Is Moral Responsibility Compatible With Determinism?

[vulcanlogician]

No. It isn't compatible.

Do you think consent is compatible with determinism?

Is there a difference between a consensual action like consensual sex, vs coerced or forced actions?

I would say in the realm of what is meant by "consent" there exist the idea of responsibility.

To the determinist, consent exists because it is a real phenomenon in the world. If it is determined that someone knocks on a door and it is determined that someone answers it. Then if it is determined that the one who knocked say, "May I come in?" and they are given an answer: "Yes,"... then consent as been given in a deterministic universe.

Giving consent is an event that happens. I don't think it's necessarily entwined with responsibility. However, if (say) libertarian free will were true, then an agent would be responsible for the consent that they give. That much is true.

[The Grand Nudger]

-and if it weren't, then a person would be as responsible as they could be for the consent they give.  

We already know that consent can be compelled.  There are multiple industries that operate on this principle. Getting a person to say yes to something doesn't seem to be a whole lot more than a matter of presentation.

[Alan V]

One wonders why our own modern day abacus doesn't show this emergent property, being a complex symbol processor operating on a vast landscape of relationships between it's own internal mechanism and an unending stream of exterior prompts.  While it may be true, emergentism often comes off to people as the classic step two in the three step "and then magic happens" explanation of phenomena. 

This ignores the fact that reductionism is also saying, "We don't know how all this works yet, but we think it all reduces to simple physical laws."

What exactly do you find so difficult about the idea that at certain levels of complexity we see evidence for properties which didn't exist at simpler material levels? We actually observe the effects of life, consciousness, reasoning, and so on. They change material realities in significant ways, even though they don't change the laws of physics.

In other words, I base my emergentism on observations of the effects of emergent properties.

Reductionists can (and will and do) point to that disparity and then contend that whatever it is you're saying, and however true it may be, there must then be some x that humans possess that the modern day abacus does not - and in that, we're right back round to reductionism again - and would you/could you argue with them on that point?  Is there not some clear and effectual difference between the two complex symbolic relationship processors?  

Yes, emergentists do contend that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts. We also contend that although reductionists will always search for reductionistic explanations, they will not likely find them when some properties only exist at levels of complexity.

In your own allusions, for example, you continually refer to complexity as that x.  Is that so different from a reductionist explaining why an abacus can't do what a pc can do?  Could we be more specific with a pc/abacus comparison?  Yes, needlingly specific, down to the parts list and circuit schem and the underlying principles of why each component works and, also, how to manufacture them.  We can't do that with the human brain..but is there some reason to suppose that it couldn't be done?   Are we saying anything by a vague reference to unspecified complexity  that actually falls outside of the reductionists wheelhouse or really does suggest imply or empower a "free will"?

No, complexity enables that x, but it is not that x in itself. The x depends on specific complex relationships, not just a lot of parts. Evolution is necessary. Otherwise piles of junk might evidence emergent properties.

That much is unclear.  Just as it's unclear how or why the addition or subtraction of free will would affect moral responsibility.  We already posit that moral responsibility exists in the case of free will -and- in it's absence, and regardless of how (or by what) our moral agency is derived.  Could be ghosts, or magic, or unspecified complexity, we may or may not have fundamental compulsions and we may or may not be able to override them, but which if any of these are actually incompatible with the notion?  

Different moral systems come to different conclusions, although there is much overlapping. That means that while you can derive a moral system without the assumption of free will, it won't be quite the same system. Some of the differences have been brought up in this discussion at a few points.

Moral agency, and thus moral responsibility, is a bit of a free rider, lol.  It doesn't have to affirm or deny the articles of any of those positions in order to provide demonstration of it's own.

I think it depends on what specifically it is affirming or denying, if I understand what you meant correctly.

[vulcanlogician]

I obviously need to read more about philosophy at some point.

If determinism is a metaphysical theory, then determinists should have no problem acknowledging another metaphysical theory.  However, in my experience determinists seem to have a hard time acknowledging emergentism as an alternative.  Why is that, if they don't think determinism is inherent to materialism?

From my point of view, free will decisions depend on reasoning, which in turn depends on the symbolic processing of information in human brains.  What law of cause and effect does the symbolic processing of information violate?  As far as I can see, none at all.  Material cause and effect still works perfectly well at its own level of complexity, and nothing changes that when you add a much greater level of complexity and free will is possible.  As I pointed out with my abacus analogy, nothing changes the material properties of the beads.  Their new properties emerge because of the meanings attributed to their relative positions, so meanings require relationships between multiple beads.  The movements of the beads are still materially caused, even while the answers they provide are derived by their symbolic attributes.  At minimum, two different levels are involved, not just one.  The rules of one level simply don't apply to the rules of another, when much more complexity is involved.

It's like the different between making meaningless noises and making music.  Music emerges from the relationships between the notes and instruments, whereas random noises have no intentional relationships.

You don't need to read more philosophy. And determinists don't have any issues with looking at alternative theories. You are missing just one key point.

In order for you to choose freely, you have to have within you the power to change reality. The question is: how? How do you have the power to change reality?

Your brain?

Your brain is made of matter. All matter obeys the laws of physics. When you have a thought, all that is is a set of neurons firing. They do this as a response to external and internal stimuli. There is no homunculus inside your brain calling the shots. As far as we know, there is no immaterial soul that calls the shots either. It's all stimulus response. It's all matter interacting with matter (as far as we know).

