Proving What We Already "Know"

[The Grand Nudger]

If you don't know whether you believe in gods..then you don't believe in gods. Believing in gods is a positive affirmation. It's like saying "I don't know if I believe that the us is the greatest country on earth" - well, there you go, clearly a person who doesn't believe that the us is the greatest country on earth.

Your claim about right and wrong not being objective and measurable is just that, a claim, as it's always been. There's a significant amount of scientific evidence..ironically..that that's not true - fwiw. While any worldview can be limited by it's axioms and application, that's a non-example to that effect. In the end, there's no need to jeoulously guard any of those things. By all means, explain consciousness by way of the immaterial better than it's explained by way of a brain.

I think, in mere reality, it's the other way around. Some people jealously guard their own ignorance hoping that it allows space for some x of value to them where materialism or monism (at least to them..also generally in ignorance) does not. I honestly long for the day someone gets truly creative and insightful..and rather than hastily declaring that science can't explain -insert the usual silly many times disproven shit here- they say "cabbage". Why is cabbage.... is.... legitimately, a more profound and difficult question to answer than why our solar system is here, or arranged the way it is, or why a living creature might be sentient.

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

Everything we ‘know’ is provisional. A search for ultimate truth is a bugaboo that is destined for ultimate failure. 

But so what? We don’t need ultimate, final proof of anything - not in maths, not in science, not even in relationships. If we arrive at an approximation of truth that appears to fit what we observe and can reason out, that seems enough to get by on.

Boru

[bennyboy]

If you don't know whether you believe in gods..then you don't believe in gods.  Believing in gods is a positive affirmation.  It's like saying "I don't know if I believe that the us is the greatest country on earth" - well, there you go, clearly a person who doesn't believe that the us is the greatest country on earth.  

Your claim about right and wrong not being objective and measurable is just that, a claim, as it's always been.  There's a significant amount of scientific evidence..ironically..that that's not true - fwiw.  While any worldview can be limited by it's axioms and application, that's a non-example to that effect.  In the end, there's no need to jeoulously guard any of those things.  By all means, explain consciousness by way of the immaterial better than it's explained by way of a brain.

I think, in mere reality, it's the other way around.  Some people jealously guard their own ignorance hoping that it allows space for some x of value to them where materialism or monism (at least to them..also generally in ignorance) does not.  I honestly long for the day someone gets truly creative and insightful..and rather than hastily declaring that science can't explain -insert the usual silly many times disproven shit here- they say "cabbage".  Why is cabbage.... is.... legitimately, a more profound and difficult question to answer than why our solar system is here, or arranged the way it is, or why a living creature might be sentient.

We've had these discussions before.  I'm trying to think if there's new ground to cover-- I suspect not.  But I'm interested in finding out.

re: belief
You can take any postive affirmation and flip it.  "Do you believe in a material monist reality?"  No, to the same degree and for the same reasons-- an inability to demonstrate that sensation represents an adequate vehicle for the formation of positive affirmations about the nature of reality (or the things in it).

re: consciousness / brain
I know nothing about the brain that has not involved some experience.  Therefore, if I doubt the validity of sensation in establishing the nature of reality, experiences of listening to professors or reading science textbooks fall into under that same agnostic cloud.  All I CAN say is what seems true in the context of given axioms: "In the context where reality is material, and where the brain is a discrete and identifiable solid object rather than (say) a collection of quantum wave functions in a virtual space projected from an n-dimensional object lacking time, then the brain seems most related to the consciousness of animals and people."

Asking an agnostic to provide a "better explanation" doesn't make much sense, since my position is that no explanation can be known to represent truth, at least absent the context of axioms which beg the question.

re: jealous guarding
Well, let me give an example.  I'd say in order to knowingly do science of consciousness, you have to be able to establish that any given material structure experiences what things are like, rather than what they are.  I know what it's LIKE to drink hot chocolate, for example.  It's easy to know that a particular structure has encountered hot chocolate-- it's impossible to know that it has experienced what hot chocolate is LIKE.

A "jealous guarding" would be an insistence that something other than knowing what things are like is consciousness, and then demonstrating a facility in working with that other thing.  Saying, "Consciousness is the ability to take information from the world, process it, and output a behavior," for example, and then claiming that science can study that better than Buddhist meditation can, would be such an insistence.

