God, Santa, and The Tooth Fairy

[Ranjr]

I'll answer for him, since he can barely 101.

The god of Hellenized lower Mediterranean philosophers exists in the upper sphere of reality, a realm of perfection.  A spiritual man, Isaiah, as written in his assent, traversed the firmament to the first heaven, then six progressively more perfect heavens to the heaven where god lives.  He is creator and rule maker, but he's not much of a baller, shot caller.  He encounters obstacles asserting his will beneath the firmament, where imperfection is too strong, and his power is weak.  There are demon spirits, holdovers from past religions, still ruling Earth.

So this god creates a worldly projection of his ideal form and sends him to live as a man.  This man, if it be proper to call him a man, being a living logos, preaches a message to his countrymen that turns commoner against clergy, thus weakening the country against an invading force.  The invaders not only wield a military advantage, they gain political advantage as the prophesies of the besieged fail like wood before iron.

That's all for tonight kids, bedtime.  Remember, this is just a story.  Sleep tight.

[Neo-Scholastic]

I can understand a conception of god that inherently disqualifies god from the category of ‘magical, imaginary things,’ i.e. the tooth fairy, Santa Clause, etc. (thank you @Neo-Scholastic for harping on the subject often enough that it finally tickled my thinker), and I’m happy to be charitable toward any argument that attempts to make such a distinction. What I’m having a hard time with is:

How can we rationally square that god is simultaneously not of the world, yet tangible in such a way that makes comparing god to magic and fantasy a category error? If a theist proposes that god is being erroneously lumped in with a particular stripe of concepts that he/she/it, de facto, doesn’t belong with, then I would say it’s the theist’s responsibility to lay out a pathway to grounding god in reality that actualizes god without leaving him/her/it susceptible to the same evidentiary standards used for any other real, material thing. 

---

I realize there’s a possible false dichotomy here: ‘either a god is detectable via methodological naturalism, or god doesn’t exist.’ It may very well be the case that there are things which exist, that are also beyond our ability to investigate. But if carving out a unique, third set that contains god and only god, isn’t special pleading; that such a category is, in fact, part of the fabric of reality; then I’d say it’s still a faith-based position at best, considering it can’t be investigated or objectively verified/falsified.

Theists: Is there a reasonable method or path to grounding the god-proposition in reality that is both reliable and tangible in a way that metaphysical arguments, alone, cannot be, yet absolves god…reasonably…from the demands of material evidence?



(Secret option number #3 - “nothing about this rambling thread makes any sense, Lady. Please stay out of the philosophy section,” is also a perfectly valid response. 😛)

---

The OP seem to embrace the notion that people cannot have justified true beliefs unless their beliefs trace back to some prior ideas that are unquestionably true (foundationalism) and are in that way justified. This type of epistemology is vulnerable to Pyrrhonic skepticism. That said, I don't take the critiques of radical skeptics very seriously, myself. ​I favor a normative approach to epistemology. There are many things people commonly consider true or existing, despite the fact there is no tangible evidence for them - other minds, non-spectral color hues, etc. My general rule is that things are as they appear to be unless shown otherwise by some defeater.

​I also define evidence as observations that warrant belief. Typical Scholastic observations would be of a 'cosmic' level, such as that there is 'something rather than nothing' or that 'there are degrees of perfection'. Others like Thomas Benteley Hart, in the Orthodox tradition refer to mystical observations of Bliss and Pure Consciousness. In either case, the claim being made is that the known universe, taken as a whole, has features that warrant belief in a larger unobservable reality. That larger reality is not just another being in a world of beings. A chip of the Totality is not the Totality. This is why I consider it silly to compare mythological creatures, that are all supposedly beings in the world, with the God of Classical Theism, Being-Itself, that sustains the existence of all beings. That's just a category error.

So as far as I am concerned, my pre-existing sense that God exists is warranted by 'cosmic' observations such as those in the 5W but also the experience of Beauty with a capital 'B'. After that, I personally find the commonly proposed defeaters insufficient for a variety of reasons, such as failing to account for the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

[brewer]

I can understand a conception of god that inherently disqualifies god from the category of ‘magical, imaginary things,’ i.e. the tooth fairy, Santa Clause, etc. (thank you @Neo-Scholastic for harping on the subject often enough that it finally tickled my thinker), and I’m happy to be charitable toward any argument that attempts to make such a distinction. What I’m having a hard time with is:

How can we rationally square that god is simultaneously not of the world, yet tangible in such a way that makes comparing god to magic and fantasy a category error? If a theist proposes that god is being erroneously lumped in with a particular stripe of concepts that he/she/it, de facto, doesn’t belong with, then I would say it’s the theist’s responsibility to lay out a pathway to grounding god in reality that actualizes god without leaving him/her/it susceptible to the same evidentiary standards used for any other real, material thing. 

