What would be the harm?

[The Grand Nudger]

How do we know that someone is healthy? But..no, in direct answer to your question..I don't think that we can be sure that a person is making the Right Conclusions™ based upon their general well being. Sometimes, people in a poor state are positively brilliant and folks hopping along without a care in the world..... damningly stupid.

In the context of moral objectivety (or realism in general)...we usually refer to the rationality of ones propositions, in combination with the information from which they make inference, to determine whether or not they are arriving at the Right Conclusions™. We're attempting a rational conversation right now..you and I...so I assume that you and I share that particular metric. I could use that opportunity to mount one of harris responses to criticism of his brand of scientific realism, while I'm at it.

Why should we value logic?

How come "waffles" isn't a sufficient response to your post? Says who?

At some point, the answer to the question of why, be it logic or well being and why we value either, is just that we do. I could give any number of interim explanations but we could always then ask why we value that thing. Around and around we go....but, to what end? None in particular. This is a separate question from whether or not something has some value, for us -to- value. That question..and that answer, as proposed by value objectivism, is that we value logic because it has value. Because we are capable of apprehending such a value. Much in the same way as we may value wellbeing, or oxygen. Each delivers goods.

That it's not necessarily our valuing that makes something valuable (though obviously it can be!)..but, rather, the reverse. That the fact of it's value can cause -us- to value -it-...as the value of oxygen provides a direct explanation for why we might desire to possess it. Without oxygen, we will die. Without reason, I would be shouting "waffles!" and you would retort "toilet paper toilet paper toilet paper!".

Both of us secure in the knowledge that whatever the fuck either of us is talking about is certainly true and the other guy is damningly stupid!

[bennyboy]

Except that it doesn't..since oxygen has value even to creatures that do not possess any such organ or mind

No, it doesn't, any more than the flow of electricity has value to a computer. The computer doesn't give a shit if it is powered-up or not; it is OUR imposition of world view from which we derive a sense of function, and therefore of the goals of function, and therefore of the value of this or that state in serving those functional goals. We desire to type out our philosophical ideas, rather than to look at a blank screen.

---

How do we know that someone is healthy?

We define health in terms of function.

How about this-- SHOULD someone be healthy? If morality is to be based on hedonic state, does that mean I have a moral obligation to maximize my own well-being? What if I feel guilty about something, and harming myself is an attempt to fulfill justice?

And what about justice in general? Should I track down my daughter's rapist and murderer, tickle him gleefully for several minutes, and feed him cream puffs and caviar, since this will increase his sense of well-being? Or should I light the fucking world on fire in my efforts to track him down, secure him in my basement, and tear strips of skin off him for a few years, just on general principle? Cuz I gotta tell you. . . I'm pretty sure I know which path I would take.

[The Grand Nudger]

Except that it doesn't..since oxygen has value even to creatures that do not possess any such organ or mind

No, it doesn't, any more than the flow of electricity has value to a computer.  The computer doesn't give a shit if it is powered-up or not; it is OUR imposition of world view from which we derive a sense of function, and therefore of the goals of function, and therefore of the value of this or that state in serving those functional goals.  We desire to type out our philosophical ideas, rather than to look at a blank screen.

The computer may not be able to apprehend value, but electricity still has a value to a computer as a necessity of it's operation.  Conditional/universal.  In the same way, it may be a that a person is incapable of apprehending value, but that won;t mean that the thing being considered doesn't have it.

Imagine we had ourselves a time machine, and we grabbed some neolithic hunter gatherer and put him into a room.  In this room..there's a fire extinguisher.  We set the room on fire.  This person may very likely not realize that the fire extinguisher has immense and immediate value to them.  The reason that they don't realize that is because of a lack of information.   They don't know what a fire extinguisher is.

If, however, we explained what it was beforehand, they would possess that information..and we would expect that person to apprehend the value of the fire extinguisher when we set the room on fire.  To reach for it, and put out the fire.

This is all that's meant by "reaching the proper conclusion" in the context of objective values.

How do we know that someone is healthy?

We define health in terms of function.

How about this-- SHOULD someone be healthy?  If morality is to be based on hedonic state, does that mean I have a moral obligation to maximize my own well-being?  What if I feel guilty about something, and harming myself is an attempt to fulfill justice?

And what about justice in general?  Should I track down my daughter's rapist and murderer, tickle him gleefully for several minutes, and feed him cream puffs and caviar, since this will increase his sense of well-being?  Or should I light the fucking world on fire in my efforts to track him down, secure him in my basement, and tear strips of skin off him for a few years, just on general principle?   Cuz I gotta tell you. . . I'm pretty sure I know which path I would take.