[bennyboy]

Everything we ‘know’ is provisional. A search for ultimate truth is a bugaboo that is destined for ultimate failure. 

But so what? We don’t need ultimate, final proof of anything - not in maths, not in science, not even in relationships. If we arrive at an approximation of truth that appears to fit what we observe and can reason out, that seems enough to get by on.

Boru

The video in the OP is very much about how evolution has steered us away from a good approximation of truth, because truth (it turns out) may not provide nearly as good genetic fitness as untruth or a very poor approximation of it.

I think your position is very pragmatic-- that's pretty much how we all live, whatever belief we hold or position we take.  But you could put it this way-- in the context defined by human instinct and apparatus, XYZ is true. (mother / baby relationships are important, people age and die, absolute truth seems unknowable)

[BrianSoddingBoru4]

Everything we ‘know’ is provisional. A search for ultimate truth is a bugaboo that is destined for ultimate failure. 

But so what? We don’t need ultimate, final proof of anything - not in maths, not in science, not even in relationships. If we arrive at an approximation of truth that appears to fit what we observe and can reason out, that seems enough to get by on.

Boru

The video in the OP is very much about how evolution has steered us away from a good approximation of truth, because truth (it turns out) may not provide nearly as good genetic fitness as untruth or a very poor approximation of it.

I think your position is very pragmatic-- that's pretty much how we all live, whatever belief we hold or position we take.  But you could put it this way-- in the context defined by human instinct and apparatus, XYZ is true.  (mother / baby relationships are important, people age and die, absolute truth seems unknowable)

I have no issue with people using the word ‘true’ when they really mean ‘an approximation of true’ - sure, it’s a little sloppy, but I’m not pedantic enough to make an issue of it.

As you said in the opener, it’s perfectly acceptable to arrive at ‘something like truth’.

Boru

[The Grand Nudger]

We've had these discussions before.  I'm trying to think if there's new ground to cover-- I suspect not.  But I'm interested in finding out.

re: belief
You can take any postive affirmation and flip it.  "Do you believe in a material monist reality?"  No, to the same degree and for the same reasons-- an inability to demonstrate that sensation represents an adequate vehicle for the formation of positive affirmations about the nature of reality (or the things in it).

Of course.  Binary things can be flipped.  If you, for example, said you didn't know whether or not you believed in material monist reality....it would be equally clear that you do not.  You're not willing to produce an affirmation of belief, QED. You may not know whether gods exist, that's agnosticism pure and simple, but you do seem to know what you do, and do not believe..about material monism and gods.

re: consciousness / brain
I know nothing about the brain that has not involved some experience.  Therefore, if I doubt the validity of sensation in establishing the nature of reality, experiences of listening to professors or reading science textbooks fall into under that same agnostic cloud.  All I CAN say is what seems true in the context of given axioms: "In the context where reality is material, and where the brain is a discrete and identifiable solid object rather than (say) a collection of quantum wave functions in a virtual space projected from an n-dimensional object lacking time, then the brain seems most related to the consciousness of animals and people."

Asking an agnostic to provide a "better explanation" doesn't make much sense, since my position is that no explanation can be known to represent truth, at least absent the context of axioms which beg the question.

Okay, how about any explanation?  As I said, no need to guard anything.  I don't really think that your idea that there can be no truth lends itself well to this notion of jealous guarding.  There's nothing to guard, in that event.  

re: jealous guarding
Well, let me give an example.  I'd say in order to knowingly do science of consciousness, you have to be able to establish that any given material structure experiences what things are like, rather than what they are.  I know what it's LIKE to drink hot chocolate, for example.  It's easy to know that a particular structure has encountered hot chocolate-- it's impossible to know that it has experienced what hot chocolate is LIKE.

A "jealous guarding" would be an insistence that something other than knowing what things are like is consciousness, and then demonstrating a facility in working with that other thing.  Saying, "Consciousness is the ability to take information from the world, process it, and output a behavior," for example, and then claiming that science can study that better than Buddhist meditation can, would be such an insistence.

Science can study anything better than buddhist meditation...even buddhist meditation...but that's only because meditation isn't studying - and it's a complete non starter if the goal is objective measurement.  Buddhists are, of course, also free to try and explain anything any way they want to, and they have...and we can compare the work of buddhism and the work of scientific inquiry and see what washes.  What I see here, in point of fact, is you pushing back against some scientific studies of consciousness, no less.

