Oh no not another free will thread.

[Edwardo Piet]

I think one of the main problems with Free Will stems from our ability to revise our actions after we've done them.

Self-causation is internally contradictory, as pointed out in OP, but I'm not so sure this alone invalidates a tradional view of Free Will.

It does though. Because a traditional view would require self-causation to be possible.

We certainly have volition, since we're able to make decisions. But because we don't see the inner workings and the underlying causations of our thinking and therefore actions means we also have a feeling of being in control of our volition and resulting decisions. This leaves us with the illusion of Free Will, if one agrees with the above.

Even if that volition isn't an epiphenomenon, unlike what the scientific experiments show, which show that our decision is made by unconscious aspects of our brain sometimes as much as 7 seconds before we are aware of them - ultimately that volition is not self-causing and is instead either caused by other factors beyond our control, so we can't be responsible for them, or isn't caused by anything at all, including us, so we can't be responsible for them. Determinism doesn't get you free will, and neither does indeterminism. And that's a true dichotomy, that's the problem. Even a combination of both won't do any good since we can't be responsible for what we do to the extent that we're partly deterministic or what we do to the extent that we're partly indeterministic, for reasons given.

I don't think anyone has Free Will, I think "Free Will" is one of those sounds-like-meaningful short phrases but is entirely inconsistent/contradictory, like asking what the meaning of life is. Just shows how powerful language is; the ability to construct sentences that make no sense.

Still, one can follow up with "What do you mean by Meaning Of Life?" or "what do you mean by free will?"

Some people, compatabilists, claim free will means something really trivial that is so impotent that it is compatible with determinism. It's like someone saying that a magic door to another reality exists but by "magic door" they just mean a door that is painted all pretty and by "another reality" they just me outside into the back yard.

The vast majority of people believe in something much more than that. They believe that they can choose between two options in exactly the same state of the universe. And in fact, they believe it so strongly that they'll still believe it even in cases in which it is demonstrably logically impossible. As Lut and CL has shown us. It's such a strong nonsensical belief that it flies in the face of logical impossibility.

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Irrelevant.

I disagree.

Well, until you actually show how blaming one's parents or malingering has absolutely anything at all to do with disbelief in free will... then you are clearly being very irrelevant.

Ironically, at least on the matter of "blaming parents" the opposite is true. It makes no sense to blame one's parents on some fundamental level if you don't believe your parents have free will... it only makes sense to do that if you do believe they have free will. Blaming one's parents is something someone who believes in the hocus-pocus kind of free will does.

You appear to be getting at something as pathetic as Pascal's Wager... like, you think that if people don't believe in free will they will use that an excuse to not bother to do things. Because it's like "Hey it's not my fault I don't have free will!"

The problem with that idea is that even if you are right it proves nothing because 1) They are still not ultimately responsible even for making those excuses 2) No one could control what they believe or disbelieve even if free will were possible.

You're basically doing something analgous with Pascal's wager so it wouldn't even work, for the same reason Pascal's Wager wouldn't work (no one can actually control what they believe) even if I was wrong about free will being impossible lol. So epic fail on your part. Even if I was wrong you'd still be wrong lol.

Like I said, it's not relevant.

[bennyboy]

I'm being a little bit lazy here, not having read 15 pages of undoubtedly brilliant philosophizing.

I'd define free will like this: It is the unfettered expression of the self in behavior.

This obviously cannot include variation in a given moment. You could not have made a different decision, because any decision other than the one you made would not have been a maximally perfect expression of the self. When I'm standing in front of a candy rack, and I choose a Mars Bar, you can argue that it's not free will because I'm just one node in a long behavioral chain that could in theory be traced all the way back to the Big Bang.

But as I see it, it is exactly for this reason that I AM free. I am a causal chokepoint, and whatever I decide, it turns out that is what I would have decided. I find this very comforting, and I game it like this: I do whatever I damn well please, because it turns out-- that crazy and spontaneous behavior was always going to be the one I exhibited.

I can't imagine a more freeing realization than that.

[Edwardo Piet]

I'm being a little bit lazy here, not having read 15 pages of undoubtedly brilliant philosophizing.

I'd define free will like this: It is the unfettered expression of the self in behavior.

This obviously cannot include variation in a given moment.  You could not have made a different decision, because any decision other than the one you made would not have been a maximally perfect expression of the self.

Right. So it sounds like you accept compatabilism then.

I believe compatabilism is true, but I'm not a compatabilist because I think that the label "free will" in those cases is misleading at best and harmful at worst.

To put it simply, I demand more of free will.

And the label "free will" is the epitome of a loaded term, for me. We're better of without it.

[The Grand Nudger]

I'm being a little bit lazy here, not having read 15 pages of undoubtedly brilliant philosophizing.

I'd define free will like this: It is the unfettered expression of the self in behavior.

This obviously cannot include variation in a given moment.  You could not have made a different decision, because any decision other than the one you made would not have been a maximally perfect expression of the self.  When I'm standing in front of a candy rack, and I choose a Mars Bar, you can argue that it's not free will because I'm just one node in a long behavioral chain that could in theory be traced all the way back to the Big Bang.

But as I see it, it is exactly for this reason that I AM free.  I am a causal chokepoint, and whatever I decide, it turns out that is what I would have decided.  I find this very comforting, and I game it like this: I do whatever I damn well please, because it turns out-- that crazy and spontaneous behavior was always going to be the one I exhibited.

I can't imagine a more freeing realization than that.

By that definition, conveyor sorters also have free will. I'm not saying it's a bad description of what free will is (as opposed to what we thought it was)...only noting it's inclusivity.

