why do we enjoy poetry From the perspective of neuroscience?

[Alan V]

I do not know whether time is a dimension, or how the Universe carries state information from one moment to the other.

Well, without any working concept of cause and effect, how could you understand how the universe carries state information from one moment to another? Objects exist in time.

Time is essential to General Relativity. There's an arrow of time in thermodynamics too. So time is built right into physics.

And since thermodynamics is statistical, it provides latitude for life to self-organize. Life increases in complexity at the cost of more disorder elsewhere.

At least that's my understanding, as over-simplified as it may be. You, on the other hand, seem to be playing dumb on these issues. I have a hard time understanding your respect for science, if you question so many of its observations.

(I wish Mathilda would comment on this discussion. She is articulate about thermodynamics.) @Mathilda

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Does mind supervene on the brain as a whole, or is it intrinsic in some kind of unknown way to self-referential information over time, or is it that every interchange of energy in the Universe is also an essential atomic nano-conscious event?

Research has shown that while consciousness is dispersed throughout different modules of the brain, not all brain activity produces consciousness. That being the case, I would guess the answer is that not only is consciousness brain-dependent, it is dependent on specific aspects of the brain. Perhaps it's confined to the overarching control layers where the specific selective properties of consciousness are employed. You have to look at consciousness in terms of its evolutionary function. Since the operation of the brain is energy intensive, it only makes sense that consciousness is confined to where it has a function to perform.

I'd like to introduce an idea for discussion-- transcendence of supervenient properties, especially information.  It seems to me that an .mp3 file, for example, while it is dependent on SOME medium or mechanism, has a life of its own.  You could run Windows 10 on silicon based systems, or in a collection of abacuses manipulated by clever monkeys, and so long as your drivers crash for no reason and it insists on updating even though you keep telling it not to, it's still just Windows-- I'd say that Windows is transcendent of whatever mechanism it supervenes on.

You and I don't really speak the same language altogether. I will be reading more philosophy this year, but may not be able to follow your interests until later -- if at all. Perhaps you could tell me how this relates to the discussion.

[bennyboy]

Research has shown that while consciousness is dispersed throughout different modules of the brain, not all brain activity produces consciousness.  That being the case, I would guess the answer is that not only is consciousness brain-dependent, it is dependent on specific aspects of the brain.  Perhaps it's confined to the overarching control layers where the specific selective properties of consciousness are employed.  You have to look at consciousness in terms of its evolutionary function.  Since the operation of the brain is energy intensive, it only makes sense that consciousness is confined to where it has a function to perform.

My understanding is that they have not been able to identify a seat for consciousness-- at best, it is distributed among several brain. But that was a couple years ago at least, so maybe I should spend a few minutes with google before I embarrass myself.

You and I don't really speak the same language altogether.  I will be reading more philosophy this year, but may not be able to follow your interests until later -- if at all.  Perhaps you could tell me how this relates to the discussion.

To use the wave metaphor-- is a wave something that water does, or does a wave have a more abstract identity, which can only be seen as it propagates through the wave, but cannot really be said to be OF the water (or at least, of the water in particular).

The .mp3 metaphor, likewise. I'd say that a Beatle's Yesterday.mp3 song on a disk is a material record of a more abstract entity-- the sonic ideas present in a room 40 years ago which are propagating in extremely complex ways through various media.

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At least that's my understanding, as over-simplified as it may be.  You, on the other hand, seem to be playing dumb on these issues.  I have a hard time understanding your respect for science, if you question so many of its observations.

It's because I'm very aware of the relationship between context and truths which I think must ALWAYS either explicitly or implicitly be held in relation to some context.

Psychology and psychogony are conflated in science, since science cannot (by definition I think) say much about brute facts. But when conflation is treated as equation ("We know a lot about how the brain affects experience" --> "We understand what mind is and why it exists. . . the brain!"), then this is in my opinion an overly impoverished philosophical position.

[Alan V]

At least that's my understanding, as over-simplified as it may be.  You, on the other hand, seem to be playing dumb on these issues.  I have a hard time understanding your respect for science, if you question so many of its observations.

It's because I'm very aware of the relationship between context and truths which I think must ALWAYS either explicitly or implicitly be held in relation to some context.

