Oh no not another free will thread.

[Silver]

There it is.  You consider knowledge to be what could be, not what is or what will be. The knowledge being invoked by the omni god (and by the knowable future conjecture) is knowledge of what is, what will be...not what could be.

Well, so long as we're talking about a supernatural type of knowledge, it makes more sense that it is the type that "could be" rather than one set in stone.

[Edwardo Piet]

I heard an analogy a little while ago, just to add something to think about in the conversation.

A voting machine is rigged, so that no matter who is voted for, the machine will record Trump. A person goes into the booth, and votes for Trump. Now there was no possible way, that they could have voted otherwise (remember the machine is rigged). Did the persons inability to vote otherwise, effect their free will choice to choose Trump?

That's a Frankfurt case

EDIT: This may be helpful:

Frankfurt's examples are significant because they suggest an alternative way to defend the compatibility of moral responsibility and determinism, in particular by rejecting the first premise of the argument. According to this view, responsibility is compatible with determinism because responsibility does not require the freedom to do otherwise.

Frankfurt's examples involve agents who are intuitively responsible for their behavior even though they lack the freedom to act otherwise. Here is a typical case:

Donald is a Democrat and is likely to vote for the Democrats; in fact, only in one particular circumstance will he not: that is, if he thinks about the prospects of immediate American defeat in Iraq just prior to voting. Ms White, a representative of the Democratic Party, wants to ensure that Donald votes Democratic, so she secretly plants a device in Donald's head that, if activated, will force him to vote Democratic. Not wishing to reveal her presence unnecessarily, Ms White plans to activate the device only if Donald thinks about the Iraq War prior to voting. As things happen, Donald does not think about Iraq prior to voting, so Ms White thus sees no reason to activate the device, and Donald votes Democratic of his own accord. Apparently, Donald is responsible for voting Democratic although, owing to Ms. White's device, he lacks freedom to do otherwise.
If Frankfurt is correct in suggesting both that Donald is morally responsible for voting Democratic and that he is not free to do otherwise, moral responsibility, in general, does not require that an agent have the freedom to do otherwise (that is, the principle of alternate possibilities is false). Thus, even if causal determinism is true, and even if determinism removes the freedom to do otherwise, there is no reason to doubt that people can still be morally responsible for their behavior.

Having presented his counter argument against the principle of alternate possibilities, Frankfurt suggests that it be revised to take into account the fallacy of the notion that coercion precludes an agent from moral responsibility. It must be only because of coercion that the agent acts as he does. The best definition, by his reckoning, is this: "[A] person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it only because he could not have done otherwise."

[henryp]

How would this question be answered?

That's why we're talking about a being knowing the future, because it's another way of thinking about the same sort of thing.

I like thinking about this stuff with time travel.

In a world with free will, I'm presented with an Apple, a Banana, and a Cucumber.  Larry video tapes me choosing the Banana.  Larry then sends the video tape back through time to himself 3 hours ago and watches it. 

So when the event occurs again, Larry secretly bets George 10 dollars I'll choose the Banana.  But this time I choose the Cucumber.  

Because Larry knowing the outcome of the reality that occurred doesn't negate the possibilities of other realities occurring.

An all knowing being knowing the outcome of the choices we will make doesn't negate our ability to have made other choices.  We just didn't happen to make them.  We determined the all-knowing beings knowledge, rather than the all-knowing beings knowledge determining us.

I don't believe in free will, but that's how I'd deal with this if I did.

[The Grand Nudger]

I heard an analogy a little while ago, just to add something to think about in the conversation.

A voting machine is rigged, so that no matter who is voted for, the machine will record Trump. A person goes into the booth, and votes for Trump. Now there was no possible way, that they could have voted otherwise (remember the machine is rigged). Did the persons inability to vote otherwise, effect their free will choice to choose Trump?

It certainly affected the dems free will choice, didn't it? 

[Catholic_Lady]

I disagree MK. God knows the future because He is not bound by time and sees everything that happens all at once. God knowing what choices we will freely make, does not mean we didn't freely choose to make those choices lol. Lutriane explained it well. Unfortunately it seems many people can't grasp it, as I've talked about this many times.

