Is Moral Nihilism a Morality?

[DLJ]

...
I'd say that all worlds together might be a good model for reality-reality... or you could say (as per strict materialist theories) world 1 is reality reality and world 2 is merely some kind of artifact of reality reality. World 3 most resembles Plato's world of forms. I rather like Popper's distinctions and they might be a good set of categories to use when addressing relevant distinctions in our little morality debate. But that's what they are to me: distinctions of a single substance... a substance which we may call reality.

One thing that jumped out at me from Popper:
"There is, secondly, the mental or psychological world, the
world of our feelings of pain and of pleasure, of our thoughts, of
our decisions, of our perceptions and our observations; in other
words, the world of mental or psychological states or processes,
or of subjective experiences. I will call it ‘world 2’. World 2 is
immensely important, especially from a human point of view or
from a moral point of view. Human suffering belongs to world 2;
and human suffering, especially avoidable suffering, is the central
moral problem for all those who can help."

If we accept human suffering as objective fact, then (to me) we can begin to formulate a moral theory that takes human suffering into account. This doesn't mean that we give an "artificial weight" to it. At this point in our conversation, the importance of human suffering is yet to be determined. Perhaps we will find, after some investigation, that only world 3 is relevant to moral theory. (I tend to think that it is world 3 because world 3 makes sense of worlds 1 and 2, and it is only after having made sense of these realities, to some degree, that moral valuation becomes possible.) But the naturalists might disagree with me there.

I think Belaqua's suggestion to use Popper's categorizations is excellent. Plato is a bit old and musty. True, he gets credit for starting Popper's project and being an all around genius when it comes to moral realism, but Popper is much more clear and also informed by modern science. So, if you agree, I say we start with his three worlds distinctions scheme to get started in our ethical discourse.

Many apologies for the delay in responding. Internet down since Friday.

Sure, let’s go with Popper’s Worlds. We’ll need to update them (given the advances made in the 40 years since) and based on clarifying this:

... framework that is independent of opinion. I call it "reality." ...

... and agree on some terminology.

Wikipedia summarises the Worlds as follows:
World 1: the world of physical objects and events, including biological entities
World 2: the world of mental processes
World 3: objective knowledge
So we already have a problem in that knowledge can never be objective or independent of opinion.

The diagram is better but still contains the ‘objective’ problem.


The problem arises from the realisation that World 2 encompasses itself and Worlds 1 and 3.

So, I propose this variation for appraisal:
World 0: the world of physical objects and events, including biological entities that is “independent of opinion” (the world that would still exist if there were no minds with which to observe, process and experience it).  Thus, the inexperienceable world.
World 1: the experienceable world of physical objects and events, including biological entities; the phenotypic machine’s external ontological dashboard.
World 2: the world of psychological / cognitive / mental process; individual perception and interpretation of Worlds 1, 2 and 3; the phenotypic machine’s ‘mind’.
World 3: the world of the output of World 2 (minds); concepts, abstractions, creations, designs etc. which when in a physical form e.g. art, text, numerals are a subset of World 1.

Thus, only World 0 can be truly objective since it requires no experiencer (an experiencer prone to, indeed designed by natural selection to, be subjective). This leads to the realisation that there can be no experienceable ‘objective facts’ only that objectivity is one of many useful ‘information quality criteria’.

Regarding the comment about suffering: yes, agreed, “the importance of human suffering is yet to be determined”. But what we can determine is that suffering can belong to Worlds 1, 2 and 3 as follows:
World 1 suffering: data input; observation of pain etc.
World 2 suffering: data (and patterns of data; and patterns of patterns etc.) processing; experienced pain/suffering and processing of observed suffering.
World 3 suffering: data/information artefacts e.g. fiction, art, historical records about suffering; studies on the causes of suffering; plans to rectify or cause suffering.

[The Grand Nudger]

Us the statement that knowledge can never be objective an objectively true statement?

