Mindfulness or Mindlessness?

[The Grand Nudger]

I know I harp on this in every conversation like this - but fully mapping and explaining a single human consciousness could not be expected to derive necessary insight into the next human consciousness and certainly would not apply to consciousness in toto if there's even one other non human consciousness anywhere in the universe.

All we could ever say was that for this particular human...so and so..and humans broadly, so and so....though not uniformly - as none of us are completely identical in every relevant respect.

Wouldn't it be horrible (for explanations) if every consciousness was as individually organized as that consciousness was individually instantiated in a meaningfully distinct conscious being? We could never do better for an explanation than a cognitive form of pidgin, no matter how much data we collected..and if resolving this was the bar for resolving the purported mystery of consciousness...we could know everything about every instantiated consciousness and even come up with a universal translation between every known example and still not satisfy that explanatory demand.

If that's not a manufactured mystery, fuck me if I know what would be...but maybe I simply lack the phenomenal concept required to ideate and understand...

GODDAMNIT!

[vulcanlogician]

Descartes laid out the mind-body problem for us. His solution to it, substance dualism, is lacking. But he asked the right questions, at least. Functionalism, if anything, is an answer to those questions. Substance dualism relies on folk intuitions. But the mind-body problem itself may not. I mean, there is a mystery there, isn't there? And we can't explore that mystery without covering the territory first travelled by Descartes.

Qualia doesn't demand an explanation. Conscious experience demands an explanation. Qualia is simply something we march out in front of those who say there is a 1:1 reduction between conscious states and brain states.

***

Are beliefs a thing? Well, in a metaphysical sense, they are. I have a belief that my car is parked in my driveway. The cause of this belief is the firing of neurons in my brain. But what the belief says (its truth-value, etc.) is not determined by looking at my neurons. The belief has a metaphysical structure, and you determine the truth value of it by looking at the structure of the belief, and comparing it to the physical world (ie. by looking at my driveway) to see if it's true. For this reason I want to say beliefs (and by proxy, memories) are on different ontological ground than qualia. "Caused by brain states" is the only common denominator.

What is there to conscious experience besides qualia?  Qualia is the what of intentionality.  It's qualia all the way down.  If qualia needs no explanation, then conscious experience needs none.

I'm very skeptical of people who talk about various "whats" of consciousness.  To me it's like hearing a noise and concluding there is a bear in the brush.  Assuming the bear brings a truckload of properties that may not belong to the noise.  Assuming that whats like qualia and experience are existent is assuming a lot about them.  As noted in the dream analogy, these may be just our brain telling us we have a what.  This, as noted, leads to the Cartesian theater, which is almost certainly wrong.  So some of the properties you're inheriting by assuming a whatness about qualia or experience are most certainly wrong.  Take memories for example.  If we assume a whatness to them, then we bring in a property of persistence and exteriorality, neither of which are supported by the science.  Memory is a process, not a thing.  So I think the evidence leans in favor of considering consciousness and experience as a process rather than a what.  I'm reminded of Searle's Chinese Room; a skeptic might look in vain for where the meaning lies by assuming it is a what that exists in or out of the room.  My favored response is the systems response, but in terms of consciousness, that's basically functionalism, which you seem unhappy with.  I have to wonder if you found square circles in a dream whether you'd be looking to explain their whatness in the dream similarly.

ETAS:  I think what you are referring to as beliefs are more properly termed propositions.  Beliefs are the feeling associated with propositions.  That feeling isn't metaphysical.

It isn't "qualia all the way down." There are quantitative conscious experiences that have a 1:1 reduction. Those don't pose the same kind of problems qualia do.

***



Searle's Chinese room is an argument against functionalism. And I agree with Searle's criticisms.

In moving to discussion of intentionality Searle seeks to develop the broader implications of his argument. It aims to refute the functionalist approach to understanding minds, that is, the approach that holds that mental states are defined by their causal roles, not by the stuff (neurons, transistors) that plays those roles. The argument counts especially against that form of functionalism known as the Computational Theory of Mind that treats minds as information processing systems

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/

You think I'm saying there's a bear in the bushes. I'm not. I'm saying, "there's a sound coming from the bushes." And your response is, "Well, there's no reason to assume it's a bear, so you're wrong."


There IS a sound from the bushes. Functionalism is insufficient. That's the sound coming from the bushes. I'm not bear hunting here. I'm critiquing theories. In no way do I win this argument by discovering a bear.

[The Grand Nudger]

Why would functionalism be insufficient in the case of a sound coming from the bushes..and, to apply your previous objections to color...to sound..are those sounds coming from the bushes..or from mind? Does sound exist outside of the mind? I mean, isn't it just the variable compression of waves in a medium filtered through a layer of processing specific to the system hearing the "sound"....?

