Is 10,000 people suffering identically equal bad as one of them?

[Tiberius]

If you believe that more sufferers of identical suffering can outweigh less sufferers of identical suffering then that implies that enough sufferers of low level suffering can outweigh one sufferer with high level suffering.

No, it doesn't imply that at all.

[Violet]

It's not more negative to any sufferer. Not in the slightest tiniest bit. Suffering requires a sufferer. Sufferers suffering identically is identical suffering to all sufferers.

Everyone feels different things, even if the same stimulus is put upon them. Some people will feel annoyance at getting a pinprick... some will feel anger... others will feel amusement... others will cry... another might even enjoy the sensation and do it several more times... and another might even fear the damn thing. It isn't even negative to some people.

And if they really are all suffering 'identically', then the group that has 10,000 people in it still would be happier without suffering that much, and again: "Little negative things are some of the worst... do away with those and most of the population gets happier in an amount that far outweighs the single man's gratitude."

[Edwardo Piet]

Everyone feels different things, even if the same stimulus is put upon them.

Not in the hypothetical case of identical sufferers. Not in my actual argument that you haven't refuted.

Some people will feel annoyance at getting a pinprick... some will feel anger... others will feel amusement... others will cry...[...]

They will all feel the same identical level of suffering otherwise they wouldn't be suffering identically.

And if they really are all suffering 'identically',

Which can only be the case in my actual argument because that is what I'm addressing.

then the group that has 10,000 people in it still would be happier without suffering that much, and again:

That isn't my argument. I'm addressing sufferers suffering identically which equates by definition to identical suffering to all sufferers (because suffering requires a sufferer.).

[Edwardo Piet]

If you believe that more sufferers of identical suffering can outweigh less sufferers of identical suffering then that implies that enough sufferers of low level suffering can outweigh one sufferer with high level suffering.

No, it doesn't imply that at all.

If what you believe is true it necessarily does imply that because it implies that sufferers can outweigh other sufferers through sheer quantity alone (because each of them suffer equally). So a great enough quantity sufferers suffering little can outweigh a smaller quantity of sufferers suffering more.

I don't care about impossible additional suffering. All suffering is equal if all sufferers suffer equally because only sufferers actually suffer.

Equal sufferers means equal suffering.

EDIT: Maybe this will help explain:

John Rawls gives a critique of Utilitarianism in A Theory Of Justice that rejects the idea that the happiness of two distinct persons could be meaningfully counted together. He argues that this entails treating a group of many as if it were a single sentient entity, mistakenly ignoring the separation of consciousness.[17] Animal Rights advocate Richard Ryder calls this the 'boundary of the individual', through which neither pain nor pleasure may pass.[18] Thus the aggregation of utility becomes futile as both pain and happiness are intrinsic to and inseparable from the consciousness in which they are felt, rendering impossible the task of adding up the various pleasures of multiple individuals.[...]

(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Utilitarian...ng_utility)

[theVOID]

If what you believe is true it necessarily does imply that because it implies that sufferers can outweigh other sufferers through sheer quantity alone (because each of them suffer equally). So a great enough quantity sufferers suffering little can outweigh a smaller quantity of sufferers suffering more.

I don't care about impossible additional suffering. All suffering is equal if all sufferers suffer equally because only sufferers actually suffer.

Right, and all sufferers suffer equally was not the case in your pinprick example, in that you had one person suffering 10,000 times more than any other individual. In this instance the person suffering 10,000 times is 10,000 times more potent in affecting our aversion to suffering, thus we have reason to prevent that suffering more than the marginal group suffering.

Equal sufferers means equal suffering.

So by that right you must conclude that 10,000 people suffering 1x is literally equal to 1 person suffering 10,000x, because the amount of suffering quantitatively is identical between groups.

If you want to know how we would act, and not what the values are, you must look at value in the situation beyond the experience of the sufferer, the only thing that affects the judgement either way therefore is the value it has relative to the person assessing the situation, again it gets down to what desires we have, I have an aversion to the suffering of Me, You and Us, the more the suffering the greater the aversion, thus given the choice I will act to prevent the suffering for which I have the greatest aversion.

But when the values are confined to an assessment of group 1 and 2 they are equal.

John Rawls gives a critique of Utilitarianism in A Theory Of Justice that rejects the idea that the happiness of two distinct persons could be meaningfully counted together. He argues that this entails treating a group of many as if it were a single sentient entity, mistakenly ignoring the separation of consciousness.[17] Animal Rights advocate Richard Ryder calls this the 'boundary of the individual', through which neither pain nor pleasure may pass.[18] Thus the aggregation of utility becomes futile as both pain and happiness are intrinsic to and inseparable from the consciousness in which they are felt, rendering impossible the task of adding up the various pleasures of multiple individuals.[...]