Objectivity, in ethics or anything else, simply refers to statements which purport to report facts and which do report the contents of those facts accurately. Its not a problem for the reporter to have experienced that content.

Your knowledge of your own name is derived from experience. We can (and do) acknowledge that human experience, and the apparatus of human experience present difficulties for any objective assessment - but a blanket rejection of the category is insensible and reduces the statements made to support its own contention into a self defeating morass.

Succinctly, if there is no knowledge, then there can be no knowledge of there being no knowledge - and even this statement cannot be known to be true. Repeat ad infinitum.

[DLJ]

There’s a tiny alert going off in my personal World 2 warning me that it might be premature to start discussing (a specific example of) Information Items before reaching consensus on Information Flows but why not?  It might be useful for clarification.

[Is] the statement that knowledge can never be objective an objectively true statement?
...

It’s not.

I think it might be best, due to the risk of equivocation, to avoid the word ‘objective(ly)’ altogether.  

“An object or objective can be objectively measured using objective metrics.”
See the problem?
Translation; An thing or goal can be independently measured using quantitative metrics.”
Leaving aside that subjective metrics could also be used. :)

So perhaps it would be wise to refer to World 0 as non-subjective? And use ‘objective’ as a synonym for ‘goal’?

The question could thus be rewritten as “Can the <information item> be assessed using the following criteria?”
Relevant criteria being: accuracy, objectivity, completeness etc.

In this case, i.e. “knowledge can never be objective” is an information item and not a knowledge item and would be accurate in line with its ‘contingency’ property, specifically definitions of both ‘knowledge’ and ‘objective’ are required to precede this information.

...
Objectivity, in ethics or anything else, simply refers to statements which purport to report facts and which do report the contents of those facts accurately.
...

Sure. No argument from me.
I’d go for “... statements which can be assessed as unprejudiced and impartial”, and drop the bit about ‘accuracy’ which is a different quality criteria.  

...
Its not a problem for the reporter to have experienced that content.
...

Agreed. A World 2 experience.  
‘Objectivity’ is an information criteria.
The statement/report is a World 3 artefact (output) and a World 1 artefact (input).

...
Your knowledge of your own name is derived from experience.  We can (and do) acknowledge that human experience, and the apparatus of human experience present difficulties for any objective assessment
...

Agreed.

...
but a blanket rejection of the category is insensible and reduces the statements made to support its own contention into a self defeating morass.
...

Well, yeah, but which category is being rejected by whom... objective or objectivity?
:huh:

...
Succinctly, if there is no knowledge, then there can be no knowledge of there being no knowledge - and even this statement cannot be known to be true.  Repeat ad infinitum.

Agreed.
Obviously.

:)

[vulcanlogician]

Many apologies for the delay in responding. Internet down since Friday.

Sure, let’s go with Popper’s Worlds. We’ll need to update them (given the advances made in the 40 years since) and based on clarifying this:
... and agree on some terminology.

Wikipedia summarises the Worlds as follows:
World 1: the world of physical objects and events, including biological entities
World 2: the world of mental processes
World 3: objective knowledge
So we already have a problem in that knowledge can never be objective or independent of opinion.

We disagree on this. To me objective knowledge is possible. It is a non sequitur to think that objective knowledge is impossible simply because subjective perception is involved in the process of attaining it. Science is a means to attain objective knowledge. Do you agree or disagree with this? We need to work this issue out before we can progress. [see below]

The diagram is better but still contains the ‘objective’ problem.


The problem arises from the realisation that World 2 encompasses itself and Worlds 1 and 3.

