[Serious] The Good

[Angrboda]

There are no objective final causes.

This seems strange to me. 

If you find an acorn on the ground, you know its final cause: to grow into an oak tree. That's objective.

It might fail to grow, or it might grow a little bit into a stunted oak tree. But it won't grow into an elephant or a dwarf star. That's all the Aristotelian four causes structure says. 

With humans it's more complicated. A human baby has a number of potentials, not all of which it can fulfill fully. The baby's teleology is to grow into a healthy human adult, that part is clear. But whether it should develop, say, musical potential, or choose to neglect that in favor of something else, makes the human case more complex than the acorn's. 

Ultimately the question of the Good, approached from this angle, is whether we can take this truth about human nature and work out what would be good for humans in every case. And again, nothing specific, probably, like "taking Flintstones vitamins" but more general, like health and opportunity.

That's efficient causes, not final causes. In the case of an acorn, final causes do no actual work. They are only causes in a figurative sense. It may be a useful way of conceiving things in order to facilitate understanding, but as far as picking out objective features of the universe, final causes aren't among them. I may intend to become a firefighter when I grow up. My intention alone doesn't cause my actually becoming a firefighter except insofar as it is an efficient cause which sets certain brain processes in motion. It is perhaps the confusion between intention as a metaphysical entity apart from matter and intention as a material, efficient cause which facilitates seeing final causes as causes at all. It's hard to see an acorn as having any kind of an intention at all. And the impotence of an acorn's so called final cause is amply illustrated by placing that acorn in outer space where no energy or matter interacts with it. Under such conditions it will not become anything other than what it is, an acorn. To attribute some sort of mysterious, metaphysical force as a final cause to its becoming an oak tree is simply to confuse the actual effect of efficient causes for something else. It may seem sensible to conceive of final causes as causes in the same sense that we conceive of mental causes as causes in and of themselves under a folk psychological theory of mind in which thoughts give rise to other thoughts, but it isn't the thoughts themselves that are magically causing the other thoughts to occur, it is the fact that the thoughts are a part of a physical system in which efficient causes transform energy and material states that are identified as one set of mental contents to result in the system assuming another state in which those other mental states exists. To speak of the thoughts themselves as causes independent of the system which they are a part is simply nonsense. And so the idea of final causes. To speak of final causes as something separate from and in addition to efficient causes is to ignore and neglect the actual efficient causes which are responsible for the effects attributed to the final causes. As such, the final causes are basically a fiction, to allow us to easily characterize complex processes as consisting of simpler mechanisms like intentions, goals and so on. But this is little more than a manner of speaking and understanding, and the mental abstraction of such doesn't exist in the world. It would be like saying that there are chemical reactions and that, even though theses chemical reactions ultimately reduce to quantum mechanical processes, in some sense chemical reactions are an objective part of the universe independent of the quantum mechanical processes. They aren't. In the same way, to speak of final causes as something other than a mental shorthand for the efficient causes is also nonsense. In that sense, final causes do not exist in the universe. They are a mental abstraction we use to aid our understanding of complex sets of efficient causes, nothing more. So to say that there are objective final causes is simply wrong, because there aren't. An acorn, regardless of any supposed natural course of development is never going to develop into an oak from final causes alone. The final causes contribute nothing to the acorn's development because they don't exist.

Robert Ingersoll once said that in nature there are no rewards and punishments; there are consequences. In a similar vein, there is no teleology in nature, and no final causes in the universe; only efficient causes and material processes. You've mistaken what is essentially nothing more than a mental abstraction for something more than a mental abstraction. Your mistake is understandable, but a mistake nonetheless.