All great questions...but unless we can agree on a set of instructive or informative metrics then no explanation or answer to any of those things will be productive between us.  

This mirrors the state of the neolithic man and the fire extinguisher, as well as moral subjectivity and objectivity. As far as the question above..personally...I'd high five you on your way to prison and set up some gofundme for your commissary card.

Harris, I think, would suggest that behavioral modification for the rapist would be the way to go..rather than retribution. It's something he's commented on before.
(i suppose you -could- tickle him and feed him cavier, not sure what the harm would be in that, but I'm also not sure why it stood opposite to retribution, so..meh?)

[bennyboy]

No, it doesn't, any more than the flow of electricity has value to a computer.  The computer doesn't give a shit if it is powered-up or not; it is OUR imposition of world view from which we derive a sense of function, and therefore of the goals of function, and therefore of the value of this or that state in serving those functional goals.  We desire to type out our philosophical ideas, rather than to look at a blank screen.

The computer may not be able to apprehend value, but electricity still has a value to a computer as a necessity of it's operation.  Conditional/universal.  In the same way, it may be a that a person is incapable of apprehending value, but that won;t mean that the thing being considered doesn't have it.

Then I don't agree with your definition of the word "value." Power is not necessary to a computer's operation, as a computer is operating perfectly fine just sitting there being a collection of metal and plastic particles. It's only if an outside observer wants the computer to DO something that there's any value to the power.

And this is a non-trivial point. All the things we're talking about have an underlying attribute about item cohesion. We conceptualize a brain as a unified arrangement of materials which has a certain function, and conceive of the idea that disruptions to this function (say by blowing parts of it onto your ceiling) represent a harm.

But the materials in the brain are elemental, and contain no brain-ness to them. There's no particular need for those elements not to be burned, fed to worms, or otherwise repurposed. What's the harm in anything, if the Universe perfectly conserves energy? The answer is in our experience of things: we prefer certain configurations of material to others-- brain material inside a head, processing food and saying "Yummy, daddy!"

There's literally nothing which we say has value that didn't get that value FROM US, i.e. from our world view, and our feelings about things in our world. Not a thing.

[The Grand Nudger]

The computer may not be able to apprehend value, but electricity still has a value to a computer as a necessity of it's operation.  Conditional/universal.  In the same way, it may be a that a person is incapable of apprehending value, but that won;t mean that the thing being considered doesn't have it.

Then I don't agree with your definition of the word "value."  Power is not necessary to a computer's operation, as a computer is operating perfectly fine just sitting there being a collection of metal and plastic particles.  It's only if an outside observer wants the computer to DO something that there's any value to the power.

Well, okay, but do you disagree with it for it for any reason that would be relevant to it's use in ethical theories or in any sense of it's objective signification?  That someone wants something doesn't actually actually make that value necessarily subjective in the sense that moral theorists are referring to anyway.  A person could want something because it is valuable. A meaningful subjectivist value as moral theorists are discussing it, is something that only has value -because- we want it.

In sum, you can disagree if you like, but, as with moral disagreement, that may not signify anything meaningful.  

And this is a non-trivial point.  All the things we're talking about have an underlying attribute about item cohesion.  We conceptualize a brain as a unified arrangement of materials which has a certain function, and conceive of the idea that disruptions to this function (say by blowing parts of it onto your ceiling) represent a harm.

But the materials in the brain are elemental, and contain no brain-ness to them.  There's no particular need for those elements not to be burned, fed to worms, or otherwise repurposed.  What's the harm in anything, if the Universe perfectly conserves energy?  The answer is in our experience of things: we prefer certain configurations of material to others-- brain material inside a head, processing food and saying "Yummy, daddy!"  

There's literally nothing which we say has value that didn't get that value FROM US, i.e. from our world view, and our feelings about things in our world.  Not a thing.

Indeed.  Whats the harm of anything?  Whats the anything of anything?  What's anything? Waffles, waffles waffles, toilet paper toilet paper toilet paper.

