Proving What We Already "Know"

[Neo-Scholastic]

Other than one's existence, unless a proposed truth is falsifiable, it is a subjective proposition, of which there are an infinite number.

IMHO the principle of noncontradiction counts as a non-subjective truth precisely because it cannot be falsified. But your point is well taken with respect to empirical truthes.

[Deesse23]

Other than one's existence, unless a proposed truth is falsifiable, it is a subjective proposition, of which there are an infinite number.

IMHO the principle of noncontradiction counts as a non-subjective truth precisely because it cannot be falsified. But your point is well taken with respect to empirical truthes.

Is a non- falsifiable god proposition also a non-subjective truth?

[Belacqua]

Other than one's existence, unless a proposed truth is falsifiable, it is a subjective proposition, of which there are an infinite number.

IMHO the principle of noncontradiction counts as a non-subjective truth precisely because it cannot be falsified. But your point is well taken with respect to empirical truthes.

This is from Britannica:

the three fundamental laws of logic: 

(1) the law of contradiction, (2) the law of excluded middle (or third), and (3) the principle of identity. 

The three laws can be stated symbolically as follows. (1) For all propositions p, it is impossible for both p and not p to be true, or: ∼(p · ∼p), in which ∼ means “not” and · means “and.” (2) Either p or ∼p must be true, there being no third or middle true proposition between them, or: p ∨ ∼p, in which ∨ means “or.” (3) If a propositional function F is true of an individual variable x, then F is true of x, or: F(x) ⊃ F(x), in which ⊃ means “formally implies.” Another formulation of the principle of identity asserts that a thing is identical with itself, or (∀x) (x = x), in which ∀ means “for every”; or simply that x is x.

https://www.britannica.com/topic/laws-of-thought

Are these considered falsifiable? They certainly wouldn't be subjective. 

I think we have to be careful not to blend categories here. As you say, beliefs we have about the world that are empirically supported don't operate the same as these purely logical rules. 

I would also insist that it's an error to apply the laws of logic to the phenomenological, internal, experiential world (what used to be called, poetically, the heart). Our desires, loves, etc., may be contradictory. Our personal beliefs may be both "I believe" and "I don't believe," simultaneously.

[Jehanne]

Other than one's existence, unless a proposed truth is falsifiable, it is a subjective proposition, of which there are an infinite number.

IMHO the principle of noncontradiction counts as a non-subjective truth precisely because it cannot be falsified. But your point is well taken with respect to empirical truthes.

In my opinion, thr principle of noncontradiction is falsifiable, in that it is true unless we live in some virtual reality, some holodeck, in which case, all bets are off.

[The Grand Nudger]

Here of course your interlocutor shows the kind of casual, question-begging scientism that I was talking about before. 

Sure Bel, it's "scientism" to notice that the the scientific method is a more effective way to study things, including experience..including buddhist meditation....than buddhist meditation.  I'm guessing that's not the only word you make meaningless so that you can launch some vry srs objection.

In mere reality, people report their experiences in scientific investigations of consciousness, and they get noted for what they are. Subjective reports requiring further exploration. Buddhist practitioners have, ofc, been the subject of exactly this sort of canvassing. As for the rest, I see that we're trying to shitcan logic entirely on account of our precious experiences and how it might create friction between what we claim and what we can rationally posit. There's the guarded thing, if there were any. That said..hey, could be true - for novel values of truth. Maybe we do live in a world where things can be themselves and not themselves. In which case, the axiom we refer to as non-contradiction would be objectively and evidentiarily false.... for then-novel values of false.

No one doubts that people can make confused, irrational, and competing claims...especially with their "heart"...but that's probably not an example of how the principle of non contradiction can be violated. No more so than a wall being permeable to items of one scale and impermeable to items of another is an example of the principle of non contradiction being violated. I think we'd need better evidence to sell that one.

[bennyboy]

If you want an organized study of what things are like, then you have to consider what things are like, and draw inferences.  What are ideas like?  How do we categorize them?   How do we control them to our advantage?  What is it like to experience XYZ?  What should be done in order to experience XYZ?  If a "tree" is a compositie idea, of what is it composed?

Well, that certainly fails the criteria of objectivity.  Introspection is purely subjective.  It also fails with respect to noted observations..and in fact the fundamental concept behind any ideas of a veil to pierce, that the way things seem is not interchangeable with they way they are.  Brains are amazing things. 

I disagree that introspection "fails the criteria of objectivity." It fails the criteria of MUTUAL objectivity required by science. Meditation is very much about treating ideas or perceptions as objects-- watching them, controlling them, understanding them. You say it's subjective because it's mind, and as far as a brain-watcher goes, it's all nonsense happening in a black box.

[The Grand Nudger]

It fails the criteria of objectivity by definition? Not because "it's mind".

We treat walls as solid, too, how does that play out?

I don't personally have any issues with considering mental events objects. That won't make gazing at the back of the veil less subjective. A subjective appraisal of mental objects..still subjective. The entire point of studying consciousness in a scientific context is to craft objective statements about those mental objects. More than "it feels like to me". You may also not have gotten it exactly right when you posit that, to brain watchers, it's all nonsense happening in a black box. In fact, you may have gotten that exactly wrong. Brain watchers don't seem to think it's nonsense -or- a black box. It'd be hard to explain why they spend all their time watching if they thought as much.

Is it important to get things right, do you think?

[bennyboy]

In fact, indeed.  You don't object to normal old truth, and make many normal old truth claims.  You doubt one in particular.  We don't even need to litigate which truth claims are and aren't really true to make that observation.  Have you given it much introspection?  It's one of those areas where you have to pick a lane.  Being skeptical of truth in total if it suggests a position you hold might be wrong, and vociferously committed to a competing truth claim that supports your position, probably isn't a very strong position.

No, I don't think you could find a "competing truth claim that supports your position."  Introspectionism is ALSO a categorical system (by which I mean a category of experiences with a context defined by one or more axioms)-- instead of being defined by acceptance of an objective shared universe that is not experiential in nature, it is defined by the axiom that others, in SEEMING conscious, most likely are.

I have to make pragmatic assumptions either way-- and those limit the scope in which inferences drawn in either context may be applied more generally.  For example, what if a robot SEEMED to be conscious, and talked a lot about introspection, and told me it dreamed of participating in a traditional peyote ceremony to learn more about its relationship to the Universal Spirit?  "Seems like me, so thinks like me" might not be so intuitively acceptable then.  In fact, I think a likely scenario for the complete obliteration of the human species, would be a social movement against Silicophobia, marches for robot rights, and so on, ultimately leading to complete control of the world's economy by AI machines that aren't, after all, "actually" conscious in that they can experience what things are like.

An aside to the Deists / theists / spiritualists in the room (I haven't yet figured out who you are), let me say that to me, "God created Man in His image" means "God created a living thing capable of knowing what things are like."

[The Grand Nudger]

We all make pragmatic assumptions. Interestingly, our appraisisals of at least some mental objects appear to be pragmatic assumptions themselves. Persuasively argued as such with complimentary evidence and repeatable experimental results that could be falsified any number of ways.

I've always wondered, what is it, specifically, about this notion that ruffles your feathers. It doesn't seem to be the sort of thing you'd object to on principle (you even express as much up there in thread, rejecting seeming in the case of robots). That objects can report or represent themselves in ways that do not wholly reflect the reality of themselves. Walls, again. Why, in the case of our mind, do you feel compelled to object?

[bennyboy]

I've always wondered, what is it, specifically, about this notion that ruffles your feathers. 

At the risk of seeming illiterate-- WHICH notion, exactly, do you believe ruffles my feathers?