Getting back to the original question, if there are efficient causes but not final ones, and this seems to be the case, then there is no teleology in the universe, as efficient causes do not have goals. Gravity doesn't seek to attract things together, it just does. The acorn doesn't become an oak tree because it has the potential to be an oak tree and a final cause of being an oak tree, an acorn becomes an oak because certain invariants of ordered relations, namely the laws of physics exist, and those laws of physics under the right circumstances yield an oak tree, and under another circumstance they yield nothing at all. It's sometimes said that it's the desires to make a baby which result in a person's creation, but it's rightly pointed out that it is the cheeseburgers that a mother eats which had more to do with your creation. Material causes cannot choose to be other than what they are, and so them being one way or the other is simply an inevitability. My heart does not pump blood "because" that's its function. Suspend a few of the laws of nature and you'll find the heart no longer does that at all. It is the regularity or nature, the ordered predictability of material processes, which allows us to infer that something is fit for one behavior and not fit for another. But this fitness for function is only a consequence of the heart being a part of a system in which its supposed "natural" function will take place, failing any interference in it doing so. Like the acorn, this isn't because the heart is somehow "naturally" destined to pump blood, but simply because of the absence of those other circumstances in which the heart would not actually pump blood. You are mistaking the contingent features, the existence of specific circumstances and the existence of specific laws of nature, for necessary features of the universe. It is not a necessary fact that a heart will pump blood, nor that an acorn will grow into an oak. To say that one set of circumstances is an example of the natural function of the heart or the acorn and the other is not is simply to express a preference for one set of contingent facts over the other. The preference for the one rather than the other, and the confusion that one typically sees the one set of contingent facts and not the other and thus infers that in more than a statistical sense the circumstance is "normal," are both mere facts of mind. The universe doesn't care whether the acorn grows into an oak, or that the heart actually pumps blood. To say that these are in some sense the "natural" function is purely a subjectivity, not an objective truth about the universe. An acorn sitting alone in deep space is every bit as much fulfilling its function to not become an oak under that set of conditions, just as another acorn, fortunately finding itself on the surface of a planet will grow into an oak and under those circumstances, growing to an oak will be its function. But there is nothing in either the acorn itself, or the universe at large, which says that an acorn sitting in deep space is somehow an aberration and a pathological existence and one comfortably ensconced in rich soil is not. An acorn is just an acorn. It has no necessary function, and there is no "right" set of conditions under which it "should" exist. Any such attributed function is simply a misunderstanding.

If, as I say, there are no final causes, and there aren't, then nothing has a necessary or intended function, and the non-theistic case for the good essentially collapses. Do you have another way of conceiving of the good which doesn't rely upon your particular, in my view mistaken, understanding of the nature of final causes, function, and teleology?

(ETA: It might help to visualize a slightly different world than the one we currently inhabit. Currently, the overwhelming majority of acorns grow into oaks because their existing under the right set of circumstances to grow into an oak is more common than anything else. But imagine a world in which that is not the case. Imagine a world in which the overwhelming majority of acorns exist in deep space and never become anything other than acorns. In that world, we would come to the conclusion, along your line of reasoning, that the function of an acorn was to remain an acorn. Sure, the odd acorn might accidentally become an oak, but it's doing so would simply be an accidental frustration of its natural function to remain an acorn. My question is what necessary feature exists in our actual world which doesn't exist in that hypothetical world? If you can't name such a necessary feature, then I'd suggest it is because there is no such necessary feature, and to speak of an acorn's function as growing into an oak is nothing more than either to infer that the way things are is the way they should be (a fallacy), or to infer that one's preference for the actual world rather than the hypothetical world is an objective truth (which it is not). Both avenues lead to failure. Do you see any other way of arguing that the actual world is somehow the way the world should be and the other world is not?)

(ETA2: Oh, and a point of fact. Under the right circumstances, say a world filled with mad scientists perverting the biology of innocent acorns, an acorn might very well grow into an elephant. It might take a different kind of mad scientist for it to grow into a dwarf star, but that, too, is certainly possible. Your claim that an acorn will not grow into an elephant or a dwarf star simply reveals your lack of imagination, and a general inability to conceive of such possibilities. So, no, even there you are wrong. It is the existence of one specific set of circumstances rather than another which determines whether the acorn grows into an oak, or an elephant, or a dwarf star. There is no reason for one set of circumstances to prevail rather than another, aside from contingent facts of existence and the possibly contingent laws of nature.)