---

I realize there’s a possible false dichotomy here: ‘either a god is detectable via methodological naturalism, or god doesn’t exist.’ It may very well be the case that there are things which exist, that are also beyond our ability to investigate. But if carving out a unique, third set that contains god and only god, isn’t special pleading; that such a category is, in fact, part of the fabric of reality; then I’d say it’s still a faith-based position at best, considering it can’t be investigated or objectively verified/falsified.

Theists: Is there a reasonable method or path to grounding the god-proposition in reality that is both reliable and tangible in a way that metaphysical arguments, alone, cannot be, yet absolves god…reasonably…from the demands of material evidence?



(Secret option number #3 - “nothing about this rambling thread makes any sense, Lady. Please stay out of the philosophy section,” is also a perfectly valid response. 😛)

---

The OP seem to embrace the notion that people cannot have justified true beliefs unless their beliefs trace back to some prior ideas that are unquestionably true (foundationalism) and are in that way justified. This type of epistemology is vulnerable to Pyrrhonic skepticism. That said, I don't take the critiques of radical skeptics very seriously, myself.  I favor a normative approach to epistemology. There are many things people commonly consider true or existing, despite the fact there is no tangible evidence for them - other minds, non-spectral color hues, etc. My general rule is that things are as they appear to be unless shown otherwise by some defeater.

I also define evidence as observations that warrant belief. Typical Scholastic observations would be of a 'cosmic' level, such as that there is 'something rather than nothing' or that 'there are degrees of perfection'. Others like Thomas Benteley Hart, in the Orthodox tradition refer to mystical observations of Bliss and Pure Consciousness. In either case, the claim being made is that the known universe, taken as a whole, has features that warrant belief in a larger unobservable reality. That larger reality is not just another being in a world of beings. A chip of the Totality is not the Totality. This is why I consider it silly to compare mythological creatures, that are all supposedly beings in the world, with the God of Classical Theism, Being-Itself, that sustains the existence of all beings. That's just a category error.

So as far as I am concerned, my pre-existing sense that God exists is warranted by 'cosmic' observations such as those in the 5W but also the experience of Beauty with a capital 'B'. After that, I personally find the commonly proposed defeaters insufficient for a variety of reasons, such as failing to account for the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

All I hear is special pleading. Claiming a special category for god because you believe god does more stuff.

What mythological creatures in the world? I'm talking about creatures of imagination, mental constructs, definitely not in the world. Maybe I misunderstand, would you like to explain further how these creatures are 'in' the world?

Also can you explain the 'sustains the existence of all beings'?

[The Architect Of Fate]

The OP seem to embrace the notion that people cannot have justified true beliefs unless their beliefs trace back to some prior ideas that are unquestionably true (foundationalism) and are in that way justified. This type of epistemology is vulnerable to Pyrrhonic skepticism. That said, I don't take the critiques of radical skeptics very seriously, myself. I favor a normative approach to epistemology. There are many things people commonly consider true or existing, despite the fact there is no tangible evidence for them - other minds, non-spectral color hues, etc. My general rule is that things are as they appear to be unless shown otherwise by some defeater.

I also define evidence as observations that warrant belief. Typical Scholastic observations would be of a 'cosmic' level, such as that there is 'something rather than nothing' or that 'there are degrees of perfection'. Others like Thomas Benteley Hart, in the Orthodox tradition refer to mystical observations of Bliss and Pure Consciousness. In either case, the claim being made is that the known universe, taken as a whole, has features that warrant belief in a larger unobservable reality. That larger reality is not just another being in a world of beings. A chip of the Totality is not the Totality. This is why I consider it silly to compare mythological creatures, that are all supposedly beings in the world, with the God of Classical Theism, Being-Itself, that sustains the existence of all beings. That's just a category error.

So as far as I am concerned, my pre-existing sense that God exists is warranted by 'cosmic' observations such as those in the 5W but also the experience of Beauty with a capital 'B'. After that, I personally find the commonly proposed defeaters insufficient for a variety of reasons, such as failing to account for the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

Translation -----I don't like you comparing the silly thing I believe to silly things I don't believe. You're a meanie!

[Oldandeasilyconfused]

[quote='Neo-Scholastic' pid='2080181' dateline='1639002691']

The OP seem to embrace the notion that people cannot have justified true beliefs unless their beliefs trace back to some prior ideas that are unquestionably true (foundationalism) and are in that way justified. This type of epistemology is vulnerable to Pyrrhonic skepticism. That said, I don't take the critiques of radical skeptics very seriously, myself.  I favor a normative approach to epistemology. There are many things people commonly consider true or existing, despite the fact there is no tangible evidence for them - other minds, non-spectral color hues, etc. My general rule is that things are as they appear to be unless shown otherwise by some defeater.