So, I propose this variation for appraisal:
World 0: the world of physical objects and events, including biological entities that is “independent of opinion” (the world that would still exist if there were no minds with which to observe, process and experience it).  Thus, the inexperienceable world.
World 1: the experienceable world of physical objects and events, including biological entities; the phenotypic machine’s external ontological dashboard.
World 2: the world of psychological / cognitive / mental process; individual perception and interpretation of Worlds 1, 2 and 3; the phenotypic machine’s ‘mind’.
World 3: the world of the output of World 2 (minds); concepts, abstractions, creations, designs etc. which when in a physical form e.g. art, text, numerals are a subset of World 1.

I don't like this revised model. It gets the job done, sure, but I think Popper's model is clearer. The problem is that in your model, World 0 is "the world of physical objects" and world 1 is the "experienceable world of physical objects."

I think ALL physical objects (whether experienceable or not) ought to be contained within a single category. Why? Because (while certainly there may be objects that are not experienceable and some that are) this distinction is irrelevant to the topic of ethics. 

However, I see where you're coming from. To you, the distinction is important because you think that knowledge which is informed by subjective experience is "not objective." I disagree with this. So this is the issue we need to focus on. [see below]

Thus, only World 0 can be truly objective since it requires no experiencer (an experiencer prone to, indeed designed by natural selection to, be subjective).

But Popper's world 1 requires no experiencer either. Even if every conscious entity were to perish, world 1 would still exist. (The same could be said of world 3). If every biological entity (or sentient being) were to perish even category 2 would still exist... it would just contain no information. Your model works; it just makes a superfluous distinction. Why not merge worlds 0 and 1 in your model?

This leads to the realisation that there can be no experienceable ‘objective facts’ only that objectivity is one of many useful ‘information quality criteria’.

Two things to say here.

1) "realisation?" Are you British or Aussie? I assumed you were American. But I guess you aren't. I'm a Yankee in case you didn't know. 
2) Objective facts are real, dude. They just aren't experienced. They're understood, comprehended, etc. (or misunderstood/miscomprehended in certain cases). You don't "experience" facts. Facts are world 3.

Regarding the comment about suffering: yes, agreed, “the importance of human suffering is yet to be determined”. But what we can determine is that suffering can belong to Worlds 1, 2 and 3 as follows:

World 1 suffering: data input; observation of pain etc.

The phenomena which cause suffering are in world 1. But suffering itself is a world 2 thing. Also, world 1 contains no data. World 1 also contains no observation. Data exists only in world 3. Observations exist in world 2. (However! The phenomena which cause observation exist in world 1. No doubt about that.)

World 2 suffering: data (and patterns of data; and patterns of patterns etc.) processing; experienced pain/suffering and processing of observed suffering.

Again, there is no data except in world 3. Data processing is a world 1 event.

World 3 suffering: data/information artefacts e.g. fiction, art, historical records about suffering; studies on the causes of suffering; plans to rectify or cause suffering.

Yes. This is all world 3 stuff.

[The below I referred to above]

The question we need to address here is this: Is science objective? I say that it is. But science relies on subjective experience to inform the theories within it. Let's consider the sun for a moment.

1) The sun exists. And it exists in world 1.
2) A biological entity (such as a human being) can look at the sun (ie. have a subjective experience of the sun... feel it's heat... see its position in the sky etc.)
3) A scientist with a telescope can make observations of the sun. These are subjective experiences.
4) From such observations, one may form a theory about what the sun is, what it is made of, why it produces heat ect. (these ideas are a part of world 3)

The thing is, science relies on subjective observations to give us objective knowledge. The sun is there, regardless of our opinions (objective truth). It is comprised mostly of hydrogen and helium, regardless of our opinion (objective truth). But we will never realize any objective truth about the sun without a subjective experience of it (ie. observation).

Some philosophers argue that science is not objective. They say it's a useful fiction. If this is your position, I cannot argue that morality is objective. 


I think science IS objective. I think science gets us closer to the truth. Also, to me, truth isn't subjective. Something either is true or it isn't.

If we can't agree on these things, there is no use for us to proceed into a discussion of ethics. But if we do agree, then this is a fine starting point in our discourse concerning the objectivity of morality.

