect factoring in the posthumous supernatural judge. Take away that and morality is flawed because it isn't always the rationally correct solution. I think you're stumbling with the definition of morality Kant is using.

The deliverance of justice is made perfect by a just deity, the moral content does not change and you have failed to demonstrate how it does. Something does not become more or less moral because justice is now absolute. Rape is wrong whether justice is done or not, because it thwarts more and stronger desires than it promotes. Thus what I deem to be moral (under the framework of desire utilitarianism) is not contingent upon justice.

Kant was arguing that objective morality is dependent on ultimate justice, this is plain wrong. I have more than made it clear already, there are naturalistic moral frameworks that deliver equal ought statements without necessitating justice be done.

Perhaps you should stop using 250 year old moral arguments and catch up with the massive amount of progress that has been made in meta-ethics.

If justice isn't given then morality isn't rational.

From this point on it seems i will be repeating myself over and over... Hopefully by now you have understood that one's determination of what is morally permissible, obligatory and forbidden can be reached without the need for ultimate justice. I can achieve objective moral oughts without such an idea, and thus your assertion that i cannot is completely misguided. The event of justice does not change the moral standards in my framework.

You might be right in saying that the absence of ultimate justice in theistic moral theories renders morality inert, but I don't defend theistic morality, so you're shooting at a non-existent target.

Your moral conclusions are dogged by injustice.

My moral conclusions do not depend on justice. Moral decisions are the decisions that a moral person would make, and a moral person will always act in a way that tends to promote more and stronger desires than they thwart.

Justice achieves two things in this model: 1) A deterrent that we can use to impact ones consideration prior to action 2) Satisfaction for those affected by immoral action.

If that is the standard by which i arrive at moral oughts then there is clearly no necessity for justice under my moral framework. You seem to be stuck with a strawman stemming from your misguided understanding of what morality is.

How do you cope with the fact that justice isn't done? ...You accept the realism of life being unjust.. that's how. Therefore your moral conclusions are different.

How do i feel? Saddened, who wouldn't?. I would love it if every rapist was punished for their actions, but do I have any reason to believe that ultimate justice exists? No. Therefore i conclude that it does not. Luckily (and as i have demonstrated) morality can exist independent of ultimate justice.

I am more concerned with reality as it is known to be, not supposing the existence of factors that cannot be indicated or necessitated in order to make a model work. As always, if you can demonstrate or necessitate ultimate justice then I would change my mind, but you haven't done either so i have no reason to accept your moral theory (and thus your deity),

Also, Name one moral conclusion (unrelated to the vanity of your deity) that you would arrive at that I would not. I can tell you now that if it exists it will be trivial and very much debatable (like premarital sex).

Once you realise that you cannot you would have demonstrated what Kant was quick to point out, moral content is independent of belief in ultimate justice, as are the oughts that one concludes upon from various moral theories. Again, Kant argued for justice as being a necessary component for the existence of morality, this is no longer believed to be the case by the vast majority of (if not all) meta-ethicists, including theistic ones.

They're jaded. Mine are not jaded, because I believe justice is being done. My morality is based on a firm understanding where yours is baseless. How can the two be similar?

We attribute the origin of objective moral standards to different things, yours to a deity and thus ultimate justice may be necessary, however i do not require either a deity or ultimate justice for my moral standards.

Also, my morality does not depend on the non-demonstrated, thus is is epistemologically superior.

That's a flippant comment. Again you raise God as an external enforcer rather than a loving inspirer.

It was simply an example of one common theistic moral theory, i was not arguing against your position. Either theistic moral theory can be used to demonstrate my point. If i was specifically addressing you i would have used Divine attitude theory (which i assume is the theory you hold to? that being: "moral truths are grounded in the attitudes (or nature) of the deity").

What we would be saying by God condemning it would be that in true justice... it's wrong. We see that injustice, but we can't easily affect justice. With our limited knowledge we can try to correct the balance, but in actual fact, we don't know where that balance lies.

