Moral Oughts

[Abaddon_ire]

Is stealing a loaf of bread to feed my starving children a moral act, or immoral?

What would you say?

How about if i stole a loaf of bread from another starving family that needed it just as much as I did?

I would say you're doing something bad "stealing a loaf of bread", for the sake of something good "saving your children from starving". 
If someone stole my bread to save their children from starving, by all means steal it.

Thus your are a moral relativist. Stealing is not wrong as such. It depends on context. That is your new claim.

[The Grand Nudger]

Thats not a description of moral relativism.

It’s simply an indication that his statement “stealing is wrong” does not mean exactly what it says. More a problem of his having offered a childish absolutist deontology in place of a realists appraisal than anything else.

In a realists appraisal, stealing may not be wrong in a range of specific circumstances which lack the relevant fact that identifies them as wrong, when it is wrong. The appeal to the starving thief with kids exploits our emotional biases( and a strong tendency towards relational moral value systems) but an even better example posits a real asshole getting his things stolen by the good guys.

We generally don’t think that seizing a drug lords shit is wrong, but it’s stealing all the same.

OTOH, deontology like that expressed by the statement is useful because most of our moral decisions don’t come with time attached to sit down and contemplate the moral nature of a given situation. The time constraints of in-the-moment decisions strongly favor the use of heuristic expressions.

They’re the moral equivalent of rounding up or down for approximate values. This, not any moral relativism, reduces his comments to absurdity as statements on either intrinsic -or-objective value. There’s nothing about stealing that’s intrinsically wrong, and no objective assessment could ever conclude as much. There is, at best, something about stealing most of the time....that isn’t present all of the time, that’s wrong. That thing, rather than stealing, would be a candidate for intrinsic or objective moral value in theft regardless of whether a person uses a natural or non natural realists framework.

TLDR version, realism is neither simple, nor a shortcut. It’s hard, long form morality. Morality by reference to facts, which are not always the same in a given instance of x (in the above case, stealing). A more specific criticism of the non realist morality Acro is employing is that he’s managed to contradict his fundamental theory of moral value and obligation by telling a person to go ahead and steal. If “bad” is necessarily the list of things you shouldn’t do, and stealing is necessarily “bad”.......then the moral choice, with no exceptions, is to starve yourself and your children to death. To let the drug lord keep his shit. No suggestion to the contrary is consistent.....and yet...

[Objectivist]

This question is primarily reserved for Atheists who subscribe to Moral Realism.

You drop your wallet, I’m tempted to keep it/steal it to buy myself an Xbox.

A moral realist, at least in regards to the scenario above would agree, that stealing is wrong, and that this is an objective truth.

So if a realist came up to me, and said stealing is wrong, I can understand that they are stating a fact, an objective truth in doing so.

Now if the realist says to me that I ought not steal, are they also expressing an objective truth? Or is it more of a subjective goal than an objective truth?

If I said no it’s not wrong to steal, according to moral realism, I’d be stating something factually incorrect, like stating the earth is flat.

Now if i said I reject the statement that I ought not steal, am I rejecting a fact, an objective truth here? Or just some subjective goal you and others want me to follow?

Hi Acrobat,

The is/ ought problem is a result of a deontological view of ethics.  But that view is flawed.  A duty based ethics is a contradiction in terms.  The moral it the chosen, but a duty is something you must perform regardless of what your judgment says.  There are no categorical imperatives. Nature does not place duties on you.   But there are hypothetical imperatives.  If you want x you must do y.  If you want to live you must eat, if you want to live you must obtain cloths, shelter, tools, etc.  The bridge between an is and an ought is values.  If you value your life and want it to continue, you must take certain actions. Those actions are not arbitrary but are based on your nature.  Your nature and the actions it requires are facts.  Facts are objective.

[Acrobat]

This question is primarily reserved for Atheists who subscribe to Moral Realism.

You drop your wallet, I’m tempted to keep it/steal it to buy myself an Xbox.

A moral realist, at least in regards to the scenario above would agree, that stealing is wrong, and that this is an objective truth.

So if a realist came up to me, and said stealing is wrong, I can understand that they are stating a fact, an objective truth in doing so.

