“Normative” ethical theories

[Lucian]

Hey all, been a while since I posted here but still bumbling on in life as an atheist in the background
My main focus in previous posts has been in metaethics but am turning from that for a while to look at ethical theories that may be compatible with or capable of being made compatible with an anti-realist commitments. I am not trying to get back into the metaethics here but am genuinely ignorant of the best books to get into different ethical systems that are compatible with my metaethics. 
I believe it has been touched on tangentially in my previous thread but would love to get into it with people who know this area and can help.

I don’t really mind whether a theory presumes mind independent normative values if that commitment can be ignored but the system itself still an interesting one to analyse

Thoughts on this?

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

Not sure I can help you, as I'm not really versed in ethical theories. My own ethical system boils down to 'Try not to be a dick.'

Boru

[Lucian]

Not sure I can help you, as I'm not really versed in ethical theories. My own ethical system boils down to 'Try not to be a dick.'

Boru

Solid ethics, and I am largely there myself at the moment 😂

[The Grand Nudger]

Briefly going over our last convo to recall what you might mean by your anti realist commitments I'd say you're going to find good books thin on the ground. Off the top of my head, I'd say you're looking for quasi realist stuff. Normative force, with air quotes. Simon Blackburn on expressivism?

Here's an interview, mostly on metaethics, but at the very end (it's time stamped in the description) the interviewer asks how we live a good life if or when we believe there are no moral facts. First order ethics. In the process of answering he makes some good critical observations about realism-in-practice and despite my (seeming) metaethical disagreement with the moral system he's describing I find no fault with his practical reasoning and what he considers the "normative force"...and it's limitations. Descriptively speaking, I'm absolutely certain that some of my moral statements and just as certainly not all of my moral statements are very likely to be contained in or best described as expressivist quasi realism. Ultimately, his idea of how to live a good life boils down to biological and cultural intersubjectivity and the historical role of moral thought vis-a-vis outcomes in our lives. A variation on benevolent pragmatism.

Even if there are no moral facts, not being a dick seems like a swell ethical goal in our day to day lives. It's worked out for many people before, and there's no reason to think it won't continue to work out. Much earlier in the video he briefly describes normative disagreement as something like plan disagreement. He wants to go to the mountains, his wife wants to go to the beach. If we transport that into dick terms, not being a dick and being a dick are at least potentially goal disagreements but not necessarily metaethical disagreements, particularly as either side can conceivably contain both contents. IE "being a dick" might be "moral". Even so, ultimately, and according to blackburn, the final word on a moral disagreement boils down to "well, that's just not something I would do". There may be better answers to such disagreements - but does there need to be?

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pUabDoNx3iY

[Lucian]

Briefly going over our last convo to recall what you might mean by your anti realist commitments I'd say you're going to find good books thin on the ground.  Off the top of my head, I'd say you're looking for quasi realist stuff.  Normative force, with air quotes.  Simon Blackburn on expressivism?  

Here's an interview, mostly on metaethics, but at the very end (it's time stamped in the description) the interviewer asks how we live a good life if or when we believe there are no moral facts.  First order ethics.  In the process of answering he makes some good critical observations about realism-in-practice and despite my (seeming) metaethical disagreement with the moral system he's describing I find no fault with his practical reasoning and what he considers the "normative force"...and it's limitations.  Descriptively speaking, I'm absolutely certain that some of my moral statements and just as certainly not all of my moral statements are very likely to be contained in or best described as expressivist quasi realism.  Ultimately, his idea of how to live a good life boils down to biological and cultural intersubjectivity and the historical role of moral thought vis-a-vis outcomes in our lives.  A variation on benevolent pragmatism.  