[SaStrike]

There are interpretations of quantum mechanics that are totally deterministic, like MWI and that ad hoc Bohmian interpretation. I personally subscribe to the MWI (Many Worlds Interpretation), and if true, this means that my actions have no control whatsoever in shaping the world I'm. Things just are, and you can't control shit. Logically and mathematically, MWI makes the most sense out of QM, but I always hope it isn't true, and continue living as if it's not.

It really is not relevant though. We can acknowledge the probability of other universes but in the end we choose to do things. We make choices that are in the present so seem to be free will. Thinking they are not free will would do what exactly? Would it alter our choices? Apparently altering our choices would be impossible or so I'm told. My opinion is free will "seems" to be here right now therefore it actually is. We are all literally making choices every moment. Until it is proven otherwise (with certainty).

It's like atheism. There seems to be no god. Even if there is no way to tell that there isn't, we have to go with what we can perceive. Until it is proven otherwise (with certainty)

[The Grand Nudger]

There it is.  You consider knowledge to be what could be, not what is or what will be.  The knowledge being invoked by the omni god (and by the knowable future conjecture) is knowledge of what is, what will be...not what could be.

Well, so long as we're talking about a supernatural type of knowledge, it makes more sense that it is the type that "could be" rather than one set in stone.

I mean, with the god conjecture it's "supernatural" knowledge...I guess, but with the full determinist conjecture it's not.

At any rate, we've found why it didn't make sense to you..but, now that we know that..and understanding why knowledge as it's being used (will be) is a problem for classical free will...does it now make sense to you?

[Mystic]

I disagree MK. God knows the future because He is not bound by time and sees everything that happens all at once. God knowing what choices we will freely make, does not mean we didn't freely choose to make those choices lol. Lutriane explained it well. Unfortunately it seems many people can't grasp it, as I've talked about this many times.

That may be true, but you can't deny the conclusion to prove the argument false, you have to deal with the argument. Also, I believe God innovates in real time,  future doesn't exist, he is not bound by time, but neither is time something that exists from beginning to end with him, the present exists, the past once existed, and the future is going to come about and is not determined.

[Silver]

I disagree MK. God knows the future because He is not bound by time and sees everything that happens all at once. God knowing what choices we will freely make, does not mean we didn't freely choose to make those choices lol. Lutriane explained it well. Unfortunately it seems many people can't grasp it, as I've talked about this many times.

I remember one of my first major debates on this forum centered around the free will debate where others here couldn't seem to grasp my conception of it. Nothing has changed. That's the beauty of it, though. I don't expect every atheist to agree with me on everything, just as I wouldn't agree with them on everything.

---

does it now make sense to you?

I cannot even see how it makes sense to you.

As I just told CL, my first major debate here was with you guys on the discussion of free will. Things haven't changed for me anymore than they have for you. And that's fine.

[Mystic]

That's why we're talking about a being knowing the future, because it's another way of thinking about the same sort of thing.

I like thinking about this stuff with time travel.

In a world with free will, I'm presented with an Apple, a Banana, and a Cucumber.  Larry video tapes me choosing the Banana.  Larry then sends the video tape back through time to himself 3 hours ago and watches it. 

So when the event occurs again, Larry secretly bets George 10 dollars I'll choose the Banana.  But this time I choose the Cucumber.  

Because Larry knowing the outcome of the reality that occurred doesn't negate the possibilities of other realities occurring.

An all knowing being knowing the outcome of the choices we will make doesn't negate our ability to have made other choices.  We just didn't happen to make them.  We determined the all-knowing beings knowledge, rather than the all-knowing beings knowledge determining us.

I don't believe in free will, but that's how I'd deal with this if I did.

The thing is "back through time" would mean, past, present, future is some sort of stream that all exists at once. If this is true, then indeed free-will is impossible per the argument shown. He would have the illusion of free-will, but if the future is discovered, he can't choose otherwise, if it's truly a determined inescapable future.