(As an aside for Khem, imagine a world in which people like to die, like to be stabbed, and prefer dysfunction to order and well being. In such a world, that which you identify as harm would no longer be considered harm and would no longer be bad. Thus it is our living in one world rather than the other which makes what you have identified as harm in your set of morals as harm and therefore bad. But morality isn't simply an accidental set of circumstances which give rise to certain empirical truths and not others. If morals are objective, and harm being bad is an objective feature of the universe, then there must exist some necessary feature other than the mere contingent facts of existence which results in, say, killing someone being bad in one world, and killing someone not being bad in the other world. If there is no necessary reason for the facts being one way rather than the other, your moral theory collapses as it depends upon identifying contingent facts as necessary ones, which is simply a mistake.)

[Belacqua]

If, as I say, there are no final causes, and there aren't, then nothing has a necessary or intended function, and the non-theistic case for the good essentially collapses.  Do you have another way of conceiving of the good which doesn't rely upon your particular, in my view mistaken, understanding of the nature of final causes, function, and teleology?

I disagree entirely with your characterization of what a Final Cause is. 

In nature it has nothing to do with intention, conscious or otherwise. It is in no way a metaphysical force. It is the end toward which a thing points. A rock, at the top of a ledge, has as its final cause being at the bottom of the ledge. The efficient cause is gravity. The rock has no conscious intention, no plan. 

I suppose that the word "cause" may be tricky. It doesn't mean that some pre-determined future ghost is "pulling" the thing in the desired direction, causing the thing to happen. It just means that the potentiality in the acorn is aimed or pointed toward that particular end. Of course if the acorn is in space, or gets eaten, or burns up, or something (I have an acorn I took from a Barbizon painter's garden) it doesn't end up making it to the thing it points to. But can you explain what an acorn is to a student without mentioning that trees grow from them?

In living things, the heart most certainly does have a purpose. Nobody ever consciously decided to make one, but the animal is quite a bit better off than if it didn't have one. Again, try explaining to students what a heart is without explaining what it's for. The material cause is the tissue, the formal cause is in the DNA, the efficient cause is the parents and growth of the animal. Nothing intentional or metaphysical is required. 

From the Stanford Encyclopedia:

Aristotle’s reply [to those who deny final causality in nature] is that the opponent is expected to explain why the teeth regularly grow in the way they do: sharp teeth in the front and broad molars in the back of the mouth. Moreover, since this dental arrangement is suitable for biting and chewing the food that the animal takes in, the opponent is expected to explain the regular connection between the needs of the animal and the formation of its teeth. Either there is a real causal connection between the formation of the teeth and the needs of the animal, or there is no real causal connection and it just so happens that the way the teeth grow is good for the animal. In this second case it is just a coincidence that the teeth grow in a way that it is good for the animal. But this does not explain the regularity of the connection. Where there is regularity there is also a call for an explanation, and coincidence is no explanation at all. In other words, to say that the teeth grow as they do by material necessity and this is good for the animal by coincidence is to leave unexplained the regular connection between the growth of the teeth and the needs of the animal. Aristotle offers final causality as his explanation for this regular connection: the teeth grow in the way they do for biting and chewing food and this is good for the animal. (See Code 1997: 127–134.)


One thing to be appreciated about Aristotle’s reply is that the final cause enters in the explanation of the formation of the parts of an organism like an animal as something that is good either for the existence or the flourishing of the animal. In the first case, something is good for the animal because the animal cannot survive without it; in the second case, something is good for the animal because the animal is better off with it. This helps us to understand why in introducing the concept of end (telos) that is relevant to the study of natural processes Aristotle insists on its goodness: “not everything that is last claims to be an end (telos), but only that which is best” (Phys. 194 a 32–33).
Once his defense of the use of final causes is firmly in place, Aristotle can make a step further by focusing on the role that matter plays in his explanatory project. Let us return to the example chosen by Aristotle, the regular growth of sharp teeth in the front and broad molars in the back of the mouth. What explanatory role is left for the material processes involved in the natural process? Aristotle does not seem to be able to specify what material processes are involved in the growth of the teeth, but he is willing to recognize that certain material processes have to take place for the teeth to grow in the particular way they do. In other words, there is more to the formation of the teeth than these material processes, but this formation does not occur unless the relevant material processes take place. For Aristotle, these material processes are that which is necessary to the realization of a specific goal; that which is necessary on the hypothesis that the end is to be obtained.

The part you added later:

Acorns in space didn't evolve that way.

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Good does not always need intent/motivations/morals, evil more often does. 

Why is that? 

