The absolute absurdity of God

[Angrboda]

I think that 99% of the people on AF have not done 1-4 thoroughly enough to say they have rejected God with full knowledge of what they were rejecting. Before I get jumped on I also want to make the point that IMO more than 90% of Christians don't accept God/live their daily lives as Christians with a full knowledge of these things either. That's why you get plenty of people here that grew up in a "Christian" home and think they know what it is they have rejected. I will bet heavily on the fact that they don't. 

How familiar are you with the various Buddhist canons?

[Succubus]

...the initial conditions are suspiciously exact and the odds of that being by chance are not even realistic...

If the initial conditions of the universe have been different we wouldn't be here discussing it.
Why did God create the universe the only way it could work?

[Amarok]

...the initial conditions are suspiciously exact and the odds of that being by chance are not even realistic...

Too bad this makes perfect sense if Atheism were true .But is rendered meaningless if there is a god . Theists falling back to the tired ,long refuted argument of fine tuning .

[SteveII]

I think that 99% of the people on AF have not done 1-4 thoroughly enough to say they have rejected God with full knowledge of what they were rejecting. Before I get jumped on I also want to make the point that IMO more than 90% of Christians don't accept God/live their daily lives as Christians with a full knowledge of these things either. That's why you get plenty of people here that grew up in a "Christian" home and think they know what it is they have rejected. I will bet heavily on the fact that they don't. 

How familiar are you with the various Buddhist canons?

Is it an evidence-based or a philosophy-based worldview? The teachings about origins and endings (two very important things in a worldview) are hard to square with what we know about reality. Anyway, there isn't really much evidence to support or to refute so I don't think there is much of a parallel here with the Christianity/evidence/rejection point I was making.

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6. If a cause is sufficient to produce its effect then if the cause is there, so is the effect.

But that is not what we model when we discuss the universe. We believe the universe came into being 14 billion years ago and is in fact not timeless, beginningless, and unchanging. So, the effect (the universe) is not timeless, beginningless, and unchanging. But the cause seems like it must be (or an infinite regress). So why wasn't the universe as permanent as its cause? 

You're not making sense here.  You seem to be suggesting that an effect must have the same properties as its cause, in which case, I must ask why the universe is not also immaterial?  I don't understand what you're getting at here.  The question is what can we know about what existed when the universe did not exist.  You're claiming we can know that the entity which existed was possessed of a mind, presumably like ours (Imago Dei).  Beyond that, I can't make sense of your objection here. 

The solution to that question is that a decision to bring the universe into being was made by a mind. Under the concept of libertarian free will, a decision requires no deterministic causal chain. You can say the argument is not convincing--but it is sound reasoning. Do you have another more-plausible explanation? 

The question was why is the cause necessarily a personal one, possessed of mind.  An entity with libertarian free will could precede creation.  That alone doesn't show that the entity which existed in the absence of creation was such an entity.  As pointed out, a non-sentient entity satisfies the priors just as satisfactorily.  

I said that because of (6) that without an intention, something either causes or does not cause the universe. Otherwise, there is no way a cause capable of creating the universe can delay its ability to cause the universe. So, if there is no capacity to decide to create, the effect would be co-eternal with any cause. But we have the hurdles of the universe being infinite in the past. To say it another way, we have a timeless cause and and non-timeless effect that are co-eternal. 

Regarding your idea that God could be coextensive with creation. The universe began to exist a finite time ago and marches on toward heat death in a finite amount of time. There is no reason to think that creation and God are inseparable other than to avoid the 'personal' conclusion.

Who said anything about God and creation being separable.  My whole point was that they might be inseparable.  That God and the creative act need not be separable.  You are not only arguing the converse, but that it is necessarily so.  Where are you getting this from?

Are there other reasons to think this might be true?

I'm not making the affirmative case.  You are.  I only need to establish the possibility to undermine your argument.  I have no need for reasons for thinking it is true, nor am I 'avoiding' anything by pointing that out.

How does omniscience work without a sentient center of being? For there to be knowledge, doesn't there have to be a mind to comprehend?

Your question has to do with meaning and knowledge.  How does it work without a mind?  How does it work with a mind?  You don't have an explanation for the latter; why do I need one for the former?  Ultimately the question relates not to how knowledge and meaning works, I freely admit I don't know.  But that's not necessary to my conclusion.  All that is required is some non-sentient power or process that can form appropriate relationships between information and logically consistent and appropriate acts.  You don't know what is under the hood with respect to God, and you seem to be begging the question by assuming that the activity of whatever cause existed required comprehension in the same manner as we possess comprehension.  It doesn't.

