[Serious] An Argument For Ethical Egoism

[Rev. Rye]

Looking further at the argument, I think I’ve figured out where the argument’s problem lies. Ought may very well imply can. The thing is, “ought implies can” isn’t what you’re doing here. You’re arguing that, because humankind is hardwired towards psychological egoism, then ethical egoism is true. What exactly is meant by that? If you’re saying ethical egoism is good, then it sounds a lot like a naturalistic fallacy. You claim that “ought implies is,” but your argument appears to be getting it exactly backwards, getting an ought from an is. If not, then what exactly do you mean, especially given that ethics is all about finding out what the good even is? The most reasonable conclusion I can discern it is that ethical egoism is a good practical strategy for ethics (except when one’s self-interest conflicts with another’s), or that, because of our bias towards psychological egoism, figuring out what’s right and wrong beyond “how dare you care about your selfish desires when you could be caring about my selfish desires” is a dead end (which I would think could very well be in conflict with Premise 1.) It’s okay if you’re arguing either of those last two, but if you’re arguing the former, than ethical egoism is not a complete answer in itself, and if you’re arguing the latter, then it kind of defeats the whole purpose of ethics. If you’re taking a third option, what exactly is it? Connect the dots, because the OP argument isn’t doing it as well as previously thought.

[vulcanlogician]

Premise 1: Moral realism is true in some form. There are objective moral values and there must be some things that are objectively right and wrong to do.

Premise 2: Psychological egoism is true. We are ultimately only capable of acting within our own self-interest because even, what on the surface appears to be, selfless acts ultimately benefit the self in some way.

Premise 3: Ought implies can. It makes no sense to say that we ought to do or avoid doing something that we can't.

Conclusion: Ethical Egoism is true.

Rev got me thinking. Does the conclusion follow from the premises here? I don't think it does.

"Ethical egoism is true" IFF "The morally correct action is the action done in self interest." I don't think any of the premises proves this.

I think premise 2 is false but even if it's true it doesn't support the conclusion. Let's assume that psychological egoism is true. Hedonistic utilitarianism may also be true, and thus, a moral agent ought to select (among the various self interested actions he may take) those actions that maximize pleasure and happiness.

Even assuming we are limited to self interested actions, that doesn't make ethical egoism true.

[Rev. Rye]

And even if P2 is true, then how can the application of the OIC principle in P3 lead to the conclusion without committing the naturalistic fallacy? If Ethical Egoism being true means it is not just a good, but The Good schema for ethical behaviour, the way P2 is flowing to the Conclusion seems to be "Egoism (psychologically) is true. Therefore, Egoism (ethically) is good."

If Ethical egoism being true doesn't necessarily mean it's good, then it would appear that Kryten here's not necessarily propping up a system of ethics, but demonstrating the limits to ethics and showing the inbuilt reasons why any and all systems of ethics eventually ends up getting undermined by human bullshit and how, as a result, expecting the pure form of these ethical systems to work simply isn't compatible with life on Earth (a conclusion that I wouldn't disagree with), and billing it as a proof of ethical egoism is fundamentally misleading. And, depending on how you explain the implications, it might start to conflict with P1.

I think the first warning bells rang in my head about P3 because, the way Kryten framed it, he seemed to be conflating "Inevitable" and "Good." And looking at the rebuttals, I'm still not seeing that distinction being made in the argument. And then I got so sidetracked with some argument about trying to beat Usain Bolt in a footrace that I missed the actual error staring at me right in the face.

[vulcanlogician]

I'm with SM on premise 3. That one is sound.

My issues are: premise 2 is false and it is a possible non sequitur.

[Rev. Rye]

P3 isn’t the problem per se for me, at least not now. But how he goes from there to the conclusion is really starting to bug me.

That said, P2 is likely at the very least oversimplified. Even if every action has a selfish motive at heart, then can there not be multiple motives for one action, one selfish and one altruistic?

[The Grand Nudger]

The truth of premises 1,2, and 3 could not establish that ethical egoism is true - it could only establish that insomuch as there might be realist obligations in the selfless set (p1), we are incapable of fulfilling them(p1,p2), and thus not morally culpable for a practical failure in that event regardless of whether or not we have an obligation to attempt.  (p1,p2,p3)

In plain language, while we might have an obligation to make something so, we don't hold people accountable for the difference between what should be and what they can do.

It could be a solid argument for desert modification, and the underlying rationale for our intuitions about people who do their best, fail as a practical matter of fact due to a limitation of ability - but are still seen as moral exemplars*, even if it doesn't demonstrate the truth of a metaethical position as contended.

*and vv, that a practical success due to great ability can still be a moral failure.