Now if the realist says to me that I ought not steal, are they also expressing an objective truth? Or is it more of a subjective goal than an objective truth?

If I said no it’s not wrong to steal, according to moral realism, I’d be stating something factually incorrect, like stating the earth is flat.

Now if i said I reject the statement that I ought not steal, am I rejecting a fact, an objective truth here? Or just some subjective goal you and others want me to follow?

Hi Acrobat,

The is/ ought problem is a result of a deontological view of ethics.  But that view is flawed.  A duty based ethics is a contradiction in terms.  The moral it the chosen, but a duty is something you must perform regardless of what your judgment says.  There are no categorical imperatives. Nature does not place duties on you.   But there are hypothetical imperatives.  If you want x you must do y.  If you want to live you must eat, if you want to live you must obtain cloths, shelter, tools, etc.  The bridge between an is and an ought is values.  If you value your life and want it to continue, you must take certain actions. Those actions are not arbitrary but are based on your nature.  Your nature and the actions it requires are facts.  Facts are objective.

I see the duty as the judgement. The duty is to do good, and not to do bad.

When I judge something my friend did as bad, I’m saying it’s something he ought not have done.

Im not referring to some sort of duty that’s separable from good, but inseparable from it.

[The Grand Nudger]

OFC, but that duty is itself informed by your evaluative premises, spoken or silent. For the umpteenth time.

This is a necessity of all realist oughts.

Is-evaluative premise- therefore ought.

John is a man, therefore I should hit John....isn’t.....valid.

John is a man, men should be hit, therefore I should hit John....follows.

Do you understand?

Hell, even “men should be hit, therefore I should hit john” isn’t valid. We failed to specify that John was a man. We assumed it, cuz John, lol.

[John 6IX Breezy]

OFC, but that duty is itself informed by your evaluative premises, spoken or silent. For the umpteenth time.

This is a necessity of all realist oughts.

Is-evaluative premise- therefore ought.

John is a man, therefore I should hit John....isn’t.....valid.

John is a man, men should be hit, therefore I should hit John....follows.

Do you understand?

Hell, even “men should be hit, therefore I should hit john” isn’t valid. We failed to specify that John was a man. We assumed it, cuz John, lol.

Does saying John should be hit have the same validity as saying I should hit John? Are both valid conclusions once we know that John is a man and men should be hit? Or is there a difference?

[The Grand Nudger]

Once you know a.....and b, then sure. It’s a valid conclusion even if it isn’t a true conclusion.

This is just a restatement of realist commitments in -any- candidate truth statement.

We could write it out formally to show as much, but there’s little need. This, and related topics...such as the dictive indifference of logic, have already been discussed with you.

At length.

[John 6IX Breezy]

Once you know a.....and b, then sure. It’s a valid conclusion even if it isn’t a true conclusion.

This is just a restatement of realist commitments in -any- candidate truth statement.

We could write it out formally to show as much, but there’s little need. This, and related topics...such as the dictive indifference of logic, have already been discussed with you.

At length.

I'm not sure if you're responding to me (it doesn't say). We haven't had such a discussion. In any case, my confusion is that saying someone should be hit and saying they should be hit by you seem very different statements. One does not imply the other, I just don't know if both are valid conclusions.

[The Grand Nudger]

No, but I suspect the same post will apply just as well to some future comment of your own.

...........lol

In any case, they only seem like separate statements for yet another unspoken evaluative.

Ofc John should be hit means that you should hit John....

.....unless we add a specific caveat. That just because someone should be hit, that doesn’t license you as the hitter. As Objectivist pointed out, realism is built on conditionals. It’s built on conditionals by necessity, since realism is fundamentally conditional to facts, by definition.

[Acrobat]

John is a man, men should be hit, therefore I should hit John....follows.
.

Except of course bad in a moral sense already implies it ought not be done.

Stealing is bad, therefore I shouldn’t do steal.

To add:

Stealing is bad, I shouldn’t do things that are bad therefore I shouldn’t steal, is redundant.

If my daughter said stealing is bad, I should do bad things, therefore I should steal. She would be wrong, like saying 1+1=5, rather than I like blue.