I would argue that we can know where the balance lies (due to the conclusions of desire utilitarianism) but we may not be able to enforce this balance.

We're inspired by our ideals of justice, and try to enact them. Factoring in God is the same thing, except we believe he is the ultimate judge. This takes away none of our responsibility to be just.

I am not inspired by justice, because as i have pointed out justice is a deterrent and a satisfaction, and my moral oughts come from neither.

And i never said it takes away our responsibility to be just, under no model is that the case. However the nature of justice does slightly change from naturalistic to theistic morality. Justice for you is at the most a way of preventing further injustice and satisfaction for the people affected by immorality. Under naturalistic models it is both a deterrent, a satisfaction and a necessity in all instances where enforcement is available, as it is the enforcement of justice in some cases that makes it a deterrent.

I would hope Kant would slap me in the face should I ever state such a thing. I don't have to demonstrate that I am more moral, that has nothing to do with it. The inclusion of a posthumously supernatural judge just makes me ABLE to be rationally moral, where the lack of the same makes you unable to.

I hope by now i have made it clear that justice is not required for morality in all moral theories, i am able to be moral based on standards that are not contingent upon ultimate justice being done (morality is always rational so I don't see what your conflation was for).

God (or same) is not required to establish the truth of moral propositions, he is required to make them happen.

I think this sentence alone shows your misunderstanding better than any, morality does not 'happen' it is a standard by which things are judged. The debate in ethics between theists and naturalists is in the establishment of these standards. If you want to argue about our ability to establish true moral propositions then that is a completely different debate.

You admit that we can establish the truth of moral propositions without God, and since all moral propositions are true (obligatory or forbidden) they ought or ought not to be done, therefore we can have oughts without god and without ultimate justice. If that is the case (which it is) then as Kant said "if you ought to do something then you have a reason to do it".

Thus, again, we have reasons to be moral without the existence of either a deity of ultimate justice.

[fr0d0]

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[theVOID]

Do you even understand what morality is? It surely doesn't seem like it based on that utter nonsense.

I'm trying to explain what I mean to you, not classically define morals. You're being pedantic. And taking an aggressive attitude. Hardly conducive to learning.

I know what you mean, and to mean what you do makes you wrong. That's what i was trying to explain. You are wrong about morality being contingent upon justice.

And if your not using the standard definitions of morals then can you define exactly what you mean and it it's too different use another word.

No, I'm talking about the difference between a standard based on a narrow view of a subject and a complete view of a subject.

Standard and narrow in what way?

You need to be very specific if you are going to pull terms into the fray out of your own conception.

Basing your standard upon global rather than individual standards has to be better.

Agreed. Not just global though, this applies to all 'agents' or 'persons' that are relevant in the situation.

Justice has no influence on individuality because it can't. Therefore Kant is right. Looking at it globally, a rational morality founded on justice meted out makes for a different conclusion on what is moral (notice I'm not changing the meaning of moral. It means the same). If you cannot justify a moral action then how is it moral to you? If you can justify a moral action because you assume a posthumous judge, then you will arrive at a different moral conclusion.

You have bizarrely conflated 'Just' and 'Justice', it's as if you walked away from a philosophy text book with some massive flaws in your understanding.

Firstly, How can justice (the idea of) not have an impact on an individual? The known consequences if we are found guiltily of our actions, to an extent, informs one's decision making and their perception of morally right and morally wrong. If one is to be consistently condemned for immoral actions, praised for good actions and given examples of actions that will result in a just punishment then you can substantially change this persons sense of moral right and wrong, and you can affect their desires to perform actions that are morally right and morally wrong.

Secondly, I have no problem in 'justifying' morality (i'm using the word as it actually means now). A moral action in my meta-ethical framework, is an action that tends to promote more and greater desires than it thwarts.

Thirdly, i challenged you latter on in my prior post to name a moral conclusion that you can reach that i cannot, so i'll leave it till then.

