Is Moral Nihilism a Morality?

[The Grand Nudger]

Moral realism is exactly as easy or difficult to argue as realism of any other kind.

It may not be runaway skepticism to seriously consider whether our declarative statements accurately report facts, but this isn’t at all unique to moral realism. It does stretch credulity to imagine that we’re always wrong, or that we can never accurately report one subset of contended fact even as we accept all others in the set uncritically.....ofc.

Nihilism presents the same fundamental obstacle to the statement “the tree is there” as it does to “assault is wrong”, after all.

Did we just make up “tree”, and where is “there”? In relation to what or whom, and how do we handle some situation where another subject disagrees about the tree or it’s there-ness? How can we be sure there is a “there” exterior to our minds or even that other subjects exist to apprehend objects? What level of confidence can we have in these statements and how do we / can we rule out inter subjectivity? How do we determine and differentiate between objects, and further how do we assign and distribute properties between objects? Hell, is there even such a thing?

A person will find that the answers to these questions are the same as the answers for realist objections of any kind...and maybe, the takeaway should be more skepticism towards the uncontroversial declaratives we make, rather than enhanced scrutiny of the subset alone.

[DLJ]

...
Lawyers want to differentiate whether someone can be held legally responsible for a given action. To a philosopher, this doesn't matter. Wrong is wrong whether one can be held legally accountable or not.

But back to your original point: if we can find a framework that is independent of opinion, we can refute relativism (that's easy)... But to refute moral nihilism, we need to show that this framework is not just "some shit we made up." That's a bit more challenging. My first strategy in arguing against nihilism is to suggest that it is "runaway skepticism." Things like math and science can't hold up to nihilistic scrutiny either. They both could be said to be "useful fictions" without any truth value at all.

So if someone is going to argue moral nihilism, I first establish that moral realism is as objective as math and science. Any skepticism so robust as to render something like math a "useful fiction" ought not be leveled at moral realism. To say, as the wiki quote in the OP says that giving value to human life is arbitrary is just such a skepticism.

Yup. Again, weak semantics is the issue here.

Are you up for a conversation aimed at tightening up those semantics in order to arrive at an explanatory “framework that is independent of opinion”?

[vulcanlogician]

Yup. Again, weak semantics is the issue here.

Are you up for a conversation aimed at tightening up those semantics in order to arrive at an explanatory “framework that is independent of opinion”?

Maybe. But I already have a word for that framework that is independent of opinion. I call it "reality." What do you call it? (Just trying to get the semantics right.)

[DLJ]

Yup. Again, weak semantics is the issue here.

Are you up for a conversation aimed at tightening up those semantics in order to arrive at an explanatory “framework that is independent of opinion”?

Maybe. But I already have a word for that framework that is independent of opinion. I call it "reality." What do you call it? (Just trying to get the semantics right.)

Ha! That’s a good place to start. I’ll go with that.

Next, how shall we account for / describe the different perspectives of reality?
Should there be a distinction between ‘reality’ and say, ‘virtual reality’? Or physical vs. logical etc. ?

[vulcanlogician]

Next, how shall we account for / describe the different perspectives of reality?
Should there be a distinction between ‘reality’ and say, ‘virtual reality’?  Or physical vs. logical etc. ?

Logical discourse and empirical investigation are good ways of accounting for different perspectives. But all perspectives that seem viable must be constantly challenged. They must earn their place as "plausible truths."

Should there be a distinction between ‘reality’ and say, ‘virtual reality’?  Or physical vs. logical etc. ?

Sure, the modifier "virtual" does a good enough job, it seems. Or maybe we can say "virtual reality" is but a part of (if I may coin a new phrase) "reality reality."

How to distinguish the physical and logical? This is Plato's project if I correctly understand what you mean. What do you mean by "physical vs. logical"?

[DLJ]

Next, how shall we account for / describe the different perspectives of reality?
Should there be a distinction between ‘reality’ and say, ‘virtual reality’?  Or physical vs. logical etc. ?

Logical discourse and empirical investigation are good ways of accounting for different perspectives. But all perspectives that seem viable must be constantly challenged. They must earn their place as "plausible truths."
...

Sure, the dialectic, the scientific method... all good. But that’s not quite what I meant.

I’m attempting to build a model that accounts for / encompasses all perspectives (however dumb they might be) and the formation of those perspectives.