We've gone from worrying that harm is subjective...and failing that, just implying that there's no such thing as harm in any sense.  Another pickle. It's starting to seem like the driving argument behind any objection is "anything but objectivism, and if objectivism, fuck it, nothing!". One wonders if you would leverage the same objection to our hunter gatherer and his fire extinguisher (and it not, why not). I mean..he -could- just burn...right? There's no reason that he has to stay not-burnt. Maybe he doesn't want to do anything, or maybe we don't want him to do anything. What is burnt, anyway? Is there even such a thing as fire? If there isn't, what does it mean to "extinguish fire"? I mean, we could ask all of those questions until we're blue in the face...but in truth, do any of them remove a fire extinguishers value for extinguishing fires or is it just a way of delaying an acknowledgement? Repeat again with electricity and computers. Ultimately, we don't have to want to extinguish a fire for a fire extinguisher to have that value, or to want to do any computing for electricity to have that value. It sits there, as potential..regardless of whether we want it, or want to make use of it. The same might be true of moral value. What are it;s value making properties? Some property exclusively of our mind..well, no. The properties that make a fire extinguisher good at extinguishing firs are it;s own, and that;s what gives it value -as- a fire extinguisher..and that might explain why we want one whenever we see a fire we want to put out. In this, we're recognizing value, not creating it.

-on and on, ad infinitum. The buck has to stop somewhere, or we're not actually having a rational conversation with an eye to understand the propositions. How about you suggest that amenable place? The place where you would begin to justify any objective thing. Doesn;t have to be moral, just..something that you think is objective, and what you use to say that..and we'll work form there, to see if that sort of objectivity making x can proceed into a moral principle. Rather than working the other way round?

---

There's literally nothing which we say has value that didn't get that value FROM US, i.e. from our world view, and our feelings about things in our world.  Not a thing.

This though, you have to stop with this reassertion. It's just not that cut and dry. We didn't give oxygen the value it has to us.  We inherited that from our biology.  If we could choose, we might choose not to be so dependent, lol....especially when we're drowning. Our oxygen dependence and thus oxygen's value to us is not a mind dependent fact, it's mind independent and anything that needs oxygen is in a similar state, mind or no mind. So...theres at least one thing. It's not actually going to be hard to find more things like it. The question of objective moral value is in finding other values that are like that sort of value. Then...when we've found those, to winnow down those values that fall to this or that fallacy.

[bennyboy]

Then I don't agree with your definition of the word "value."  Power is not necessary to a computer's operation, as a computer is operating perfectly fine just sitting there being a collection of metal and plastic particles.  It's only if an outside observer wants the computer to DO something that there's any value to the power.

Well, okay, but do you disagree with it for it for any reason that would be relevant to it's use in ethical theories or in any sense of it's objective signification?  That someone wants something doesn't actually actually make that value necessarily subjective in the sense that moral theorists are referring to anyway.  A person could want something because it is valuable.  

No.  It's valuable because the person wants it, or something associated with it.  There's no such thing as value without a subjective attribution of value.

[The Grand Nudger]

You keep saying that, but that wont make it true...and even if it is the case that some value is exactly as you describe it (and I certainly agree that it is), that won't be enough to demonstrate that all value is, or is necessarily so.  

Could you explain what obvious fault there is with the notion that we can, at least sometimes, recognize value rather than create it.. that this value is an issue of some value making property of the thing in question?

I could point out problems with the sort of value proposed in the oxygen example...as it relates to moral realism. That it's an instrumental good, for example..but there doesn't seem to be any obvious problem of objectivity there so far as moral theory is concerned. Nor in the fire extinguisher example, as it relates to objectivity and what might be failures or successes of objectivity that could express themselves as value disagreement.

I'm looking for something more than "all value is subjective because I/subjectivists say so".

Or, if you prefer, something obviously wrong with the notion that the mere presence of a subjective assessment of x does not, in and of itself, obviate the actuality or possibility of some thing x's objective existence. Both things can be concurrent, could they not?

That, to continue with the same examples..fire extinguishers really can be good-for putting out fires..even if theres no one around who wants to put out fires. That, if someone did want to put out fires, they value fire extinguishers for those properties that make them good-for putting out fires. That if they don't value fire extinguishers, but they do want to put out fires, explaining what a fire extinguisher is would give them cause to then value fire extinguishers.

---

Or, if you prefer:

Can you explain why fire extinguishers can only be subjectively good-for putting out fires?  That a fire extinguisher could only be valued for subjective properties?  Or that no explanation of what a fire extinguisher is would cause a person to see anything but a subjective value of fire extinguishers?

---

Or...and heres a real nasty one...imagine that some thing x actually is valuable because some other person wants it.  No particular use or anything like that, no good-fors.  No particular reason.  Some guy just wants it.