[Belacqua]

I don't like this revised model. It gets the job done, sure, but I think Popper's model is clearer. The problem is that in your model, World 0 is "the world of physical objects" and world 1 is the "experienceable world of physical objects."

I think ALL physical objects (whether experienceable or not) ought to be contained within a single category. Why? Because (while certainly there may be objects that are not experienceable and some that are) this distinction is irrelevant to the topic of ethics. 

However, I see where you're coming from. To you, the distinction is important because you think that knowledge which is informed by subjective experience is "not objective." I disagree with this. So this is the issue we need to focus on. [see below]

@DLJ
This is the way I understand the model, also. World 1 is all the stuff that's there physically, observed or not. The observation occurs in World 2, but we are certainly reasonable to assume that World 1 stuff is real. Popper leaves open, and doesn't address in this case, all the old problems of noumena/phenomena, etc. All the questions of exactly how World 1 stuff gets translated into World 2 remains. 

[quote pid='1918594' dateline='1562954805']

The thing is, science relies on subjective observations to give us objective knowledge. The sun is there, regardless of our opinions (objective truth). It is comprised mostly of hydrogen and helium, regardless of our opinion (objective truth). But we will never realize any objective truth about the sun without a subjective experience of it (ie. observation).

Some philosophers argue that science is not objective. They say it's a useful fiction. If this is your position, I cannot argue that morality is objective. 


I think science IS objective. I think science gets us closer to the truth. Also, to me, truth isn't subjective. Something either is true or it isn't.

If we can't agree on these things, there is no use for us to proceed into a discussion of ethics. But if we do agree, then this is a fine starting point in our discourse concerning the objectivity of morality.

Personally, I like this model because it clarifies the objective/subjective thing. I think it makes clear how both World 1 objects and World 3 artefacts are objective, though in different ways. 

As always, it seems to me that part of the problem comes about when people imply that "objective" means "universal and eternal." I'd rather say that it just means "not belonging to World 2."  

So some trivial examples: the camellia tree in my garden has objective World 1 existence, though not universal or eternal. Sherlock Holmes has objective World 3 existence, though not universal or eternal. Sherlock Holmes doesn't have, and has never had, World 1 existence. He occurs in World 2 fleetingly, whenever someone thinks of Sherlock Holmes. His existence in World 3 is the interesting part of Popper's model. His existence there is not the same as his fleeting occurrence in a subject, and is therefore an object -- objective. And as with anything objective (?) we can make truth claims about it. For example, it is false to say that Sherlock Holmes lives in Wichita. He lives in London. We can also discern the difference between the real Sherlock Holmes and parodies or "reboots," which are "inspired by" but not the same. 

So I think Popper's model applies to morality because we can say that moral principles are World 3 objects, which are concerned with World 2 states, and probably have World 1 solutions. For example: the conviction that suffering is bad is World 3, the suffering itself is World 2, and the way to relieve the suffering, in any given case, is probably through improved medicine, housing, nutrition, etc., which are all World 1. 

(Granted, there may be different attempts at a solution. For example Cognitive Therapy may address World 2 suffering though World 2 processes. Attempts to redefine suffering as a good thing without changing the subjective experience would be a World 3 issue.)

[The Grand Nudger]

The distinction between objective and subjective in ethics is far simpler in principle than these world distinctions. The objective refers to true statements about the object, the subjective refers to true statements about the subject.

It can obviously be difficult to determine which of the two sets a representative statement belongs to, but the referent sets themselves are well defined and in need of no new terms or novel explanations in order to clarify their boundaries.





I

[DLJ]

I’ve been staring so hard at that damned model for over 3 days now that my head is spinning so I thought I’d better type a reply or you’d think I’d disappeared.

