why do we enjoy poetry From the perspective of neuroscience?

[Angrboda]

The argument to other minds is an inductive argument, based upon the premise that similar effects have similar causes. It's hardly brain surgery, benny.

[bennyboy]

The argument to other minds is an inductive argument, based upon the premise that similar effects have similar causes.  It's hardly brain surgery, benny.

That's right.  That's why when I wake up in the morning, I act as though everyone is real-- it makes my social interactions so much more meaningful.

That being said, an argument by similarity is only as valid as the similarity itself.  Seems-so-is is the fundamental issue here, so declaring "seems-so-is because inductive argument" doesn't really address that underlying philosophical problem.

[GrandizerII]

The argument to other minds is an inductive argument, based upon the premise that similar effects have similar causes.  It's hardly brain surgery, benny.

That's right.  That's why when I wake up in the morning, I act as though everyone is real-- it makes my social interactions so much more meaningful.

That being said, an argument by similarity is only as valid as the similarity itself.  Seems-so-is is the fundamental issue here, so declaring "seems-so-is because inductive argument" doesn't really address that underlying philosophical problem.

It's only a problem if you're looking for a deductive type of proof. Otherwise there is nothing unreasonable about assuming other people just like you and me have minds of their own, just as we do. What's more plausible? That we all share a lot of universally common features being members of the same species, or that somehow there's something really special about you that others who look and behave similarly to you just don't have: consciousness?

[bennyboy]

Do a thought experiment. What if you were in the Matrix or the Mind of God? So long as your experiences seemed consistent, would you know? Could you?

"It's plausible" without something that can actually have statistical analyses attached to it is really just another word for "seems-so-is." Things seem plausible which are in accord with my mode of perception, my world view, and so on. But I cannot use any of those things to validate themselves without immediately going circular.

But this is what we're doing when we talk about mind-- using mind (whatever it is) to establish truths about itself. It's like using an in-the-Matrix "brain" to prove you're not in the Matrix (or that you are).

[Belacqua]

That's right.  That's why when I wake up in the morning, I act as though everyone is real-- it makes my social interactions so much more meaningful.

That being said, an argument by similarity is only as valid as the similarity itself.  Seems-so-is is the fundamental issue here, so declaring "seems-so-is because inductive argument" doesn't really address that underlying philosophical problem.

It's only a problem if you're looking for a deductive type of proof. Otherwise there is nothing unreasonable about assuming other people just like you and me have minds of their own, just as we do. What's more plausible? That we all share a lot of universally common features being members of the same species, or that somehow there's something really special about you that others who look and behave similarly to you just don't have: consciousness?

I don't think anybody here is genuinely doubting that other people have consciousness. Even I'm not that skeptical. 

The point of the p-zombie thought experiment isn't to challenge the idea that other people are conscious. It's just to pose the question: what precisely can we point to that will distinguish a conscious subject from a high-functioning non-conscious robot?

[GrandizerII]

No I wouldn't really really really know. But do a Bayesian analysis and compare both sides; it makes sense to believe other people have minds of their own. Given what we do know and observe, of course.

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It's only a problem if you're looking for a deductive type of proof. Otherwise there is nothing unreasonable about assuming other people just like you and me have minds of their own, just as we do. What's more plausible? That we all share a lot of universally common features being members of the same species, or that somehow there's something really special about you that others who look and behave similarly to you just don't have: consciousness?

I don't think anybody here is genuinely doubting that other people have consciousness. Even I'm not that skeptical.

I'm just answering what I read. If bennyboy doesn't genuinely believe solipsism is true, cool. This means he thinks it's reasonable to believe others have minds of their own, right?

The point of the p-zombie thought experiment isn't to challenge the idea that other people are conscious. It's just to pose the question: what precisely can we point to that will distinguish a conscious subject from a high-functioning non-conscious robot?

That's a little bit of a different question from what I was addressing. My answer here is no idea. Depends on ones views of consciousness.

[Dmitry1983]

it makes sense to believe other people have minds of their own. 

Scientificaly it doesn't since you can observe only one mind
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statistical_significance

[GrandizerII]

it makes sense to believe other people have minds of their own. 

Scientificaly it doesn't since you can observe only one mind
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Statistical_significance

Not quite. You can make inferences using science and null hypothesis usually assumes equality and symmetry as opposed to asymmetry.

[Belacqua]

I don't think anybody here is genuinely doubting that other people have consciousness. Even I'm not that skeptical.

I'm just answering what I read. If bennyboy doesn't genuinely believe solipsism is true, cool. This means he thinks it's reasonable to believe others have minds of their own, right?

I don't want to speak for him, but I haven't gotten the idea that he's a solipsist. I think the discussion got a bit sidetracked by someone else's misunderstanding of the thought experiment. 

The point of the p-zombie thought experiment isn't to challenge the idea that other people are conscious. It's just to pose the question: what precisely can we point to that will distinguish a conscious subject from a high-functioning non-conscious robot?

That's a little bit of a different question from what I was addressing. My answer here is no idea. Depends on ones views of consciousness.

Me too. But I think that's the point of the whole p-zombie concept -- just to show that there is no clear and obvious thing we can point to. From outside another person's mind, it is absolutely reasonable -- but absolutely unprovable -- to think that they are having experiences just as I do.

[Belacqua]

To me the orchestra analogy doesn't work because a single note and a symphony are ontologically the same; the difference is complexity. But an electrochemical event and an experience are not, in my view, ontologically the same.

It's true that there are emergent properties in the world that come about due to complexity, but I haven't seen it demonstrated yet that consciousness is one of those things. Some people think it is. If you have some argument for this I will read it.

Not just complexity, but relationships.  Single notes of an orchestra piece may be ontologically the same, but the timing and relationships between them over time are not.  Those are new properties which only exist in the full piece.  That's where the music exists, and that music is similar to the emergent property of consciousness in that sense.  The music doesn't exist without the timing and relationships between the notes.  I will describe this in more detail in my book report about the human brain.

Thanks for remaining reasonable and patient.  I guess I'm having a hard time articulating my thoughts well enough to be understood.  That's part of the reason I'm working on a longer presentation.  I will add this much, however: another way to express one of my main points is that the hard problem of consciousness isn't really about how consciousness arose, but about how life arose.  The latter is what created subjects from objects.  Thus my comment that consciousness is necessarily an experience of bodies, and that it couldn't exist without them.  That wasn't intended as a tautology.

I've read the first chapter and a half of the Gazzaniga book, and I'm impressed! 

Often enough, when a scientist starts a book with a brief summary of the history of his field, it makes me cringe. Especially if the subject is one that has bumped up against religion, what we get is ideology disguised as fact. And the more popular a book, the more likely this is to happen. (Carl Sagan and Neil Tyson, I'm looking at you.) But Gazzaniga gives the impression of being fair and knowledgable. Both the historical facts and the philosophy are clear and accurate, as far as I can tell. 

(There is one point I'd ask him about if I were in his class: I have on hand here reproductions of diagrams from a European translation of Avicenna, made in about 1300 AD, and it clearly shows thought happening in the brain. It even shows that different parts of the brain have different thought functions. Avicenna thought that deep memory is at the back of the brain, which is why we tend to tip our heads back when we're trying to recall something. Gazzaniga seems to say that locating thought in the brain was later than this date. But obviously, he couldn't include everything or the book would be a million pages long.)

So he's made a very good impression so far. I'm looking forward to the rest. Thank you for pointing out the book to me.