His valuing the thing is immediately recognizable as a subjective value....but how about yours as a middle man?  If the other guys wants it, then it has value, that value isn't an artifact of your mind..you're not imagining it.  He really will hand you money for it.  In what way is that thing not objectively valuable, even if his valuation is meaningfully subjective? For that matter, he really does want it, so there's the objective fact of his subjective valuation. Through all of this, you don't think it's worth shit, it's just trash, you're astounded that anyone will pay anything for it.

This last one I ask because it does seem to be the case that some subjectively valued thing can become objectively valuable as moral theorists discuss objectivity. Or is there something obviously wrong with that notion?
(there's a subtle kicker in there too...wonder if you'll spot it)

[bennyboy]

Could you explain what obvious fault there is with the notion that we can, at least sometimes, recognize value rather than create it.. that this value is an issue of some value making property of the thing in question?

The obvious fault is that you need a subjective agent who has feelings about things for the idea of value even to make sense. Do you think that a rock values the soil around it? Or that the sun values the Earth?

I'm looking for something more than "all value is subjective because I/subjectivists say so".

For any given thing of value, you could find some who either do not value it, or hold a negative value toward it. There are two positions:
1) The thing has no intrinsic value, and subjective agents imbue it with value by dubbing it so.
2) The thing is intrinsically valuable, and functional people will know that, and dysfunctional people will not know it.

My position is (1) and yours is (2). You'll have to explain by what metric we will judge judges-- who is functional and who is dysfunctional? I believe that there's no way for you to do this without a circular reference-- "Obviously, a suicidal person is dysfunctional and a non-suicidal person is functional." Why? "Because they recognize the intrinsic value in life" or whatever.

I said in the previous thread that your stance was religious. That didn't sit well with Jorg at the time, I should have known that would be the case since this is atheistforums.org. But the analogy is still there-- this "knowing without knowing" that a particular mode of circular thinking is right simply because someone is so immersed in it.


Maybe at this point, we should establish a definition of value (spare me the dictionary link, please, and make your own) which isn't dependent on people's feelings about things. Because my position is so obvious to me that it's hard to comprehend that any sensible person could begin to argue against it.

[The Grand Nudger]

Could you explain what obvious fault there is with the notion that we can, at least sometimes, recognize value rather than create it.. that this value is an issue of some value making property of the thing in question?

The obvious fault is that you need a subjective agent who has feelings about things for the idea of value even to make sense.  Do you think that a rock values the soil around it?  Or that the sun values the Earth?

Why would that be a problem.  The mere presence of a subjective agent does not make some thing, itself, subjective.  Have you seriously considered the implications of this statement....if it were true.  

I'm in the presence of a subjective agent right now.....you.  Do you feel that I would be justified in disregarding everything you've said to me on account of that..or do you think that even though you;re a subjective agent, and even though i need you, for your thoughts...that some of them are true?  Specifically, those criticisms you've levied against notions of objectivity?

For any given thing of value, you could find some who either do not value it, or hold a negative value toward it.  There are two positions:
1)  The thing has no intrinsic value, and subjective agents imbue it with value by dubbing it so.
2)  The thing is intrinsically valuable, and functional people will know that, and dysfunctional people will not know it.

I'm not worried about intrinsic value, at present.  I've been giving you examples of instrumental values that are objective in the sense that moral theorists discuss them so that you can see why the statement "all values are subjective" might not be a true statement as objectivity and subjectivity are discussed in moral theory.  A more careful (and aruably more accurate) statement may be "all value judgements are subjectively possessed"

My position is (1) and yours is (2).  You'll have to explain by what metric we will judge judges-- who is functional and who is dysfunctional?  I believe that there's no way for you to do this without a circular reference-- "Obviously, a suicidal person is dysfunctional and a non-suicidal person is functional."  Why?  "Because they recognize the intrinsic value in life" or whatever.

Sure, I do think that there's such a thing as intrinsic value, but you know..see above.  Additionally, I can only tell you that moral disagreement may not signify anything relevant, and explain why, and give examples of how that explanation plays out in practice..so many times. In the case of the fire extinguisher and value disagreement..it wasn;t actually a value disagreement between the two parties - though it seemed as much at first glance. Once supplied with the relevant empirical knowledge the value judgements were equivalent. Non natural realists propose exactly this relationship between empirical claims and moral judgement.

I said in the previous thread that your stance was religious.  That didn't sit well with Jorg at the time, I should have known that would be the case since this is atheistforums.org.  But the analogy is still there-- this "knowing without knowing" that a particular mode of circular thinking is right simply because someone is so immersed in it.

Calling something religious is a lazy way to admit that you don;t have an argument. 