Should there be a distinction between ‘reality’ and say, ‘virtual reality’?  Or physical vs. logical etc. ?

Sure, the modifier "virtual" does a good enough job, it seems. Or maybe we can say "virtual reality" is but a part of (if I may coin a new phrase) "reality reality."

How to distinguish the physical and logical? This is Plato's project if I correctly understand what you mean. What do you mean by "physical vs. logical"?

I mean tangible vs. intangible - for example, fiction, concepts, ideas etc. All part of reality-reality. But not as real in the same way as reality-reality.

"physical vs. logical" comes from network topology... the physical design of a network vs. information flows. In biology the analogy would be: genes and memes.

[vulcanlogician]

Sure, the dialectic, the scientific method... all good. But that’s not quite what I meant.

I’m attempting to build a model that accounts for / encompasses all perspectives (however dumb they might be) and the formation of those perspectives.

Okay. But aren't some perspectives just plain wrong? eg. flat earth, creationism etc.

What good model encompasses "just plain wrong" perspectives?

I mean tangible vs. intangible - for example, fiction, concepts, ideas etc. All part of reality-reality. But not as real in the same way as reality-reality.

"physical vs. logical" comes from network topology... the physical design of a network vs. information flows. In biology the analogy would be: genes and memes.

You lost me a little bit. It's the second line about network vs. information flows that I don't quite follow.

The first line makes sense to me and, again, I'm reminded of Plato so I'm going to (annoyingly?) refer to his thinking to see if there is overlap between what you are saying and he is saying:

Far and away the most influential passage in Western philosophy ever written is Plato's discussion of the prisoners of the cave and his abstract presentation of the divided line. For Plato, human beings live in a world of visible and intelligible things. The visible world is what surrounds us: what we see, what we hear, what we experience; this visible world is a world of change and uncertainty. The intelligible world is made up of the unchanging products of human reason: anything arising from reason alone, such as abstract definitions or mathematics, makes up this intelligible world, which is the world of reality. The intelligible world contains the eternal "Forms" (in Greek, idea ) of things; the visible world is the imperfect and changing manifestation in this world of these unchanging forms. For example, the "Form" or "Idea" of a horse is intelligible, abstract, and applies to all horses; this Form never changes, even though horses vary wildly among themselves—the Form of a horse would never change even if every horse in the world were to vanish. An individual horse is a physical, changing object that can easily cease to be a horse (if, for instance, it's dropped out of a fifty story building); the Form of a horse, or "horseness," never changes. As a physical object, a horse only makes sense in that it can be referred to the "Form" or "Idea" of horseness.

http://physics.weber.edu/carroll/honors/Plato.htm

Is this what you're getting at?

[Belacqua]

I mean tangible vs. intangible - for example, fiction, concepts, ideas etc. All part of reality-reality. But not as real in the same way as reality-reality.

I wonder if Popper's Three Worlds structure might be useful here.

https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documen...pper80.pdf

[DLJ]

Sure, the dialectic, the scientific method... all good. But that’s not quite what I meant.

I’m attempting to build a model that accounts for / encompasses all perspectives (however dumb they might be) and the formation of those perspectives.

Okay. But aren't some perspectives just plain wrong? eg. flat earth, creationism etc.

What good model encompasses "just plain wrong" perspectives?
...

A generic one. One that accounts for flawed reasoning and faulty beliefs too.

...
I mean tangible vs. intangible - for example, fiction, concepts, ideas etc. All part of reality-reality. But not as real in the same way as reality-reality.

"physical vs. logical" comes from network topology... the physical design of a network vs. information flows. In biology the analogy would be: genes and memes.

You lost me a little bit. It's the second line about network vs. information flows that I don't quite follow.
...

Sorry. Maybe I’m jumping ahead a bit.

I’m looking at humans as ‘phenotypic machines’ (service providers to internal and external stakeholders) thus as food-processors and information-processors... body-mind kinda thing.