You can suppose all you like that there is an ultimate justice, and while it would be nice to think that every immoral action will be accounted for, it remains both wishful thinking and irrespective of all known effects of moral conditioning.

It isn't irrespective though is it? It's proven here to be true. A moral decisions considering justice being rationally supported is different to a moral decision which accepts injustice. What Kant is saying is that a moral decision is as good as worthless without rational assent.

And as i have said numerous times now, I don't accept Kant's premise that rational morality is contingent upon justice. I have a moral framework that does not depend on justice to arrive at moral conclusions, nor does it require justice to justify acting morally. Desire utilitarianism is descriptive and prescriptive at the same time (there is no is/ought gap) because the things that a moral person would to are the things that should be done. You can't, as Kant said, have an ought to act without reason.

If i can establish an ought (which i have) then i simply do not need ultimate justice as a motivation to do moral things.

No one has suggested the responsibility is lifted from us except you in this fabrication of your own making. Please address the subject rather than your own fantasies if you'd like to honestly discuss this.

Can you or any other human or group of bring 'ultimate justice'? If not then it is perfectly true that you want ultimate justice but can't achieve it, therefore it is (correctly put) "Passed of to a deity". This is a trivially true statement based on the very conditions that you stated, those being that 1)humans can't bring ultimate justice 2) you want ultimate justice and 3) God can provide ultimate justice. So i don't see what your objection could be other than a misunderstanding.

I think it's more that the increased rational potential of my model means that I can adopt your model and add mine on top.

God is superfluous in Desire Utilitarianism, so you can adopt both if you like, but all you would have achieved is sticking god into a theory that doesn't require him. You've essentially made God a desire utilitarian Cop, after all, his nature would be one that promotes more desires than it thwarts, and the immoral decision is to do the opposite (both because it's against Desirism and God's nature), so everything moral is the same and we (and god's nature) have the same reasons for acting (or being in his case) moral. Because God is rational and moral yet not subject to justice, this again demonstrates that Justice is an extra and one can be fully compliant and rational in terms of a desire utilitarian morality without being subject to justice.

Also, you have not demonstrated that it is more rational to act in a system where there is ultimate justice. It is morally wrong to act when the desires thwarted are more and stronger than the desires promoted. If it is moral it is rational (Kant, again) and this is without morally wrong needing to be defined as "an act against the nature of a divine being that will be punished for being committed".

So again, justice just simply does not factor (as moral oughts are already rational). It certainly is extra, not rationally, but motivationally, because not morality coincides with self interest.

Well Kant's model is the subject here. No it doesn't make the application superior just the potential.

The potential to be good or rational? Something is either rational or not, moral oughts are already rational, therefore you can't become more rational than you are already are by being moral. The justice simply doesn't inform moral decisions, it only comes in later as an implication of being moral. Either way, if it provides no more reason for being moral then the only reason you have is because you want ultimate justice, and without a way to demonstrate or necessitate it, it's just plain wishful thinking.

Our moral conclusions are different, and that influences our actions.

Can you demonstrate that we come to different 'serious' conclusions? Not the conclusions that involve harm only being done to your God's feelings... As you know i couldn't care less for the feelings of a being that I do not believe exists.

Agreed. Morality is affected by the reasoning for it. The effect is what we're talking about here, not the concept of morality.

You already conceded that there is no difference in moral content or action that can be demonstrated, and now you admit that morality can be rational (the establishment of moral oughts) without ultimate (or any) justice. So what is the effect of moral action that you are talking about? If it involves offending your god then i don't give a shit honestly, i don't think he exists, but beyond that i can't think of any moral difference that isn't completely trivial and necessarily informed by some of God's preferences, and since i believe God's preferences exist you would be the one who has a moral theory in error (and that also means that neither you or the God are desire utilitarians, so you can't possibly adopt it plus extra).

That it's logical for me and illogical for you makes the moral answer different. Justice in the only factor in the two different answers.