In the example you gave though, even if we could meaningfully assess happiness and determine which situation would have the greatest amount (and assuming suffering is the antithesis of happiness) the two situations would still be of equal value.

That doesn't matter though, it's easy to make value claims without evaluating strange and mostly unworkable phenomenon like happiness, which in this case would have to have intrinsic value, in fact as far as I know nobody here used happiness as a response, there are much more concrete relationships to work with. Thus, Rawl's objection has no place amongst our objections to your reasoning.

[Edwardo Piet]

Right, and all sufferers suffer equally was not the case in your pinprick example, in that you had one person suffering 10,000 times more than any other individual. In this instance the person suffering 10,000 times is 10,000 times more potent in affecting our aversion to suffering, thus we have reason to prevent that suffering more than the marginal group suffering.

As I have already explained, if more people suffering equally can be worse than less of them then that means that quantity alone can outweigh the quality of suffering.

So above you say that a high quantity of low sufferers (many people suffering from pinpricks) can't outweigh one person suffering 10,000 times more than any of them. Which means that 10,000 individuals suffering pinpricks can't be equal to one person suffering 10,000 times the weight of a pinprick, right?

But here you say:

So by that right you must conclude that 10,000 people suffering 1x is literally equal to 1 person suffering 10,000x, because the amount of suffering quantitatively is identical between groups.

Here you completely contradict yourself. You say that 10,000 people suffering a pain value of '1' is equal to 1 person suffering 10,000X that pain.

I agree with the first option but the difference is, I'm consistent. I understand that when no sufferers individually suffer more than anyone else this means that they can't possibly add up in reality because sufferers only suffer as individuals. We can't feel anyone else's pain we can only interpret theirs and feel our own pain. And if we could 'feel someone else's pain' then it would be our pain too so we'd feel equally and so neither of our pain would be worse than each other. It would be equivalent to 10,000 identical pinpricks or 10,000 identical torture levels of pain.

Even quantities of pain in the same individual can only add up if they're not all absolutely identical. Because if they're all absolutely identical then not one of those experiences will increase the suffering. If 10,000 identical pinpricks to the same person pisses them off a hell of a lot more than one it is because that those experiences aren't identical. If they were identical then all the other 9,999 pinpricks after the first pinprick could not be experienced as any worse than the first one, which means they don't add up in any meaningful way whatsoever. And by not in a 'meaningful way' I mean they don't add up in anyway outside your own imagination if they're truly identical. They don't add up outside of your fetish for adding things up.

[theVOID]

As I have already explained, if more people suffering equally can be worse than less of them then that means that quantity alone can outweigh the quality of suffering.

You've used two different examples. For the sake of clarity I will call them Ex1 and Ex2.

Quality (x) = Amount of suffering experience by individual
Quantity (n) = Number of individuals suffering x.
Quality (x) * Quantity (n) = Total suffering (t)

As for the rest, it depends on which one of the two very different examples you used.

Ex1:
Group 1: n = 1, x = 1
Group 2: n = 10,000 x = 1

Group 1 (1*1x) < Group 2 (10,000*1x)

Ex2:
Group 1: n = 1, x = 10,000
Group 2: n = 10,000 x = 1

Group 1 (1*10,000x) = Group 2 (10,000*1x)

When the suffering is the only value considered, in Ex1 Group 2 contains more total suffering, in Ex2 both groups have equal total suffering.

Before we get any further, do you agree with that proof?

[jason56]

It's a basic human instinct to empathise on scale. And a natural human instinct far outweighs any philosophical question.

[theVOID]

No it doesn't Jason, human instinct can be used to justify belief in all kinds of falsities. We use our instincts at best as working assumptions until methods can be established, it just so happens that our instincts lead to pseudo methodologies in every day life with experiential patterns. However, lending favor to one argument or the other based on instinct when evaluating the thing in question isn't rational.

We may initially act instinctively, but only until we have enough data for our pseudo models, then our actions are very much informed by a set of beliefs we have about the situation relative to the outcome we desire, so instincts take a back seat to calculated responses.

[jason56]

No it doesn't Jason, human instinct can be used to justify belief in all kinds of falsities. We use our instincts at best as working assumptions until methods can be established, it just so happens that our instincts lead to pseudo methodologies in every day life with experiential patterns. However, lending favor to one argument or the other based on instinct when evaluating the thing in question isn't rational.

We may initially act instinctively, but only until we have enough data for our pseudo models, then our actions are very much informed by a set of beliefs we have about the situation relative to the outcome we desire, so instincts take a back seat to calculated responses.

You're right, of course. I guess my problem with this philosophical question is that of most philosophical questions, it's about defining a concept. All these questions do is highlight our own imperfect labeling of the world.

The short answer is that there's no human benefit to equate suffering to a single mathematical unit. There's a more natural benefit to equate suffering to zero.