The first line makes sense to me and, again, I'm reminded of Plato so I'm going to (annoyingly?) refer to his thinking to see if there is overlap between what you are saying and he is saying:

Far and away the most influential passage in Western philosophy ever written is Plato's discussion of the prisoners of the cave and his abstract presentation of the divided line. For Plato, human beings live in a world of visible and intelligible things. The visible world is what surrounds us: what we see, what we hear, what we experience; this visible world is a world of change and uncertainty. The intelligible world is made up of the unchanging products of human reason: anything arising from reason alone, such as abstract definitions or mathematics, makes up this intelligible world, which is the world of reality. The intelligible world contains the eternal "Forms" (in Greek, idea ) of things; the visible world is the imperfect and changing manifestation in this world of these unchanging forms. For example, the "Form" or "Idea" of a horse is intelligible, abstract, and applies to all horses; this Form never changes, even though horses vary wildly among themselves—the Form of a horse would never change even if every horse in the world were to vanish. An individual horse is a physical, changing object that can easily cease to be a horse (if, for instance, it's dropped out of a fifty story building); the Form of a horse, or "horseness," never changes. As a physical object, a horse only makes sense in that it can be referred to the "Form" or "Idea" of horseness.

http://physics.weber.edu/carroll/honors/Plato.htm

Is this what you're getting at?

No annoyance here. It’s exactly what I’d hoped for.

Plato’s ‘visible’ and ‘intelligible’ (as described above) fit nicely with Popper’s Worlds 1 and 3. But does not account for your ‘reality-reality’.

The latter would be closer to Kant’s Noumenon / thing in itself.

Please correct me if I’m wrong. My background is not philosophy (no one is surprised) it’s data/information governance and management.

I mean tangible vs. intangible - for example, fiction, concepts, ideas etc. All part of reality-reality. But not as real in the same way as reality-reality.

I wonder if Popper's Three Worlds structure might be useful here.

https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documen...pper80.pdf

Yes. Thank you.

There’s some weak semantics there (which no doubt Popper covers in other publications) e.g. “mind”, “thought process”, “objective”, “consciousness”, “knowledge” and there seems to be a misstep in the summary when describing World 2 as “conscious experience” when earlier it was described as “process”.

But yes, that’s the kind of thing.

So, can we label Kant’s Noumenon and Vulcanology’s Reality-reality as World 0 given that World 1 (as described) requires human lenses and filters to detect/perceive/interpretat its contents?

[vulcanlogician]

There’s some weak semantics there (which no doubt Popper covers in other publications) e.g. “mind”, “thought process”, “objective”, “consciousness”, “knowledge” and there seems to be a misstep in the summary when describing World 2 as “conscious experience” when earlier it was described as “process”.

But yes, that’s the kind of thing.

So, can we label Kant’s Noumenon and Vulcanology’s Reality-reality as World 0 given that World 1 (as described) requires human lenses and filters to detect/perceive/interpretat its contents?

I'd say that all worlds together might be a good model for reality-reality... or you could say (as per strict materialist theories) world 1 is reality reality and world 2 is merely some kind of artifact of reality reality. World 3 most resembles Plato's world of forms. I rather like Popper's distinctions and they might be a good set of categories to use when addressing relevant distinctions in our little morality debate. But that's what they are to me: distinctions of a single substance... a substance which we may call reality.

One thing that jumped out at me from Popper:
"There is, secondly, the mental or psychological world, the
world of our feelings of pain and of pleasure, of our thoughts, of
our decisions, of our perceptions and our observations; in other
words, the world of mental or psychological states or processes,
or of subjective experiences. I will call it ‘world 2’. World 2 is
immensely important, especially from a human point of view or
from a moral point of view. Human suffering belongs to world 2;
and human suffering, especially avoidable suffering, is the central
moral problem for all those who can help."

If we accept human suffering as objective fact, then (to me) we can begin to formulate a moral theory that takes human suffering into account. This doesn't mean that we give an "artificial weight" to it. At this point in our conversation, the importance of human suffering is yet to be determined. Perhaps we will find, after some investigation, that only world 3 is relevant to moral theory. (I tend to think that it is world 3 because world 3 makes sense of worlds 1 and 2, and it is only after having made sense of these realities, to some degree, that moral valuation becomes possible.) But the naturalists might disagree with me there.

I think Belaqua's suggestion to use Popper's categorizations is excellent. Plato is a bit old and musty. True, he gets credit for starting Popper's project and being an all around genius when it comes to moral realism, but Popper is much more clear and also informed by modern science. So, if you agree, I say we start with his three worlds distinctions scheme to get started in our ethical discourse.