Let me illustrate with regard to the example of John Searle's classic Chinese Room argument.  In that gedanken, Searle postulated that one could create a room containing a set of rules for responding to Chinese language queries, and an automaton necessary to carry out those rules.  His point was that there is no actual understanding in such a room in the sense that we understand things.  However, from the point of view of someone outside the room, there's no way to tell whether what is inside the room is an automaton, mindlessly carrying out a process, or an actual person with a mind that comprehends Chinese as a native speaker does.  Essentially, we only know God by his effects.  If an automaton can have the same effects as a sentient entity, then you have failed to show that the entity in question necessarily is sentient.  To do that would either be to show that no such automaton or other non-sentient entity could accomplish the same effects, or that sentience is a requirement for understanding, neither of which I think is within the realm of possibility here.  The assumption of natural theology is that you can know God through his effects, specifically in the natural world.  If you cannot show that those effects require sentience, then you cannot establish that the first cause was necessarily personal.

Note that I am not suggesting that the cause was an automaton in the sense of being a material process or having any specific mechanism of operation.  If you can appeal to mystery and magic, so can I.  A relevant example is the Turing Oracle.  We have no idea how such an oracle would work, but it is not a logical contradiction to propose such an oracle.  The idea itself is not incoherent.

An additional possibility that I'll raise as long as I'm at it is that the initial cause was a non-sentient entity possessed of the necessary powers that simply creates the effects we are trying to explain in the appropriate time and order for no reason whatsoever.  While such an entity may seem improbable, it's not necessarily any more improbable than the God you postulate, nor is it necessary that I establish that it is -- again, I'm not making the affirmative case; it only need be possible, not necessarily actual.

I will grant that it is broadly logically possible that the cause of the universe isn't personal (defined in a weak sense as intentional/purposeful). But I think you must then say the universe is co-eternal with its cause. The cost of this is that you need to expand your metaphysics to include an infinite series of events in the past. Because this and other similar arguments are probabilistic, I would say that "personal" does not come with such a cost and is therefore the more reasonable conclusion. 

Correct me if I am wrong, but you are objecting to my inferences about what a first cause must be like by proposing a necessarily-existing universal consciousness? If so, does this universal consciousness have purposes?

Let me ask you this: how do you know that God has purposes?  You don't.  You're either pulling it from an interpretation of special revelation, or out of thin air.  These are natural theology arguments.  What relation is there between your question about purpose and the general question at issue?  Can you demonstrate that any supposed first cause is necessarily personal?  I don't think you can.  You initially appealed to Ghazali's argument, which was shown to be flawed.  You've yet to replace it with anything substantial other than a bunch of talk about the finite and tensed nature of the universe, which doesn't seem to relate to any necessity about the nature of the first cause that I can see.  It seems nothing more than a non sequitur.

From this argument, you only get that the cause has intentions (as I try to explain above). It is reasoned that intentions are something only ever ascribed to a person. 

A computer does not make decisions in the sense we mean when we talk about libertarian free will--which seems a necessary understanding of the word when talking about whether a first cause had it or not.

It needn't do so.  All that is required is a process or cause that is indistinguishable from an entity possessing a mind. Arguing that this entity or cause must work in the same way that we or God works is basically special pleading; placing a requirement on the answer that has no reason for being there.  How we got on the subject of libertarian free will is a mystery to me.  It seems to bear no relation to what you are trying to prove.  You can't as yet demonstrate that a first cause necessarily reasoned as we do.  I'm reasonably certain you're simply pushing a successful argument further out of your reach by claiming that these natural theology arguments establish that the cause had libertarian free will.  I'll entertain some contemplation on the matter simply because I find it amusing.  It's predicated that our minds have a will which operates in some as yet not fully determined manner.  Libertarian free will is a specific way of conceptualizing this will, but it's not the only one.  Physicalists postulate that as a consequence of materialism and determinism, that libertarian free will does not exist.  But it's not necessary to retain the requirement that the will be the effect of a material process.  One could equally as well postulate a will that was completely deterministic in its operation, completely independent of the brain.  A "robot soul," so to speak.  We don't know whether libertarian free will is the reality anymore than we know that the hard incompatibilist account is.  You can't determine which is the case with respect to human beings, how are you going to do so for a supposed first cause?

I see your point: I did push the argument further than it can support.

[Neo-Scholastic]

How familiar are you with the various Buddhist canons?

Gene Reeves, the foremost English translator of the Lotus Sutra, is both my friend and neighbor. We've had many conversations during which he illuminated me on some of the more subtle points. Even still, I would never claim to be an expert.

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I wonder why, the vast majority of professional philosophers are atheists? I am sure they have been exposed to all these arguments, and have found them unconvincing.

The Largest-Ever Survey of Philosophers

Atheism or theism?
72.8% atheism
14.6% theism
12.5% other

Your fallacious argument from authority is stupid. That's like polling beer drinkers about their wine preferences. Maybe intellectuals who are religiously inclined go into theology instead. What do you think the results of a poll of theologians would say?