The premise that loss of function is evil is just silly.

Please give the argument by which you decided this. 

What if we restated it by saying that one way to be evil is to deprive someone (unjustly) of function, would that be OK?

[Angrboda]

The part you added later:

Acorns in space didn't evolve that way.

I'll get back to you another time, as you have replied immediately after me, but a couple notes. Acorns evolving and thus not existing in space is a contingent fact. If final causes are simply a contingent fact, then the entire first paragraph you quoted about the end result not being "mere coincidence" is completely destroyed, because it is nothing more than mere coincidence that acorns exist in the one way other than the other. Final causes serve no explanatory role over and above efficient causes. Note specifically that in the first paragraph you quote, Aristotle asks why teeth "regularly" grow one way rather than the other. Thus Aristotles conception of final causes, according to this author, rests on confusing statistical norms with other kinds of norms. In a different universe, the teeth would not "regularly" grow in that fashion. If the "cause" of one result occurring rather than the other is the result of existing in one set of circumstances rather than the other, then final causes aren't doing any explanation at all, as they don't in fact explain anything that isn't explained by efficient causes and the contingent facts. And indeed, when those explanations ignore efficient causes and contingent facts, the explanation derived turns out to be wrong, as in the case of the acorn and the heart. Anything which results in incorrect explanations for things is, at the very least, not an objective feature of the universe.

As to the second point, which rests primarily upon Aristotle's conception of being and existence as in itself good, in that, Aristotle is simply wrong. There is no objective reason to prefer existence to non-existence, only subjective ones. Therefore Aristotle's entire framework collapses due to a false assumption.

I think you'd do well to stop quoting others and try to do some of your own thinking, as the answers to the objections you quoted in reply to my prior post were contained in the post you replied to with them. If you're just making an argument from authority, then this is going to get old very fast. If you're not going to actually respond to what I've said and engage the points that I've made, this is likely going to lose my interest.

[Belacqua]

Most acts of man are both good and evil. There is a little bit of evil in pretty much everything that is 'good', and there is a little bit of good in everything that is 'bad'. In the earthly realm, things aren't entirely good or entirely bad. There is a correct measure for everything. The correct measure is not necessarily a constant.

Every person has a capacity for evil that is equal to their capacity for good. They have a capacity for good that is equal to their capacity for evil. So Hitler could have been one of the greatest people in world history, had he chosen the better part of his nature. We have the yetzer hara (dark side) and the yetzer hatov (our better nature). There is a story of some students of a great Rabbi saying that their Rabbi had no yetzer hara. Another Rabbi objected, saying that they were insulting their Rabbi. To say that someone has no yetzer hara is to say that they are a zero, a doormat. Our dark side motivates us to do great things. Our better nature moderates the ambition of the dark side.

I like this a lot. Partly because I always jump at any chance to quote William Blake:

Thou art good, and Thou alone;
Nor may the sinner cast one stone.
To be good only, is to be
A God or else a Pharisee.

(With apologies to the historical, non-symbolically-used Pharisees.) 

It helps to think about the good actions we do, which nonetheless have a component of pride or self-satisfaction -- but which on balance really are good for the world. 

I think Plato says that everything we do, we do it because we think we are doing good. When we choose to do evil it's because we've made a mistake. I think that if I eat all the donuts in the box it'll make me happy. Experience should have taught me by now that in fact I'll feel terrible afterwards. Yet I still go on trying. 

Not to compare donuts to Hitler, but people's evil probably often can be explained as mistaken good. Or perhaps selfishly-calculated good, when one is ignorant of the pain of others. 

If you'll forgive a sectarian jump: those who like to imagine God as the Good itself imagine Jesus as the one exception to the rule that humans are a mixture of good and bad. Even those of us who don't accept him as an incarnation of something can imagine him as a sort of model or place-holder for what people would do if they really were all good. And perhaps more importantly, what this world would do to someone like that.

---

The part you added later:

Acorns in space didn't evolve that way.