Maybe at this point, we should establish a definition of value (spare me the dictionary link, please, and make your own) which isn't dependent on people's feelings about things.  Because my position is so obvious to me that it's hard to comprehend that any sensible person could begin to argue against it.

You ask for a definition and then rule out a dictionary, lol.  Your position may be obvious to you..I get that, but..again....as moral theorists are discussing subjectivity and objectivity, the presence of a subjective agent is not enough to establish subjectivity.  That a subjective agent is making some claim is not enough to establish that the claim is subjective, either.

What they're looking for, is some mind independent fact referred to -by- that subjective agent.  So, for example..it is a fact that oxygen is valuable to anything that depends on oxygen, and that fire extinguishers are good-for putting out fires.  We are not imagining this, it's a true statement  (and, in this case, of natural properties). Well being, like health, can be conceptualized as just such a metric. It may not be the only metric for moral evaluation...it may be the wrong metric for moral evaluation (though..it's super difficult to assert this one)...and it has problems. The problem it doesn't have, though, is a problem of not being meaningfully objective.

What's clear is that, to you, anything that comes from a subjective agent is subjective and you treat this as tautologically true (though what that would mean if it were is kind of amusing, given your subjective agency)...but that's not at all what moral theorists are discussing with objectivity or subjectivity.

[bennyboy]

The obvious fault is that you need a subjective agent who has feelings about things for the idea of value even to make sense.  Do you think that a rock values the soil around it?  Or that the sun values the Earth?

Why would that be a problem.  The mere presence of a subjective agent does not make some thing, itself, subjective.  Have you seriously considered the implications of this statement....if it were true.  

I'm in the presence of a subjective agent right now.....you.  Do you feel that I would be justified in disregarding everything you've said to me on account of that..or do you think that even though you;re a subjective agent, and even though i need you, for your thoughts...that some of them are true?  Specifically, those criticisms you've levied against notions of objectivity?

I don't have a problem with objectivity. . . only with the idea that value is objective.

I'm not worried about intrinsic value, at present.

Either something has intrinsic value, or that value is assigned to it by a subjective agent.

Calling something religious is a lazy way to admit that you don;t have an argument. 

No. It's a way of describing an obvious circular argument in a way that I think will make the point salient to an atheist. This is because atheists often refer to Biblical circularity as a major flaw in Christian argumentation.

You ask for a definition and then rule out a dictionary, lol.  Your position may be obvious to you..I get that, but..again....as moral theorists are discussing subjectivity and objectivity, the presence of a subjective agent is not enough to establish subjectivity.  That a subjective agent is making some claim is not enough to establish that the claim is subjective, either.

Does a corpse value oxygen? Does a rock? Does a guy sitting in his car in his garage trying to breathe in as much carbon monoxide as he can, or a man with a rope around his neck? How about a woman who walks into a room and sees her young toddler struggling with a plastic bag on his head?

We have here a collection of non-agents, and of subjective agents. In none of these cases is the value of oxygen clearly resolved. What we CAN do is predict that the mother will act as though oxygen is extremely valuable indeed, and the others not so much.

What they're looking for, is some mind independent fact referred to -by- that subjective agent.  So, for example..it is a fact that oxygen is valuable to anything that depends on oxygen, and that fire extinguishers are good-for putting out fires.  We are not imagining this, it's a true statement  (and, in this case, of natural properties).  Well being, like health, can be conceptualized as just such a metric.  It may not be the only metric for moral evaluation...it may be the wrong metric for moral evaluation (though..it;s a super difficult to assert this one)...it has problems.  The problem it doesn't have, is a problem of not being meaningfully objective.

As I said earlier, once a subjective agent has determined that it considers something of value, then there can be objective contributors to his thinking process. If I decide that pain is harm, and harm is bad, then I can claim a broken leg to be an objective harm. But to then say that broken legs are objectively bad is wrong-- it's just a projection of a subjective agent onto an objective state.

Maybe the road to philosophical truth is to stab steak knives through your eyes and bash your head against a table top until you break through to the "other side"-- if you think so, then you may feel that's a good action. Now, most of us have instincts that tell us this is counterproductive. We view acts like that as deeply bad.

And yet. . . it's all just states of matter, no? Remember my previous definition of morality-- that it mediates among feelings, ideas and the objective environment, but that it is mainly predicated on feeling.

Assuming you assume that steak knife philosophy is bad, do you have a rational reason for that, or is it because the idea of doing that seems abhorrent? My prediction is that you'll go one step back, but not back to the root, which is where the issue of the roots of value must go in order to be valid.