[tackattack]

The truth of premises 1,2, and 3 could not establish that ethical egoism is true - it could only establish that insomuch as there might be realist obligations in the selfless set (p1), we are incapable of fulfilling them(p1,p2), and thus not morally culpable for a practical failure in that event regardless of whether or not we have an obligation to attempt.  (p1,p2,p3)

It could be a solid argument for descent modification, and the underlying rationale for our intuitions about people who do their best, fail as a practical matter of fact - but are still seen as moral exemplars*, even if it doesn't demonstrate the truth of a metaethical position as contended.

*and vv, that a practical success can still be a moral failure.

Which I believe some were making a point about. I believe the point was that while you're not morally obligated to bang your head into a wall and shouldn't be morally reprimanded for not trying, the attempt is impractical and thus worthless and irrational.

[The Grand Nudger]

I'm commenting more to the effect that even if we were morally obligated to bang our heads against walls - an implication of premise 1. We'll use that as the example for it's pure lulz value.

The conclusion, in effect, is that in this instance you should not be reprimanded because you lack the ability to fulfill some obligation, but that's not actually a comment on whether or not you have that obligation.

You are morally obligated to bang your head against the wall
You, however, are physically incapable of banging your head against the wall.

-we could bicker all day about whether or not what should be is always equivalent to what can be...

[SenseMaker007]

The truth of premises 1,2, and 3 could not establish that ethical egoism is true

It does establish it because if moral realism is true then we, morally speaking, ought to do something.

If we only ought to do what we can do, and psychological egoism is true, then it is true that the only thing that we ought to do is act in our own self-interest. That's ethical egoism.

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The truth of premises 1,2, and 3 could not establish that ethical egoism is true - it could only establish that insomuch as there might be realist obligations in the selfless set (p1), we are incapable of fulfilling them(p1,p2), and thus not morally culpable for a practical failure in that event regardless of whether or not we have an obligation to attempt.  (p1,p2,p3)

It could be a solid argument for descent modification, and the underlying rationale for our intuitions about people who do their best, fail as a practical matter of fact - but are still seen as moral exemplars*, even if it doesn't demonstrate the truth of a metaethical position as contended.

*and vv, that a practical success can still be a moral failure.

Which I believe some were making a point about. I believe the point was that while you're not morally obligated to bang your head into a wall and shouldn't be morally reprimanded for not trying, the attempt is impractical and thus worthless and irrational.

This doesn't address the argument.

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I'm commenting more to the effect that even if we were morally obligated to bang our heads against walls - an implication of premise 1.  We'll use that as the example for it's pure lulz value.

Even if we deem the morally right action to be 'pure lulz' ... it doesn't mean it isn't also a morally right act.

The argument is valid and you have failed to address that.

[The Grand Nudger]

I, personally, would improve the argument, rather than argue against what appears to be broad dissatisfaction from every corner for a wide variety of reasons.

Meanwhilke, this -

It does establish it because if moral realism is true then we, morally speaking, ought to do something.

If we only ought to do what we can do, and psychological egoism is true, then it is true that the only thing that we ought to do is act in our own self-interest. That's ethical egoism.

Is not moral realism or ethical egoism. The truth of ethical egoism does not depend on whether psychological egoism is true, or on our ability to do this that or the other thing, or even the coherence between what can be done and what self interest demands. You're angling more for rational egoism. Under ethical egoism, whatever it is that self interest dictates, regardless of whether or not it is rational and whether or not you can do it, is "good".

If you want to go to the game, then you should, regardless of whether or not you have a ticket, regardless of whether or not there are any seats left open. If there's one seat, and two people who want to go to the game, then they both should™, despite the fact that only one -can-. Your argument doesn't allow for that even though ethical egoism does. Nor does your argument allow for the fact that doing what you want but can't is one way of maximizing self interest. Self interest is the focus of ethical egoism, not the completion of some action x...and self interest doesn't have to be rational or even a statement of some plausible end state.

I wanna be a princess.

Still, the removal of the troubling issue of premise one would be an improvement, if for no other reason but because, as you mention, something being a true normative statement but also pure lulz (like, say, the normative demands that we bang our heads against walls or sprout wings and fly or that I should be a princess) is -still- a true normative statement with respect to what it purports to report. Realism contends that these statements are objective, but egoism, in any form, is explicitly subjective. You don't need it to get where you're going, anyway. It would also reduce my ability to accept every premise and then argue that the conclusion is false by reference to how well it sits in a natural realist context.

Ultimately, though, I don't think that you're going to have much success with trying to leverage a descriptive position on morality to establish or imply a meta-ethical position. When the argument is scrubbed for issues of structure, people will still point out that the assertions may not be (or certainly aren't) true. I mention this from a position of some experience on the boards, lol.

ala

Descriptive natural realism is true.
Ought implies can
Therefore natural realism is true.