Psychology and psychogony are conflated in science, since science cannot (by definition I think) say much about brute facts.  But when conflation is treated as equation ("We know a lot about how the brain affects experience" --> "We understand what mind is and why it exists. . . the brain!"), then this is in my opinion an overly impoverished philosophical position.

I prefer to think of science as conservative, in that it doesn't wander far from what is warranted from observations. So I guess we will remain at odds on certain issues.

[Belacqua]

I'm about halfway through The Consciousness Instinct by Michael Gazzaniga.

In Chapter 3 I find this sentence:

In discussing cerebral events as they relate to conscious experiences, Eccles asked the question, "How can some specific spatiotemporal pattern of neuronal activity in the cerebral cortex evoke a particular sensory experience?" That question was left unanswered, and remains so.

So this doesn't bode well for the specific question that we've been pondering on this thread.

So far, it appears that the book does two things:

1) It gives the most up to date information on what is going on in the brain when consciousness occurs. This includes descriptions of the "architecture" of the brain, to explain things like different levels of attention. For example, when you're concentrating on one thing, you may be less aware of something near you, which may suddenly come to the front of your perception.

2) It explains why consciousness is useful for us -- how we benefit from it. This shows why natural selection would favor it.

These are interesting topics. But, as I say, not the one we were looking at.

Maybe something more relevant will appear later in the book.

[Alan V]

I'm about halfway through The Consciousness Instinct by Michael Gazzaniga.

In Chapter 3 I find this sentence:

In discussing cerebral events as they relate to conscious experiences, Eccles asked the question, "How can some specific spatiotemporal pattern of neuronal activity in the cerebral cortex evoke a particular sensory experience?" That question was left unanswered, and remains so.

Yeah, I thought of you when I read that line.  But it's sort of like asking, "How can a TV transfer an image from one place to another through mere electronics?" The answer is likely to be both very technical and uninteresting compared with what we would really like to know. The book tackles questions I find of more interest.

[bennyboy]

It's because I'm very aware of the relationship between context and truths which I think must ALWAYS either explicitly or implicitly be held in relation to some context.

Psychology and psychogony are conflated in science, since science cannot (by definition I think) say much about brute facts.  But when conflation is treated as equation ("We know a lot about how the brain affects experience" --> "We understand what mind is and why it exists. . . the brain!"), then this is in my opinion an overly impoverished philosophical position.

I prefer to think of science as conservative, in that it doesn't wander far from what is warranted from observations.  So I guess we will remain at odds on certain issues.

Here's the essence of the issue, then.  If science is about making objective observations, I say you cannot do a science of mind, because mind cannot be observed at all.  A neural psychologist will say that neural function is a direct correlate of mind, so much so that one is not separable from the other, and will look at reports of experience ("I smell toast for some reason."), performance on tests (Like a computer being able to know what choice you'll make in a test before you are consciously aware of it), and the relationship between drugs on parts of the brain and subsequent changes in reported experience or in behaviors.

In a pragmatic sense, I'll go with science because it achieves results that are useful and interest.  But I will never stand by for declarations of fiat: "Well, it's the processing that is mind, so a computer can have a mind. . . so we need to make laws to protect cyborgs!" The possible consequences of doing bad philosophy are real, IMO, with the advent of AI that might consistently pass the Turing test.

[Alan V]

If science is about making objective observations, I say you cannot do a science of mind, because mind cannot be observed at all.

Of course we can observe our own minds directly. First person accounts form a useful part of scientific studies, especially when scientists have large samplings which are compared to measurements of brain activity.

All sorts of things can't be observed directly by science, yet scientists can assemble excellent guesses by means of their careful detective work on available evidence, including proxies. That's how scientists reconstructed ancient climates for instance.

This is perhaps my main objection to philosophical approaches to knowledge, and this problem seems to go all the way back to the Greeks: philosophers think knowledge must be certain, while in fact our best knowledge always seems to come with probabilities. Quantum mechanics is accurate to how many decimal places? Yet it states explicitly exactly where you have to draw a line between what you can know and what you can't.

[Belacqua]

The book tackles questions I find of more interest.