First thing of note was the realisation on Sunday morning (it’s Monday night now) of the similarity of the 3 Worlds diagram to the first slide of a presentation I used to rope a Biologist and a Psychologist into assisting with my current project. Of course, with my flair for the pretentious I called the three circles (which overlapped, Venn style), Aphrodite, Psyche and Demeter to represent Biology (reproduction), Psychology and Society (sacred law) - which also covered the specialist fields of the three of us.
Credit where it’s due to the Greeks in naming the grandchild of Aphrodite and the daughter of Psyche, Hedone. They knew their shit.
The intersection of the three circles had a “You Are Here” arrow.

And this could be where I’m struggling with the diagram. If the circles overlapped rather than represented a flow it might make more sense. However I am considering changing Demeter to Athena (representing Wisdom) to see if that works more betterly.

Anyway... it’s stuff like the word “books” in World 3 that has me puzzled. Physical media / the carrier of information only exists in World 1 so yeah I get that the concept of Sherlock Holmes resides in World 3 and he has to get into a book (or kindle) in World 1 before he can be read about in World 2... so all the arrows make sense: imagination > invention > signals.
We must conclude from this that Sherlock-the-concept has no physical substance while in World 3. Does he have a metaphorical substrate? We can ask Jordan Peterson.

And yes, apologies @vulcanlogician I called the bottom arrow “data input”. Old habit. Data input or data entry and access channels is how I think of it. My Biologist usually thwacks me when I do that and mutters “stimuli” under her breath. To me it’s the same thing.

So how about god(s)?  Yup, that works. Same as Sherlock. And god modifies the physical world (left arrow) by shutting down Planned Parenthood (not on his own, of course. He gets help).

So far so good. The model I’m hoping for allows for shitty ideas as well as good scientific ideas.

Will god stay in his metaphorical form with all the other explanatory knowledge that’s in there? Of course not; he gets reified into world 1 and the access channel (bottom arrow) is prayer (I guess).

So where is the actual, physical god? we ask.
In World 1 says the congregation, in unison, arms raised skyward.
How do you know he’s real? we enquire.
We feel him in our hearts, comes the reply.
Well, I guess we can’t argue with that.

This is why I’d prefer to have a World 0 tucked behind World 1. They can claim that gods and djinns and angels are in the unknown-unknown realm (and they do claim that) but they’d need to explain how god gets into World 1 from World 0.

If they say “you can’t prove he’s not in World 0”, we say “sure, but then you can’t make claims about his properties and attributes unless he’s in observable World 1, so STFU”.

The first stanza of the Tao Te Ching explains that you don’t know the Tao if you can talk about the Tao. Bingo! World 0 Tao is ‘eternally nameless’. Nice one.

So to acquiesce to the protests about World 0, I’m imagining World 1 with two parts: known and unknown (or discovered and not yet discovered). Over the millennia Science has shifted the division of the circle in favour of ‘discovered’. And Science’s one job is to finish that task.
Radiation is a good example.

Humans have evolved some quite cool access channels. Senses include:
Touch, taste, smell, sound, light, colour*, temperature, pH
Distance, proximity, movement, edges, direction, location (space and time), passing of time, loss
Balance, pain, discomfort, comfort, injustice, fraud, deceit, lies etc.
... but not radiation.

*yes, I’m a Brit. But I lived in Oz for a couple of years so I have a smattering of Strayan

But then from World 2 comes a thought which turns into a theory and a concept then an invention and the Geiger Counter is born into World 1. This creates a new source of data.

Science FTW.

Now comes a sticking point.
In the summary of Popper’s essay he notes:
“The feedback effect between World 3 and World 2 is of particular importance. Our minds are the creators of World 3; but World 3 in its turn not only informs our minds but largely creates them.”

How is that shown on the model? The right-hand arrow is not bi-directional. And what about the assurance/assessment process to ascertain the quality of World 3 knowledge? Assessing for truth, credibility, objectivity, accuracy, reputation of sources etc. ... when does that happen? Before the interpretation of the physical world leaves World 2 or afterwards?

