Is Moral Nihilism a Morality?

[The Grand Nudger]

IOW you think it would be incoherent with respect to the premise of nihilism as you see it. 

No. It's incoherent for nihilism to be a morality because then it wouldn't be nihilism. It has nothing to do with how I see it and everything to do with what nihilism means.

It would be (could be?) incoherent, but perhaps nihilism is incoherent.  That doesn't mean it's impossible for it to do so or be so..and again, you're arguing that it's impossible for nihilism to contain an explicit or implicit set of normative functions.  Impossible for there to be a list of things that a nihilist can't do* - while remaining consistent with their properly understood and genuinely held nihilism...even as you comment on how, if they do those things, they're not "correctly" nihilists.

That is not what I've said. I don't agree with you. On the contrary, it's nihilism that's incoherent and it has nothing to do with consequences. I don't agree with you.

Nihilism may be incoherent, and if nihilism must be empty to deserve the title coherently then a set of nihilist normatives would be a black mark against it - but what would make nihilism incoherent to you and what exists are not interchangeable sets.  Is there a list of things that a nihilist can't do* and still correctly be nihilists?  

Well, if you're always like this then you're not worth discussing with because you can't make yourself clear nor answer questions clearly.

Honestly, I'm not sure that the issue is clarity - but, ofc, you decide what and to whom you respond.   

What does "If permissibility is meaningless x because y" mean? It doesn't appear to make any sense.

So, we've got a statement that some other person may make.  It doesn't matter what the variables are here, to nihilism.  Nihilism doesn't take specific issue with any individual moral metric.  No matter why a person says that doing x is permissible because of y, the only coherent response is, no..in fact, that statement is not true.  X does not make y permissible because permissibility is a meaningless concept.  This is coherent with respect to the nihilists fundamental premise..but it's content equivalent to the statement that x -does not- make y permissible.  So lets say that a utilitarian hedonists claims that stroking the peener is permissible because it hurts no one and generates happiness.  A nihilist, by sheer force of accurate categorization -must contend in response that hurting no one and generating happiness does not, in fact, make beating the peener permissibile.  Permissibility is meaningless.  No amount of jumbling around the components of permissibility matters to nihilism.  

Can a nihilist, who properly understands and genuinely holds their position, affirm the truth of any moral permissibility statement?  

What does "X does not derserve Z for Y" mean? Let's say we replaced it with "Individual does not deserve life for bad behavior" ... even that doesn't quite make sense.

It's a generic statement of desert that we can fit into any schema of desert.  Sure, "Individual does not deserve life for bad behavior" is a sensible comment on desert.  Potentially two.  It's either the contention that someone should die because of bad behavior, or the contention that someone doesn't deserve a life sentence for bad behavior.  

What is?

The point is that you have consistently failed to demonstrate how ethical nihilism, noncognitivism and error theory ever implicitly makes any normative statements. 

That's probably an assessment better left for others, lol.  I get that you don't agree, but after explaining what I mean, showing that implicit normatives are present (even if they're meaningfully incoherent), allowing you to provide them, and commenting on the emergence of the semantics of desert even as you consider which nihilist candidates are more deserving of the title, I..obviously, think the point has been made very well.  

Are you trying to say that we can obviously contradict our beliefs? I.e.  as I said, someone can be a nihilist but still make statements that aren't nihilistic.

OFC that's also true, but no - though here..because of your position on the coherence of nihilism, you think the two are related.  They're not.  An incoherent position is still capable of providing normatives that are internally consistent, in the kindest of interpretations - the sort of position we take when we want to do a deep dive.  Not that it matters, since an existent set of incoherent or inconsistent normatives is still an existent set of normatives.  It may be the case that nihilism is incoherent, and maybe this would ripple down through any implication derived from nihilism - but it wouldn't prevent them from being, from existing.  The question as to whether nihilism is a morality is independent of the question as to whether nihilism is coherent, or any implicit normatives are consistent.  It's only a question as to whether or not nihilism does or can provide those characteristics we take to qualify as a moral system.  Things like normativity and desert.  

It is not incumbent upon me (or any nihilist) to argue for the positions consistency, or for the normatives coherence in order to demonstrate that it can or does possess those characteristics.  Yes, it seems odd that a nihilist would say that x doesn;t deserve y, or that x is not permissible because of y - but that is a definitional statement of nihilisms premise.  That moral statements are wrong.  Unfortunately (for nihilism), as far as normativity and desert are concerned - saying that something doesn't deserve something or doesn't make something permissible (and it doesn't matter the reason) is still a normative comment, still a comment on desert.  These are characteristics of a moral system and they flow directly from the foundational premise of nihilism.  

I like to use the word nihilism to mean what it means, yes.

I think you are struggling to understand this topic.

As above, it doesn't actually matter -why- you think x deserves y (and in this case that x deserves y more than z) - this is an explicit invocation of desert.  