I'll get back to you another time, as you have replied immediately after me, but a couple notes.  Acorns evolving and thus not existing in space is a contingent fact.  If final causes are simply a contingent fact, then your entire first paragraph about the end result not being "mere coincidence" is completely destroyed, because it is nothing more than mere coincidence that acorns exist in the one way other than the other.  Final causes serve no explanatory role over and above efficient causes.  Note specifically that in the first paragraph you quote, Aristotle asks why teeth "regularly" grow one way rather than the other.  Thus Aristotles conception of final causes rests on confusing statistical norms with other kinds of norms.  In a different universe, the teeth would not "regularly" grow in that fashion.  If the "cause" of one result occurring rather than the other is the result of existing in one set of circumstances rather than the other, then final causes aren't doing any explanation at all, as they don't in fact explain anything that isn't explained by efficient causes and the contingent facts.

As to the second point, which rests primarily upon Aristotle's conception of being and existence as in itself good.  In that, Aristotle is simply wrong.  There is no objective reason to prefer existence to non-existence, only subjective ones.  Therefore Aristotle's entire framework collapses due to a false assumption.

I think you'd do well to stop quoting others and try to do some of your own thinking, as the answers to the objections you quoted in reply to my prior post were contained in the post you replied to with them.  If you're just making an argument from authority, then this is going to get old very fast.  If you're not going to actually respond to what I've said and engage the points that I've made, this is likely going to lose my interest.

If everything existed in another universe, yes, the final causes would be different, probably. But we live in this one. 

If some strange person moved all the acorns to space, it would just mean that they would never have the chance to reach the final cause for which they evolved. Yes, that's contingent. And changes nothing. 

Final Causes don't consist of statistical norms, the regularity of the structure of the teeth are as they are because they serve the animal well. 

As for my not thinking for myself, that's just insulting and not fair. If you're going to end these posts with little personal lectures there's no point in continuing. I provided the quote to show that I am not saying some random thing, that what I say is backed up. If you want to explain why it's wrong that's fine, but please do so without making rude and false insinuations. 

As for your assertion that "...Aristotle's conception of being and existence as in itself good.  In that, Aristotle is simply wrong.  There is no objective reason to prefer existence to non-existence, only subjective ones." I look forward for your argument on this. But please address the actual argument made by these people, and not your own subjective feeling.

[Angrboda]

As for your assertion that "...Aristotle's conception of being and existence as in itself good.  In that, Aristotle is simply wrong.  There is no objective reason to prefer existence to non-existence, only subjective ones." I look forward for your argument on this. But please address the actual argument made by these people, and not your own subjective feeling.

I'm not responsible for any argument pointing out that Aristotle is wrong until it is established that Aristotle is correct. If you want to argue that Aristotle is correct, by all means make your case. Remember, you're the one defending Aristotle's ideas as a necessary prerequisite to your argument about function, therefore you carry the burden of proof in showing Aristotle to be correct. Where have I used my own subjective feeling instead of engaging in actual argument? Now you're the one that's being insulting.

As to your first point, if final causes don't exist in the thing itself then final causes don't exist. If final causes are determined by the contingent facts which exist apart from the thing itself, then final causes don't exist in the things in and of themselves. Final causes are determined by the contingent facts which exist apart from the thing itself. Therefore, final causes do not exist. QED.

Now, as to whether what I said was insulting or a lecture, it is arguments which back things up, not that other people say them. As noted, the paragraph you quoted didn't even engage the arguments I made. If your only point in quoting others is to show that your ideas are "backed up" then indeed you are making an argument from authority and my complaint is fully acquitted. My point was not to insult you but to suggest that you are not engaging what I am actually writing and instead just lobbing canned ideas at me. Your response seems to rather suggest I was correct. If I had simply suggested that you were not thinking, and that was all that I said, that indeed would be insulting, but that is not at all what I said. I said that you were not engaging my actual points and I attributed that to your not doing any actual thinking. I may have been mistaken, but it was not an insult. Your interpreting it as something else is purely your own folly.

[Belacqua]

As for your assertion that "...Aristotle's conception of being and existence as in itself good.  In that, Aristotle is simply wrong.  There is no objective reason to prefer existence to non-existence, only subjective ones." I look forward for your argument on this. But please address the actual argument made by these people, and not your own subjective feeling.

