Is 10,000 people suffering identically equal bad as one of them?

[Edwardo Piet]

If empathy made any difference to my thought experiment then we're not talking about 10,000 identical experiences of suffering. If empathy modified any experiences then they're not identical experiences.

[Minimalist]

If misery loves company then 10,000 people suffering identically should be happier than one poor bastard suffering alone.

So much for fucking philosophy!

[Paul the Human]

If Person One is suffering at a level 8... then that is what he experiences. If there are 10,000 others also suffering identically (at level 8), Person One's suffering is no different than when he suffered alone. Empathy comes into play when gauging the reactions of those that know of the suffering, but are not suffering themselves. The more people that are known to be suffering, the more empathy may be inspired.

In reality, empathy can come into play for Person One, as well. If others suffer exactly as he does, and he cares for those people, his suffering may seem worse to him than it would were he suffering alone.

[Edwardo Piet]

I'm arguing from tautology here. 10,000 people suffering identically by definition suffer identically, so no one can suffer the total because then that would require one of them to suffer the total of all of them. Which can't happen if they suffer identically.

It doesn't matter how much empathy you take into account it makes no difference to my tautological argument whatsoever. If there is a bunch of people empathizing then however much they empathize that's how much they're empathizing by definition. They can't feel the total sum of themselves + anyone else whatsoever they can only feel themselves by definition. Nothing can be more than itself by definition because that would require redefining 'more than itself' as itself.

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If misery loves company then 10,000 people suffering identically should be happier than one poor bastard suffering alone.

So much for fucking philosophy!

One poor bastard suffering alone cannot be part of the 10,000 people suffering identically if he is to suffer any different whatsoever by definition.

So much for 'fucking philosophy'? You're arguing with tautology here.

[ib.me.ub]

It's just a matter of probability. If people generally suffer variably then generally a larger group is more likely to contain someone who suffers higher than someone in a smaller group.

Ok, this is fine. But why is the one that suffers most, more important than other 10,000 suffereing slightly less.

[theVOID]

Apparently, 10,000 people suffering absolutely identically to any one of them is 'worse' than one of those identical person's suffering because it matters more in the 'big picture'. I say that it obviously doesn't matter and there is no 'big picture' because only individual's suffer so when you add up the suffering of many individuals you pretend that such a big picture actually exists when it doesn't. It equates to pretending that all the suffering of many different people can be treated as if it was all in the same organism.

Against a 'big picture' it makes no sense to say that the suffering of 10,000 has a greater negative value than against a single person, because the big picture does not exist, as you pointed out, however there are other means of evaluation.

You can for instance assign the suffering a value based on it's relationship with a state that is subjectively considered not-suffering. For this example we are assuming all else is equal, thus you simply need to take into account the situation with a greater negative value, that being the suffering of the 10,000 has a higher negative value than the 1 person, by a factor of 10,000:1.

You can also apply the methodology in Desirism, which situation has a greater negative value in relationship to the number of desires thwarted. 10,000 desires thwarted has a greater negative value than one. We have an aversion to suffering so we have more reason for action to deal with the greatest suffering first.

I'm sure you could come up with many more valid relational values.

Assuming a hypothetical where one was to chose if 10,000 would suffer Vs 1, based on any valid relational value you can determine the better choice.

I'm sure we all agree that we are not a mass organism. But clearly Adrian and Shiny don't seem to see how adding up suffering of many is treating individuals as if they were a mass organism. If this is not what this so called 'big picture' is about then I don't know it is!

How on earth is evaluating group values treating the group as a mass organism? That makes absolutely no sense. Statistics wouldn't work at all if that was the case.

In the event that the 10,000 suffering are a conceptual organism, and assuming that each of the 10,001 individuals suffer the same in relationship to their other values, then the suffering giant organism would suffer proportionately the same as the 1 person (say 80% of his being is in a state of suffering, after combining 10,000 entities 80% of the being is still suffering).

This only causes a problem if there is a singular giant organism, but your case for this being the result of Adrian's evaluation is completely unfounded. With group values each being is at 80% suffering just like before, but there is a 10,000:1 ratio between groupings in the total suffering experienced.

My philosophy is that those who suffer worse should be prioritized obviously.... but those who suffer equally feel all the same amount and people only feel their own individual pain. So it makes no sense to pretend they add up.

Prioritized why?

And you're ignoring all relational values. You CAN add them up, we do it every 3-4 years with elections, to name one of an large number of relational values. Now, last time I checked it seemed to work just fine without treating the nation as a giant organism.