[bennyboy]

I'm being a little bit lazy here, not having read 15 pages of undoubtedly brilliant philosophizing.

I'd define free will like this: It is the unfettered expression of the self in behavior.

This obviously cannot include variation in a given moment.  You could not have made a different decision, because any decision other than the one you made would not have been a maximally perfect expression of the self.  When I'm standing in front of a candy rack, and I choose a Mars Bar, you can argue that it's not free will because I'm just one node in a long behavioral chain that could in theory be traced all the way back to the Big Bang.

But as I see it, it is exactly for this reason that I AM free.  I am a causal chokepoint, and whatever I decide, it turns out that is what I would have decided.  I find this very comforting, and I game it like this: I do whatever I damn well please, because it turns out-- that crazy and spontaneous behavior was always going to be the one I exhibited.

I can't imagine a more freeing realization than that.

By that definition, conveyor sorters also have free will.  I'm not saying it's a bad description of what free will is (as opposed to what we thought it was)...only noting it's inclusivity.

Conveyor's don't have a self to express.

[Edwardo Piet]

By that definition, conveyor sorters also have free will.  I'm not saying it's a bad description of what free will is (as opposed to what we thought it was)...only noting it's inclusivity.

Conveyor's don't have a self to express.

I guess Khem just missed something someone else said accidentally for the 18 millionth time by accident again /sarcasm

I agree with you by the way. Self was part of your definition, and then he mentioned something without a self.

The sarcasm is not that I don't think it's unbelievable that he missed something once again. It's that I don't think he did it by accident. I think he does it on purpose. It's so constantly that I think the likelihood that it's by accident is very very low. And when someone tells him he's getting their view wrong, he doesn't seem to care much, and he just continues on misrepresenting it.

Just my two cents. I put him on block because I'm tired of wasting my energy on him. Your mileage may very. Perhaps you think you've had some interesting discussions with him over the years. He's been doing nothing but strawman me since 2012. That's the way I see it.

[henryp]

Freely in libertarian just says that it's a choice, not causal determinism.

Under libertarian free will, it is possible that nothing determines the choice one makes. Logically incoherent, but that's the free will the typical theist believes in.

Prior to receiving the tape from the future, Bob can't know what Larry is going to choose, which rules out causal determinism, no?

Not necessarily. The only way to rule out causal determinism is to say that choices can be made randomly, which is not what you're assuming here. Larry still chose what he chose for a reason. And Bob simply observes that choice in advance.

I meant in the context of this discussion.  To show knowledge of the future makes free will impossible, we have to pretend free will was possible to begin with.

[brewer]

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I disagree.

Well, until you actually show how blaming one's parents or malingering has absolutely anything at all to do with disbelief in free will... then you are clearly being very irrelevant.

Ironically, at least on the matter of "blaming parents" the opposite is true. It makes no sense to blame one's parents on some fundamental level if you don't believe your parents have free will... it only makes sense to do that if you do believe they have free will. Blaming one's parents is something someone who believes in the hocus-pocus kind of free will does.

You appear to be getting at something as pathetic as Pascal's Wager... like, you think that if people don't believe in free will they will use that an excuse to not bother to do things. Because it's like "Hey it's not my fault I don't have free will!"

The problem with that idea is that even if you are right it proves nothing because 1) They are still not ultimately responsible even for making those excuses 2) No one could control what they believe or disbelieve even if free will were possible.

You're basically doing something analgous with Pascal's wager so it wouldn't even work, for the same reason Pascal's Wager wouldn't work (no one can actually control what they believe) even if I was wrong about free will being impossible lol. So epic fail on your part. Even if I was wrong you'd still be wrong lol.

Like I said, it's not relevant.

I disagree. You've failed to address motive.

[Edwardo Piet]

Freely in libertarian just says that it's a choice, not causal determinism.

Under libertarian free will, it is possible that nothing determines the choice one makes. Logically incoherent, but that's the free will the typical theist believes in.

Prior to receiving the tape from the future, Bob can't know what Larry is going to choose, which rules out causal determinism, no?

Not necessarily. The only way to rule out causal determinism is to say that choices can be made randomly, which is not what you're assuming here. Larry still chose what he chose for a reason. And Bob simply observes that choice in advance.

No one has to know anything for causal determinism to be true. Knowledge requires minds and even minds don't have to exist for causal determinism to be true.

All causal determinism means, in the philosophical sense, is that every single thing that happens in the universe has a cause. That can be true with or without minds.

The idea of an omniscient being is just one way of showing how if you will definitely do X then it of course makes no sense to say you will not do X.

No omniscient being is required of course. No knowledge is required, of course. No being is required at all, of course, for philosophical determinism to be true.

[henryp]

Under libertarian free will, it is possible that nothing determines the choice one makes. Logically incoherent, but that's the free will the typical theist believes in.


Not necessarily. The only way to rule out causal determinism is to say that choices can be made randomly, which is not what you're assuming here. Larry still chose what he chose for a reason. And Bob simply observes that choice in advance.

No one has to know anything for causal determinism to be true. Knowledge requires minds and even minds don't have to exist for causal determinism to be true.

All causal determinism means, in the philosophical sense, is that every single thing that happens in the universe has a cause. That can be true with or without minds.

The idea of an omniscient being is just one way of showing how if you will definitely do X then it of course makes no sense to say you will not do X.

No omniscient being is required of course. No knowledge is required, of course. No being is required at all, of course, for philosophical determinism to be true.

Where causal determinism can't exist is in a hypothetical discussion trying to determine whether knowledge of the future affects the nature of a free will event.

If I claim wearing a pink hat makes riding a unicorn impossible, I have to pretend unicorns could exist for awhile.