You haven't in any way shown that it's illogical to act morally without justice. I have provided you with my model, shown that it can present ought statements about moral actions and shown that it does not in any way depend on justice, nor do any of it's conclusions.

For the last time. I reject the premise that justice is necessary for morality to be rational. If you have an argument that shows why my model requires justice then present it, but if not then you are arguing a strawman. You're idea of ultimate justice is wishful thinking, that's not something that comes close to satisfying my epistemic standard.

Well it becomes either rational or irrational... I don't see how you can agree on a moral standard that you think is irrational.

It's not irrational at all, you have not shown why cant's argument that rational morality is contingent upon ultimate justice is true and i have presented a moral theory that completely refutes that conclusion for the following reasons:

1) If something ought to be done then we have reason to do it
2) Because morality is rational and I have achieved moral oughts I therefore have a rational reason to act.
3) If i already had a rational reason to act irrespective of justice, then justice necessarily has no impact on the rationality of my moral decisions.

I would agree that rape is immoral. A moral framework that rationalised a chance of injustice would cause the rapist to consider if rape was really worth it. The odds are better for the rapist without the posthumous judge, therefore his moral 'standards' can be lower. It works the other way for praiseworthy acts too.

*Facepalm*

The rapist already thinks rape is worth it, irrespective of whether they acknowledge right and wrong. That is evinced by the rape it's self. Let me remind you that there are plenty of Christian rapists (proportionally more than non-religious) that have raped people, especially children. If ultimate justice were really as an effective deterrent as you think then the number of theistic rapists should be lower than those of a non-believer in ultimate justice.

You are making the very argument that you have said multiple times already was bullshit, the same argument that Kant himself shot down time and time again, you even said you'd hoped Kant would slap you in the face for making it! There is no correlation between the belief in ultimate justice and one's reasons for being moral, nor their ability to be moral. You have said before you agreed with Kant and now you have completely contradicted yourself!

You have a long way to go in hashing out this argument mate.

I didn't say morality 'happens' I said moral 'propositions happen'.

Which is also false... Moral propositions are phrased like "It is wrong to rape" and "it is good to give to charity". These are not things that can happen.

[fr0d0]

I would agree that rape is immoral. A moral framework that rationalised a chance of injustice would cause the rapist to consider if rape was really worth it. The odds are better for the rapist without the posthumous judge, therefore his moral 'standards' can be lower. It works the other way for praiseworthy acts too.

*Facepalm*

The rapist already thinks rape is worth it, irrespective of whether they acknowledge right and wrong. That is evinced by the rape it's self. Let me remind you that there are plenty of Christian rapists (proportionally more than non-religious) that have raped people, especially children. If ultimate justice were really as an effective deterrent as you think then the number of theistic rapists should be lower than those of a non-believer in ultimate justice.

You are making the very argument that you have said multiple times already was bullshit, the same argument that Kant himself shot down time and time again, you even said you'd hoped Kant would slap you in the face for making it! There is no correlation between the belief in ultimate justice and one's reasons for being moral, nor their ability to be moral. You have said before you agreed with Kant and now you have completely contradicted yourself!

You have a long way to go in hashing out this argument mate.

Let me just address this bit for now, as I don't have much time and the rest seems to be a repetition of what's already been said as I've skimmed over it.

Potentially we're all rapists, and at given any moment we could choose to break the law. What informs our choice is our rationalisation of the outcome. Now without PJ (posthumous judge) our rational outcome is different. "Christians that rape" are people going against their claimed rational framework and adopting a view that justice won't be served. They're adopting a world view sans God. This illustrates the point here... that our world view is what informs our choices. To act morally is to rationally justify what all humans regard as moral. Those without PJ cannot rationalise what they would see as moral, and would therefore act in accordance with their own standard. That doesn't match up to what all humans consider to be 'moral'.

No I'm not making the argument I said I wouldn't. Yet again you ASSUME that's what I'm saying. You ASSUME Christianity is some magic transformation that changes people into non humans that can't revert at any moment to their natural state. That's not the case. Christians are human and susceptible to failure at every moment. Just because a person adopts a world view doesn't mean they will always follow it.