The brain does not have the power to change reality. The brain itself does not control which neurons fire. It merely transfers messages from one part to another. It's all neurons firing in the precise way that the laws of physics say they should fire. That doesn't allow the brain to change reality.

If your answer to the question of free will is "brains." You need to answer how brains can change reality.

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I guess another way of looking at the brain is like it is a lightning rod. Sure, when lightening hits a lightning rod it runs currents of electricity this way and that way. But the lightning rod doesn't control any of that. It all has to do with its structure which way the electricity goes. The lightning rod isn't "choosing."

What is a brain but an intricate complex if mini "lightning rods" called neurons?

[The Grand Nudger]

Such as?  What difference to moral systems does it make if determinism, reductionism, or emergentism are true?

[Acrobat]

Do you think consent is compatible with determinism?

Is there a difference between a consensual action like consensual sex, vs coerced or forced actions?

I would say in the realm of what is meant by "consent" there exist the idea of responsibility.

To the determinist, consent exists because it is a real phenomenon in the world. If it is determined that someone knocks on a door and it is determined that someone answers it. Then if it is determined that the one who knocked say, "May I come in?" and they are given an answer: "Yes,"... then consent as been given in a deterministic universe.

Giving consent is an event that happens. I don't think it's necessarily entwined with responsibility. However, if (say) libertarian free will were true, then an agent would be responsible for the consent that they give. That much is true.

I would say what we mean by being responsible for an action, operates in the same way that consenting to an action does. Where as coercion, someone forcing you to act against your own will, negates both responsibility and consent. Responsibility exists in a deterministic universe the same way that consent does. It's the saying yes, to the may i come in, rather no.

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

If determinism is true, then moral responsibility cannot exist. Moral bad actors have no free will, and the members of society who punish them have no free will.  It's a wash.

Boru

[Alan V]

You don't need to read more philosophy. And determinists don't have any issues with looking at alternative theories. You are missing just one key point.

I need to better understand how philosophers define such words as "properties" to be able to communicate with them more clearly. I also need to read up on Hume and other philosophers on the issues of cause and effect and free will. It's difficult to have a conversation with people who refer to issues with which I am not properly conversant. Philosophers may not understand what I mean if I am not speaking their language.

In order for you to choose freely, you have to have within you the power to change reality. The question is: how? How do you have the power to change reality?

All sorts of different things can happen within the laws of physics, but only some do. As biological creatures, we work endlessly to weight the dice in our favor. And we are a very successful species.

Your brain?

Your brain is made of matter. All matter obeys the laws of physics. When you have a thought, all that is is a set of neurons firing. They do this as a response to external and internal stimuli. There is no homunculus inside your brain calling the shots. As far as we know, there is no immaterial soul that calls the shots either. It's all stimulus response. It's all matter interacting with matter (as far as we know).

No, it is not "all stimulus response." You are completely overlooking motivated selective focus, the human ability to suppress reactions, and conflicting desires, not all of which can be followed at one time.

The brain does not have the power to change reality. The brain itself does not control which neurons fire. It merely transfers messages from one part to another. It's all neurons firing in the precise way that the laws of physics say they should fire. That doesn't allow the brain to change reality.

If your answer to the question of free will is "brains." You need to answer how brains can change reality.

Sure, but that really isn't as difficult a problem as you assume. I'm writing this response. My brain is involved. That's changing reality. These questions are answered by observations.

I guess another way of looking at the brain is like it is a lightning rod. Sure, when lightening hits a lightning rod it runs currents of electricity this way and that way. But the lightning rod doesn't control any of that. It all has to do with its structure which way the electricity goes. The lightning rod isn't "choosing."

What is a brain but an intricate complex if mini "lightning rods" called neurons?

And THAT is reductionism, in a nutshell. I have no reductionistic answers for you since I am not a reductionist.

According to emergentists, the human brain can only be understood at its own level of complexity. Neuroscience and physics may be important at their own levels, but don't overlook psychological studies where it is accepted that people often make choices based on their reasoning. Our brains don't just happen to us. They are us.

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Such as?  What difference to moral systems does it make if determinism, reductionism, or emergentism are true?

I was thinking specifically about what Vulcanlogician wrote:

A determinist is guided less to punish bad behavior and more to prevent its causes... because (to a determinist) free choice ISN'T the cause of x behavior. It was exterior factors that made such and such a person do x.

I think it is quite clear that we humans are more determined than many theists, for instance, can comfortably admit.  But that doesn't mean we are completely determined, so we have to take that into account too.  To the extent that we do, our laws will change since our laws are how we codify our moral thinking.

[Alan V]

You confuse contingent unpredictability with non-determinism.

The fact that there seems to you to be a gap into which you think you can insert a belief in choice that is founded solely on your affinity towards the saccharine notion of choice is not an excuse to present that belief as anything more than sheer fantasy.

Some determinists try to define themselves as correct. My position is that this does violence to our ability to communicate different distinctions by trying to define some words in ways which rob them of any useful meanings. I'm a pragmatist in that sense.

[Acrobat]

If determinism is true, then moral responsibility cannot exist. Moral bad actors have no free will, and the members of society who punish them have no free will.  It's a wash.

Boru

This presupposes the the idea of free will negates all external influences on our decisions and actions, when traditional conceptions of never indicate that.