I think that buddhist meditation is a particularly strange example given your comments about an inability to pierce some veil. Don't you? That's just staring at the back side of that veil without the help of inhuman instruments that lack our human inabilities. My favorite joke..being a big fan of zen myself..is that you can't learn anything from buddhist meditation that you don't already know. Meditate over that the next time you clear your mind and imagine yourself to be a clear vessel filling with pure light. Anywho, I think you hit the nail on the head with Boru. It's not truth you doubt, but absolutes. Not objectivity, but absolutes. Truth in context is just truth same as always. Context being part of any objective assessment of anything. Logical and scientific truths both coming with caveats, and provisional guarantees of certitude. If we wonder how fast a boat can cross the atlantic, there will be no absolute answer. We would need to know the type of boat, weather, currents, etc. To take the product of those deliberations and doubt that they can be true because they aren't absolutes or because absolutes can't be known....less than cogent. If I really had to hammer in..I'd say it's axioms, and not truth, that you're doubting in these conversations. Those are the closest thing to absolutes. I also think it's interesting where reproductive fitness fancies a false assertion - ofc......that's why we've tried to be more and more systematic and rigorous in our investigations - the scientific method just the newest most capable entrant in that space.

So, for example, you doubt the dogmatic axiomization of material monism. Or at least your version of material monism as an axiom. All well and good. As you said, we've been over this so many times. I find it amazing to see you come back and reassert all of those same things in light of that context. Thing is, whether there is or isn't some other stuff is irrelevant to whether or not a thing is or can be explained by one of those kinds of stuff...and every example you offered can be explained.and is explained, by material stuff...even if there is some other stuff....very literally is material stuff. It's not even a prudent way to explain your wholly justified skepticism of axioms or axiomatic thinking. There's another thing I think is interesting. Axioms. Rules. Say we live in a universe where things can, in fact, be themselves and not themselves. That would suggest that there could be married bachelors. That our truth systems need a serious overhaul, lol. That brings me right back round to the real headscratcher.

Why is cabbage? I know, I know, it seems like a snarky retort...but it's not. We know about as much..or less..about cabbage as we do about consciousness and cosmogeny. It's a really interesting family of plants...capable of spontaneous cladogenesis, just as one tidbit..... and, ofc, photosynthesis is as yet unexplained, despite being the basis for all life and all consciousness on earth. It's like that cartoon we see here from time to time "and then a miracle occurs" where the man at the blackboard says more work is needed in step number two. Cracking photosynthesis would be as monumental to us as cracking consciousness..likely more so. Just domesticating cabbage was more consequential than every thought ever given to thought.

Maybe we should get some buddhists to meditate on it? See, now that..was snark. Welcome back man.

[bennyboy]

Science can study anything better than buddhist meditation...even buddhist meditation...but that's only because meditation isn't studying - and it's a complete non starter if the goal is objective measurement.  Buddhists are, of course, also free to try and explain anything any way they want to, and they have...and we can compare the work of buddhism and the work of scientific inquiry and see what washes.  What I see here, in point of fact, is you pushing back against some scientific studies of consciousness, no less.

When I say "Buddhist meditation," let me say that's a placeholder for any organized system of introspection. Buddhists refer to perceptions (including thoughts) as objects, and discuss their properties, processes for working with them and so on. In a sense, you could call it "the science of what things are like," i.e. of qualia. But I'm not a convert to Buddhist beliefs in general nor have much interest in the religious or cultural aspects of it.

I think that buddhist meditation is a particularly strange example given your comments about an inability to pierce some veil.  Don't you?

If you want an organized study of what things are like, then you have to consider what things are like, and draw inferences. What are ideas like? How do we categorize them? How do we control them to our advantage? What is it like to experience XYZ? What should be done in order to experience XYZ? If a "tree" is a compositie idea, of what is it composed?

Unless XYZ is a state that can be achieved through electrical stimulation or drug administration, I don't think the modern science of mind is really as useful as you claim it is. In fact, I don't think science can study "what things are like" at all-- at best, it can influence what things are like by disrupting brain function, or enumerate what things are like by measuring poll results.