I think angr might be the bear here, I'm just an old boar.

[vulcanlogician]

I know I harp on this in every conversation like this - but fully mapping and explaining a single human consciousness could not be expected to derive necessary insight into the next human consciousness and certainly would not apply to consciousness in toto if there's even one other non human consciousness anywhere in the universe.  

All we could ever say was that for this particular human...so and so..and humans broadly, so and so....though not uniformly - as none of us are completely identical in every relevant respect.  

Wouldn't it be horrible (for explanations) if every consciousness was as individually organized as that consciousness was individually instantiated in a meaningfully distinct conscious being?  We could never do better for an explanation than a cognitive form of pidgin, no matter how much data we collected..and if resolving this was the bar for resolving the purported mystery of consciousness...we could know everything about every instantiated consciousness and even come up with a universal translation between every known example and still not satisfy that explanatory demand.

Nudger, this is metaphysics. Satisfying explanatory demands ruins all the fun.

When all the possible explanatory demands are satisfied, the metaphysician presses onward. And that may be the point we've come to here. There's really no sure-fire way to know that we have. If it is the case that that's the point we've come to, no further explanation is possible... so, no point in pursuing further explanation. One of my professors shared a story about when he was in grad school: one of his fellow students would carry around a card with an "M" printed on it. The "M" stood for metaphysics. And whenever the conversation drifted from, say, ethics to metaphysics, he'd pull the "M" card out of his pocket and raise it up... to signify that the debate was drifting into metaphysics... and thus wasn't worth carrying further because the issue would never be resolved.

Another one of my professors expressed disdain for this anecdote. She said, "Well, I'm just going to pull out my 'E' card-- for epistemology-- because you're assuming knowledge you don't have." And she had a point. Since Descartes's time, we haven't "resolved" the mind problem. But we've clarified it. We've increased its resolution. Spinoza vastly improved upon Descartes's theories. And he was a contemporary. So, there is value in trying to clarify these issues, even if there's no way of knowing that they can't be further resolved.

[The Grand Nudger]

I agree, even in a tunnel of ignorance any increased accuracy is consequential (and I'd say the same of sensory accuracy anytime we employ the semantics that might deny that accuracy). Saying that there is no color in the universe is false on it's very face, and any further elaboration which relies on this is in exponential experiential error. Saying that there is no color.... exactly as we perceive it..... may be true, but irrelevant to apprehension or the content validity of apprehension.

If the "mystery" of consciousness is predicated on the force of such objections.....this, it's no mystery at all, and there are no such valid objections. That doesn't mean there can't be mysteries, and mysteries of consciousness.......just that this is demonstrably not one of them - so, couldn't be referred to as a demonstration of the existence of that set.

If consciousness is a control schema, it doesn't have to look like anything in particular, but it does have to look like something, and the granted ability of that schema is directly correlated with how well the simulated content matches the actual content..which is pretty well...according to our instrument derived measurements of millimeters or colors. The distribution of accurate sensory input and subsequent apprehension through process is non-zero/unknown, and the more successful we see those processes to be, the further from non zero that non...non-known...... set, is demonstrated to be.

Red is real, even if not real in the way we imagine it, and the same might be said of consciousness in general.

I think this even though the way I think about consciousness allows at least the product of consciousness as we know it (so much as we do) in all manner of disparate circumstance.

[Angrboda]

What is there to conscious experience besides qualia?  Qualia is the what of intentionality.  It's qualia all the way down.  If qualia needs no explanation, then conscious experience needs none.

I'm very skeptical of people who talk about various "whats" of consciousness.  To me it's like hearing a noise and concluding there is a bear in the brush.  Assuming the bear brings a truckload of properties that may not belong to the noise.  Assuming that whats like qualia and experience are existent is assuming a lot about them.  As noted in the dream analogy, these may be just our brain telling us we have a what.  This, as noted, leads to the Cartesian theater, which is almost certainly wrong.  So some of the properties you're inheriting by assuming a whatness about qualia or experience are most certainly wrong.  Take memories for example.  If we assume a whatness to them, then we bring in a property of persistence and exteriorality, neither of which are supported by the science.  Memory is a process, not a thing.  So I think the evidence leans in favor of considering consciousness and experience as a process rather than a what.  I'm reminded of Searle's Chinese Room; a skeptic might look in vain for where the meaning lies by assuming it is a what that exists in or out of the room.  My favored response is the systems response, but in terms of consciousness, that's basically functionalism, which you seem unhappy with.  I have to wonder if you found square circles in a dream whether you'd be looking to explain their whatness in the dream similarly.