More to follow. My phone can’t cope with the length of this monologue.

---

Regarding “objective”.

The object of my objective objection is ‘objective’ for the objective reason that @Belaqua indicates ... its proneness to equivocation e.g. “universal and eternal” or “objectivity”.

Also, if (from post #136) “The objective refers to true statements about the object”... aren’t Sherlock and gods subjects?

I’d be happier if World 2 was labelled “Explanatory Knowledge” or “Actionable Information”.

Also, since we haven’t discussed ‘knowledge’ yet, for future reference, here are some definitions that I’ll be using (they’re not textbook but they’re close enough):
Data, Information
Objective, Subjective *
Knowledge, Wisdom
Ethics, Morals **

* The video claims that “Morality is not objective” which is correct but the claim “morality is opinion” is also not the whole picture.
** “Morals” isn’t quite right as there’s no separation of noun and verb, ‘a moral’ vs. ‘to be moral’ and a misuse or misunderstanding of ‘culture’. But that’s for later discussion.

[DLJ]

...
I think ALL physical objects (whether experienceable or not) ought to be contained within a single category. Why? Because (while certainly there may be objects that are not experienceable and some that are) this distinction is irrelevant to the topic of ethics. 
...

Until we get to Divinity Ethics, methinks.

...
1) The sun exists. And it exists in world 1.
2) A biological entity (such as a human being) can look at the sun (ie. have a subjective experience of the sun... feel it's heat... see its position in the sky etc.)
3) A scientist with a telescope can make observations of the sun. These are subjective experiences.
4) From such observations, one may form a theory about what the sun is, what it is made of, why it produces heat ect. (these ideas are a part of world 3)

The thing is, science relies on subjective observations to give us objective knowledge. The sun is there, regardless of our opinions (objective truth). It is comprised mostly of hydrogen and helium, regardless of our opinion (objective truth). But we will never realize any objective truth about the sun without a subjective experience of it (ie. observation).

Some philosophers argue that science is not objective. They say it's a useful fiction. If this is your position, I cannot argue that morality is objective. 

I think science IS objective. I think science gets us closer to the truth. Also, to me, truth isn't subjective. Something either is true or it isn't.

If we can't agree on these things, there is no use for us to proceed into a discussion of ethics. But if we do agree, then this is a fine starting point in our discourse concerning the objectivity of morality.

Technically, “the sun” exists in World 2.

I would not describe science as objective. That would understate its importance.
Instead let me suggest that the scientific method aspires to be and has self-correcting, continuous improvement mechanisms to deliver high value intrinsic quality information:

[The Grand Nudger]

Is there some specific reason that moral reasoning can’t provide the same, or that science for that matter, can’t comment on ethics? Cornell realism immediately springs to mind.

In the absence of such a reason, might we also conclude that calling realist moral theory “objective” similarly understates its importance?

[vulcanlogician]

Technically, “the sun” exists in World 2.

There is a monster of matter and energy that hurls billions of photons at the Earth every second. It exists. And it exists in world 1. When we look into the noonday sky, we are treated the image of a brilliant glowing disc (that's world 2). We have determined all kinds of facts about this "brilliant glowing disc" such as that it is comprised mostly of hydrogen has a gravitational field associated with it, could be the giant wheel of a Greek chariot (world 3 stuff).

To me, some of these facts are objectively true. Others are objectively false.

I would not describe science as objective.

This is where we disagree. The fiend's exposed!

Instead let me suggest that the scientific method aspires to be and has self-correcting, continuous improvement mechanisms to deliver high value intrinsic quality information:

Couldn't a soap opera be said to have "a self-correcting, continuous improvement mechanisms to deliver high value intrinsic quality information?" At least a well-written one, perhaps. So what separates science from a well-written soap opera from science? To me, something separates them. They are obviously distinct things.

(Sorry, chart was confusing. Please explain which parts are relevant.)