You struggle with relevance.

It's very much relevant.  If there are normatives present in nihilism, and if those normatives are derived in exactly the same way as the normatives of another candidate morality, if there are comments of desert present, and if those comments on desert are derived in exactly the same way as another candidate morality - then nihilism contains equivalent characteristics to things we call moralities.  

You may think this is self defeating, or inconsistent, or incoherent with respect to nihilism - but it's not my aim or my responsibility to argue for any of that (and hey, maybe nihilism is just self defeating and inconsistent and/or incoherent) - only to explain why the question of normative ubiquity in moral statements is, itself, coherent and compelling.

Is there a list of things a nihilist can't do while correctly being a nihilist?  In what way is this list different from the lists of things that an [insert competing realist or relativist moralities here] can;t do while correctly being [whatever we inserted].  

In normative semantics, the contents of that list..which does exist... are our oughts/ought nots.  You can't make a comment about correctly being a nihilist (or any other position) without simultaneously creating such a list by default.  You can't comment on which interpretation of nihilism deserves the title without making explicit reference to normatives.

[SenseMaker007]

It would be (could be?) incoherent, but perhaps nihilism is incoherent.  That doesn't mean it's impossible for it to do so or be so..and again, you're arguing that it's impossible for nihilism to contain an explicit or implicit set of normative functions. 

Noncognitivism is the form of ethical nihilism that is incoherent and it's incoherent because it says that moral statements are neither true nor false. But nothing can be neither true nor false. Clear?

It's impossible for ethical nihilism to express anything normatively from the point of view of ethical nihilism because from the point of view of ethical nihilism there are no normative expressions. Clear?

Until you are able to grasp these very basic points I'm not going to waste my time responding to the rest of what you say.

[vulcanlogician]

...I'm not going to waste my time responding to the rest of what you say.

As far as I can tell you guys think moral nihilism is unintelligible for different reasons. Big whoop.

Why don't you guys just take a break from ethics? How about some metaphysics. We have a Christian pushing dualism here... with a video featuring a neuroscientist failing at logic.

[The Grand Nudger]

It would be (could be?) incoherent, but perhaps nihilism is incoherent.  That doesn't mean it's impossible for it to do so or be so..and again, you're arguing that it's impossible for nihilism to contain an explicit or implicit set of normative functions. 

Noncognitivism is the form of ethical nihilism that is incoherent and it's incoherent because it says that moral statements are neither true nor false and nothing can be neither true nor false. Clear?

The overall coherence or incoherence of a position on morality and it's implications does not determine the presence or absence of normative functions, implications, or content, in my view.  It may in fact be that the presence of that content is part of what makes the position self defeating or incoherent.  This could certainly be argued in the case of nihilism (and your comments earlier about relative emptiness are a variant of that line of thought).  That nihilism may fail on it's own grounds if it succeeds at being a moral system (even if it's a relatively minimal one).  Still, an incoherent position can possess these characteristics of normativity and desert just as easily as a coherent one.  

I have no interest in debating the coherence of the positions in any general sense.  It's not required for the existence, the sheer presence, of normative functions implications or content that can be and are derived from those positions.  If those characteristics are present, if that position succeeds as a morality, it doesn;t matter that this success might make it a failure fundamentally.  Oh well, maybe some moral positions are failures.  Ultimately self defeating.  

If there is a list of what a nihilist can or can't do while correctly being a nihilist, there is a list of normative content.  We can assert that this list is logically normative, rather than morally normative - but when/if other things we accept as moral systems assert that their own logical and moral normativity are interchangeable - does this really rule out nihilism as a morality or nihilism's logical normatives as moral normatives?  IDK that it does.  

It's impossible for ethical nihilism to express anything normatively from the point of view of ethical nihilism because from the point of view of ethical nihilism there are no normative expressions. Clear?

Until you are able to grasp these very basic points I'm not going to waste my time responding to the rest of what you say.

Like I said, you decide what you respond to and what you don't.  I'm not going to take any offense, lol.  

Sure, let's talk basics.  You wanted to approach nihilism above through noncognitivism.  An utter lack of truth aptness.  Is a lack of truth aptness the determining factor in the sheer presence of normative expressions?  Must a statement be truth apt, for a normative expression to be derived from it? You can help me to get to where you are from the bottom up.

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I'll provide an example for you to work with and school me.

Vanilla icecream is the best icecream.  You should only eat the best icecream.  Therefore you should only eat vanilla icecream.  

This is a normative expression.  Which parts of it, if any, are truth apt?

---

...I'm not going to waste my time responding to the rest of what you say.

As far as I can tell you guys think moral nihilism is unintelligible for different reasons. Big whoop.

Why don't you guys just take a break from ethics? How about some metaphysics. We have a Christian pushing dualism here... with a video featuring a neuroscientist failing at logic.

