Nihilism

[lrh9]

This would go a lot quicker on IRC.

[theVOID]

Good point, the more I think about the examples many of them were opposition to a desire it's self, which is perfectly valid.

However, There is still however praise and reward for good actions and desires.

Keep in mind, praise and condemnation for desires happen before or independently from the incident, praise and condemnation of actions is necessarily after the fact. One is preventative and the other is reactionary. You still have these measures and these are not opposition but support.

[theVOID]

Uh, what definitions are you using there?

Support and opposition seem to be the antithesis of each other, and something cannot be part of it's antithesis. Unless you are saying that support for one thing is necessarily opposition to it's antithesis? If that is the case then in asymmetrical circumstances support is not necessarily in opposition to something else - It would only apply in mutually exclusive choices.

[Tiberius]

1. All values exist as a relationship between desires and states of affairs and/or objects.
2. Desires are the only objects of evaluation that exist regarding value.
3. That which is good for an individual is that which fulfils the most/strongest desires from their competing sets of desires.
4. Morality is a subset of value dealing with shared values (good for us).
5. The values in question when it comes to making moral evaluation are all other desires (competing values)
6. Therefore, that which is morally good (good for us) is a desire that tends to fulfil the most and/or strongest desires from competing sets of desires.

If you spot any flaws feel free to point them out.

I don't see how this is an argument for moral realism. If anything, it is an argument that morals are determined by what the majority of people want, which is subjective, and therefore in the realm of moral nihilism. There is absolutely nothing "objective" in this argument, hence it cannot be an argument for moral realism.

Even if this argument were valid, you would first have to prove the usefulness (and existence) of "good" in an objective sense, since you use it in 3, 4, and 5 as a given. In this sense, the argument is neither valid nor sound (especially with regard to the first 2 propositions, which are unfounded).

[lrh9]

Uh, what definitions are you using there?

Support and opposition seem to be the antithesis of each other, and something cannot be part of it's antithesis. Unless you are saying that support for one thing is necessarily opposition to it's antithesis? If that is the case then in asymmetrical circumstances support is not necessarily in opposition to something else - It would only apply in mutually exclusive choices.

I edited my post about nihilism, so your argument is no longer relevant to my post about nihilism.

Since I am no longer contesting the assertions regarding my comments about how nihilism handles destructive people and how moral realists handle destructive people, may I delete my two previous replies?

[theVOID]

If you like, but it was a good point you had about condemnation and opposition being the same thing.

[lrh9]

Given a more preferable - to me - alternative I want to avoid conflict.

In this case I find it easier to revise my post about nihilism to be non-controversial.

It doesn't say anything significant, but problem resolved for now.

[theVOID]

I don't see how this is an argument for moral realism. If anything, it is an argument that morals are determined by what the majority of people want, which is subjective, and therefore in the realm of moral nihilism. There is absolutely nothing "objective" in this argument, hence it cannot be an argument for moral realism.

How?

The objective part is that it is objectively true or false whether or not a desire is good for both the individual and the society.

If Subjective means "grounded in the opinion or attitudes of persons" then Objective means "not grounded in the opinion of attitudes of persons"

It is not the desire of the person that is grounded in objectivity, it is the statement about which desires are good relative to all other desires. This is an evaluation with a right or wrong answer. It is either objectively true or false that Desire x tends to promote more and stronger desires than it thwarts. This is a statement of fact about a relationship that can be verified true or false - The conclusion of the evaluation is not in any way grounded in the attitude of persons, though the objects of the relationships are these very desires.

Given the premise that all values exist as a relationship between desires and states of affairs or objects, and given that to say something that is of a positive increase in value is good and given that which is good for an individual is that what fulfils the most and/or strongest desires from their own competing sets of desires, it is true that some desires have a greater positive value than others.

If good means anything at all it is about positive value.

We can have opinions and intuitions about whether or not the desires we have are ones that tend to bring about the most value for the most people, but there is an objective way of determining it.

Wants are a subset of desires, you can get away with using them interchangeably in most circumstances.

There is nothing to say that an objective truth cannot exist in a relationship, the proposed distance between the sun and the earth is either true or false yet the distance is determined by a relationship between the two objects. What is to stop us using desires instead of planets and making truth claims about the relationships between desires?

Even if this argument were valid, you would first have to prove the usefulness (and existence) of "good" in an objective sense, since you use it in 3, 4, and 5 as a given. In this sense, the argument is neither valid nor sound (especially with regard to the first 2 propositions, which are unfounded).

Any statement of value made by an individual comes down to their desires for a state of affairs or object. To value equality is to desire a state of affairs in which the statement "everyone is equal" is to be made or kept true.

Good means "positive or desirable in nature" (thefreedictionary.com) and is also used comparatively towards something that is less desirable. If good is desirable then the fulfilment of a desire is necessarily good. If individuals have competing sets of desires then that which fulfils the most/strongest from competing sets is the "most desirable". When good is used comparatively the best of the options is the one that is more derisible.

In the same sense that for an individual the "most derisible" thing is better than all other things the desire that is 'good for us' is the one that is most desirable for the most people.

And thus we have a moral theory that is based on desires being the object of evaluation regarding values, good is that which is desirable and a good desire is that which tends to promote more/stronger desires than it thwarts (has a net positive impact). To assess shared values you need to evaluate desires as they overlap relative to the consequences of the desires (their ability to promote or thwart more desires).

[lrh9]

I would like to point out that a description of something is only proof that it exists in some manner and that it was perceived in some way. The description of something is not proof that it should be as it is.

For instance, one common variant of this mistake is the naturalistic fallacy. The fact that most organisms of a species behave a certain way does not make the proposition, "That behavior is moral.", true.

[theVOID]

Do you want to point out the error or just insist it's there?