I also define evidence as observations that warrant belief. Typical Scholastic observations would be of a 'cosmic' level, such as that there is 'something rather than nothing' or that 'there are degrees of perfection'. Others like Thomas Benteley Hart, in the Orthodox tradition refer to mystical observations of Bliss and Pure Consciousness. In either case, the claim being made is that the known universe, taken as a whole, has features that warrant belief in a larger unobservable reality. That larger reality is not just another being in a world of beings. A chip of the Totality is not the Totality. This is why I consider it silly to compare mythological creatures, that are all supposedly beings in the world, with the God of Classical Theism, Being-Itself, that sustains the existence of all beings. That's just a category error.

So as far as I am concerned, my pre-existing sense that God exists is warranted by 'cosmic' observations such as those in the 5W but also the experience of Beauty with a capital 'B'. After that, I personally find the commonly proposed defeaters insufficient for a variety of reasons, such as failing to account for the Principle of Sufficient Reason.

All I hear is special pleading. Claiming a special category for god because you believe god does more stuff.

What mythological creatures in the world? I'm talking about creatures of imagination, mental constructs, definitely not in the world. Maybe I misunderstand, would you like to explain further how these creatures are 'in' the world?

Also can you explain the 'sustains the existence of all beings'?







That was fully explained in two great documentaries, "The Never Ending Story" and "Merlin" the mini series with Sam Neill.
Each film explained it quite clearly I thought; Mythical beings like dragons , fairies and  gods cease to exist when enough people simply stop believing in them.  I should clarify; by 'exist' I mean occupy space in people's minds. They never actually exist in a material sense.  

[Belacqua]

[...] by 'exist' I mean occupy space in people's minds. They never actually exist in a material sense.  

Do minds have space in them? I'm thinking that mind, though associated with the brain, is not itself something which has extension. Certainly a given form in someone's mind doesn't seem to have a measurable space that it occupies. (I'm guessing you're using this as a metaphor.)

If they exist in the mind, then they do exist in a particular way. 

If they exist in the mind but not in a material sense, then there are things which can exist non-materially.

How would you define this non-material realm? Can the things which "occupy space" in people's minds be in some way real, like numbers? In terms of hylomorphism, we can talk about things of which the forms exist (morphe) without the matter (hyle). This would certainly be in line with standard theology.

[The Grand Nudger]

Things in our head do seem to have a measurable space they occupy..jesus christ.... I can barely read the garbage the two of you spit out some times it's so goddamned insufferably stupid.

[brewer]

[...] by 'exist' I mean occupy space in people's minds. They never actually exist in a material sense.  

Do minds have space in them? I'm thinking that mind, though associated with the brain, is not itself something which has extension. Certainly a given form in someone's mind doesn't seem to have a measurable space that it occupies. (I'm guessing you're using this as a metaphor.)

If they exist in the mind, then they do exist in a particular way. 

If they exist in the mind but not in a material sense, then there are things which can exist non-materially.

How would you define this non-material realm? Can the things which "occupy space" in people's minds be in some way real, like numbers? In terms of hylomorphism, we can talk about things of which the forms exist (morphe) without the matter (hyle). This would certainly be in line with standard theology.

I'd define it as the realm of imagination. The place where Santa exists.

There are claims in christianity (and other religions as well) that god and it's actions/effects exist outside the mind and you know this.

[The Architect Of Fate]

If they exist in the mind, then they do exist in a particular way. 

[Mister Agenda]

[...] by 'exist' I mean occupy space in people's minds. They never actually exist in a material sense.  

Do minds have space in them? I'm thinking that mind, though associated with the brain, is not itself something which has extension. Certainly a given form in someone's mind doesn't seem to have a measurable space that it occupies. (I'm guessing you're using this as a metaphor.)

If they exist in the mind, then they do exist in a particular way. 

If they exist in the mind but not in a material sense, then there are things which can exist non-materially.

How would you define this non-material realm? Can the things which "occupy space" in people's minds be in some way real, like numbers? In terms of hylomorphism, we can talk about things of which the forms exist (morphe) without the matter (hyle). This would certainly be in line with standard theology.

There are no numbers without a brain, computer, abacus, piece of paper, or the like to be imprinted on or processed within. All of those things take up space. Numbers and ideas and concepts can't be demonstrated to exist without matter and energy in space and time.