That's no problem. It's certainly an interesting topic, and I enjoy getting up-to-date information. 

Not you, but some people are likely to go too far, and claim that the book answers questions that it doesn't. I've seen that before, with books on Big Questions.

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philosophers think knowledge must be certain, while in fact our best knowledge always seems to come with probabilities.

That's an interesting thing to say. I hadn't heard that before. 

It's true that the standard definition of knowledge is "justified true belief." So by that definition, something that isn't true isn't knowledge. But this is generally invoked to remind us that what we hold to be true is more tentatively held than we are inclined to remember. That what we call knowledge now, if disproved, we will call belief later on. 

But what philosopher thinks we have to disregard things we aren't certain of? I mean, they all do their best to prove their cases, but as far as I know most of them accept that we can't be sure of very much. 

After all, Socrates, who got the whole thing rolling, taught that self-doubt is the beginning of wisdom. And he leaves a number of his dialogues with no solid conclusion -- just an aporia.

[Alan V]

philosophers think knowledge must be certain, while in fact our best knowledge always seems to come with probabilities.

That's an interesting thing to say. I hadn't heard that before. 

It's true that the standard definition of knowledge is "justified true belief." So by that definition, something that isn't true isn't knowledge. But this is generally invoked to remind us that what we hold to be true is more tentatively held than we are inclined to remember. That what we call knowledge now, if disproved, we will call belief later on. 

But what philosopher thinks we have to disregard things we aren't certain of? I mean, they all do their best to prove their cases, but as far as I know most of them accept that we can't be sure of very much. 

After all, Socrates, who got the whole thing rolling, taught that self-doubt is the beginning of wisdom. And he leaves a number of his dialogues with no solid conclusion -- just an aporia.

"Philosophical skepticism begins with the claim that the skeptic currently does not have knowledge. Some adherents maintain that knowledge is, in theory, possible. It could be argued that Socrates held that view. He appears to have thought that if people continue to ask questions they might eventually come to have knowledge; but that they did not have it yet. Some skeptics have gone further and claimed that true knowledge is impossible, for example the Academic school in Ancient Greece well after the time of Carneades. A third skeptical approach would be neither to accept nor reject the possibility of knowledge."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_skepticism

My problem with some philosophers (I should have emphasized) is that they take their skepticism too far. The perfect is the enemy of the good, to paraphrase Voltaire I believe. At a point, such thinking blurs the line between justified true belief and unjustified false belief. We might be brains in vats. A thermostat might have awareness. Science can't study the mind, or whatever. Nothing is good enough to go on. Scientists would waste their grant money if they took the same approach.

[bennyboy]

Of course we can observe our own minds directly.  

What's this "we" stuff, figment-of-my-imagination?

All sorts of things can't be observed directly by science, yet scientists can assemble excellent guesses by means of their careful detective work on available evidence, including proxies.  That's how scientists reconstructed ancient climates for instance.

The process is reversed, I think. In one case, you have data, and try to speculate on what might have generated it.

In the case of mind, we start with a gnostic position on the existence of mind, and try to map data to fit what believe we already know.

This is perhaps my main objection to philosophical approaches to knowledge, and this problem seems to go all the way back to the Greeks: philosophers think knowledge must be certain, while in fact our best knowledge always seems to come with probabilities.  Quantum mechanics is accurate to how many decimal places?  Yet it states explicitly exactly where you have to draw a line between what you can know and what you can't.

Probabilities are okay so long as they are numerical. "I think this physical system which talks probably has a mind like mine" isn't really talking about probability. It's a stand-in for something like, "I have a strong sense that this physical system has a mind like mine." In other words, strength of impression substitutes for chance.

The problem with seems-so-is is that it goes from "I sense something watching me sometimes. It seems possible to me that there's some intangible entity that I can't see which is influencing my luck" to "God said don't be a fag, and if you break God's inviolate command, I'm going to burn you."

In the case of discussions of mind, we are about to enter an era where seems-so-is could have real consequences. What if android robots are so convincing that our instincts say, "Yeah. . . I'll accept that as a person"? Then we can have android rights, androids competing for jobs, and so on. The left will start talking about androidophobia. And all the while-- they may just be p-zombies.