[SteveII]

1. No, I think we derive a PSR from every observation that ever was with no exception. Why would we doubt those observations?(1) If we are going to go that far down the hyper-skepticism path, then your stance becomes that we can know nothing.(2) Do you have examples of where humans universally projected their own meaning on something? This argument avoids any personal projection of truth by referring to axioms like the PSR, the Law of Identity, the Law of the Excluded Middle, and the Law of Non-Contradiction.(3)

2. Related to (1), I think the human mind (collectively) is capable of working out fundamental features of reality. You don't have to have any biases to engage the argument. The inductive nature does not demand the conclusion is true--but even atheists have to concede that a first cause is a real problem for a purely naturalistic worldview. Isn't it special pleading when you encounter a problem your worldview can't deal with to say "well maybe we are projecting our thought onto reality"--when in literally every other area of science (and life) we act like we can navigate through it?(4)

(1)  Must every observation that ever was conform to how humans observe? Does reality operate solely within humanistic ways of thinking and sense-making?   

(2)  I clarified in my last post that I’m asking questions and am trying to learn more about your ideas and am interested in your responses to the questions that I’ve asked: I’m taking no stance.  Personally, I’ve made no final conclusions about reality, and as a result, I’m curious. That said, if reality does not conform to the ways that humans observe and make sense of things, then why must the conclusion be that humans can know nothing? Why can’t it be that humans can still know and understand features of reality provided that they minimize personal bias and are willing to interpret reality in a more neutral, objective manner that seeks to understand how reality works (rather than assuming that reality operates in a given way from the beginning)?  

(3) IMO, if one assumes that reality conforms to humanistic ways of thinking and sense-making, then it would seem that the following axioms posted above would also hold as they were derived via human reasoning.  However, if it is not the case that reality conforms to humanistic ways of thinking and sense-making, then how can one be sure that the above axioms will have universal validity in reality and that using them isn’t just some form of anthropomorphizing reality?

(4)  If one insists on framing intellectual conversations in a competitive way, then such a response could be perceived as special pleading to keep the contest alive.  However, I’ve already stated that my intent here is to ask questions: the last thing I want is for this exchange to devolve to some sort of contest.  That said, as stated in my response to (2), perhaps humans can navigate through life while learning cool, fascinating, and fundamental features of reality provided that they are willing to do this with a mindset that does not seek to explain via its own preconceptions/starting points but seeks to gain an understanding of that reality via inquisitiveness, neutrality/impartiality, and open-mindedness, so that it can explain reality in a more objective way.  What are your thoughts?

1. Your question seems to be: are human perceptions reliable? I would say yes. We are long past the days where we do not look for causes of everything. We understand facts and counterfactuals. We understand inferential and deductive reasoning. We understand mathematics. We understand human limitations. Do we understand everything? No. But enough to know a lot of what we don't know. 

2. I didn't say that if we cannot trust our perceptions, we can know nothing. We cannot be certain of anything. There is a difference. It inserts systematic doubt into everything. There is no justification for such a position.

3. Where the axioms of PSR, the Law of Identity, the Law of the Excluded Middle, and the Law of Non-Contradiction derived from human reasoning? Would they not all apply if there were not humans to think about them? I think they would. So, I think they are fundamental features of reality. In 'possible world semantics', these would exist in every possible world.  

4. At some point you have to develop a metaphysical framework in which to operate any investigation. You seem to be saying that holding firm to a framework is somehow counterproductive. I would say that not holding to a framework actually prevents meaningful investigation or attaining knowledge. Think about it, if one does not ascribe to a PSR, science does not get off the ground.

[downbeatplumb]

Well then, what is a god?

What is a theist?

What is a theist?

Someone who believes in a god.

As you are one can you explain to me what you believe in please. As much detail and specifics as you can theres a good chap.

[Neo-Scholastic]

If the initial conditions of the universe have been different we wouldn't be here discussing it.

Pure speculation. There is not enough data to show that the way things are is the only way they could be. Conversely, there is not enough data to show that things could be other than what they are.

[Angrboda]

4. At some point you have to develop a metaphysical framework in which to operate any investigation. You seem to be saying that holding firm to a framework is somehow counterproductive. I would say that not holding to a framework actually prevents meaningful investigation or attaining knowledge. Think about it, if one does not ascribe to a PSR, science does not get off the ground.

Not accepting the PSR doesn't mean you don't explain things, it just means it isn't a necessary truth that all things have explanations. That seems more a philosophical trouble than an issue for science. As a practical matter, there are likely to always be a lot of things we can't explain, and, some things which we can never explain due to practical constraints (such as what happened at the start of the big bang). Science still gets off the ground as science is simply about describing ordered phenomena. The PSR is a proscriptive or normative principle which is neither practically nor logically required for science. So, your claim here is false. All that science requires is that some things are explicable, but that principle is not the PSR. (And science even suggests that certain things are fundamentally inexplicable, such as the specifics of radioactive decay, and other quantum phenomena, so it seems that science has no trouble denying the PSR after all.)

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If the initial conditions of the universe have been different we wouldn't be here discussing it.

Pure speculation. There is not enough data to show that the way things are is the only way they could be. Conversely, there is not enough data to show that things could be other than what they are.

I'm pretty sure that from a strictly cause and effect standpoint, things indeed had to be the way they were or we wouldn't be here. I don't think he said that the way things are is the only way they could be. That would appear to be a straw man.

[Angrboda]

I've run out of time today. I'll try to get back to you this weekend, Steve.