I'm not responsible for any argument pointing out that Aristotle is wrong until it is established that Aristotle is correct.  If you want to argue that Aristotle is correct, by all means make your case.  Remember, you're the one defending Aristotle's ideas as a necessary prerequisite to your argument about function, therefore you carry the burden of proof in showing Aristotle to be correct. Where have I used my own subjective feeling instead of engaging in actual argument?  Now you're the one that's being insulting.  

As to your  first point, if final causes don't exist in the thing itself then final causes don't exist.  If final causes are determined by the contingent facts which exist apart from the thing itself, then final causes don't exist in the things in and of themselves.  Final causes are determined by the contingent facts which exist apart from the thing itself.  Therefore, final causes do not exist.  QED.

Now, as to whether what I said was insulting or a lecture, it is arguments which back things up, not that other people say them.  As noted, the paragraph you quoted didn't even engage the arguments I made.  If your only point in quoting others is to show that your ideas are "backed up" then indeed you are making an argument from authority and my complaint is fully acquitted.  My point was not to insult you but to suggest that you are not engaging what I am actually writing and instead just lobbing canned ideas at me.  Your response seems to rather suggest I was correct.  If I had simply suggested that you were not thinking, and that was all that I said, that indeed would be insulting, but that is not at all what I said.  I said that you were not engaging my actual points and I attributed that to your not doing any actual thinking.   I may have been mistaken, but it was not an insult.  Your interpreting it as something else is purely your own folly.

And I think you are not engaging with my points, and merely making assertions. No doubt these assertions seem clear to you.

Anyway, since there is no point in arguing who is guilty of the greater folly, I will end things here.

[Angrboda]

I'm not responsible for any argument pointing out that Aristotle is wrong until it is established that Aristotle is correct.  If you want to argue that Aristotle is correct, by all means make your case.  Remember, you're the one defending Aristotle's ideas as a necessary prerequisite to your argument about function, therefore you carry the burden of proof in showing Aristotle to be correct. Where have I used my own subjective feeling instead of engaging in actual argument?  Now you're the one that's being insulting.  

As to your  first point, if final causes don't exist in the thing itself then final causes don't exist.  If final causes are determined by the contingent facts which exist apart from the thing itself, then final causes don't exist in the things in and of themselves.  Final causes are determined by the contingent facts which exist apart from the thing itself.  Therefore, final causes do not exist.  QED.

Now, as to whether what I said was insulting or a lecture, it is arguments which back things up, not that other people say them.  As noted, the paragraph you quoted didn't even engage the arguments I made.  If your only point in quoting others is to show that your ideas are "backed up" then indeed you are making an argument from authority and my complaint is fully acquitted.  My point was not to insult you but to suggest that you are not engaging what I am actually writing and instead just lobbing canned ideas at me.  Your response seems to rather suggest I was correct.  If I had simply suggested that you were not thinking, and that was all that I said, that indeed would be insulting, but that is not at all what I said.  I said that you were not engaging my actual points and I attributed that to your not doing any actual thinking.   I may have been mistaken, but it was not an insult.  Your interpreting it as something else is purely your own folly.

And I think you are not engaging with my points, and merely making assertions. No doubt these assertions seem clear to you.

Now you're just completely full of shit. In my earlier reply, I not only pointed out that you weren't engaging my arguments but also pointed out how the arguments in the text that you quoted are wrong. If you're simply going to lie and pretend that I have done things that I have not, then you would indeed be wise to quit the field. I'll note, simply for completeness, that the statement that I am merely making assertions is itself an assertion not backed by any actual argument, and my pointing this out both serves as refutation in that it points out the hollowness of your tu quoque as well as provide counter-examples to your claim. And I will also point out that my previous post contained an argument which soundly refutes any and all arguments in favor of final causes, and rather than actually engage that argument, you choose to whine and make patently and demonstrably false claims. Jesus bloody Christ, what the fuck is wrong with you? The only explanations I can see for your ignoring my grappling at great length with your prior arguments are not flattering to you. So if you want to quit, do so, but don't pretend that it's because I have not engaged your actual points because that is simply not so.

Indeed, the very words in the post you quoted, "as to your first point," clearly show that I was engaging your arguments and that the idea that I have not been doing so is a callous lie that is refuted by the very post you are quoting!

Anyway, we'll all await with baited breath your acquittal of Aristotle's conception of being and existence as being good, as until you do so, your entire line of argument is unsupported and can be simply dismissed.