ETAS:  I think what you are referring to as beliefs are more properly termed propositions.  Beliefs are the feeling associated with propositions.  That feeling isn't metaphysical.

It isn't "qualia all the way down." There are quantitative conscious experiences that have a 1:1 reduction. Those don't pose the same kind of problems qualia do.

Such as?

Searle's Chinese room is an argument against functionalism. And I agree with Searle's criticisms.

In moving to discussion of intentionality Searle seeks to develop the broader implications of his argument. It aims to refute the functionalist approach to understanding minds, that is, the approach that holds that mental states are defined by their causal roles, not by the stuff (neurons, transistors) that plays those roles. The argument counts especially against that form of functionalism known as the Computational Theory of Mind that treats minds as information processing systems

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/chinese-room/

Searle's response to the systems reply is that if you internalize the system, then the system is completely within me and I still don't understand Chinese. But this is question-begging because nowhere does he consider whether the system is understanding Chinese or not, inside or out of the person. He's effectively side-stepping the systems reply without actually answering it. I don't know that a simulation within Searle wouldn't be realizing the function of understanding and neither does he. Because the systems reply is about instantiating a function, regardless of Searle's intent, it constitutes a functionalist response which Searle doesn't meaningfully answer.

You think I'm saying there's a bear in the bushes. I'm not. I'm saying, "there's a sound coming from the bushes." And your response is, "Well, there's no reason to assume it's a bear, so you're wrong."

I think you are indeed saying there's a bear. You've separated qualia from the process as an atomistic component. That's a bear. I prefer to remain agnostic as to whether qualia or the state of perceiving that we have qualia are the same. You do not. Just as supposing we need an answer to where memories are stored would also be assuming a bear.

In what way do you find functionalism unsatisfactory? Let me ask you this: If we experience seeing square circles in a dream, do we then need to explain how square circles can exist? Your qualia posts suggest that we do.

[Neo-Scholastic]

In what way do you find functionalism unsatisfactory?

Because it sneaks mental concepts in through the back door by using tacitly intentional language. Another way of saying function is purpose. Teleology, anyone?

Tell you what. I have new reductive mind-body theory. It's called Valualism. For every instance that a functionalist theory uses the term "function" substitute "value". Now you have a 1:1 coincidence of value with brain-state....by definition. No need to explain values. Values don't exist...they just are brain-states with evolved advantage. It's a just so story. So basically what I am saying facetiously is that functionalism is an empty theory. Any intangible can be inserted into the place of "function".

[The Grand Nudger]

Model based control is the function of mind.
Model based control is the value of mind.

AST would then go on to explain model based control in theory and in practice. Demonstrate model based control, and the advantages of model based control - and then make predictions about systems using model based control.

Valualism, you say, provides no further elaboration? Offers no explanation, provides no further avenue for questions, and makes no predictions?

[Neo-Scholastic]

Model based control is the function of mind.
Model based control is the value of mind.

---

AST would then go on to explain model based control in theory and in practice.  Demonstrate model based control, and the advantages of model based control - and then make predictions about systems using model based control.  

Valualism, you say, provides no further elaboration?  Offers no explanation, provides no further avenue for questions, and makes no predictions?

---

Maybe you can help me better understand what you are saying. I am getting hung-up on what I see as tacit assumptions of intentionality in your statements. I kinda want to know things like...model based control of or about what?...and model based control to what end? You seem to have buried normative judgements into the concept of model based control by considering it "advantageous".

[The Grand Nudger]

Boundary boxing is a form of model based control that should answer those questions.

It's a body model. A system is supplied with values for it's dimensions and information about it's environment. Interestingly, the values about it's dimensions don't have to be completely accurate..and are intentionally inaccurate in many cases as a buffer. The system then simulates itself in that environmental data, and this layer of processing between sensor input and collision avoidance systems..for example, offers clear and impressive advantages.

A functionalist would tell you that any system...organic or inorganic..which has a structure which provides this function, has a body model, and is using model based control. That body modeling doesn't reduce to and isn't limited to any specific individual body model or body models instantiation. The applications are tremendous, this is how autonomous navigation of a factory floor or on a highway (someday) is accomplished. The utility to a living creature write's itself.

Do you think that you have a body model? What do you use it for? Closes your eyes and then slowly open and close your hands. Can you see your hands? If you woke up in your bedroom on a pitch black night, could you find some cherished item on a table without the use of your eyes and minimal (if any) groping? Do you have an idea of how many steps you could take out of bed before you ran into a wall?