why do we enjoy poetry From the perspective of neuroscience?

[Belacqua]

"Philosophical skepticism begins with the claim that the skeptic currently does not have knowledge. Some adherents maintain that knowledge is, in theory, possible. It could be argued that Socrates held that view. He appears to have thought that if people continue to ask questions they might eventually come to have knowledge; but that they did not have it yet. Some skeptics have gone further and claimed that true knowledge is impossible, for example the Academic school in Ancient Greece well after the time of Carneades. A third skeptical approach would be neither to accept nor reject the possibility of knowledge."

Yeah, that all sounds reasonable. So I think it's good that you added "some" to your statement. The quote above indicates that the nature and possibility of knowledge is one of the things philosophers argue about. So the statement that they think knowledge must be certain would be over the top -- they discuss whether or not knowledge must be certain. 

I suspect there are weighty tomes produced by British language philosophers post-Wittgenstein on the differences between "probably" and "possibly." 

My problem with some philosophers (I should have emphasized) is that they take their skepticism too far.  The perfect is the enemy of the good, to paraphrase Voltaire I believe.  At a point, such thinking blurs the line between justified true belief and unjustified false belief.  We might be brains in vats.  A thermostat might have awareness.  Science can't study the mind, or whatever.  Nothing is good enough to go on.  Scientists would waste their grant money if they took the same approach.

But the examples you give aren't cases of skepticism. Granted, they are not questions we really need to solve, but each of them points to a problem in thought that is relevant to more important questions. 

For example, nobody really believes we are brains in vats and no grant money has been wasted on the issue. But if we're talking about the interface between the world and the mind, and how it works, and how much confidence we can have in the accuracy of our mental images, then the brain-in-vats issue is a kind of limit-case thought experiment. What can we point to, exactly, to show that our sensory input is a direct reaction to a real world and not a made-up illusion? Nobody thinks there are evil scientists tricking us. Except Keanu Reeves.

Likewise the thermostat example. This is not a case of extreme skepticism -- it's just a way to differentiate between awareness and reactivity. If I say I must be aware because I react to changes in my environment, then I have to show that my awareness includes more than a thermostat's reaction to its environment. Or some people might claim that the difference between the thermostat's awareness and mine is a matter of degree and not kind. I think that those who hold that mind is purely a result of physical brain activity might have to acknowledge this. Let's just say that it's a simple example people use to talk about the difference between awareness and reactivity, or between degrees of awareness.

Whether science can study the mind is an open question. Or I think everybody agrees we can study it to some extent. But it is a real and interesting question about the limits of the scientific method, which demands repeatable inter-subjective quantifiable data. And personal experience may not supply that. 

So I don't think that what you're talking about here are extreme skeptic positions that deny the possibility of knowledge, or demand that to be called knowledge it must be absolute. These are just easy to imagine cases which demonstrate points in larger problems. 

Even the infamous question about how many angels can dance on the head of a pin can be helpful in this way. (Although it's important to point out that this question was never ever used in genuine theological debate. It was made up in modern times to make fun of people.) It can be useful in showing students the difference between location and extension, which is a genuine distinction to make, and it's a distinction which may even be important in discussion of brain/mind questions.

[Alan V]

Probabilities are okay so long as they are numerical.  "I think this physical system which talks probably has a mind like mine" isn't really talking about probability.  It's a stand-in for something like, "I have a strong sense that this physical system has a mind like mine."  In other words, strength of impression substitutes for chance.

That's a great example of the perfect being the enemy of the good. What about the application of Occam's Razor? Isn't that a useful means of assessing probabilities in general?

---

My problem with some philosophers (I should have emphasized) is that they take their skepticism too far.  The perfect is the enemy of the good, to paraphrase Voltaire I believe.  At a point, such thinking blurs the line between justified true belief and unjustified false belief.  We might be brains in vats.  A thermostat might have awareness.  Science can't study the mind, or whatever.  Nothing is good enough to go on.  Scientists would waste their grant money if they took the same approach.

But the examples you give aren't cases of skepticism.

No, but they are examples of how skepticism about face-value claims can lead to giving too much weight to what are really unwarranted beliefs.

While I appreciate your critiques of philosophical thought experiments as valid explanations within the philosophical community which understands the words games being played, the effects of such ideas on people at large are not healthy in far too many cases. In the context of arguing with Bennyboy over panpsychism and p-zombies, what I said makes sense.

[bennyboy]

That's a great example of the perfect being the enemy of the good.  What about the application of Occam's Razor?  Isn't that a useful means of assessing probabilities in general?

I think I'd like you to specify how you mean to apply that principle to the subject at hand before I attempt to give an opinion on that.