People who suffer worse don't add up with those who suffer less bad either.... they are merely prioritized because suffering worse is... worse.

You're just trying to sneak that in there. Why does something being worse than something else mean we should prioritize it? It sounds to me like you are assigning an intrinsic value to 'worse' that requires action (priority), and as you know, intrinsic value doesn't exist.

Adrian suggested how we should add them up for the same reason that we add up any value like 10 Ferraris rather than 1 for instance. But people already do value those things and it makes sense economically.

Any why are existing economic values allowed in consideration but not existing relational values or even existing democratic values?

That is a descriptive matter, that is not about why we morally should value something. And what I'm saying is why should we value many individuals more than one if all those individuals are suffering absolutely identically? It makes no sense to me, as I've said, for reasons given.

Where's the if? As in "IF you have an aversion to suffering" - If you don't then there is no reason why you should give a shit about suffering at all. This question is addressed to people who do care, we have that aversion to suffering, so we have an If for your hypothetical 'should'. There is no problem here.

IF you have an aversion to suffering, then suffering has a negative value against your desires. A group of 10,000 suffering has a greater total negative value than a group of 1 suffering.

To go a bit more into detail: In what I will call alternative reality 1 (AR1): If one person of the 10,000 suffering is saved it is not equally moral to all 10,000 being saved but only because there are still 9,999 individuals suffering, not because they add up, they don't.

Oh so you have 'real' moral value now? Where'd you get that from? Because all it seems to me is that you have intrinsic 'suffering' based value, making less suffering better with no justification, making your reasoning logically invalid, even if your conclusion is right that 1 prevented case of suffering has less value than 10,000.

In AR2(Alernative reality 2) if there is only 1 individual being tortured who is saved that is equally moral to all the 10,000 being saved in AR1 because in both cases all the equal individual pain in existence was eliminated.

However if both realities exist simultaneously (which is necessary for comparison) then only 1 of 10,001 existent cases of suffering was eliminated. Following from your AR1 example it should be worse than saving everyone in AR1.

EDIT: And another thought though too.... to approach it another way.... is 10,000 people who are equally happy better than one? I think not because everyone experiences exactly the same level of happiness as if it was just one of them.... so to act as if more is any 'better' is to pretend there is something extra here.

Right, intrinsic value. Happy is not necessarily better, though in relation to desires it certainly is. Relational values are your 'something extra'.

However, your dismissal of happiness having intrinsic value contradicts your above 'less suffering' value. You can't have both (or either, in reality)

[Edwardo Piet]

I'll make it really fucking simple: If 10,000 people suffer identically, no one feels more pain than anyone else. So why should you or would you care 10,000 times more, or any more at all? Why care about quantity of sufferers if not one sufferer suffers any more than any other? If you think that if enough people suffer from pin pricks you can consider that to morally outweigh one person being severely tortured, then I give up: All I can say is I find that repugnant.

[Paul the Human]

If that is how you feel, then I can only conclude that you lack the capacity for empathy.

[Shinylight]

If you think that if enough people suffer from pin pricks you can consider that to morally outweigh one person being severely tortured, then I give up: All I can say is I find that repugnant.

If you think that 10,000 people suffering the same amount of pain is no worse than one person suffering said amount, I find that repugnant.

[ib.me.ub]

I'll make it really fucking simple: If 10,000 people suffer identically, no one feels more pain than anyone else. So why should you or would you care 10,000 times more, or any more at all? Why care about quantity of sufferers if not one sufferer suffers any more than any other? If you think that if enough people suffer from pin pricks you can consider that to morally outweigh one person being severely tortured, then I give up: All I can say is I find that repugnant.

From this example given, fair enough. Since you have now outlined the terms of suffering, you premise is correct, in my opinion.

See, the problem for me is you haven't outlined the comparisons in suffering to allow for a truely subjective opinion to be formed. What is considered suffering, differes from one person to another person. You must realise that unless you specifically outline the context by which you are conducting your thought experiment, it is very hard to define the goal posts.

You need to outline the how the 10,000 are suffering (which you have) and how the one is suffering (which you haden't). The one could have just had a paper cut, which in my book is worse than a pin prick, but in reality arn't really that much worse than pin pricks. There is very little difference.

How does one determine which is a more detrimental suffering, when you have only previously outline one type of 'suffering'. How do we weigh it up if you don't describe both types of suffering.

If you just say 10,000 pin pricks Vs 1 suffering, when you haven't explained the 1 suffering, you get the answer we have given.

If you say 10,000 pin pricks Vs 1 torture, I will agree with you.