So I have shown a correlation there between the belief in ultimate justice and one's reasons for being moral. It seems quite simple to me and I can't see any clear reasoning from you opposing it.

[downbeatplumb]

Where do morals come from?

From society and progressive individuals.

Sometimes things can come and alter morals, these normally take the form of ideas or ideologies.

The Nazis (I know godwins law) subverted a normally progressive society with their 'bad jew' and 'eastern europeans are subhuman' memes.

Of course the most common way to subvert morals is to introduce religious commandments, so you get people who would oherwise be harmless, killing doctors, just because they carry out abortions, or stoning young girls for taking an unescorted ride in a mans car or... I could go on and on and on and on and on and on and on and on...........

So to summarise no god good, god bad.

Societies worse off 'when they have God on their side'

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk...571206.ece

[HeyItsZeus]

A post by fr0d0........Almost as terrible as my posts.........

[theVOID]

I would agree that rape is immoral. A moral framework that rationalised a chance of injustice would cause the rapist to consider if rape was really worth it. The odds are better for the rapist without the posthumous judge, therefore his moral 'standards' can be lower. It works the other way for praiseworthy acts too.

*Facepalm*

The rapist already thinks rape is worth it, irrespective of whether they acknowledge right and wrong. That is evinced by the rape it's self. Let me remind you that there are plenty of Christian rapists (proportionally more than non-religious) that have raped people, especially children. If ultimate justice were really as an effective deterrent as you think then the number of theistic rapists should be lower than those of a non-believer in ultimate justice.

You are making the very argument that you have said multiple times already was bullshit, the same argument that Kant himself shot down time and time again, you even said you'd hoped Kant would slap you in the face for making it! There is no correlation between the belief in ultimate justice and one's reasons for being moral, nor their ability to be moral. You have said before you agreed with Kant and now you have completely contradicted yourself!

You have a long way to go in hashing out this argument mate.

Let me just address this bit for now, as I don't have much time and the rest seems to be a repetition of what's already been said as I've skimmed over it.

Agreed.

Potentially we're all rapists,

No, only those with a desire to rape are potentially rapists. If you lack a desire to rape you cannot perform the action of rape as desires are the only things that exist that inform action.

and at given any moment we could choose to break the law. What informs our choice is our rationalisation of the outcome. Now without PJ (posthumous judge) our rational outcome is different.

The conclusions are trivially different, not substantively, and that is because of some of your God's commands or attitudes, like no premarital sex, that have no basis in any 'morality' outside of divine command or attitude.

"Christians that rape" are people going against their claimed rational framework and adopting a view that justice won't be served.

You don't know that their rape dictates that they believe they will get away with it. All that it demonstrates is that their desire to rape was stronger than their fear of justice, both in this life and the next. This is the point bot I and Kant made explicit, there is no perceivable difference in the moral actions of those who do and do not believe in ultimate justice given the same moral conclusions.

The moral conclusions are essentially the same (minus trivialities) therefore it is incorrect to place weight on the fear of ultimate justice, it seems not to factor into the likelihood of being moral or immoral. So one who commits immoral acts is just as likely to do so given belief in ultimate justice.

This again is the thing that kant explicitly stated.

They're adopting a world view sans God. This illustrates the point here... that our world view is what informs our choices.

Yes, and the difference in moral choices between our frameworks are trivial. Are you going to attempt the challenge set out at some point?

To act morally is to rationally justify what all humans regard as moral.

It would be better to say 'to act morally is to act in accordance with moral standards' and moral standards can vary according to your moral theory (albeit trivially). The moral sense we have is for the most part the same, these moral intuitions hardly vary at all regarding one's chosen moral theory.

Essentially, all moral theories try and account for the same moral intuitions, and since the moral intuitions are very much the same, the moral theories have very much the same conclusions.