(I'll read the entirety of your posts, but I'll have to cherry pick what I respond to to prevent post-quote explosion. If you want a particular idea addressed that you consider critical, please re-quote your own post and I'll answer that)

[The Grand Nudger]

When I say "Buddhist meditation," let me say that's a placeholder for any organized system of introspection.  Buddhists refer to perceptions (including thoughts) as objects, and discuss their properties, processes for working with them and so on.  In a sense, you could call it "the science of what things are like," i.e. of qualia.  But I'm not a convert to Buddhist beliefs in general nor have much interest in the religious or cultural aspects of it.

Sure, that's totally workable.  An organized system of introspection would still seem to be the same in that it can only be staring at the back of that veil.

If you want an organized study of what things are like, then you have to consider what things are like, and draw inferences.  What are ideas like?  How do we categorize them?   How do we control them to our advantage?  What is it like to experience XYZ?  What should be done in order to experience XYZ?  If a "tree" is a compositie idea, of what is it composed?

Well, that certainly fails the criteria of objectivity.  Introspection is purely subjective.  It also fails with respect to noted observations..and in fact the fundamental concept behind any ideas of a veil to pierce, that the way things seem is not interchangeable with they way they are.  Brains are amazing things.  

Unless XYZ is a state that can be achieved through electrical stimulation or drug administration, I don't think the modern science of mind is really as useful as you claim it is.  In fact, I don't think science can study "what things are like" at all-- at best, it can influence what things are like by disrupting brain function, or enumerate what things are like by measuring poll results.

In fact, indeed. You don't object to normal old truth, and make many normal old truth claims.  You doubt one in particular.  We don't even need to litigate which truth claims are and aren't really true to make that observation.  Have you given it much introspection? It's one of those areas where you have to pick a lane. Being skeptical of truth in total if it suggests a position you hold might be wrong, and vociferously committed to a competing truth claim that supports your position, probably isn't a very strong position.

(I'll read the entirety of your posts, but I'll have to cherry pick what I respond to to prevent post-quote explosion.  If you want a particular idea addressed that you consider critical, please re-quote your own post and I'll answer that)

No idea any more than another.  Just things to consider.

[Belacqua]

Science can study anything better than buddhist meditation...even buddhist meditation...but that's only because meditation isn't studying - and it's a complete non starter if the goal is objective measurement.  Buddhists are, of course, also free to try and explain anything any way they want to, and they have...and we can compare the work of buddhism and the work of scientific inquiry and see what washes.  What I see here, in point of fact, is you pushing back against some scientific studies of consciousness, no less.

When I say "Buddhist meditation," let me say that's a placeholder for any organized system of introspection.  Buddhists refer to perceptions (including thoughts) as objects, and discuss their properties, processes for working with them and so on.  In a sense, you could call it "the science of what things are like," i.e. of qualia.  But I'm not a convert to Buddhist beliefs in general nor have much interest in the religious or cultural aspects of it.

Here of course your interlocutor shows the kind of casual, question-begging scientism that I was talking about before. 

He assumes that "to study" is always to study in the way that science studies, and that results to be meaningful must be objective and measurable. In this way he's able to rule out Buddhist meditation as something that tells us something useful.

You have made it very clear, though, that you're talking about experience. And the experience of meditation -- what it's like to the person doing it -- is of course something science can't tell us. 

I am confident (having spent some time at a Zen retreat outside Fukuyama) that it is possible to change and improve one's perception of things. The mind is often distracted and unclear, and this is something we can work on. 

There is a long and serious tradition of people talking about satori. It would be easy to dismiss this if we begin with the question-begging scientism. I think we aren't justified in doing that. 

Not having come anywhere near to satori, I can only rely on other people's accounts. If what they say has to do with "seeing behind a veil," it is not an epistemological barrier of the type that Kant describes. It is more a barrier of habit and narrowness imposed by one's own mind. In fact the gist of much Buddhist poetry is that once one has opened one's mind, one realizes that there is no veil. That what we're seeing is, at last, what there is. Western epistemologists will question this, of course. But those of us who haven't had the experience shouldn't judge what the experience is like, or what the value of it is.

[Jehanne]

Other than one's existence, unless a proposed truth is falsifiable, it is a subjective proposition, of which there are an infinite number.