Hehehe, I have alot more faith in this conversations productivity than I have in dualism or any discussion of dualism. 

Ironically, we don't disagree on the things that make moral nihilism in some sense unintelligible.  I'm only adding another to the list.  The embeddeding problem.  

You'll probably get a huge kick out of this, courtesy of S. Blackburn(1984) 

(a) H!(B!p --> B!q)

H! is the hooray operator.  B! for boo.  The relationship between p and q demonstrates attitudes or beliefs.  

Noncognitivist nihilism posits that moral operators aren't actually talking about what they're about, as opposed to cognitivist nihilism which asserts that they are - but get it wrong.  Above we can see that expressivism as a noncognitivist theory could, at least in principle, be a logical product - and thus we're back to wondering whether there is any valid distinction between logical and moral normatives.....even in a noncognitivist framework.

[vulcanlogician]

Ironically, we don't disagree on the things that make moral nihilism in some sense unintelligible.  I'm only adding another to the list.  The embeddeding problem.  

You'll probably get a huge kick out of this, courtesy of S. Blackburn(1984) 

(a) H!(B!p --> B!q)

H! is the hooray operator.  B! for boo.  The relationship between p and q demonstrates attitudes or beliefs.  

Noncognitivist nihilism posits that moral operators aren't actually talking about what they're about, as opposed to cognitivist nihilism which asserts that they are - but get it wrong.  Above we can see that expressivism as a noncognitivist theory could, at least in principle, be a logical product - and thus we're back to wondering whether there is any valid distinction between logical and moral normatives.....even in a noncognitivist framework.

I did get a kick out of it. I had to refer to truth tables (my symbolic logic is a lil' rusty) and I still had a rather difficult time working through it. I actually didn't quite work through it. It's pretty complicated. But fascinating nonetheless.

[The Grand Nudger]

-and ultimately not a conclusive or satisfying answer, either.  The best kind! 

[SenseMaker007]

The overall coherence or incoherence of a position on morality and it's implications does not determine the presence or absence of normative functions, implications, or content, in my view. 

So, in your view, it's possible for an incoherent view to coherently express something? That seems like square circles to me.

In my view, an incoherent viewpoint can't coherently express anything and, so, that includes normative statements.

Sure, let's talk basics.  You wanted to approach nihilism above through noncognitivism.  An utter lack of truth aptness.  Is a lack of truth aptness the determining factor in the sheer presence of normative expressions?

What I'm saying is, regarding a viewpoint that doesn't even acknowledge the meaning or truth aptness of normative statements, from its point of view it obviously can't meaningfully express normative statements.

  Must a statement be truth apt, for a normative expression to be derived from it?

Not from its own point of view if from if its point of view you can't do that. There's nothing about ethical nihilism that says one ought to do or avoid doing X ... because if ethical nihilism said such a thing, even implicitly, it wouldn't be ethical nihilism.

 

You can help me to get to where you are from the bottom up.

I can try.

---

...I'm not going to waste my time responding to the rest of what you say.

As far as I can tell you guys think moral nihilism is unintelligible for different reasons. Big whoop.

He's said a lot of things that are plain contradictory and he's claimed that I've said things that I clearly haven't. He has also insisted that ethical nihilism implicitly makes normative statements ... something that it can't possibly do by definition.

He says that him and I agree and you've said that him and I agree ... but I don't agree with the contradictory and absurd things that he's stated ... and that's what I'm disagreeing with.

Basically, Vulcan, I'm not interested in the fact that we come to the same conclusion ... I'm interested in our reasoning in how we get there. His appears to be full of contradictions and that needs correction. Improving our method of getting to the truth is more important than whether we've reached it. Because how can we trust our conclusions if we can't trust our reasoning?

Both premises and conclusions will always be less interesting to me than the bit in between.

Why don't you guys just take a break from ethics? How about some metaphysics. We have a Christian pushing dualism here... with a video featuring a neuroscientist failing at logic.

Because I find metaethics more interesting than Christianity and dualism.

I'm interested in theory of mind ... but dualism is plain silly. Sure, I could provide arguments against dualism ... but it's a very easy target. Much like God.

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Noncognitivist nihilism posits that moral operators aren't actually talking about what they're about, as opposed to cognitivist nihilism which asserts that they are - but get it wrong. 

And neither form of nihilism even implicitly states anything normative or that anybody ought to do or avoid doing anything ... and yet you insist the opposite. Don't you see that if an ethical framework says that somebody ought to behave a certain way then that framework is not ethically nihilistic? Explaining why to you is like explaining why squares have 4 sides. You're misdefining ethical nihilism if you think ethical nihilism can tell people what they ought to do.

Lastly, you still haven't shown where I made a normative statement.