Those without PJ cannot rationalise what they would see as moral, and would therefore act in accordance with their own standard. That doesn't match up to what all humans consider to be 'moral'.

I have already refuted that by providing a moral theory that can allow one to form objective moral propositions that are agreed upon (with the exception of the trivialities) unanimously by all objective moral theories (rape is wrong, murder is wrong, giving to charity is good) as well as providing a reason why one ought to act. This means we have an objective moral standard and a rational reason to act according to this standard. The fear of PJ does not influence what makes a decision moral or the reasons why we ought to act morally.

Regardless of PJ, an immoral action is irrational. Rationality is boolean, you are either rational or you are not. If rationality is achieved without PJ then PJ is not necessary for establishing either rational morality or reasons for action.

In other words, I am no more likely to act morally if i accept PJ than if i reject it.

Also, Acting in accordance to one's own standard is moral irrealism or moral subjectivism, and that is not the position i am defending. You are once again arguing a strawman and committing the fallacy of equivocation by suggesting that all moral theories that do not contain PJ are the same as subjectivism.

No I'm not making the argument I said I wouldn't. Yet again you ASSUME that's what I'm saying. You ASSUME Christianity is some magic transformation that changes people into non humans that can't revert at any moment to their natural state. That's not the case. Christians are human and susceptible to failure at every moment. Just because a person adopts a world view doesn't mean they will always follow it.

That is not at all what i said, i was talking about the fear pf PJ. As i pointed out, the belief in PJ does not have any demonstrable effects on one's ability to form rational moral standards or to act upon them.

You cannot claim that all who believe in PJ and commit immoral acts do so because their belief in PJ subsides, you can ask people if their belief in PJ subsided during the immoral action and i guarantee you the vast majority will say no, for instance religious priests who raped children have made no indication that they lacked belief in God during the action and even if some did others certainly did not. Concerning your argument the temporary absence of belief is 'gratuitous convenience' and doesn't in any way substantiate your argument, so you're pissing into the wind here.

The only thing we have substantiated reason to say is 'fear of PJ has no demonstrable impact on rational moral content or the ability to act morally'. Until you can establish this your argument is fallacious, specifically a 'bare assertion'.

So I have shown a correlation there between the belief in ultimate justice and one's reasons for being moral. It seems quite simple to me and I can't see any clear reasoning from you opposing it.

And i have shown that it is possible to both form a rational morality and have moral oughts without the need for PJ, as well as pointing out that there is absolutely no reason to assume that belief in PJ is necessary (or even advantageous) in forming 1) rational morality or 2) reasons for action.

Your insistence that PJ is advantageous is false, as is any notion that PJ is necessary.

[fr0d0]

I changed tack here, I accept all moral standards are more or less the same. All your references to me saying the opposite to that are ill founded.

What changes are the motivations to act morally given the justification from PJ. Our rapist has a lot less motivation just fearing the law rather than fearing the law and PJ. A rational atheist rapist would laugh in the face of PJ. A rational believer rapist would consider PJ. You say that should have no substantial effect, I beg to differ.

Belief changes people, but not irreversibly. You have a vested interest in denying that, so I don't expect you to accept it. Logic dictates that it's true however.

Believers come from all walks of life. Rapists, murderers, whores... all can be believers. I've attended a few very big camps where everyone is a believer. It's a whole different atmosphere to the places at other times. Where people aim to believe that selfishness is bad, produces a different atmosphere to one where people have the idea that selfishness is king. I have no statistics to prove that, because I haven't heard of any tests being done. I kinda makes more than sense so I tend to give assent to the obvious, taking into account all influences.

I think that if you desire females, the potential is there to abuse the situation. The desire is there but it isn't corrupted by the need for frustration or power. We're all capable of that.

[theVOID]

I changed tack here, I accept all moral standards are more or less the same. All your references to me saying the opposite to that are ill founded.

Then what was your example about rape getting at?

Anyway, now that we are agreed that belief in PJ doesn't change the moral conclusion reached in any substantial way we can move on.