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pUabDoNx3iY

Thanks, hopefully I am less argumentative with you this thread 😂 (that comment is aimed at me not you). Will check that video later, thanks for the pointer. 
I guess I am looking for a system that I can say “ok, here is a sensible approach to conduct in a world where there are no objective morals”. Not something I am going to particularly follow per se, just something consistent and just trying to see the range of options

Incidentally, i recently read Morris’s book Moral Damages and am sympathetic to antiretributivist approaches

[The Grand Nudger]

Quasi realist expressivism is more expansive. It does away with the difficulties of trying to assert subjectivist facts while rejecting objectivist facts by doing away with cognitivist metaethics entirely. This has the benefit of allowing us to answer first order questions without needing to address second order questions..and, at least according to proponents, employ non novel language to describe our dispositional or attitudinal states towards normative goal disagreements. It acknowledges there is no or may be no "best", and that even our personal "best" is a moving target and not a fact of ourselves.

Blackburns secondary is linguistics, btw, and this colors his view of the purpose of moral statements. They, like all other forms of communication, are primarily about facilitating human cooperation by providing necessary detail* about potential participants. In that, it doesn't really matter why you will or won't x - but it's sure good to know that half your crew wont x before you try to do x. Conversely, how many hands you can actually get on x without the added effort of coercive action. Coercive action being the primary societal use of non-novel normative expressions....rightly or wrongly -in fact-.

*(though not necessarily factual detail..remember, subjectivism is also false in a noncognitivist view - a person can believe they will or won't x and be less than wrong about that either way...ever done anything you thought you could never do, ever electively fail to do something you believed you should or must?)

[The Grand Nudger]

Incidentally, i recently read Morris’s book Moral Damages and am sympathetic to antiretributivist approaches

Just a cursory glance at the blurb and reviews I'd say that's an interesting one.  A case to do away with morality because it does more harm than good....?   

Ummmmmmm........ 

Aside from what some would call a fundamental and blatantly obvious contradiction there, there probably is a good moral and pragmatic case to be made against heavy handed moralizing, even if not morality itself. As a realist I also think that we should cool it with alot of the consequentializing we do. It always seems to me that trying to -make- things shitty for people we're in moral disagreement with suggests we do not actually believe in the reality of moral or practical failure itself to be instructive and provide some consequence in peoples lives. A good context being our legal systems. Sure, I'd stop you from hitting your neighbor in the face - but I wouldn't hit you in the face for it or throw you in the oubliette.

Pragmatic and expressivist ethics, I think, can draw alot of people with very different metaethical views together.

[Paleophyte]

One of the things that we rarely see is a justification for viewing ethics as anything more than the necessary behaviors of members of a tribe of apes with delusions of sentience. Sure, Don't-Be-A-Dick ethics is probably a bit too simple, but it's pretty much where it's at. Aside from keeping both philosophers and theologians occupied so that they don't endanger the public by studying anything with real-world applications, long-winded metaethical arguments never seem to be able to demonstrate a need for their inevitably bendy thinking.

[Lucian]

Incidentally, i recently read Morris’s book Moral Damages and am sympathetic to antiretributivist approaches

Just a cursory glance at the blurb and reviews I'd say that's an interesting one.  A case to do away with morality because it does more harm than good....?   

Ummmmmmm........ 

Hahahah I have to admit, I partially mentioned the book as I thought your response would be amusing to it (not in a bad trolling way). It would be an interesting conversation in and of itself

Do you have suggestions on pragmatic theories?

[Lucian]

One of the things that we rarely see is a justification for viewing ethics as anything more than the necessary behaviors of members of a tribe of apes with delusions of sentience. Sure, Don't-Be-A-Dick ethics is probably a bit too simple, but it's pretty much where it's at. Aside from keeping both philosophers and theologians occupied so that they don't endanger the public by studying anything with real-world applications, long-winded metaethical arguments never seem to be able to demonstrate a need for their inevitably bendy thinking.

Yeah, partially why I said earlier that I am not looking to particularly starting following any system. Just an intellectual exercise that I am keen to delve into

That said, I do think that some metaethics can have positive practical outputs, but trying to not get stuck into that here for once