Do you retract your claims yet? Because if you won't back them up one bit, and you are just going to continue with bare assertions and contradictions, then I think it's highly likely that you're either unable or unwilling to acknowledge your logical errors on this matter.

---

I'll provide an example for you to work with and school me.

Vanilla icecream is the best icecream.  You should only eat the best icecream.  Therefore you should only eat vanilla icecream.  

This is a normative expression.  Which parts of it, if any, are truth apt?

I don't think it's truth-apt but if it is then that just means it's a statement that is capable of being true. But I only don't think it's truth-apt because I think the concept of something being "the best", without an expression of in what way it is the best, is incoherent. "Best" is meaningless without a qualifier. Even "tastes the best" would not do ... because tastes the best to whom? Your statement has to be meaningful before it can be evaluated. An incoherent and meaningless statement can't be truth-apt only because incoherent and meaningless statements don't state anything meaningful or coherent ... and hence aren't actually statements. If X is not a statement at all then it can't be a truth-apt statement.

Your example isn't relevant, anyway. There's nothing about ethical nihilism that says that such a statement can be true ... which is exactly my point.

Furthermore, your ice cream example just goes in favor of the fact that ethical nihilism doesn't say that such statements can be true. There's nothing about ethical nihilism that says anything can be better or worse than anything else. Ethical nihilism doesn't state anything axiological.

So there you go, schooled. Easy. Too easy, in fact.

And no, a statement that isn't truth-apt or coherent can't possibly express anything normative because a statement that isn't truth-apt or coherent doesn't express anything at all.

Perhaps we should make things simpler by asking each other yes or no questions so we have clearer views to home in on.

I'll give you many of my own for a big head start (you'll need it).

Is moral nihilism a morality? No.

Are moralities metaethical posiitons? No.

Are moralities normatively ethical positions? Yes.

Is moral nihilism a normatively ethical position? No.

Is moral nihilism a metaethical position? Yes.

Do normatively ethical positions express something normative? Yes.

Do non-normatively ethical positions express something normative? No.

Does a statement have to be truth-apt to be meaningful? Yes.

Does a statement have to be coherent to be truth-apt? Yes.

Does a statement have to coherently state something to actually state something? Yes.

Does a statement have to actually state something to state something? Yes.

Does a statement have to state something to be a statement? Yes.

Can a position that can't express anything at all coherently express something normative? No.

Can an entirely incoherent position express anything coherently? No.

Can a position that, from its point of view, doesn't acknowledge the existence of anything normative, express anything normative from its point of view where such normativity doesn't even exist? No.

Some of these questions are ludicrously trivial and obvious ... but considering that from my point of view they're ALL ludicrously trivial and obvious and yet you still can't seem to grasp them ... I thought I'd put them all out there.

[vulcanlogician]

He's said a lot of things that are plain contradictory and he's claimed that I've said things that I clearly haven't. He has also insisted that ethical nihilism implicitly makes normative statements ... something that it can't possibly do by definition.

He says that him and I agree and you've said that him and I agree ... but I don't agree with the contradictory and absurd things that he's stated ... and that's what I'm disagreeing with.

In my experience, GB can be quite insightful and thus worth engaging with on intellectual matters. But he's also belligerent as fuck. And maybe you're having a bit of trouble adjusting to that. It never bothered me, but it has been known to irk some of his interlocutors on occasion. Hopefully, you'll acquire a taste for him. I've completely rejected his reasoning on certain things before, so I feel you in that regard.

Basically, Vulcan, I'm not interested in the fact that we come to the same conclusion ... I'm interested in our reasoning in how we get there. His appears to be full of contradictions and that needs correction. Improving our method of getting to the truth is more important than whether we've reached it. Because how can we trust our conclusions if we can't trust our reasoning?

Both premises and conclusions will always be less interesting to me than the bit in between.

Dude, I'm the exact same way. I couldn't agree with this more. I hope you stick around man. You really are a "sense maker."

Because I find metaethics more interesting than Christianity and dualism.

I'm interested in theory of mind ... but dualism is plain silly. Sure, I could provide arguments against dualism ... but it's a very easy target. Much like God.

God is an easy target? I always thought he was quite hard to hit. Just when you are about to nail him with a solid refutation --POOF!-- he becomes allegory. And then when you demonstrate that adopting such allegory as unblemished truth might be in error --POOF!-- now he's some concrete entity who rules the very universe with his whims, and is therefore beyond the reach of any criticisms you might level at some rickety ol' allegory.

[SenseMaker007]

Well, literally speaking God isn't an easy target ... but only because you can't even aim at something that doesn't even exist, let alone hit it.

Gae doesn't frustrate me ... I just wonder whether it's better if I spent my time responding to somebody else.

[vulcanlogician]

-and ultimately not a conclusive or satisfying answer, either.  The best kind! 

The secret to Tantra is avoiding the orgasm