What changes are the motivations to act morally given the justification from PJ.

So your motivations to act are entirely contingent upon your belief that there is a PJ who will punish wrong actions and praise good actions? I doubt that is true, at least not entirely, i suspect that you would find reasons to act in the same way regardless.

You're free to take that stance, but I have other reasons for acting that do not require a PJ. My reasons for acting are because i want to be a moral person, and I want that because promoting moral behavior makes this world a better place to live. This alone is sufficient motivation to act morally, and it does not depend in any way on the fear of punishment by a PJ.

Our rapist has a lot less motivation just fearing the law rather than fearing the law and PJ.

That isn't true and plays on the same reasons i pointed out earlier. Motivations to act change the balance of actions in either direction, if fear of PJ was really a substantial motivating factor then it should sufficiently influence the actions of those who fear PJ to the point where instances of rape should be demonstrably lower in people who do fear PJ. Like we have already established this is not the case, in fact the opposite is true (though i'm sure that fact is coincidental), so claiming that the motivational factor of PJ makes your moral theory better is 1) Wishful thinking and 2) Plain false.

A rational atheist rapist would laugh in the face of PJ. A rational believer rapist would consider PJ. You say that should have no substantial effect, I beg to differ.

Then find the stats that contradict both Kant and I.

Also, in terms of morality a 'rational rapist' cannot exist, as morality is rational - it establishes what you ought to do and gives reason for action. If you didn't care about being moral then it wouldn't matter if you believed in a PJ or not, the effects would be the same.

This is what the stats support in all cases, being immoral in either moral framework is irrational, and if one is going to act immorally then we should not expect them to have either the desirism reasons for action OR the Divine attitude reasons for action.

Belief changes people, but not irreversibly. You have a vested interest in denying that, so I don't expect you to accept it. Logic dictates that it's true however.

I could easily accuse you of having a vested interest in theism, but making accusations achieves nothing and makes everyone question the validity of your argument.

I have no vested interest in disbelief of any kind, i simply see no reason to believe and have absolutely nothing to lose in changing my mind if i am at some point convinced. No part of my life is contingent upon maintaining atheism, not even my involvement here which is the atheistic endeavor i have invested most in, and the whole point in that is to increase my understanding of the arguments for and against to i can make a rational decision.

Also, The burden of proof is on you making the claim and not only have you failed at every attempt to demonstrate an a priori logical necessity, but the a posteriori reasoning disagrees with you completely. Like i said, the stats show no such phenomenon, this is what Kant suspected in the 1700's and it has been nothing but supported by data.

Believers come from all walks of life. Rapists, murderers, whores... all can be believers. I've attended a few very big camps where everyone is a believer. It's a whole different atmosphere to the places at other times. Where people aim to believe that selfishness is bad, produces a different atmosphere to one where people have the idea that selfishness is king. I have no statistics to prove that, because I haven't heard of any tests being done. I kinda makes more than sense so I tend to give assent to the obvious, taking into account all influences.

1) That is personal credulity if ever I saw a more striking example.

2) That sounds exactly like every music/psychedelic festival I have ever been to. It's the nature of such communal celebrations, not some phenomenon contingent upon god worship.

3) I don't believe that selfishness is king of anything. It's another baseless accusation on your part. I'm mostly selfless, I'm not materialist (in the american dream sense), humble, i'm a student who's broke as fuck yet I donate to charity, and i'm helping people whenever i see that i am able to. Accuse me of being of the mind that 'selfishness is king' all you like. All these tactics demonstrate is your rationality has failed you and now you have to resort to painting me as selfish and vested in atheism.

I think that if you desire females, the potential is there to abuse the situation. The desire is there but it isn't corrupted by the need for frustration or power. We're all capable of that.

I do desire females, but I desire that there exist no rape, and my desire for these morals surpasses any of my own needs for warm wet dark places. My desires to be moral are first and foremost, my desires to be intellectually honest and fulfilled come second, my personal desires are third.