[brewer]

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Good does not always need intent/motivations/morals, evil more often does. 

Why is that? 

The premise that loss of function is evil is just silly.

Please give the argument by which you decided this. 

What if we restated it by saying that one way to be evil is to deprive someone (unjustly) of function, would that be OK?

Because the counter of good is not always evil.

Loss of function does not always include intent. It could be thru an unavoidable accident or ones own innocent unknowing action. While this would be bad for the individual it would not be the result of evil.

[The Grand Nudger]

(As an aside for Khem, imagine a world in which people like to die, like to be stabbed, and prefer dysfunction to order and well being.  In such a world, that which you identify as harm would no longer be considered harm and would no longer be bad.  Thus it is our living in one world rather than the other which makes what you have identified as harm in your set of morals as harm and therefore bad.  But morality isn't simply an accidental set of circumstances which give rise to certain empirical truths and not others.  If morals are objective, and harm being bad is an objective feature of the universe, then there must exist some necessary feature other than the mere contingent facts of existence which results in, say, killing someone being bad in one world, and killing someone not being bad in the other world.  If there is no necessary reason for the facts being one way rather than the other, your moral theory collapses as it depends upon identifying contingent facts as necessary ones, which is simply a mistake.)

Yeah, I can imagine a world like that, and there are situations in this world like that.  Killing someone can be bad or not bad here in this world.  You're thinking of moral absolutism.

Moral realism asserts that there are facts of a matter that establish the hypothetical conclusion, and if in your estimation any such fact is a contingent fact, well..that's okay, so long as it's a fact of that matter. There could be some other world or some other situation in which those aren't the facts of that matter, and in that world any conclusion based on those now-non-existent facts couldn't be established.

The example of what people like isn't necessarily the best, that would be a fact of the person, not the matter - but we do use those facts to modify realist conclusions. Boxers like to box, after all. Even here, many harmful things aren't considered harmful, or meaningfully harmful, and then there are valued and necessary harms. We could propose some person who was depressed and wanted to find a way to get someone else to kill them for relief to create a set of circumstances such as the ones you refer to above. Would it be absolutely bad to be that other person? I think it's hard to make that case. Is there some set of circumstances in which it would be bad to be that other person? Plenty. We could repeat the question in reference to the soon to be dead-ed party as well and get the same answers. Absolutely bad to try to get someone else to do that? No. Some set of circumstances in which it would be? Plenty.

The difference between clinical assisted suicide and asking a friend to feed you some thing they don't know you're fatally allergic to. The difference between knowingly taking a life in a mutual act with great consideration beforehand, or drunkenly pulling out your pistol and shooting the guy because he offended you. Not only is there a factual basis as to why this thing x is or could be bad, there are factual modifications and circumstances that lead to either conclusion.

Realism, not absolutism. I suppose that we could put "if" in front of every realist statement and "in this world/circumstance" at the back, and "so far as we can tell" as a summary, but that would be unwieldy.

[Belacqua]

Otherwise I believe that as a creator of all; he created both good and evil; but chose good over evil. That's why "good" is attractive to us; not because "good" has its own unique power or evil have its own unique power.
We just see "good" as "pure" because God chose it. If God chose evil; evil would've been the attractive concept for us.

After all; we can see this in nature. Some animals live on causing misery to humans; to us it is misery; to them it is joy and life.

God made our scope prefer what is known as "good". If he wanted; he would've made us enjoy "evil" at birth; and become evil by birth.

The above is my personal theory and personal belief based on the Quran alone.

This is a very interesting view to me. Largely because it's so different from the ones I've studied before.

First, I admit to knowing nothing at all about the Quran, so if you have the time to show us some of the writing that leads you to your view, I'd enjoy seeing it. 

Second, if God creates evil, I wonder about the long-term view of things. For example, some people might say that the evil is in the world to lead, in the end, to greater good. This is a view you sometime see among Christians (e.g. Milton) that the Fall from Eden was a necessary evil for bringing about the eventual fulfillment of human's potential. 

If that's true, then when we perceive God as doing evil, it is his way of indirectly doing good, or something like that. Is this a formula that's available in Islam?