I'd say that in general, applying Occam's Razor to existing world views is likely to lead to the following result: that collections of assumptions (for example about physical realism) are interpreted by a thinker as a single assumption. No physicalist says, "Given that solipsism is false, and that my senses are informing me about real objects, and that those objects exist independently of my mind in a 3D space, then X is true." Instead, you get something more like:

"Given that my existing world view is correct, and I feel sure it is, what I already think is most probably true." But most of us will add a lot of extra words to confound the obvious simplicity of that kind of thinking.

[Belacqua]

But the examples you give aren't cases of skepticism.

No, but they are examples of how skepticism about face-value claims can lead to giving too much weight to what are really unwarranted beliefs.

One of the things philosophy does is to question face-value claims. A lot of things seem obvious that turn out to be more complicated. 

I am against unwarranted beliefs, but, again, I don't know of anyone who really believes in p-zombies, etc. Granted, there will always be dumb people. 

While I appreciate your critiques of philosophical thought experiments as valid explanations within the philosophical community which understands the words games being played, the effects of such ideas on people at large are not healthy in far too many cases.  

I guess so. But what's the alternative? Should we ban these ideas from people without advanced degrees? If people get them wrong but debate them, there is some change of getting corrected.

In the context of arguing with Bennyboy over panpsychism and p-zombies, what I said makes sense.

I haven't read every post, but I don't see Bennyboy as being overly gullible. It looks to me as if he has discussed p-zombies just as they are meant to be discussed -- as mental constructs used to show the difference between an experiencing subject and a non-experiencing object dressed up to look like one. 

Granted, such thought experiments can get frustrating. The truth seems, as you say, to be at face-value, yet we find that we have no way to prove it. Zeno's paradoxes come to mind. At this point we are all tempted to just stomp our feet and say, "But that's just the way it is, goddammit." Philosophers tend not to be satisfied with this answer.

---

bennyboy, have you ever suggested that p-zombies roam among us, for real? 

Or are you just using them as a thought experiment? 

It seems to have been suggested that you take your skepticism too far.

[bennyboy]

bennyboy, have you ever suggested that p-zombies roam among us, for real? 

Or are you just using them as a thought experiment? 

It seems to have been suggested that you take your skepticism too far.

I'll tell you about an experience I had recently. I went to the hospital for ulcer / polyp surgery, and they gave me a knockout drug. I went into a state of apparent non-existence that was qualitatively very different than normal sleep.

When I awoke, I had the sensation of a big thing going in and out of my mouth and throat about 5 times over a couple seconds. I realized later that this was the tube being inserted and removed. What I did not remember was that the doctor had been issuing me verbal commands-- roll over, put your arm over your chest, and so on.

Now, I cannot say whether I was conscious, and just didn't remember anything later, or whether that drug turned me into a temporary p-zombie. But I can say that it VERY much seemed that the latter was the case.

Given that we don't really know what brain parts / functions are responsible for consciousness, it seems perfectly possible to me that given damage to particular brain systems there are people walking around who can respond to their environment, and maybe even demonstrate some simple emotional responses, but who have absolutely no real subjective awareness of the world around them.

[Dr H]

I generally enjoy poetry from the perspective of an armchair.

[Alan V]

Should we ban these ideas from people without advanced degrees? If people get them wrong but debate them, there is some chance of getting corrected.

Your perspectives seem quite reasonable.

What methods do philosophers employ to determine if the ideas they explore are warranted? Are they typically informed of the latest science in the areas in which they speculate?

[bennyboy]

Should we ban these ideas from people without advanced degrees? If people get them wrong but debate them, there is some chance of getting corrected.

Your perspectives seem quite reasonable.  

What methods do philosophers employ to determine if the ideas they explore are warranted?  Are they typically informed of the latest science in the areas in which they speculate?

Science is a branch of philosophy.

[Belacqua]

What methods do philosophers employ to determine if the ideas they explore are warranted?  

I guess the best we can do is discuss and debate. Good-faith dialogue. 
 

Are they typically informed of the latest science in the areas in which they speculate?

Probably it depends on what questions they're working on. Some issues benefit from the input of science, and some aren't related much. 

Philosophy and science have always worked dialectically. Or, depending on where you want to draw the boundary lines, we can agree with bennyboy that science is a subset of philosophy. It's the part of philosophy which demands, a priori, methodological naturalism, and accepts only empirical repeatable inter-subjective quantifiable evidence. Questions about reality which can't be answered within those limits aren't science, but may interest philosophers.

[bennyboy]

The essence of the issue, to me, is this: mind is about "What is it like to experience X?" Science might be able to guess, linguistically, what a person is experiencing. It might be able to report, "bennyboy exhibits brain patterns associated with X" But I cannot conceive of any way in which subjective and objective perspectives can truly be brought into a single framework. That's because they are diametrically opposed, by definition.